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ABBREVIATIONS

- ABS.=Advaitabrahmasiddhi (Sadānanda).
 ACK.=Advaitacintākaustubha (Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī, B.I., 1901).
 AM.=Āptamīmāṃsā (Samantabhadra Svāmī), Benares, 1914.
 AMV.=Āptamīmāṃsāvṛtti on AM., (Basunandyācārya), Benares, 1914.
 AP.=Appendix.
 ATP.=Advaitatattvaprabodhinī (edited by Sādhu Śāntinātha), Amalner, 1932.
 BG.=Bhagavad Gītā.
 BhP.=Bhāṣāpariccheda (Viśvanātha) Jāvāji's edition, Bombay, 1916.
 B.I.=Bibliotheca Indica, Asiatic Society Library, Calcutta.
 BP.=Buddhist Philosophy (A. B. Keith).
 BPR.=Bhāvapradīpa (Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla) on VPD., Sarhvat, 1993.
 BPs.=Buddhist Psychology (Mrs. Rhys Davids).
 Br.=Brhadāraṇyaka.
 B.S.=Brahma Sūtra (Bādarāyaṇa).
 B.S.S.=Benares Sanskrit Series, Benares.
 CCB.=The Central Conception of Buddhism (Scherbatsky).
 Chānd.=Chāndogya.
 Ch. S.S.=Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares.
 CP.=Compendium of Philosophy (S. Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids).
 CSV.=Comparative Studies in Vedantism (M. N. Sircar).
 C.U.=Calcutta University.
 C.U.P.=Cambridge University Press.
 DHIP.=History of Indian Philosophy (S. N. Das Gupta), C.U.P.
 DS.=Dravyasaṃgraha (Nemicandra), Bombay, Sarhvat, 1976.
 DSV.=Dravyasaṃgrahavṛtti (Brahmadeva) on DS., Bombay, Sarhvat, 1976.
 E.R.E.=Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.
 E.T.=English Translation.
 G.O.S.=Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Oriental Institute, Baroda.
 H.I.L.=History of Indian Logic (S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa), C.U., 1921.
 HIP.=A History of Indian Philosophy (Jadunath Sinha), Vol. I & II, Calcutta, 1952 and 1956.
 I.L.A.=Indian Logic and Atomism (A. B. Keith), 1921.
 IPM.=Introduction to Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (Pashupati Śāstrī).
 JTV.=Jainatarkavārtika, Benares, 1917.
 JTVV.=Jainatarkavārtikavṛtti (Śantīyācārya), Benares, 1917.
 Kath.=Kātha.
 Kir.=Kiraṇāvalī (Udayana), B.S.S., Sarhvat, 1941.
 KM.=Karma Mīmāṃsā (A. B. Keith).
 KR.=Kiraṇāvalībhāṣya (Śaṅkara Miśra), Ch. S.S., No. 231.
 K.S.S.=Kashi Sanskrit Series, Benares.
 KU.=Khaṇḍanoddhāra (Vācaspati Miśra), Benares, 1909.
 KVB.=Kiraṇāvalībhāṣya (Padmanābha Miśra), S.B.T., 1920.
 LV.=Lakṣaṇāvalī (Udayana), Benares, 1897.
 MB.=Mitabhāṣiṇī (Mādhava Sarasvatī) on SP., V.S.S., 1893.
 M.S.=Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (Jaimini).
 Muṇḍ.=Muṇḍaka.
 NB.=Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti), K.S.S., 1924.
 NBh.=Nyāyabhāṣya (Vātsyāyana) on NS., Jivānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1919.
 NBT.=Nyāyabindutīkā (Dharmottara), on NB., K.S.S., 1924.
 NK.=Nyāyakandālī (Śrīdhara) on PBh., V.S.S., 1895.
 NKL.=Nyāyakalīkā (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa), S.B.T., 1925.
 NKS.=Nyāyakusumāñjali (Udayana), Benares, 1912.

- NKSH. = Haridāsa's gloss on NKS., Benares, 1913.
 NKSP. = Nyāyakusumāñjali prakāśa (Vardhamāna) on NKS., Benares, 1912.
 NM. = Nyāyamañjarī (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa), V.S.S., 1895.
 NP. = Nyāyapariśuddhi (Veṅkaṭanātha), Ch.S.S., No. 249.
 NPR. = Nyāyapraveśa (Dinnāga), G.O.S., 1930.
 NPV. = Nyāyapraveśavṛtti (Haribhadra Sūri) on NPR., G.O.S., 1930.
 NPVP. = Nyāyapraveśavṛttipañjikā (Pārśvadeva) on NPV., G.O.S., 1930.
 NR. = Nyāyaratnākara (Pārthasārathimīśra), on ŚV., Ch.S.S., 1898-9.
 NS. = Nyāyasūtra (Gautama), Jivānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1919.
 NSA. = Nyāyasiddhāñjana (Veṅkaṭanātha), Benares, 1901.
 NSār. = Nyāyasāra (Bhāsarvajña), B.I., 1910.
 NSM. = Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī (Jānakīnātha), Benares, 1916.
 NSPP. = Nyāyasārapadapañcikā (Vāsudeva Sūri) on NSār., T.S.S., No. 109.
 NSV. = Nyāyasūtravṛtti (Viśvanātha) on NS., Jivānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1919.
 NTD. = Nyāyatātparyadīpikā (Jayasimhasūri) on NSār., B.I., 1910.
 NV. = Nyāyavārtika (Uddyotakara) on NBh., B.I., 1893.
 NVTT. = Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā (Vācaspati Mīśra), V.S.S., Benares, 1898.
 PBh. = Praśastapādabhāṣya on V.S., V.S.S., 1895.
 PK. = Pañcāstikāya (Kundakunda Svāmī), Bombay, Saṁvat, 1972.
 PKM. = Prameyakamalamārtanḍa (Prabhācandra), Jāvājī's edition, Bombay, 1912.
 PKSI. = Introduction, PK. (E.T.), (A. Chakravarty).
 PKV. = Pañcikaraṇavārtika (Sureśvara), K.S.S., 1923.
 PMS. = Parikṣāṁukhasūtra (Mānikyanandi), B.I., 1909.
 PMV. = Parikṣāṁukhalaghuvṛtti (Anantavīrya), B.I., 1909.
 PNT. = Pramāṇanayatatvālokālaṅkāra (Śrī Vādi Deva Sūri).
 PP. = Prakaraṇapañcikā (Śālikānātha Mīśra), Ch.S.S., 1903-1904.
 PPV. = Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa (Prakāśātman), V.S.S., 1892.
 PR. = Prasthānaratnākara (Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja), Ch.S.S., No. 141.
 Pras. = Praśna.
 PRP. = Pramāṇaparikṣā (Vidyānanda Svāmī), Benares, 1914.
 PSAH. = *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* (B. N. Seal), Longmans.
 PSPM. = *The Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* (Gaṅgānātha Jhā), 1911, in *Indian Thought*.
 R.B. = Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on B.S.
 RK. = Ratnāvakārikā on PNT.
 RM. = Rājamārtanḍa (Bhojadeva), on YS., Jivānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1903.
 SAS. = Sarvārthasiddhi (Veṅkaṭanātha) on TMK., Benares, 1900.
 S.B. = Sāmkara's Bhāṣya on B.S.
 S.B.E. = Sacred Books of the East.
 SBNT. = *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, B.I., 1910.
 S.B.T. = Sarasvatī Bhavan Text, Benares.
 ŚD. = Śāstradīpikā (Pārthasārathi Mīśra), Benares, Saṁvat, 1964.
 ŚDP. = Śāstradīpikā prakāśa (Sudarśanācārya), Benares, Saṁvat, 1964.
 SK. = Sāmkhyakārikā (Iśvarakṛṣṇa), Jivānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1911.
 SKG. = Gauḍapāda's Bhāṣya on SK., Calcutta, 1911.
 S.L. = *The Sādhulāl Lectures on Nyāya* (Gaṅgānātha Jhā), *Indian Thought*.
 SLS. = Siddhāntaleśasamgraha (Appayadikṣita), Jivānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1897.
 SM. = Siddhāntamuktāvalī (Viśvanātha), Jāvājī's edition, Bombay, 1916.
 SMD. = Dinakārī (Dinakara Bhaṭṭa) on SM., Bombay, 1916.
 SP. = Saptapadārthī (Śivāditya), V.S.S., Benares, 1893.
 SPB. = Sāmkhyappravacanabhāṣya (Vijñānabhikṣu), Benares, 1909.
 SPŚ. = Sāmkhyappravacanasūtra (Kapila), B.I., 1888.
 SS. = Sāmkhyappravacanasūtra (Kapila), B.I., 1888.
 SS. = Sarvārthasiddhi (Pūjyapāda) on U.T.S., Kolahpur, Śaka, 1839.
 SSP. = Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Jagadīśa).
 SSV. = Sāmkhyasūtravṛtti (Aniruddha), on SS., B.I., 1888.
 SSVM. = Commentary on SSV. (Mahādeva Vedāntin), B.I., 1888.

- ST. = Śāradā Tilaka, S.B.T.
 STK. = Saṁkhyatattvakaumudī (Vācaspati Miśra), Bombay, Saṁvat, 1969.
 ŚV. = Ślokaṇṭika (Kumārila), Ch.S.S., Benares, 1898-9.
 Śvet. = Śvetāśvatara.
 SVM. = Syādvādamāñjarī (Mallīṣena), Ch.S.S., 1900.
 TA. = Tarkāmṛta (Jagadīśa), Jīvānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1921.
 TBh. = Tarkabhāṣā (Keśavamīśra), Poona, 1924.
 Tait. = Taittirīya.
 TC. = Tattvacintāmaṇi (Gaṅgeśa), B.I.
 TCA. = Tattvacintāmaṇi (.), Anumāna, Vol. 2, B.I., 1892.
 TDTV. = Tattvadīpikātparyavṛtti on PK., Bombay, Saṁvat 1972.
 TK. = Tarkakaumudī (Laugākṣi Bhāskara), Jāvāji's edition, Bombay, 1914.
 TMK. = Tattvamuktākālāpa (Veṅkaṭanātha), Benares, 1900.
 TR. = Tārkikarakṣā (Varadarāja), Benares, 1903.
 TRV. = Tattvārtharājavārtika (Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka), Benares, 1915.
 TS. = Tarkasaṁgraha (Annambhaṭṭa),
 TSar. = Tattvārthasāra (Amṛtacandra Sūri), Calcutta, 1919.
 TSC. = Tarkasaṁgrahacandrikā (Mukunda Śarma), Bombay, 1912.
 TSD. = Tarkasaṁgrahadīpikā (Annambhaṭṭa).
 TSN. = Nīlakanthī (Nīlakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa) on TS.
 T.S.S. = Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, Trivandrum.
 TSV. = Tattvārthasālokaṇṭika (Vidyānandi Svāmī), Bombay, 1918.
 TV. = Tattvavaiśārādī (Vācaspati Miśra) on YBh.
 UP. = Upaniṣad.
 U.T.S. = Tattvārthādhigamasūtra (Umāsvāmī) edited by J. L. Jaini.
 VCM. = Vivekaśūdhāmaṇi (Saṁkara), Gītā Press, Gorakhpur.
 VMR. = Vidyānmanorāñjanī (Rāmatīrtha Yati) on VSR., (edited by Col. Jacob), Bombay, 1925.
 VP. = Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Dharmarājādharmaśāstra), Bombay, Saṁvat, 1968.
 VPD. = Vākyapadīya (Bhaṭṭarhari), K.S.S., Saṁvat, 1993.
 VPS. = Vivaraṇaprameyasāṁgraha (Mādhavācārya Vidyāraṇya), V.S.S., 1893.
 VRS. = Vitarāgaśūtri (Hemacandra) on SVM., Ch. S.S., 1900.
 V.S. = Vaiśeṣika Sūtra (Kaṇāda), Saṁvat, 1969.
 VSB. = Vaiśeṣikasūtrabhāṣya (Candrakānta Bhaṭṭācārya), Saṁvat, 1969.
 VSR. = Vedāntasāra (Sadānanda), Jacob's edition, Bombay, 1925.
 V.S.S. = Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares.
 VSU. = Upaskāra (Saṁkara Miśra) on V.S., Gujrati Press, Saṁvat, 1969.
 VSV. = Vaiśeṣikasūtravivṛti (Jaya Nārāyaṇa) on V.S., Saṁvat, 1969.
 YBh. = Yogabhāṣya (Vyāsa) on YS., Benares, 1911.
 YCh. = Chāyāvṛtti (Nāgeśa) on YS., Benares, 1907.
 YHD. = Yoginīhrdayadīpikā, S.B.T.
 YMD. = Yotindramatadīpikā (Śrīnivāsa), B.S.S., 1907.
 YP. = Yoga Philosophy (S. N. Das Gupta), C.U.
 YPR. = Yoga as Philosophy and Religion (S. N. Das Gupta), Kegan Paul, London.
 YS. = Yoga Sūtra (Patañjali), Benares, 1911.
 YSP. = Yuktisnehaprapuraṇī (Rāmakṛṣṇa) on ŚD., Bombay, 1915.
 YV. = Yogavārtika (Vijñānabhikṣu) on YBh., Benares, 1884.

PREFACE TO THE REPRINT

I had spiritual experiences throughout my life. I had visions of great saints like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Caitanya, Śrī Aurobindo, Śrī Bāmdev and others who prompted me to write Indian Philosophy and Indian Psychology.

I had vision of Lord Krishna, Lord Śiva and Divine Mother Tārā who had blessed and bestowed grace on me. I have devoted fifty years of life in severe spiritual discipline, shunned luxury, undergone penances, studied, meditated, disseminated knowledge, went on pilgrimages, resorted to saints, yogis and seers. My source of knowledge has been divine inspiration, intuition and original Sanskrit texts.

The first edition of the book was published by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London under the title *Indian Psychology: Perception*.

In the second edition chapters on Memory, Imagination, Thought and Language were added and the same was published by Sinha Publishing House, Calcutta, under the title *Indian Psychology: Cognition* which constitutes the first volume of *Indian Psychology*.

The available material on the psychology of imagination and thought is scanty and inadequate. Hence the treatment of these topics is not as comprehensive as that of perception. But there is vast material on the psychology of language in Indian philosophical literature. The material on different topics, which could not be incorporated in the body of the book, has been embodied in the Appendix.

My special thanks to my son, Amiya Kumar Sinha, Executive Director, Jadunath Sinha Foundation, and founder, Bāmdev International Centre, who took great pains to get the second edition of the book published and further helped me in preparing the manuscripts of all the volumes.

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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The crowning achievement of the Hindus was metaphysical speculation. But the philosophical literature of India is not only rich in Metaphysics but also in Psychology, Logic, Ethics, Æsthetics, and Epistemology. There is no system of Indian philosophy which has not advanced a theory of knowledge, and which has not appealed to the facts of our experience. Every school of philosophy has made valuable contributions to Psychology, Logic, Ethics, and other mental sciences. But these have never been treated as separate branches of study in India.

The Hindu mind is essentially synthetic. It always analyses a problem into its various aspects, and considers them in their synthetic relation to one another. It never destroys the organic unity of a subject and makes a compartmental study of its different aspects. In the philosophical literature of India we find a synthetic treatment of a problem in all its multifarious aspects, psychological, logical, ethical, and metaphysical. In the later stages of the development of Indian thought, though we come across separate treatises and monographs on Logic and Epistemology, we find them mixed up with Metaphysics. There is not a single work which is exclusively devoted to the psychological analysis of mental processes.

But though there are no independent sciences of Psychology, Logic, Ethics, Epistemology, etc., we can collect ample material from the original works on different schools of Indian philosophy dealing with these mental sciences, disengage them from their metaphysical setting, and make a consistent study of them. Indian Metaphysic has, for some time past, evoked a great deal of interest among the Eastern and Western orientalists. In recent times some comprehensive works have been published on systems of Indian philosophy, which, incidentally, treat of Psychology, Logic, and Ethics. Some valuable works on Indian Logic and Indian Ethics also have been published. Mrs. Rhys David's *Buddhist Psychology* is a monumental work on the psychology of the Buddhists. But no attempt has yet been made to give a comprehensive account of the psychology of the Hindus.

The present work is an attempt at a constructive survey of Indian Psychology. The aim of this book is to give, in brief compass, an outline of the most important topics of Indian Psychology. It will be complete in two volumes. The first volume is wholly devoted to the psychology of perception. The subject is vast and immense in scope, and there is abundant wealth of material on this subject. My account of the psychology of perception is not complete and comprehensive. My task here is not an historical survey of all the problems of perception in their chronological order, but a systematic exposition and interpretation of the most fundamental problems of perception in their logical development of thought. I have tried to throw light on different topics from the different standpoints of Indian thought.

There is no empirical psychology in India. Indian Psychology is based on Metaphysics. The psychological account of some problems of perception, e.g. perception of the self, perception of the universal, etc., is unintelligible without consideration of their metaphysical foundations. So I found it extremely difficult to avoid metaphysical considerations altogether in my treatment of these topics.

Indian Psychology is based on introspection and observation ; it is not based upon experiments. Students of introspective psychology will find ample food for reflection in Indian Psychology. They will find acute psychological analysis of some very subtle mental processes which have not yet attracted the attention of the Western psychologists.

I have indulged in comparisons of Indian Psychology with Western Psychology here and there, which, I am sure, will be agreeable to some and disagreeable to others. But such comparisons are unavoidable to students of Indian and Western Psychology, though they may be misleading.

The present work was planned and partly composed more than a decade ago. Different parts of this work were submitted to the Calcutta University for Premchand Roychand Studentship in 1922, 1923, and 1924. The work was completed in 1924, and some portions of it were published in the *Meerut College Magazine* in 1924 and 1926. But owing to unforeseen circumstances its publication has been delayed so long. The work has since undergone considerable alterations in the course of revision.

I acknowledge my deep debt of obligation to Sir Brajendra Nath Seal, then George V Professor of Philosophy of Calcutta University, who suggested the subject to me, indicated the main line of research, and helped me with important references.

In addition to the works referred to in the footnotes, I desire to express my general debt to the works of Thibaut, Keith, Mrs. Rhys Davids, Aung, S. C. Vidyabhushan, Ganganath Jha, and S. N. Das Gupta.

My best thanks are due to Professor Haridas Bhattacharya of the Dacca University, who was good enough to go through a considerable part of the MS. and helped me with many valuable suggestions. I am also obliged to the publishers for their expediting the publication of the work.

July, 1933.

BOOK I

CHAPTER I

THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF PERCEPTION

1. Introduction

The ancient Hindus developed a conception of the nervous system, which is mainly to be found in the medical works of Caraka and Suśruta, and in the works on Tantra. Caraka and Suśruta regarded the heart as the seat of consciousness, but the Tāntric writers transferred the seat of consciousness to the brain. Caraka had a clear conception of the sensory nerves (*manovahā nāḍī*) and the motor nerves (*ājñāvahā nāḍī*). The Tāntric writers constantly referred to the centres of different kinds of consciousness. They not only distinguished between the sensory nerves and the motor nerves, but also recognized different kinds of sensory nerves: the olfactory nerves (*gandhavahā nāḍī*), the optic nerves (*rūpavahā nāḍī*), the auditory nerves (*śabdavahā nāḍī*), the gustatory nerves (*rasavahā nāḍī*), and the tactile nerves (*sparsavahā nāḍī*).¹

In the philosophical literature of the Hindus we find an elaborate account of the sense-organs in the treatment of the problems of perception. The different schools of philosophers had different views as to the nature, origin, and functions of the sense-organs. Their views were based mostly on their systems of philosophy, though they advanced certain facts of experience in support of their views. The Hindu accounts of the sense-organs are widely different from those of Western physiology, because they are based more on metaphysical speculation than on scientific observation and experiment. In the first Book we shall treat of the nature, origin, and functions of the sense-organs without comprehension of which there cannot be an adequate conception of some important problems of the Indian psychology of perception.

2. The Nature of the Sense-organs

The Buddhists recognize six varieties of consciousness: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and purely mental.

¹ PSAH., pp. 218-225.

Corresponding to these there are six bases (*āśraya*): the organs of vision, audition, smelling, tasting, touch, and consciousness itself; and there are six objects (*viśaya*): colours, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, and ideas.² The preceding moment of consciousness is the basic element of the next moment of consciousness.³ Thus there are six sense-organs including consciousness. Consciousness is the faculty of intellect which apprehends non-sensuous objects.⁴ It is called the mind. It is immaterial and invisible.⁵

Leaving out the mind, there are five sense-organs. They are the end-organs (*golaka*). They are the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. They are made up of a kind of translucent subtle matter. The five sense-organs are made up of five different kinds of atoms.⁶ Thus the sense-organs are material but invisible. They are divided into two classes, viz. *prāpyakāri* and *aprāpyakāri* sense-organs. The former apprehend their objects when they come into direct contact with them. The latter apprehend their objects without coming in contact with them. The organs of smell, taste, and touch are *prāpyakāri*; they must be in immediate contact with their objects. The organs of vision and audition are *aprāpyakāri*; they apprehend their objects at a distance.⁷ The Buddhists do not hold with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that the sense-organs are different from the peripheral organs, and the visual organ and the auditory organ come into contact with their objects in order to apprehend them.⁸

The Jaina recognizes five sense-organs.⁹ They are of two kinds: objective senses (*dravyendriya*) and subjective senses (*bhāvendriya*).¹⁰ The former are the physical sense-organs. The latter are their psychical correlates. They are the invisible faculties of the soul. A physical sense-organ (*dravyendriya*) consists of two parts, viz. the organ itself and its protecting environment. The former is called *nirvṛti*. The latter is called *upakaraṇa*.¹¹ Each of these is of two kinds, internal and external. The internal organ is the soul itself which is embodied in the sense-organ. The external organ is the physical organ which is permeated by the soul. The internal environment of the visual organ is the pupil

² CCB., p. 58.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 96-7.

⁶ CCB., pp. 12-13.

⁸ VPS., p. 187; ABS., p. 74.

¹⁰ U.T.S., ii, 16.

³ Ibid., p. 58.

⁵ BP., p. 102.

⁷ Ibid., p. 60.

⁹ U.T.S., ii, 15.

¹¹ U.T.S., ii, 17.

of the eye. The external environment is the eyelid.¹² The subjective senses (*bhāvendriya*) are of two kinds: *labdhi* and *upayoga*.¹³ "*Labdhi* is the manifestation of the sense-faculty by the partial destruction, subsidence, and operation of the knowledge-obscuring karma relating to that sense. *Upayoga* is the conscious attention of the soul directed to that sense."¹⁴ There are five sense-organs: organs of touch, taste, smell, vision, and audition.¹⁵ The tactual organ pervades the whole body. The Jaina does not regard the mind as a sense-organ.¹⁶ He conceives the soul as pervading the whole body. A particular kind of sense-perception is generated in the soul through that part of it which is associated with a particular sense-organ. Of the physical sense-organs the visual organ is *aprāpyakāri*; it does not come into direct contact with its objects.¹⁷ On this point the Jaina agrees with the Buddhist. The Jaina holds that the visual organ apprehends objects at a distance with the help of light. But he does not explain the nature of the action of light upon the visual organ. All the other sense-organs are *prāpyakāri*; they come into direct contact with their objects.¹⁸ But the direct contact may be gross (*sthūla*) or subtle (*sūkṣma*). The organs of touch and taste come into contact with gross objects. But the organs of smell and hearing come into contact with subtle objects. The organ of smell has direct contact with minute particles of the object smelt. The organ of hearing has direct contact with merely a kind of motion. Sound is due to the knocking of one physical object against another. It is the agitation set up by this knock. The auditory organ comes into contact with this motion.¹⁹

Vijñānabhikṣu says, "An Indriya is the instrument of the Lord of the body or the soul. The essential nature of a sense-organ consists in its instrumentality (in producing cognitions and actions) and in being an effect of *ahamkāra* (egoism)."²⁰ Kapila speaks of eleven sense-organs: five organs of knowledge (*buddhindriya*), five organs of action (*karmendriya*), and the internal organ or mind (*manas*).²¹ Īśvarakṛṣṇa also sometimes mentions eleven sense-organs: the sensory organs, the motor organs, and the mind

¹² TSV., p. 326.

¹³ U.T.S., ii, 18.

¹⁴ J. L. Jaini, U.T.S., 65. See PKM., p. 61.

¹⁵ U.T.S., ii, 19.

¹⁶ Anindriyaṃ manas. PMV., ii, 5.

¹⁷ Rūpaṃ paśyatyasaṃspṛṣṭam. Tattvārthasāra, ii, 49, p. 69 (Calcutta).

¹⁸ Tattvārthasāra, ii, 49.

¹⁹ PKSI., p. xxxviii.

²⁰ SPB., ii, 19.

²¹ SS. and SPB., ii, 19.

which partakes of the nature of both and is thus a sensori-motor organ.²² And sometimes he mentions thirteen sense-organs adding *buddhi* and *ahamkāra* to the above list.²³ *Manas*, *buddhi*, and *ahamkāra* are the three forms of the internal organ. The Sāṃkhya recognizes two classes of sense-organs, external and internal. It divides the external sense-organs into two classes: organs of cognition (*buddhīndriya*) and organs of action (*karmendriya*).²⁴ The visual organ, the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, and the tactful organ are the organs of cognition. The vocal organ, the prehensive organ, the locomotive organ, the evacuative organ, and the generative organ are the organs of action. By these organs of cognition and action the Sāṃkhya does not mean the gross material organs, e.g. the eye, the ear, etc., and hands, feet, etc. By these it means determinate modifications of the indeterminate mind-stuff (*ahamkāra* or egoism).²⁵ The gross material organs, e.g. the eye, the ear, etc., and hands, feet, etc., are the seats of those determinate sensory and motor psychophysical impulses. By the *buddhīndriyas* the Sāṃkhya means the determinate sensory psychophysical impulses which go out to the external objects and receive impressions from them, and by the *karmendriyas* it means the determinate motor psychophysical impulses which react upon the objects perceived. The sense-organs are not products of gross matter (*bhautika*) but of *ahamkāra* (egoism) which, though not spiritual, may be called mental or psychophysical. Hence the distinction between the organs of knowledge and the organs of action is ultimately based upon the primary distinction between the sensory and motor mechanisms of the psychophysical organism, by which it knows the external world and reacts upon it.

The internal organs are the instruments of elaboration. The mind presides over both the sensory and motor organs. The external senses give immediate impressions of their objects. These discrete impressions are synthesized by *manas* by assimilation and discrimination. Then they are referred to the unity of apperception by *ahamkāra*. Then they are determined by *buddhi* which hands them over to the self and reacts upon them.²⁶

Vyasa refers to two kinds of sense-organs, viz. gross organs and

²² SK., 26-7.

²³ SK., 26; SS., ii, 19.

²⁴ Chapter VIII.

²⁵ SK., 32-3.

²⁶ PSAH., pp. 10-11.

subtle organs.²⁷ Vijñānabhikṣu says that *buddhi* and *ahamkāra* are subtle (*sūkṣma*) sense-organs, and that the five organs of cognition, the five organs of action, and the central sensory or *manas* are gross (*sthūla*) sense-organs.²⁸ Vyāsa says that the five cognitive organs, the five motor organs, and the *manas* which apprehends all objects are the determinate modifications of indeterminate egoism (*asmitā*).²⁹

The sense-organs are not the same as their physiological sites or end-organs (*adhiṣṭhāna*). The Buddhists wrongly hold that the sense-organs are nothing but the end-organs. They are super-sensuous.³⁰ Aniruddha argues that, if the sense-organs were identical with their physical seats, one whose ears have been cut off would be unable to hear, and one whose eyes are affected with cataract would be able to see.³¹ So the sense-organs are not identical with their sites.

The sense-organs are not material (*bhautika*) but are products of *ahamkāra* (egoism).³² Aniruddha says that the Naiyāyikas labour under a misconception when they argue that the sense-organs are made up of those material elements which are apprehended by them.³³

3. The Origin of the Sense-organs

According to the Sāṃkhya, Prakṛti, the equilibrium of *sattva* (essence), *rajas* (energy) and *tamas* (inertia) is the ultimate ground of all existence. *Buddhi* evolves out of Prakṛti when the equilibrium of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* is disturbed by a transcendental influence of the Self (*puruṣa*) for the sake of which all evolution takes place. *Buddhi* is the cosmic matter of experience: it is the undifferentiated matrix of the subjective series and the objective series.³⁴ From *buddhi* evolves *ahamkāra* (the empirical ego) which gives rise to the eleven sense-organs and the subtle elements (*tanmātra*) of matter under the influence of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*.³⁵ Īśvarakṛṣṇa holds that all the eleven sense-organs evolve out of *ahamkāra* by the preponderance of *sattva*; that five *tanmātras* evolve out of *ahamkāra* by the preponderance of *tamas*; and

²⁷ YBh., ii, 18.

²⁸ Mahadahamkārau sūkṣmendriyam ekādaśa sthūlendriyāṇi. YV., ii, 18. See also Chāyāvṛtti, ii, 18.

²⁹ YBh., ii, 19.

³⁰ SSV., ii, 23.

³¹ SSV., v, 84.

³² SS., ii, 16-18.

³³ SS., ii, 23.

³⁴ SS., ii, 20; v, 84.

³⁵ PSAH., p. 10.

that both the sense-organs and the *tanmātras* evolve with the help of *rajas*.³⁶ Vācaspatimiśra elaborates this view. The cognitive organs (*buddhīndriya*) are the instruments of knowledge. So they are endowed with the quality of manifesting objects. They are also capable of quick movement. The cognitive organs quickly move out to distant objects. The motor organs (*karmendriya*) also are capable of quick action. And these properties of illumination and light movement are the distinctive properties of *sattva*. Hence the preponderating element in the constitution of the sense-organs is *sattva*, though they evolve out of *ahamkāra*. The five *tanmātras* also evolve out of *ahamkāra*; but the preponderating element in their constitution is *tamas* (inertia) because they are extremely inert in their nature. The preponderance of *sattva* in *ahamkāra* gives rise to the sense-organs, and the preponderance of *tamas* in *ahamkāra* gives rise to the *tanmātras*. But if *sattva* and *rajas* do everything, what is the use *rajas*? *Rajas* (energy) is necessary to give impetus to *sattva* (essence) and *tamas* (inertia) to perform their functions. They cannot act without the help of *rajas*. When *rajas* sets them in motion on account of its characteristic property of energizing they perform their functions. Hence both the sense-organs (*sāttvic*) and the *tanmātras* (*tāmasic*) evolve out of *ahamkāra* with the help of *rajas*.³⁷ Aniruddha also holds that the eleven sense-organs are evolved from *ahamkāra* under the influence of *sattva*.³⁸ But Vijñānabhikṣu holds that the mind (*manas*) is evolved from *ahamkāra* owing to the preponderance of *sattva*; that the five cognitive organs and the five motor organs evolve out of *ahamkāra* owing to the preponderance of *rajas*; and that the five *tanmātras* evolve out of *ahamkāra* owing to the preponderance of *tamas*.³⁹ Bālarāma holds that all the sense-organs have the preponderance of *sattva*, but that there are different degrees of its preponderance. The mind arises from *ahamkāra* when *sattva* is most preponderant; the organs of knowledge arise from *ahamkāra* when *sattva* is less preponderant; and the organs of action arise from *ahamkāra* when *sattva* is least preponderant.⁴⁰

4. The Principal and Subordinate Organs

The three internal organs, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, and *manas*, are the principal sense-organs, since they apprehend all objects past,

³⁶ SK., 25.

³⁷ SSV., ii, 18.

⁴⁰ Vidvattoṣiṇī on STK., 25.

³⁸ STK., 25.

³⁹ SPB., ii, 18.

present, and future. The external senses are the subordinate organs, since they apprehend only present objects. The former are called gatekeepers, while the latter are called the gateways of knowledge.⁴¹ *Buddhi* is the principal organ not only in comparison with the external organs but also with the internal organs of *manas* and *ahamkāra*.⁴² Superiority and inferiority depend upon functions; they are relative terms.⁴³ *Manas* is the chief organ in relation to the functions of the external senses; *ahamkāra* is the chief organ in relation to the function of *manas*; and *buddhi* is the chief organ in relation to the function of *ahamkāra*.⁴⁴ *Buddhi* is the chief organ for the following reasons. Firstly, *buddhi* directly brings about the experience of the self (*puruṣa*), while the other senses do it through the mediation of *buddhi*.⁴⁵ *Buddhi* is the immediate instrument among all the external and internal senses, and makes over the object to the self, even as among a host of servants some one person becomes the prime minister while the others are his subordinate officers.⁴⁶ Secondly, *buddhi* pervades all the sense-organs, and never fails to produce the result in the shape of knowledge.⁴⁷ Thirdly, *buddhi* alone is the receptacle of all subconscious impressions (*saṁskāra*). The external organs cannot retain the residua, for in that case the blind and the deaf would not be able to remember things seen and heard in the past. *Manas* and *ahamkāra* also cannot retain subconscious impressions because even after their dissolution by means of knowledge of Truth (*tattvajñāna*) recollection persists. Hence *buddhi* has pre-eminence over all.⁴⁸ Fourthly, the superiority of *buddhi* is inferred from the possibility of recollection which is of the nature of meditation, the highest of all mental functions. Recollection is the function of *buddhi*.⁴⁹ Thus *buddhi* is the chief organ and all the other senses are secondary organs.

If *buddhi* is the principal organ, why should we not regard it as the only sense-organ and dispense with the other sense-organs? Vijñānabhikṣu replies that without the help of the external senses *buddhi* cannot serve as an instrument in all sense-activities, since in that case the blind would be able to see, the deaf would be able to hear, and so on.⁵⁰ Kapila holds that the ten external senses

⁴¹ SK., 35, and Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya.

⁴² STK., 35.

⁴³ SPB., ii, 45.

⁴⁴ SPB., ii, 40.

⁴⁵ SPB., ii, 42.

⁴⁶ SS., ii, 45.

⁴⁷ SSVM., ii, 39.

⁴⁸ SPB., ii, 41.

⁴⁹ SPB., ii, 43.

⁵⁰ SPB., ii, 44.

may be regarded as different modifications of the chief organ, *manas*, owing to the difference of the modifications of the constituent *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*.⁵¹ Just as one and the same person assumes many rôles in association with different persons, so *manas* also becomes manifold, through association with different sense-organs being particularized by the functions of the different senses by reason of its becoming one with the senses. This diverse modification of the mind is due to the diverse modification of the constituent *guṇas*.⁵²

The Sāṃkhya holds that the sense-organs are *prāpyakāri*; that they move out to their objects in the form of *vṛttis* or modifications, assume their forms, and apprehend them. The *vṛttis* of the senses cannot be perceived. But their existence can be inferred from the fact that the sense-organs cannot apprehend their objects without being related to them, even as a lamp cannot illumine objects without being related to them. If the sense-organs be said to apprehend their objects without being related to them, then they may apprehend all objects, distant and hidden. But this is not a fact. Hence the sense-organs must be conceived as moving out to their objects and assuming their forms without leaving connection with the body. And this is possible only by means of a peculiar modification of the senses called *vṛtti*. Thus the existence of *vṛtti* is established. It connects the senses with their objects.⁵³ The *vṛtti* is neither a part nor a quality of the senses. If it were a part it would not be able to bring about the connection of the visual organ with distant objects like the sun. If it were a quality it would not be able to move out to the object. Thus the *vṛtti* of a sense-organ, though existing in it, is different from its part of quality. Hence, it is established that the *vṛtti* of *buddhi* also is, like the flame of a lamp, a transformation quite of the nature of a substance which, by means of its transparency, is capable of receiving images of the forms of objects.⁵⁴

Suśruta holds with Sāṃkhya that there are eleven sense-organs: five organs of knowledge, five organs of action, and the mind which partakes of the nature of both.⁵⁵ The sense-organs evolve out of *ahamkāra* under the influence of *rajas* (energy).⁵⁶

⁵¹ SS., ii, 27.

⁵² SPB., ii, 25, and ii, 27.

⁵³ SPB., v, 104; SS., v, 106, and SPB., v, 106.

⁵⁴ SPB., v, 107.

⁵⁵ Suśrutasaṃhitā, Śārīrasthāna, i, 4-5.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 2-3.

Caraka also holds that there are eleven sense-organs, five sensory organs, five motor organs, and one internal organ or *manas*.⁵⁷ Sometimes he mentions twelve sense-organs: five organs of knowledge, five organs of action, *manas* and *buddhi*.⁵⁸ The mind is atomic and one in each body.⁵⁹ It is different from the external senses. It is sometimes called *sattva*. Its functions are regulated by the contact of its objects with the soul. And it controls the functions of the external senses. They can apprehend their respective objects when they are led by the mind.⁶⁰ The functions of the mind are the apprehension of objects through the external senses, subjecting them to control, comparison, and ratiocination. Then *buddhi* ascertains the nature of the objects. Certain knowledge is the function of *buddhi*. When *buddhi* has brought about definite apprehension one begins to act, guided by *buddhi*.⁶¹

Caraka says: "There are five sense-organs, five materials that constitute the senses, five seats of the senses, five objects of the senses, and five kinds of perception obtained through the senses."⁶² Here evidently he speaks of the organs of knowledge. The organs of vision, audition, smell, taste, and touch are the five sense-organs. The materials that enter into the composition of the five senses are light, ether, earth, water, and air respectively. The physical seats of the five senses are the two eyes, the two ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. The sense-organs are not the same as the peripheral organs which are their seats. The objects of the five senses are colour, sound, odour, taste, and touch. Visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactual perceptions are five kinds of sense-perception.⁶³ As to the composition of the external senses Caraka seems to be in agreement with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view. But he does not wholly agree with it. According to him one particular element does not enter into the composition of a particular sense-organ; but all the primal elements exist in each sense-organ, though only one element predominates in the composition of a particular sense-organ. Thus light especially enters into the composition of the visual organ, ether into that of the auditory organ, earth into that of the olfactory organ, water into that of the gustatory organ and air into that of the tactual

⁵⁷ Carakasamhitā, śarīrasthāna, i, 6, and 30.

⁵⁸ Ibid., i, 26.

⁵⁹ Ibid., i, 7.

⁶⁰ Carakasamhitā, Sūtrasthāna, viii, 2-3.

⁶¹ Ibid., śarīrasthāna, i, 7-8.

⁶² Ibid., Sūtrasthāna, viii, 2.

⁶³ Ibid., viii, 4.

organ. The particular sense-organ into whose composition a particular element especially enters apprehends that particular object which has that element for its essence, since both partake of the same nature, and one is invested with greater power over the other.⁶⁴ Light especially enters into the composition of the visual organ: so it can apprehend colour which has light for its essence. Both the visual organ and colour partake of the nature of light, the former being more powerful than the latter. Hence the visual organ can apprehend colour. Such is the case with the auditory organ and sound, and so with the others. This doctrine of Caraka is kindred to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine. But Caraka does not regard the sense-organs as products of matter as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds. He traces the origin of the senses to *ahamkāra* after the Sāṃkhya. His cosmology is the same as that of the Sāṃkhya.⁶⁵ Thus Caraka's views as to the nature, kinds, and functions of the sense-organs are partly similar to the Sāṃkhya view, and partly to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view.

The Sāṃkarite agrees with the Sāṃkhya in recognizing five organs of knowledge, five organs of action, and the internal organ.⁶⁶ The Sāṃkhya recognizes three forms of the internal organ, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, and *manas*. But the Sāṃkarite admits four forms of the internal organ, *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, and *citta*. Though the internal organ is one and the same, it assumes different forms according to its diverse functions. When it has the function of doubt or indetermination it is called *manas*. When it has the function of determination it is called *buddhi*. When it produces the notion of ego in consciousness it is called *ahamkāra*. And when it has the function of recollection it is called *citta*. These functions are different modifications of the same internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). This is the view of Śāktaism also.⁶⁷

The five organs of knowledge are made up the *sāttvic*⁶⁸ part of the unquintupled material elements. The organs of vision, audition, smell, taste, and touch are made up of the *sāttvic* parts of light, ether, earth, water, and air respectively in an uncombined state.⁶⁹ The organs of action are made up of the *rājasic*⁷⁰ part of the unquintupled material elements. The organ of speech,

⁶⁴ Ibid., viii, 7-8.

⁶⁵ ACK., p. 70.

⁶⁶ Pertaining to *sattva* or essence.

⁶⁷ ACK., p. 62.

⁶⁸ Carakasamhitā, Śārīrasthāna, i, 30-1.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 65; YHD., p. 130; ST., i, 35-37.

⁷⁰ Pertaining to *rajas* or energy.

hands, feet, the excretive organ, and the generative organ are made up of the *rājasic* parts of ether, air, light, water, and earth respectively in an uncombined state.⁷¹ The internal organs are made up of the *sāttvic* parts of the five material elements combined.⁷²

The Rāmānujist recognizes eleven sense-organs: five organs of cognition, five organs of action, and the mind.⁷³ The Sāṃkhya admits three internal organs, and the Śāṃkarite admits four internal organs. Both these views are wrong. The so-called internal organs are nothing but different functions of one and the same internal organ, *manas*.⁷⁴ Sometimes the *manas* is included in the organs of knowledge.⁷⁵

5. *The Different Views about the nature of the Sense-organs*

The author of *Vivaraṇāprameyasamgraha* discusses the nature of the sense-organs. The Buddhists hold that the sense-organs are the peripheral organs, viz., the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. It is the sockets (*golaka*) in the body that constitute the sense-organs. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that the sense-organs consist in the faculty of potency (*śakti*) abiding in the sockets. The mere end-organs do not constitute the sense-organs. Others hold that the sense-organs are distinct from both the end-organs and their potency, and are distinct substances by themselves.⁷⁶

The Śāṃkarite rejects the first theory on the ground that certain animals (e.g. serpents) can hear, though they do not possess the ear-hole, and that the plants which are believed to be sentient living beings are devoid of end-organs or sockets. For the same reason the Mīmāṃsaka theory also is rejected. The Mīmāṃsaka argues that the law of parsimony demands that we should assume the existence of potency (*śakti*) only, and not of the sense-organs endowed with a potency. But the Śāṃkarite contends that it is needless to assume the existence of the potency also; that the law of parsimony, if rigidly applied, will lead us to assume the existence only of the self capable of knowing things in succession. The self is all-pervading; so it can produce cognitions in the end-organs.

⁷¹ ACK., p. 65.

⁷² Tattvatraya, p. 54 and p. 70.

⁷³ YMD., p. 16; NSA., p. 16.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 62; VP., p. 357.

⁷⁵ TMK., p. 94.

⁷⁶ VPS., p. 185.

The Mīmāṃsaka himself admits that the self has modifications of consciousness (*jñānapariṇāma*) only in those parts of the body in which there are end-organs. Thus the Mīmāṃsaka argument ultimately leads to the denial of the sense-organs altogether. So the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine is not tenable. The third theory also is not acceptable. There is no proof of the existence of the sense-organs as distinct substances quite different from the sockets. It may be argued that perceptions of colour and the like are due to the action of the self, and since an action always requires an instrument, the self must require the instrumentality of the sense-organs to perceive colour and the like. This argument is wrong. The reason is over-wide. The self acts upon the sense-organs to incite them to action; but in doing so it does not require any instrument. If it did it would lead to infinite regress. So the third theory also cannot be maintained. But the Śaṅkarite believes in the existence of sense-organs as something different from the peripheral organs on the authority of the scriptures.⁷⁷

Gautama establishes the existence of five sense-organs on the following grounds: In the first place, the existence of five sense-organs is inferred from five distinct functions.⁷⁸ Vātsyāyana argues that there are five purposes (*prayojana*) of the senses: touching, seeing, smelling, tasting, and hearing; these five purposes require five distinct sense-organs, viz. the tactual organ, the visual organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, and the auditory organ. Touch is apprehended by the tactual organ; but it does not apprehend colour. So we infer the existence of the visual organ which serves the purpose of apprehending colour. Similarly, touch and colour are apprehended by the tactual organ and the visual organ respectively; but these organs do not apprehend odour. So we infer the existence of the olfactory organ which serves the purpose of apprehending odour. In the same manner, touch, colour, and odour are apprehended by the tactual organ, the visual organ, and the olfactory organ respectively; but these organs do not apprehend taste. So we infer the existence of the gustatory organ which serves the purpose of apprehending taste. Lastly, touch, colour, odour, and taste are apprehended by the tactual organ, the visual organ, the olfactory organ, and the gustatory organ respectively; but these organs do not apprehend sound. So we infer the existence of the auditory organ which serves the purpose

⁷⁷ VPS., pp. 185-6.

⁷⁸ Indriyārthapāṇicātvaṭ. NS., iii, 1, 58.

of apprehending sound. The function of one sense-organ cannot be performed by another. So the existence of five sense-organs is inferred from five kinds of sense-activities.⁷⁹ In the second place, the existence of the five sense-organs is inferred from the five-fold character of the signs in the shape of perceptions, the sites, the processes, the forms, and the constituents.⁸⁰

Firstly, there are five different kinds of perception, visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactual, from which we infer the existence of five sense-organs.⁸¹ Secondly, there are five sense-organs corresponding to the five sites (*adhiṣṭhāna*) or end-organs. The tactual organ, which is indicated by the perception of touch, has its seat throughout the body. The visual organ issuing out to the object as indicated by the perception of colour has its site in the pupil of the eye. The olfactory organ has its site in the nose. The gustatory organ has its site in the tongue. The auditory organ has its site in the cavity of the ear.⁸¹ The diversity of the sense-organs is proved by the diversity of their locations. Things with distinct locations are always found to be distinct as in the case of jars. If the whole body were the seat of all the sense-organs, then deafness, blindness, and the like would be impossible. But if the different sense-organs are held to have different sites, the site of one organ being destroyed the other organs may remain unaffected so that a deaf or blind person will not necessarily be deprived of all the sense-organs. Thus, this theory does not involve any incongruity.⁸² This argument shows that the sense-organs are different from their physical seats (*golaka*). Thirdly, the five sense-organs involve different processes (*gati*). The visual organ, which is of the nature of light, issues out of the pupil and moves out to the objects endued with colour. The tactual organ, the gustatory organ, and the olfactory organ come into contact with their objects resting in their own sites. They do not move out to their objects like the visual organ. The auditory organ also does not move out to its object. Sound travels from its place of origin to the auditory organ in a series of waves. This argument shows that all the sense-organs are *prāpyakāri*; they apprehend their objects by coming into direct contact with them.⁸³ Fourthly, the five sense-organs have different magnitudes (*ākṛti*). The olfactory

⁷⁹ NBh., iii, 1, 58.

⁸¹ NBh., iii, 1, 62.

⁸² NBh., iii, 1, 62.

⁸⁰ NS., iii, 1, 62.

⁸³ NV., p. 394.

organ, the gustatory organ, and the tactual organ have the magnitudes of their sites; they are coextensive with their seats. The visual organ, though located in the pupil, issues out of it and pervades its object. So it is not coextensive with its site but with the field of vision. The auditory organ is nothing but *ākāśa*, which is all-pervading; still it cannot apprehend all sounds because its scope is restricted by the disabilities of the substratum in which it subsists. The all-pervading *ākāśa* located in the ear-hole owing to the *adrṣṭa* of a person assumes the rôle of the auditory organ, and produces the perception of sound through it. Lastly, the five sense-organs have their origin (*jāti*) in five material elements. The olfactory organ is made up of earth and apprehends smell which is its characteristic quality. The gustatory organ is made up of water and apprehends taste which is its characteristic quality. The visual organ is made up of light and apprehends colour which is its characteristic quality. And the auditory organ is nothing but *ākāśa* and apprehends sound which is its characteristic quality.⁸⁴ There is a community of nature between the sense-organs and their objects. A sense-organ apprehends the distinctive quality of that substance which enters into its constitution. The Vaiśeṣika also agrees with this view.

Gautama does not distinctly mention anywhere that the mind (*manas*) is a sense-organ. But Vātsyāyana points out that Gautama's definition of perception, as a non-erroneous cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects, inexpressible by words and well-defined, implies that the mind is a sense-organ. If by the sense-organs he means only the external senses his definition will apply only to the perceptions of external objects. But Gautama does not give a separate definition of internal perception of pleasure and the like. This shows that his definition covers both external perception and internal perception, and the mind is a sense-organ.⁸⁵ Vātsyāyana includes the mind in the sense-organs and points out its distinction from the external senses.⁸⁶ Viśvanātha regards the mind as a sense-organ. He argues that the perception of pleasure must be produced through an instrument just as the visual perception of colour is produced through the instrument of the eyes; and this instrument is the mind (*manas*) which is thus a sense-organ (*karana*).⁸⁷ Praśastapāda

⁸⁴ NBh., iii, 1, 62; NM., p. 477.

⁸⁶ NBh., i, 1, 4.

⁸⁵ NBh., i, 1, 4.

⁸⁷ SM., 85.

describes the mind as the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). He argues that pleasure and pain are not perceived through the external senses ; but that they must be perceived through an instrument, and that is the mind.⁸⁸ Śāṅkaramiśra also gives the same argument.⁸⁹

A sense-organ is defined by the Mīmāṃsaka as that which, rightly operating upon its object, produces direct presentations. There are two kinds of sense-organs, external and internal. There are five external organs: the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the visual organ, the tactual organ, and the auditory organ. Of these the first four are made up of earth, water, light, and air respectively. So far the Mīmāṃsaka agrees with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards the auditory organ as of the nature of ether (*ākāśa*), while the Mīmāṃsaka regards it as a portion of space (*dik*) confined within the ear-hole. There is only one internal organ, viz., the mind (*manas*). The mind is atomic in nature, because of the impossibility of simultaneous cognitions. It is called the internal organ, since it operates independently in the perception of the self and its qualities. But in the perception of external objects it acts in co-operation with the external senses, since being an internal organ it cannot come into contact with external objects. It depends upon marks of inference (*liṅga*) to produce inferential cognitions, and upon sub-conscious impressions (*saṁskāra*) to bring about recollections.⁹⁰ Thus the Mīmāṃsaka view of the nature and functions of the sense-organs resembles the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view.

The Sāṅkhya and the Vedāntist hold that the vocal organ, the prehensive organ, the locomotive organ, the excretive organ, and the generative organ are the organs of action (*karmendriya*). They are regarded as sense-organs because they are the instruments which produce the functions of speaking, grasping, walking, evacuation, and sexual intercourse respectively. The function of one cannot be done by another.

But Jayanta urges that if these organs are regarded as sense-organs, many other organs also should be regarded as such. The throat has the function of swallowing food ; the breasts have the function of embracing ; the shoulders have the function of carrying burdens. So they also must be regarded as sense-organs. If

⁸⁸ PBh., pp. 152-3 ; Kir., p. 153.

⁸⁹ VSU., iii, 2, 2.

⁹⁰ SD., pp. 115-16.

it is argued that these functions can be done by other organs also, then it may equally be argued that eating and drinking can sometimes be done by hands and feet, swallowing food by the anus, and the grasping of things by the mouth. The functions of the so-called motor organs are sometimes done by other organs also. But the function of one cognitive organ (*buddhindriya*) can never be done by another. A person whose eyeballs have been taken out of their sockets can never perceive colour. But a person can grasp and walk a little even with his hands and feet amputated. Besides, walking is not the function of feet alone; it can also be done by hands. If the different parts of the body having different functions in the shape of actions are said to be motor organs, then throat, breast, shoulder, etc., also should be included in the motor organs.⁹¹ Vidyānandin argues that the so-called motor organs are included in the tactual organ.⁹² Hence there is no necessity of supposing the existence of the so-called motor organs.

Jayanta argues that one internal organ, *manas*, is quite adequate. It is needless to assume three internal organs, *manas*, *ahamkāra*, and *buddhi*. *Buddhi* is of the nature of cognition, and so it is of the nature of an operation of an instrument. Hence it cannot be an instrument of cognition. *Ahamkāra* (egoism) also is an object of cognition; so it cannot be an instrument of cognition. Therefore, there is only one internal organ, viz., *manas*.⁹³ Vidyānandin argues that *buddhi* and *ahamkāra* cannot be regarded as sense-organs, since they are modifications of the soul and results of the sense-organs and the mind.⁹⁴ Veṅkaṭanātha argues that the so-called internal organs of *buddhi* and *ahamkāra* are functions of the mind which is the only internal organ.⁹⁵

Gautama does not include the *manas* (mind) in the list of sense-organs.⁹⁶ He mentions it separately among the objects of valid knowledge (*prameya*).⁹⁷ Kaṇāda is silent upon the point. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers generally regard the *manas* as the internal organ through which we perceive pleasure and pain.⁹⁸ The Mīmāṃsakas also recognize the *manas* as the internal organ. They call it the internal organ, since it operates independently

⁹¹ NM., pp. 482-3 NVT., p. 372.

⁹² NM., p. 483.

⁹³ TMK., p. 94.

⁹⁴ NS., i, 1, 9.

⁹⁵ NBh. and NV., i, 1, 4; NM., p. 484; SM., p. 397; VSU., iii, 2, 2.

⁹⁶ TSV., p. 326.

⁹⁷ TSV., p. 326.

⁹⁸ NS., i, 1, 12.

in the perception of the self and its qualities. But in the perception of external objects it acts in co-operation with the external senses, since being an internal organ it cannot come into contact with external objects.⁹⁹ The Sāṃkhya also regards the *manas* as an internal sense-organ. Īśvarakṛṣṇa says that the *manas* is a sensori-motor organ (*ubhayātmakam manah*)¹⁰⁰; it partakes of the nature of both the organs of knowledge and the organs of action. The Vedāntists also generally recognize the *manas* as a sense-organ. The Rāmānujists regard the *manas* as the internal organ of knowledge, which is the cause of recollection.¹⁰¹ They differ from the Sāṃkhya which regards the *manas* as partaking of the nature of both the organs of knowledge and the organs of action.¹⁰² They differ from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in holding that the *manas* is not the organ of internal perception (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*), since there is no internal perception at all.¹⁰³ Śaṅkara admits that the *manas* is a sense-organ because it is distinctly laid down in the Smṛti.¹⁰⁴ Manu says: "There are eleven sense-organs of which the eleventh organ is the *manas*."¹⁰⁵ Vācaspatimiśra also holds the same view.¹⁰⁶ But some Śaṅkarites hold a contrary view.

The authors of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, and *Advaitacintākaustubha* hold that the *manas* is not a sense-organ on the authority of the Śruti. "The objects are greater than the sense-organs, and the *manas* is greater than the senses." In this text the *manas* is given a higher place than the sense-organs. So it cannot be regarded as a sense-organ.¹⁰⁷ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argues that the *manas* should be regarded as a sense-organ, since it is the organ of the perception of pleasure and pain. Perception is always of sensuous origin. There can be no perception without a sense-organ. The author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* argues that the perception of pleasure and pain does not necessarily imply that the *manas* is a sense-organ through which the self perceives pleasure and pain. The perceptual character of a cognition does not consist in its being produced by a sense-organ. In that case, inferential cognition also would be regarded as perception, since it is produced by the mind. The perceptual character of a

⁹⁹ SD., pp. 115-16.

¹⁰⁰ YMD., p. 16.

¹⁰¹ NP., p. 76.

¹⁰² Manusamhitā, ii, 89-92.

¹⁰³ VP., pp. 49-51.

¹⁰⁴ SK., 27.

¹⁰⁵ NSA., pp. 16-17.

¹⁰⁶ S.B., ii, 4, 17.

¹⁰⁷ Bhāmati, ii, 4, 17.

cognition depends on the identification of the apprehending mental mode with the perceived object.¹⁰⁸

The Jaina also does not regard the *manas* as a sense-organ. It is called *anindriya*. It is not a sense-organ.¹⁰⁹ Vidyānaṇḍin argues that the mind is not a sense-organ because it is different from the sense-organs. The sense-organs apprehend specific objects. One sense-organ cannot apprehend the objects of another. But the mind can apprehend all objects. So it cannot be regarded as a sense-organ. It may be argued that the mind is an instrument (*karana*) of cognition, and so it must be regarded as a sense-organ. But in that case smoke also would be a sense-organ, since it is an instrument (*karana*) of cognition, being a mark (*liṅga*) of inference. Hence it is wrong to include the mind in the sense-organs.¹¹⁰

6. The External Organs and the Internal Organ or Organs

The Sāṃkhya regards the internal organ as threefold in character. It assumes the forms of *buddhi*, *aḥamkāra*, and *manas* according as its functions differ. Īśvarakṛṣṇa holds that the external organs can apprehend only the present. But the internal organs can apprehend the present, the past, and the future.¹¹¹ Gauḍapāda makes it clear by examples. The visual organ apprehends only the present colour, neither past nor future colours. The auditory organ apprehends the present sound, neither past nor future sounds. The tractual organ, the gustatory organ, and the olfactory organ apprehend respectively the present touch, taste, and odour, but not past or future ones. This is the case with the motor organs also. The vocal organ utters only present sounds, but not past or future ones. The hands can grasp only the present jars, but not the past or future ones. The feet can walk upon only the present road, but not upon past or future ones. The excretive and generative organs can perform their functions only at present. The functions of the external organs are confined only to the present time. They cannot carry us forward to the future and backward to the past. For this we have to fall back upon the internal organs. The *manas* assimilates and

¹⁰⁸ VP., pp. 52-8; ABS., p. 156; Chapter VII.

¹⁰⁹ DS., p. 13; PMV., ii, 5.

¹¹⁰ TSV., p. 326.

¹¹¹ Sāṃpratakālaḥ bāhyarṇ trikālam ābhyantaram karānam. SK., 33.

discriminates the present as well as past and future objects. The *ahamkāra* refers the present as well as past and future objects to the unity of the empirical ego. The *buddhi* determines the nature of present, past, and future objects.¹¹³ The internal organs bring us in contact with the past and the future as with the present. Vācaspatimiśra refers to it in *Bhāmati*.¹¹³ He holds that the immediate past and the immediate future should be included in the present owing to their close proximity to it. He seems to believe in the specious present, which is a meeting point of the present, the past, and the future. And this tract of time is an object of sense-perception.¹¹⁴

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believes in only one internal organ or *manas*. What is the difference between the mind and the external senses? Vātsyāyana mentions three points of difference. In the first place, the external sense-organs are material, but the mind is immaterial. The mind is not material, since it is not of the nature of an effect, and so does not possess any quality of matter. In the second place, the external senses apprehend only a limited number of objects (*niyataviśaya*), but the mind apprehends all objects (*sarvaviśaya*). For instance, colours, sounds, tastes, odours, and touch are apprehended by the visual organ, the auditory organ, the gustatory organ, the olfactory organ, and the tactual organ respectively. But all these are apprehended by the mind. It guides all the external senses in the apprehension of their objects and directly apprehends pleasure, pain, and the like.¹¹⁵ Vyāsa also holds that the *manas* apprehends all objects (*sarvārtha*).¹¹⁶ In the third place, the external senses are of the nature of sense-organs owing to the fact that they are endued with the same qualities as are apprehended by them. For instance, the olfactory organ is endued with the quality of odour, and consequently it can apprehend odour. The visual organ can apprehend colour, because it is endued with the quality of colour. The gustatory organ is endued with the quality of taste and so it can apprehend taste. The auditory organ is endued with the quality of sound, and so it can apprehend sound. And the tactual organ can apprehend touch, because it is endued with the quality of touch.

¹¹³ Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya on SK., 33. ¹¹³ Bhāmati, ii, 4, 17.

¹¹⁴ Vartamānasamīpamatitamanāgatamapi vartamānam. STK., 33. See Chapter IX.

¹¹⁵ NM., p. 497.

¹¹⁶ YBh., ii, 19.

But the mind is not endued with the qualities of pleasure, pain etc., which are apprehended by the mind.¹¹⁷

Uddyotakara recognizes only the second point of difference between the mind and the external sense-organs. He rejects the other two points of difference. Vātsyāyana holds that the external sense-organs are material, but that the mind is immaterial. But this is not right. In fact, the mind is neither material nor immaterial: materiality and immateriality are properties of products; what is produced out of matter is material, and what is not produced out of matter, but out of something else is immaterial. As a matter of fact, however, the mind is not a product at all, and as such it can be neither material nor immaterial. Moreover, the auditory organ, which is an external sense-organ, is not material, since it is not a product of matter, but *ākāśa* itself. So the auditory organ also is neither material nor immaterial.

But this objection of Uddyotakara is based on a misconception of the meaning of the word "material". It may mean either a product of matter (*bhūtajanya*) or of the nature of matter (*bhūtātma*). In the latter sense, the auditory organ also is material, since it is of the nature of *ākāśa* (ether), though it is not a product of it. In the former sense, all the other sense-organs are material. The tactual organ is a product of air; the visual organ is a product of light; the olfactory organ is a product of earth; and the gustatory organ is a product of water. Further, Vātsyāyana holds that the external senses are sense-organs because they are endued with certain distinctive qualities, but that the mind is a sense-organ without being endued with any specific quality. But Uddyotakara disputes this point also. For the auditory organ also does not, through its own quality of sound, apprehend a sound exterior to itself, as the other external senses do. For instance, the olfactory organ apprehends an odour exterior to itself, through the odour inherent in itself. But the auditory organ apprehends a sound which is not exterior to itself, but which is actually produced within the ear itself. Hence Uddyotakara concludes that there is only one point of difference between the mind and the external sense-organs; the external senses can apprehend only certain specific objects, but the mind can apprehend all objects. And it is proved by the following reasons. Firstly, the mind is the substratum of the conjunction with the condition of

¹¹⁷ NBh., i, 1, 4.

recollection. Secondly, it is the substratum of the conjunction which brings about the cognition of pleasure and the like. And thirdly, it presides over all other sense-organs.¹¹⁸

7. Are the External Sense-organs *Prāpyakāri* or *Aprāpyakāri* ?

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsaka, the Sāṃkhya, and the Vedāntist hold that all the sense-organs are *prāpyakāri*; they apprehend their objects when they come in direct contact with them. This doctrine is called the doctrine of *prāpyakāritā*. But the Buddhist holds that the visual organ and the auditory organ are *aprāpyakāri*; they apprehend their objects at a distance without coming in contact with them. All the other sense-organs are *prāpyakāri*; they apprehend their objects when they come in contact with them. The Jaina holds that only the visual organ is *aprāpyakāri*; it apprehends its object at a distance with the help of light without getting at it.

According to the Buddhist, the visual organ is the eyeball or the pupil of the eye (*golaka*), and it can apprehend its object without coming in direct contact with it, because the eyeball can never go out of its socket to the object existing at a distance. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, all the sense-organs are *prāpyakāri*; they can apprehend their objects only when they come in direct contact with them. Thus the visual organ cannot apprehend its object without coming in direct contact with it. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the visual organ is not the eyeball or the pupil of the eye which is the seat (*golaka* or *adhiṣṭhāna*) of the visual organ which is of the nature of light (*tejas*); and that this ray of light goes out of the pupil to the object at a distance and comes in direct contact with it.

The Buddhist offers the following criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *prāpyakāritā*. Firstly, the sense-organs are nothing but end-organs (*golaka*) which are within the range of perception. They are not mysterious entities behind these peripheral organs. So the visual organ is nothing but the pupil of the eye through which we see visible objects. And the pupil can never go out of the eye to the object, and come into direct contact with it. Secondly, the visual organ cannot come into direct contact with its object in order to apprehend it, for in that

¹¹⁸ NV., i, 1, 4.

case it would not be able to apprehend an object bigger than itself. But, as a matter of fact, the visual organ can apprehend vast objects like mountains and the like. Thirdly, the visual organ apprehends the branches of a tree and the moon at the same time; it takes the same length of time to apprehend these objects though they are at different distances. If the eye goes out to its object in order to apprehend it, then it must take less time to apprehend a near object, and more time to apprehend a distant object. But, in fact, the eye apprehends the branches of a tree and the moon at the same time; it does not take more time to apprehend the moon than to apprehend the branches; just on opening our eyes we see both the objects at the same time. Fourthly, the eye cannot go out to its object; for if it could go out to its object of apprehension, it would never be able to apprehend objects hidden behind glass, mica, etc., as it would be obstructed by them.¹¹⁹ Hence the Buddhist concludes that the visual organ can never go out to its object to apprehend it; it apprehends its object from a distance without getting at it.

Udayana criticises the above arguments of the Buddhist in *Kiraṇāvahī*. Firstly, what apprehends or manifests an object must come into direct contact with it. A lamp manifests an object only because the light comes into direct contact with it. The visual organ is of the nature of light, and so the ray of light must go out of the pupil to the object in order to apprehend it. Secondly, the light of the visual organ issues out of the pupil, and spreads out, and thus can cover a vast object. Hence the field of vision is not co-extensive with the eyeball or the pupil of the eye. Thirdly, it is wrong to argue that a near object and a distant object can be perceived through the visual organ in the same space of time. There must be some difference in the moments of time required in the apprehension of the two objects, though it is not distinctly felt by us. Light is an extremely light substance, and its motion is inconceivably swift. So even the distant moon is seen just on opening the eyes. Some hold that the light of the visual organ, issuing out of the pupil, becomes blended with the external light, and thus comes into contact with far and near objects simultaneously, so that the eye can apprehend the branches and the moon at the same time. But this is not a correct explanation. On this hypothesis, the visual organ

¹¹⁹ *Kīr.*, p. 74.

would be able to apprehend those objects which are hidden from our view, e.g., objects behind our back. But it can never apprehend these objects. Fourthly, glass, mica, etc., are transparent by their very nature, and so they cannot obstruct the passage of light. Hence the light of the visual organ can penetrate these substances and apprehend objects hidden behind them. Hence the visual organ must be supposed to go out to its object and come into direct contact with it.¹²⁰ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not regard the auditory organ as moving out to sounds, which are held to travel to the ear; either sounds reach the ear in concentric circles of waves like the waves of water or they shoot out in all directions like the filaments of a *kadamba*.¹²¹

The Sāṃkhya also holds that the sense-organs are *prāpya-kāri*: they get at their objects in order to apprehend them. All schools of philosophers admit that the organs of touch, taste, and smell come into direct contact with their objects. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the visual organ moves out to its objects, but that the auditory organ does not. The Sāṃkhya differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in holding that the sense-organs come into contact with their objects through their functions (*vytti*), and that the auditory organ also moves out to sounds through its function like the visual organ.

The Buddhists argue that the visual organ does not move out to its object, since we see objects through glass, mica, and crystal; and that the auditory organ does not move out to its objects, since we hear sounds at a distance. The Sāṃkhya refutes this view. Kapila contends that the sense-organs do not apprehend objects which they do not reach, because of their not reaching, or because they would reach everything.¹²² Aniruddha explains this argument. The sense-organs do not manifest those objects which they do not reach, because they have the nature of manifesting only what they reach or come into contact with. The visual organ goes out to objects hidden by glass, mica, and crystal in the form of *vytti*; these substances do not obstruct the passage of the *vytti* on account of their transparency. The auditory organ is connected with sound by means of its function, which moves out to it. It does not apprehend sound at a distance without reaching out to it. The sense-organs apprehend objects at a

¹²⁰ Kir., pp. 74-5.

¹²² SS., v, 104.

¹ BhP., 166.

distance by means of their functions. If it is argued that the sense-organs do not apprehend objects at a distance because they do not reach out to them, as in the case of hidden objects, then it may be pointed out that this disability of the sense-organs (*i.e.*, their not moving out to their objects) will affect not only the cognitions of distant and hidden objects but also those of unhidden objects as well, since the disability must operate equally in both the cases. But, in fact, the cognitions of unhidden objects are never so affected. Therefore, it cannot be maintained that the sense-organs do not reach out to their objects. If, on the other hand, it is argued that the sense-organs apprehend objects even without reaching out to them, then they will apprehend everything which exists within the universe, since there is no distinction in this respect with regard to all things.¹²³ Hence the Sāṃkhya concludes that all sense-organs get at their objects.

The Sāṃkhya holds with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that the visual organ moves out to its object. But it does not hold like it that the visual organ is made up of light, though it has the power of gliding, since the phenomenon of movement of the visual organ can be explained by its function.¹²⁴ Aniruddha says that the fact that the visual organ moves out to distant objects, like light, and manifests them, leads to the misconception that it is made up of light. But, in reality, the visual organ is related to its objects through its function.¹²⁵ Vijñānabhikṣu says that the visual organ, though not made up of light, shoots out to distant objects like the sun by means of its particular modification (*vyūṭi*) without altogether leaving the body, even as the vital air (*prāṇa*) moves out from the tip of the nose up to a certain distance by means of its particular modification without altogether leaving the body.¹²⁶

Kumārila criticizes the Buddhist and Sāṃkhya theories of auditory perception. The Buddhist holds that the auditory organ apprehends sounds without coming into contact with them. Kumārila contends that in that case all sounds near and distant would be equally perceptible, since they are equal in having no contact with the auditory organ. In that case, both near and distant sounds could be either perceived or unperceived; there would be no sequence in the perception of sounds, near sounds

¹²³ SSV., v, 104.

¹²⁴ SSV., v, 105.

¹²⁵ SS., v, 105.

¹²⁶ SPB., v, 105.

being first perceived and then distant sounds; and sounds coming from different distances would not have different degrees of intensity. This shows that sounds must come into contact with the auditory organ in order to be perceived.¹²⁷

The Sāṃkhya holds that the auditory organ moves out to the region where sounds are produced through its *vytti*. Kumārila contends that the Sāṃkhya doctrine involves the assumption of two imperceptible things. The so-called *vytti* or function of the auditory organ is imperceptible, and its movement also is imperceptible. It is difficult to conceive how a modification is produced in the auditory organ by a distant sound. The Sāṃkhya may argue that the auditory organ moves out to distant sounds, owing to its all-pervading nature, being a product of all-pervading *ahamkāra*. Kumārila contends that this fact would apply equally well to very distant sounds, and hence all sounds would be heard equally well. Moreover, the function of the auditory organ, being immaterial, could not be obstructed by any material obstacles, and hence even intercepted sounds would be heard.¹²⁸ Thus the Sāṃkhya theory is untenable. Kumārila holds that sound travels through the air and reaches the space in the ear, and then produces a modification (*saṃskāra*) in it. This theory explains many facts about auditory perception. Sounds are carried to the ear through the air. So when the air is intercepted by obstacles sounds cannot be heard. The air moves along in a certain order of sequence, and hence we first hear sounds near at hand, and then distant sounds, and near sounds are intense and distant sounds are faint.¹²⁹

The Sāṃkarite also holds that the sense-organs are *prāpya-kāri*. They apprehend their objects when they come into contact with them. Of the five external senses, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, and the tactual organ apprehend their objects, remaining in their seats. But the visual organ and the auditory organ go out to their appropriate objects and apprehend them. Even the auditory organ can move outward to sounds because it is the all-pervading ether limited by the ear-hole. Just as the visual organ, which is of the nature of light and very transparent, can move outward to its object and apprehend it, so the auditory

¹²⁷ ŚV., pp. 760-1; see Chapter VIII.

¹²⁸ ŚV., pp. 359-360; also NE.

¹²⁹ ŚV., p. 763.

organ also, which is of the nature of ether, can move out to its object and apprehend it.

The Śaṅkarite differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in his view of the nature of the auditory organ. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that a sound is produced somewhere in space and spreads in concentric circles like the waves of water and ultimately strikes the drum of the ear, and thus produces the auditory perception of sound.¹³⁰ But the Śaṅkarite urges that had it been the case, we should apprehend the sound as *in* the ear, and not in the place in which it is generated. But, in fact, we always perceive a sound in such a form as "I hear a sound there" and not "in the ear". This conclusively proves that the auditory organ also, like the visual organ, moves out to the object and apprehends it. The Śaṅkarite thinks that it is unnecessary to assume an infinite series of sounds coming from the original place in concentric or spherical circles to the auditory organ to produce the auditory perception of the original sound. The law of parsimony requires that there must be a connection between the sound produced somewhere in space and the auditory organ. And the connection can be easily established by supposing that it is the auditory organ itself that goes outward to the sound and apprehends it.¹³¹ In fact, it is the translucent *antaḥkaraṇa* (internal organ) which streams out through the orifices of the visual organ and the auditory organ and gets at the visible objects and sounds.¹³² The Rāmānujist also holds the same view.¹³³ The Vedāntists agree with the Sāṅkhya on this point.

8. *Are the External Sense-organs Physical (bhautika) or Psychical (āhaṃkārika)?*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the external sense-organs are material (*bhautika*) in nature. But the Sāṅkhya disputes this view on the following grounds. In the first place, the sense-organs are *prāpyakāri*; they apprehend their objects only when they come into contact with them. If the sense-organs were products of gross matter, they could never go out to distant objects and apprehend them. But, as a matter of fact, some sense-organs (e.g. the visual organ) can apprehend distant objects, and hence they must reach out to them. And they can move out to distant

¹³⁰ BhP., 165-6.

¹³² VP., p. 57.

¹³¹ VP., pp. 180-1; also Śikhāmaṇi.

¹³³ TMK., pp. 104 ff.

objects if they are products of *ahamkāra* (egoism) and as such capable of expansion. So the Sāṃkhya concludes that the sense-organs are psychical, being products of *ahamkāra*, reach out to distant objects in the form of functions (*vytti*) which are modified into the forms of these objects. In the second place, if the sense-organs were material they would apprehend only those objects which are of their size. But, as a matter of fact, they can apprehend objects which are larger or smaller than themselves. This proves that the sense-organs are not products of matter but of *ahamkāra*. In the third place, material objects like lamps, which manifest other objects, also manifest themselves. So, if the sense-organs were material, they would be able to manifest not only other objects but also their own nature. But they cannot manifest themselves; the sense-organs are not objects of sense-perception. So they are not material.¹³⁴ They are products of *ahamkāra*. The Rāmānujist also agrees with this view.¹³⁵

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refutes these arguments thus. The first argument is based on a false assumption. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika agrees with the Sāṃkhya in holding that the sense-organs are *prāpyakāri*; they come into contact with their objects in order to apprehend them. But the sense-organs are not the peripheral organs or the physical seats of eyes, etc. For example, the visual organ is not the pupil but the ray of light (*tejas*) which has its seat in the pupil. And the ray of light can easily stretch out to a distant object and apprehend it, since its motion is extremely swift. So the sense-organs need not necessarily be psychical (*āhamkārika*) in order to get at their objects; they may be material (*bhautika*) and yet *prāpyakāri*. The second argument also is without foundation. The sense-organs cannot be said to be psychical (*āhamkārika*) because they can apprehend objects bigger or smaller than themselves. They can do so even if they are material. For example, the visual organ, which is of the nature of light, can expand and apprehend a larger object. The expansion of an object is not the sign of its psychical character. The third argument also is beside the mark. The different sense-organs apprehend different qualities. Every sense-organ does not apprehend all qualities. The sense-organs can apprehend only those qualities of their objects, which inhere in themselves. For instance, smell inheres in the olfactory organ; so it can apprehend

¹³⁴ NM., pp. 477-8.

¹³⁵ TMK., p. 91.

only the smell of an object. But it cannot apprehend its own smell. It is by virtue of its own inherent smell that it can apprehend smell in its object. If the sense-organs were devoid of qualities, they would not be able to apprehend anything at all, and they would cease to be sense-organs. Thus the sense-organs can apprehend other objects but not themselves.¹³⁶ Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concludes that the sense-organs are material.

Some maintain that there is only one sense-organ; that it appears to be many owing to the difference of *upādhis* or limitations. Kapila refers to this view and criticizes it.¹³⁷ Aniruddha argues that though there is a difference of *upādhis* we must also admit that there is a real difference of powers, and that if the difference of powers is real, the plurality of sense-organs also is real.¹³⁸ Vijñānabhikṣu argues that the theory of one sense-organ performing different functions through diversity of powers amounts to the assumption of a plurality of sense-organs, since these different powers also have the character of sense-organs.¹³⁹ Hence there is not a single sense-organ.

9. *Is the Tactual Organ the only Sense-organ?*

Caraka holds that the organ of touch pervades all the sense-organs. They are modifications of the sense of touch. All the sense-organs apprehend their objects when they come into contact with them, and contact is nothing but touch. Thus the sense of touch is conterminous with all the senses. It is perpetually connected with the mind which presides over all the external senses.¹⁴⁰ Vācaspatimiśra refers a similar doctrine to some Sāṃkhyas who hold that there are seven sense-organs: the tactual organ which is the only organ of knowledge and capable of apprehending various objects like colour, etc., five organs of action, and the mind (*manas*).¹⁴¹ Gautama also refers to the doctrine that the sense of touch is the only sense-organ and criticizes it.¹⁴² Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, and others elaborate his arguments. Some hold that the sense of touch is the only sense-organ, since

¹³⁶ NM., pp. 478-481.

¹³⁷ SS., ii, 24.

¹³⁸ SSV., ii, 24.

¹³⁹ Śaktināmapīṇḍriyatvāt. SPR., ii, 24.

¹⁴⁰ Carakasamhitā, Sūtrasthāna, xi, 32.

¹⁴¹ Tanmātrameva hi buddhindriyamanekarūpagrahaṇasamarthanamekam. Bhāmati, ii, 2, 10.

¹⁴² NS., iii, 1, 52-7.

all the seats (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of sense-organs are pervaded by the tactual organ, so that in the presence of the sense of touch there is perception and in its absence there is no perception at all. So the tactual organ is the only sense-organ.¹⁴³

This doctrine cannot be maintained on the following grounds. It contradicts the facts of actual experience. If the tactual organ were the only sense-organ, it would be able to apprehend all sensible objects, so that colour would be perceived by the blind, sound by the deaf, and so forth. But, as a matter of fact, the blind can never see colour, the deaf can never hear sound, and so on. Hence the tactual organ is not the only sense-organ.¹⁴⁴ But it may be urged that the various sense-organs are only special parts of the tactual organ, which is the only sense-organ. The different kinds of sensible objects are perceived through its different parts, so that when these particular parts are destroyed we cannot perceive the corresponding objects. The blind fail to see colours because the particular part of the tactual organ which was located in the eye and was the means of colour-perception has been destroyed. The deaf cannot hear sounds because the particular part of the tactual organ which was located in the ear-hole and was the means of sound-perception has been destroyed. This view is self-contradictory. If the perception of colours, sounds, etc., is held to be brought about by different parts of the tactual organ, then it contradicts the doctrine that the tactual organ is the only sense-organ. Are the so-called special parts of the tactual organ of the nature of sense-organs or not? If they are, then there are many sense-organs, and the doctrine of a single sense-organ falls to the ground. If they are not, then colours, sounds, etc., cannot be regarded as perceptible by the senses.¹⁴⁵ The hypothesis of a single sense-organ with different parts endowed with different powers amounts to the assumption of many sense-organs.¹⁴⁶ Further, the tactual organ cannot be regarded as the only sense-organ because, in that case, there would be simultaneous perception of colour, sound, and the like. The soul would come into contact with the mind, the mind with the single sense of touch, and the tactual organ with colour, sound, etc. Thus there would be simultaneous perception of them all. But it is not a fact of experience. Colour, sound, etc., are never

¹⁴³ NBh., iii, 1, 52.

¹⁴⁵ NV., pp. 389-390.

¹⁴⁴ NBh., iii, 1, 53.

¹⁴⁶ NM., p. 462.

perceived at the same time.¹⁴⁷ Hence there is not a single sense-organ which apprehends all kinds of sensible objects.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, the doctrine of a single sense-organ involves a contradiction. The tactual organ is *prāpyakāri*; it can apprehend only those objects which it comes into contact with; it cannot apprehend distant objects. But colour and sound can be perceived from a great distance. How, then, can they be perceived through the tactual organ? If they are perceived through it though it does not come into contact with them, it should apprehend touch also without coming into contact with it. Or, if the tactual organ can apprehend touch when it comes into contact with it, it should apprehend colour and sound also when it comes into contact with them. It should not operate on touch, colour, and sound in different ways. But it may be argued that the tactual organ is *prāpyakāri* in apprehending touch and *aprāpyakāri* in apprehending colour and sound. If the tactual organ can apprehend colour without coming into contact with it, it should perceive hidden as well as unhidden colours, which is not a fact; and the perception of colour near at hand and the non-perception of colour at a distance would remain unexplained.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, if the sense of touch is the only sense-organ, its derangement or destruction will make all perception impossible.¹⁵⁰ But, in fact, we find that though one sense-organ is deranged or destroyed, we can perceive through the other sense-organs. Hence there is not a single sense of touch.

¹⁴⁷ This is the Nyāya View.

¹⁴⁸ NBh., iii, 1, 57.

¹⁴⁹ NBh., iii, 1, 56.

¹⁵⁰ NV., p. 391.

BOOK II

CHAPTER II

INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION AND DETERMINATE PERCEPTION

1. *Introduction*

The Indian thinkers generally recognize two distinct stages of perception, indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and determinate (*savikalpa*). The former is the immediate apprehension of the mere form of an object, while the latter is the mediate perception of the object with its different properties and their relations to one another. The former is an undifferentiated and non-relational mode of consciousness devoid of assimilation and discrimination, analysis and synthesis. The latter is a differentiated and relational mode of consciousness involving assimilation and discrimination, analysis and synthesis. The former is purely sensory and presentative, while the latter is presentative-representative. The former is dumb and inarticulate—free from verbal images. The latter is vocal and articulate—dressed in the garb of verbal images. The former is abstract and indeterminate, while the latter is concrete and determinate. The former is what William James calls “knowledge of acquaintance”, and the latter is what he calls “knowledge-about”.

The distinction between indeterminate perception and determinate perception has for centuries engaged the attention of all schools of Indian thinkers, both from the psychological and epistemological points of view. Here we shall attempt a psychological analysis of these two stages of perception from the Indian stand-points. Though almost all the systems of Indian thought recognize the existence of indeterminate perception and determinate perception, they hold slightly different views on the nature of these two types of perception.

According to Śaṅkara, indeterminate perception apprehends the mere “Being”; it can apprehend neither an individual object nor its properties; it is absolutely indeterminate. According to the Buddhists, perception is always indeterminate; there is no determinate perception; the so-called determinate perception is

not perceptual in character. Indeterminate perception apprehends the specific individuality of an object (*svalakṣaṇa*) devoid of its generic character and other qualifications. Kumārila, the founder of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, holds that indeterminate perception apprehends the individual (*vyakti*), which is the substrate of its generic character (*sāmānya*) and specific character (*viśeṣa*). Prabhākara, the founder of the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, holds that indeterminate perception apprehends both the generic character and the specific character of its object as an undistinguishable mass. Pārthasārathimīśra, a follower of Kumārila, holds that indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehension of an object with its multiform properties such as generality, substantiality, quality, action, and name, but not as related to each other. Vācaspatimīśra represents the Sāṃkhya view of indeterminate perception as the simple apprehension of an object, pure and simple, unqualified by its properties. The earlier Vaiśeṣikas hold that indeterminate perception is the immediate cognition of the generic and specific characters of its object undifferentiated from each other. The earlier Naiyāyikas hold that there is no difference between indeterminate perception and determinate perception except that the former does not apprehend the name of its object. Both of them apprehend substantiality, generality, action, and quality. The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that indeterminate perception apprehends an object and its properties as unrelated to each other. The Neo-Sāṃkarite also holds that indeterminate perception is the non-relational apprehension of an object which is not necessarily sensuous in character. Rāmānuja holds a different view. He regards indeterminate perception as relational apprehension which apprehends the first individual of a class with its generic character in the shape of a structure (*saṁsthāna*) and also its relation to the individual. Thus most of the schools of Indian philosophers admit the existence of indeterminate perception, though they hold different views as to its nature and object. But Madhva and Vallabha, the founders of minor schools of Vedānta, deny the existence of indeterminate perception. They regard all perception as determinate. The Śābdikas also hold the same view. They hold that there can be no thought without language, and hence no nameless, indeterminate perception. No one denies the existence of determinate perception; only the Buddhist holds that the so-called

determinate perception is not perceptual in character. We shall consider these different views in detail.

2. The Different Views

According to Śaṅkara, indeterminate perception cannot apprehend any qualifications whatsoever. It cannot apprehend even an object (e.g. mere jar, *ghaṭa*), and its generic nature (e.g. mere jariness, *ghaṭatva*) unrelated to each other, as some hold; for the apprehension of these qualifications presupposes the apprehension of their difference, and difference means mutual non-existence, which is not apprehended even by determinate perception. So it can never be apprehended by indeterminate perception. Non-existence is apprehended by non-perception (*anupalabdhi*). Hence indeterminate perception apprehends the mere undifferentiated "Being" (*sattā*), which is identical with universal consciousness. Thus Śaṅkara regards indeterminate perception as absolutely indeterminate or devoid of all determinations. It neither apprehends an individual object nor its qualities; it merely apprehends "Being" or existence (*sanmātraviśayam*).¹

Some hold that indeterminate perception apprehends an object (*viśeṣya*) and its qualifications (*viśeṣaṇa*) but not their relations to each other. But the Buddhist holds that indeterminate perception does not at all apprehend the qualifications of its object, viz. generality, substantiality, quality, action, and name. They are the forms of thought (*vikalpa*). Perception is always presentative and hence indeterminate; it is free from all forms and determinations. It merely apprehends the specific individuality of its object (*svalakṣaṇa*) devoid of all qualifications.² The so-called determinate perception is not perceptual in character, since it is a presentative-representative process and not produced by peripheral stimulation alone. The recollection of a name intervenes between the purely sensory presentation of an object and the determinate cognition of it as qualified by its name. So the determinate cognition of a qualified object cannot be regarded as a perceptual process.³ Thus the Buddhist agrees with Śaṅkara in holding that indeterminate perception cannot apprehend the qualifications of its object. But he differs from Śaṅkara in so far as he holds that

¹ ŚD., pp. 126-7.

² PP., p. 49.

³ NM., p. 92; ŚDP., p. 139.

indeterminate perception does not apprehend the mere "Being", but the specific individuality of an object. Hence the indeterminate perception of the Buddhists is more determinate than that of Śaṅkara.

Kumārila, a Mīmāṃsaka, holds that immediately after peripheral stimulation there is an undefined and indeterminate perception of an object, pure and simple, similar to the simple apprehension of a baby or a dumb person. It arises purely out of the object itself (*śuddhavadstuja*). It apprehends only an individual object which is the substratum of generic and specific characters. Even in indeterminate perception there is the apprehension of an object in its two-fold aspect, generic and specific; but there is no distinct apprehension of the generic character *as* generic, and the specific character *as* specific. But is it not self-contradictory to say that indeterminate perception apprehends an object, in its two-fold aspect, generic and specific, but yet it cannot apprehend its generic character *as* generic and specific character *as* specific? Kumārila points out that there is no contradiction here. The generic character is common to many individuals. The specific character is peculiar to one individual. The former is inclusive, while the latter is exclusive. Inclusiveness of the generic character and exclusiveness of the specific character are not apprehended by indeterminate perception, since it apprehends only one individual. It cannot apprehend its object *as* specific, since it cannot distinguish it from other objects; nor can it apprehend its object *as* generic, since it cannot assimilate it to other objects. It apprehends an object, pure and simple, not as qualified by its generic and specific characters. They qualify the object of indeterminate perception, which is their substratum, but they are not apprehended by it as qualifying its object. All that Kumārila means by mentioning the two-fold aspect of the object of indeterminate perception is to define the character of the *object*, and to emphasize that its object *has* a two-fold aspect, generic and specific.⁴

Prabhākara, a Mīmāṃsaka, holds that indeterminate perception apprehends not merely the individual object, which is the substrate of its generic and specific characters, but it apprehends also the generic and specific characters of its object without

⁴ Na viśeṣo na sāmānyam tadānīmanubhūyate.

Tayorādhārabhūtā tu vyaktirevāvasīyate.—ŚV., Sūtra, iv, 113. See also Sūtra, iv, 112, and 118, and NR.

apprehending their distinction. It is not an object of inference ; it is felt as perception. The Buddhist is wrong in holding that indeterminate perception apprehends merely the specific individuality (*svalakṣaṇa*), since we are distinctly conscious of the generic character (*jāti*) in it. Śaṅkara also is wrong in holding that it apprehends merely the generic character (*sāmānyamātra*), since we are distinctly conscious of the specific character in it. It apprehends the bare nature (*svarūpamātra*) of the generic character or community and the specific character or particularity but not their distinction from each other. Community (*sāmānya*) is inclusive (*anugata*) in character ; it is common to many individuals ; and particularity (*viśeṣa*) is exclusive (*vyāvṛtta*) in character ; it is confined to a particular individual. The former is the ground of assimilation, and the latter, of discrimination. Indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehension of an object with its generic and specific characters. But since it is devoid of assimilation and discrimination, it cannot distinguish the two from each other and apprehend the object as belonging to a definite class. Indeterminate perception does not involve assimilation, discrimination, recollection, and recognition.

But how is it that the generic character and the specific character of an object are apprehended by indeterminate perception, but not their distinction? Prabhākara replies that the apprehension of two different objects does not necessarily imply the apprehension of their difference ; that the apprehension of the difference between two objects involves an additional factor, viz. the apprehension of the distinctive characters of both these objects. Though indeterminate perception apprehends both the generic and specific characters of its object, it cannot apprehend the difference between the two, because, having a single individual for its object, it cannot apprehend their distinctive characters, viz. inclusiveness and exclusiveness respectively.

But determinate perception apprehends the generic character of its object as generic and its specific character as specific, because it assimilates its object to other like objects and distinguishes it from other unlike objects. But it may be objected that in determinate perception also only one individual object is present to a sense-organ. Hence determinate perception also cannot apprehend the generic character as generic and the specific character

as specific, since it presupposes an apprehension of other like and unlike objects which are not present to the sense-organ. Prabhākara gives this reply. The sense-organs, being material and unconscious, cannot apprehend objects; nor can cognitions by themselves apprehend objects; it is the self which apprehends all that can be apprehended. And after indeterminate perception of an object the self remembers some other objects of the same class, from which it differs in some respects, and which it resembles in others, by reviving the subconscious impressions of previous perceptions of these objects. And thus the self comes to have a determinate perception of an object as belonging to a particular class.⁵ Indeterminate perception apprehends the bare nature of the generic and specific characters but not the difference between them. But determinate perception distinguishes them from each other and apprehends its object as qualified by them. It apprehends the qualified object and the qualifying properties in the subject-predicate relation.⁶

Pārthasārathimiśra, a follower of Kumārila, holds a slightly different view. Kumārila holds that indeterminate perception apprehends an individual object (*vyakti*) in which the generic character (*sāmānya*) and the specific character (*viśeṣa*) subsist. Prabhākara holds that indeterminate perception apprehends both the generic character and the specific character of its object but not their distinction from each other. Pārthasārathimiśra holds that indeterminate perception is an undifferentiated and non-relational apprehension of an object with its multiple forms and properties, viz. genus, substance, quality, action, and name. Determinate perception breaks up this undifferentiated sensory matrix into its component factors, viz. the qualified object and its qualifying properties, differentiates them from and relates them to each other, and integrates them into the unity of a determinate percept.⁷ It apprehends an object as belonging to a particular class (e.g. 'this is a cow'), as being qualified by a particular substance (e.g. 'this is with a staff'), as being endowed with a particular quality (e.g. 'this

⁵ PP., pp. 54-5.

⁶ *Sāmānyaviśeṣau dve vastunī pratīpadyamānaṁ pratyakṣaṁ prathamamutpadyate . . . Savikalpantu tatprārabhāvī te eva vastunī sāmānyaviśeṣātmanā pratīpadyate.* PP., p. 54 and p. 55.

⁷ *Nirvikalpakaḥ manekākāraṁ vastu sammughdhaṁ grhṇāti, savikalpakāni tvekaikākāraṁ jātādikaṁ vivicya viśayīkaroti.* ŚD., p. 140.

is white'), as doing a particular action (e.g. 'this is going'), and as bearing a particular name (e.g. 'this is *Ḍirtha*').⁸

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa also holds a similar view. He defines indeterminate perception as the apprehension of an object and its properties as unrelated to each other. For instance, it apprehends a jar (*ghaṭa*) and its generic character (*ghaṭatva*), but not as related to each other. It does not apprehend its object as a qualified substance and its generic character as its qualifying property. Just after the contact of an object with a sense-organ there is the apprehension of the mere individual object in which the generic character and the specific character are not yet differentiated from each other.⁹ Gāgā Bhaṭṭa's view resembles that of Viśvanātha, who holds that indeterminate perception apprehends an object (*ghaṭa*) and its generic character (*ghaṭatva*) as unrelated to each other. It also resembles the view of Prabhākara, who holds that indeterminate perception apprehends an object in which the generic character (*sāmānya*) and the specific character (*viśeṣa*) are not distinguished from each other.

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa holds that indeterminate perception is a distinct apprehension that there is *something*. Some hold that indeterminate perception is an object of inference. It is inferred from the determinate perception of a qualified object, which presupposes indeterminate perception of its qualifying properties. Others hold that there is no need of assuming the existence of indeterminate perception to account for determinate perception; that the intercourse of an object and its qualifications with the sense-organs is the condition of determinate perception. The indeterminate perception of qualifications is not the condition of the determinate perception of a qualified object. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa holds that indeterminate perception is a distinct psychological process, which apprehends an undifferentiated mass of many properties which are not related to the object in the subject-predicate relation. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa defines determinate perception as the apprehension of a qualified object, its qualifications, and the relation between the two.¹⁰ This definition closely resembles that of Nīlakaṇṭha. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa accepts the Neo-Naiyāyika definition of determinate perception. Like Pārthasārathimīśra, he

⁸ *SD.*, pp. 139-140.

⁹ Bhaṭṭacintāmaṇi, p. 21.

¹⁰ *Saviśeṣyakaṁ saprakāraṁ sasamśargakaṁ vā jñānaṁ savikalpam. Bhaṭṭacintāmaṇi*, p. 21.

divides determinate perception into five kinds, according as it apprehends an object as qualified by a genus, a substance, an attribute, an action, and a name.¹¹ These are the views of the Mīmāṃsakas.

Aniruddha maintains that perception is of two kinds, indeterminate and determinate. The Buddhists do not recognize determinate perception. They define perception as a non-erroneous cognition free from imagination (*kalpanā*). Imagination is the apprehension of an object as associated with name, class, and other *vikalpas* or categories. And the so-called determinate perception involves such factors of imagination. So it cannot be regarded as perception. Perception is entirely free from imagination.

Aniruddha criticizes the Buddhist theory of perception. He urges that the Buddhist definition of perception is wrong. Perception is direct and immediate apprehension of an object. It is produced by conditions of direct and immediate knowledge, not vitiated by any defect.¹² And this direct apprehension or perception is either indeterminate or determinate. Indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehension of an object free from all association of name, class, and the like. It is purely presentative in character. It is free from representative elements. But determinate perception is a presentative-representative process. It involves the recollection of name, class, etc., of the object, which were perceived in the past and are brought back to consciousness by the law of similarity. The visual perception of an object reminds us of its name heard in the past; it reminds us of the class to which it belongs, and so on. And this visual perception of an object as having a particular name, and belonging to a particular class, is called by a special name, viz. determinate perception, because it contains an additional factor of representation of name and class.¹³ The Buddhists may argue that the so-called determinate perception involves an element of representation, and so cannot be regarded as perception. But Aniruddha contends that the representative element does no harm to the conditions of perception, nor does it in any way vitiate the perceptual character of the cognition. The name of an object revived

¹¹ Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, p. 21.

¹² Aduṣṭasāksātkāripamājanakasāmagrījanitaṁ pratyakṣam. SSV., i, 89.

¹³ SSV., i, 89.

in memory by the visual perception of it does not vitiate the perceptual character of the determinate cognition. A name is an arbitrary mark of an object. It cannot obscure its intrinsic character.¹⁴ So the determinate perception of an object as bearing a particular name can apprehend its real nature, though it involves the recollection of its name.

Vācaspatimiśra recognizes the distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception. He defines indeterminate perception as the first act of immediate cognition which apprehends an object, pure and simple, devoid of the relationship between the qualified object and its qualifications. And he defines determinate perception as the definite cognition of an object as qualified by its generic character, specific character, and other properties. Indeterminate perception is the function of the external senses ; they give us a non-relational apprehension of an object unqualified by its properties. Determinate perception is the function of *manas* or the central sensory. It distinguishes the generic character from the specific character, and apprehends its object as qualified by them. The external senses are the organs of indeterminate perception, while *manas* is the organ of determinate perception. The external senses apprehend an object as merely 'this', not as 'like this' or 'unlike this'. Assimilation and discrimination which are involved in determinate perception are the functions of *mānas*.¹⁵

Vijñānabhikṣu also distinguishes between indeterminate and determinate perception. But his view is slightly different from that of Vācaspati. According to Vācaspati, we have indeterminate perception through the external senses, which give us only an unconnected mass of presentations, and then we have determinate perception through the internal organ of *manas*, which converts it into a concrete object of perception by assimilation and discrimination. Vijñānabhikṣu, on the other hand, holds that we have both indeterminate and determinate perception through the external senses. *Manas* does not play any part in determinate perception. Up to the stage of determinate perception the external senses do everything. Assimilation and discrimination, analysis and synthesis are not the functions of *manas*, but of the external senses. Vijñānabhikṣu cites the authority of Vyāsa, who holds

¹⁴ Sarvajñā hi smaryamāṇāpi pratyakṣatvaṁ na bādhati.

Samjñānaḥ sū tatasthā hi na rūpācchādanakṣamā.—SSV., i, 89.

¹⁵ STK., 27.

that we perceive an object as endowed with generic and specific characters (*sāmānyaviśeṣātmā*) through the external senses.¹⁶ Vācaspati seems to be in the right. We can hardly ascribe the interpretative processes of assimilation and discrimination to the external senses. They are essentially the functions of *manas*. These are the Sāṃkhya views.

Praśastapada maintains, that just after the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ there is immediate apprehension of the mere form of the object (*svārūpamātra*). This is indeterminate perception. It apprehends an object with its generic and specific characters, but does not distinguish them from each other. It is the primal stage of perception. It is not the result of any other prior cognition. It is not of the nature of resultant cognition.¹⁷

Śrīdhara clearly brings out the characteristics of indeterminate perception. It is the immediate apprehension of the mere form of an object, which is a purely presentative process free from all determinations and representative elements.¹⁸ It apprehends both the generic character and the specific character of its object as an indistinguishable mass. It does not analyse its object into its component qualities, generic and specific, distinguish them from each other, and combine them together by a synthetic act of apperception. It apprehends its object with its generic and specific characters, but does not apprehend the generic character as generic and the specific character as specific, since it apprehends a single individual belonging to a class, and cannot therefore assimilate it to other like objects, and distinguish it from other unlike objects. Thus both generic and specific characters are apprehended by indeterminate perception, but they are not differentiated from each other and recognized as such. It is only at the stage of determinate perception that the generic and specific characters are distinguished from each other, and the object is recognized as belonging to a definite class. If the generic and specific characters were not apprehended by indeterminate perception, they could not be distinguished from each other by determinate perception. Hence it cannot be denied that indeterminate perception apprehends both common and distinctive features of an object. But it cannot

¹⁶ SPB., ii. 32.

¹⁷ *Sāmānyaviśeṣajñānotpattāvibhaktamālocanamātram pratyakṣam pramāṇam asminnānyat pramāṇāntaramasti aphalarūpatvāt.* PBh., p. 187.

¹⁸ *Svarūpasyālocanamātram grahaṇamātram vikalparahitam pratyakṣamātramiti yāvat.* NK., p. 189.

recognize them as such because it is a purely presentative process, and consequently cannot revive the subconscious impressions of other individuals perceived in the past. It cannot recognize the generic character of its object as common to the whole class, and its distinctive characters as peculiar to it alone, which distinguish it from all other objects of the same class.¹⁹ Thus Śrīdhara's view is similar to that of Prabhākara.

Śivāditya agrees with Praśastapada and Śrīdhara in his view on the nature of indeterminate and determinate perception. He defines the former as the apprehension of the bare nature of an object (*vastusvarūpamātra*), and the latter as the apprehension of an object as qualified by its properties (*viśiṣṭa*).²⁰ Śaṅkara Miśra also agrees with Śrīdhara in his view of indeterminate and determinate perception. He holds that in the perception of substances, qualities, and actions there is a determinate consciousness of these individual objects as qualified by their generic characters. And this determinate apprehension presupposes an indeterminate apprehension of the individual objects which are qualified and the generic characters which qualify them. And this indeterminate apprehension is produced by the intercourse of the individual objects (*viśeṣa*) and their generic characters (*sāmānya*) with the sense-organs. This is called indeterminate perception. It apprehends both common characters (*sāmānya*) and individual characters (*viśeṣa*) of its object but not the relation between them. It is only at the stage of determinate perception that this relation is apprehended, and a particular substance, quality, or action is recognized as 'this is a substance', 'this is a quality', or 'this is an action'.²¹ Determinate perception is due to three causes, viz. indeterminate perception of the qualifying properties, intercourse of the qualified object with a sense-organ, and non-apprehension of the absence of connection between the qualified object and its qualifying properties.²² Thus Śaṅkara Miśra's view is substantially the same as that of Śrīdhara. These are the views of the Vaiśeṣika philosophers.

Vātsyāyana recognizes a nameless perception which may be called indeterminate perception. An object may be perceived

¹⁹ NK., pp. 189-190.

¹ SP., p. 68.

²¹ VSU., viii, 1, 6.

²² Viśiṣṭajñāne viśeṣaṇajñānaviśeṣendriyasannikarṣatadubhayaśamsargā-grahasya kāraṇatvāvadharanāt. VSU., viii, 1, 2.

even without an apprehension of its name. When an object is perceived along with its name and their relation to each other, it is said to be apprehended by determinate perception. Determinate perception has the same object as indeterminate perception, but it differs from the latter in apprehending an additional factor, viz. the name of its object revived in memory by association. The former is mixed up with the verbal image of the name of its object, while the latter is free from verbal images.²³

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa discusses the different views of indeterminate perception. (1) Some (e.g. Buddhists) hold that the object of indeterminate perception is the specific individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) as distinct from all other homogeneous and heterogeneous objects.²⁴ (2) Some (e.g. Śaṅkara) hold that the object of indeterminate perception is Being which is the *summum genus*.²⁵ (3) Some (e.g. Śābdikas) hold that the object of indeterminate perception is the word denoting the object, which constitutes its essential nature.²⁶ (4) Others hold that the object of indeterminate perception is a multiform object qualified by the different forms of quality, action, substance, genus, etc.²⁷

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Buddhist view. If indeterminate perception apprehends only the specific individuality of its object, how do its common features suddenly enter into the determinate cognition? In fact, the consciousness of generality must be already imbedded in indeterminate perception, which is only brought to relief by determinate perception. The consciousness of the class-character must be implicit in indeterminate perception.²⁸

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa rejects the Vedāntist view. Mere 'Being' or existence (*sattā*) cannot be regarded as the object of indeterminate perception. For, if it apprehends the mere being or bare existence of its object, how can its particular features be perceived? The existence of an object can never be perceived apart from its different qualities.²⁹

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa rejects the Śābdika view on the ground that indeterminate perception can never apprehend the name of its object, since it presupposes the apprehension of the relation of the

²³ NBh., i, 1, 4.

²⁴ Sajātiya-vijātiya-parāvṛttaṁ svalakṣaṇam. NM., p. 97.

²⁵ Mahāsamānyam sattā. NM., p. 98.

²⁶ Vāgrūpaṁ tattvam. NM., p. 98.

²⁷ Guṇakriyādravyajātibhedādirūṣitaṁ śabalaṁ vastu. NM., p. 98.

²⁸ NM., p. 98.

²⁹ NM., p. 99.

object to its name, and indeterminate perception, being of the nature of non-relational apprehension, can never apprehend any relation. Jayanta's criticism will be given in detail later.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa rejects the fourth view also. It is curious to hold that indeterminate perception has for its objects all the different qualities taken together, viz. quality, action, substantiality, generality, etc. They do not always exist in an object. Sometimes we perceive generality, sometimes substantiality, sometimes action, sometimes quality, and so on. So the object of indeterminate perception cannot be regarded as a multiform object with all its qualifying properties.

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the object of indeterminate perception is essentially the same as that of determinate perception; the only difference between them lies in the fact that the former is devoid of all reference to a name³⁰ and hence free from verbal images, while the latter apprehends the name of its object and is thus mixed up with verbal images. Both types of perception apprehend generality, substantiality, quality, and action. But the former is nameless, dumb and inarticulate, while the latter is vocal and articulate. Thus determinate perception differs from indeterminate perception only in apprehending the name of its object.³¹

Bhāsarvajña defines indeterminate perception as apprehension of the bare nature of an object immediately after peripheral stimulation.³² Thus he agrees with Praśastapāda and Śivāditya. Vāsu-deva points out that immediately after the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ there is no recollection of its relation to a name and other qualifications. So there is only an immediate apprehension of the mere existence of the object apart from its qualities. And this is called indeterminate perception.³³ Jayasimhasūri points out that immediately after sense-object-intercourse there is an immediate apprehension of the bare existence of an object, which is free from recollection and cognition of time and special properties. But, it may be argued, as soon as there is the sense-object-intercourse, determinate perception emerges into consciousness, and we are not conscious of indeterminate perception arising before determinate perception; so there is no indeterminate perception.

³⁰ Śabdollekhavarjita. NM., p. 99.

³¹ NM., p. 99.

³² Vastusvarūpamātrābhāsakam nirvikalpakam yathā prathamākṣaṣan-nipātajam jñānam. NSār., p. 4.

³³ NSPP., p. 15.

But Jayasimhasūri urges that we are not distinctly conscious of indeterminate perception arising before determinate perception in our adult experience because, owing to habit, as soon as indeterminate perception arises, determinate perception supervenes and shuts out the former from our view. This is the reason why, in our adult experience, as soon as we perceive that an object exists we perceive what it is. But we are distinctly conscious of indeterminate perception in perceiving an entirely new object, where habit does not convert indeterminate perception into determinate perception at once.³⁴

Bhāsarvajña defines determinate perception as the apprehension of an object qualified by its qualifications such as name, substance, quality, action, genus, and non-existence. The concept of name (*saṃjñā*) enters into such a determinate perception as 'this is Devadatta'. The concept of substance (*dravya*) enters into such a determinate perception as 'the man is with a stick'. The concept of quality (*guṇa*) enters into such determinate perception as 'the cloth is white'. The concept of action (*karman*) enters into such a determinate perception as 'the man is going'. The concept of genus (*sāmānya*) enters into such a determinate perception as 'this is a cow'. The concept of non-existence (*abhāva*) enters into such a determinate perception as 'the ground is without a jar'.³⁵

According to Varadarāja, indeterminate perception apprehends an object in itself devoid of all qualifications such as name, class, substance, quality, action, and the like; and determinate perception apprehends an object as qualified by these qualifications.³⁶

Vāsudeva raises an interesting question. What is the organ of determinate perception? Is it the external sense-organs or the internal organ of *manas*? If the same external sense-organ apprehends the qualified object (*viśeṣya*) and its qualifications (*viśeṣaṇa*), then this sense-organ is the organ of determinate perception. But if the qualified object and its qualifications are apprehended by different external sense-organs, then the internal organ or *manas* should be regarded as the organ of determinate perception. For example, the visual organ is the organ of the determinate perception of a white cloth, because it apprehends the

³⁴ 'Abhyāsadaśāyāṁ savikalpaśāśvāpādītvānnirvikalpānupalambhe' pyanabhyāsadaśāyāṁ tasya sphuṭopalambhāt. NTD., p. 86.

³⁵ NSPP., p. 14.

³⁶ TR., p. 60.

cloth as well as its white colour. But the *manas* is the organ of the determinate perception of an object with a name such as 'this is Devadatta', because 'this' is apprehended by the visual organ which cannot apprehend its name, and because the name is remembered by the *manas*. The *manas* also is the organ of the determinate perception of a fragrant flower, because the flower is apprehended by the visual organ, and its fragrance by the olfactory organ. The *manas* synthesizes the discrete presentations of the flower and its fragrance given by two different sense-organs into the composite percept of a fragrant flower. This is a type of apperception.³⁷

Keśavamiśra describes the process of perception as follows. The self comes into contact with the *manas*. The *manas* comes into contact with a sense-organ. And the sense-organ comes into contact with an object. The sense-organ can manifest an object when it gets at, and is related to, the object. Then immediately after the sense-object-intercourse there arises an indeterminate perception of an object as 'this is *something*'. It is the apprehension of the mere existence of the object devoid of all its qualifications such as name, class, and the like. It is followed by determinate perception. It is the apprehension of the object as qualified by name, class, and other qualifications. It apprehends the relation between the qualified object and the qualifications. It connects them together by the subject-predicate relation. Indeterminate perception is vague and abstract. Determinate perception is definite and concrete. The former is the apprehension of an object as something. The latter is the apprehension of an object as having a certain name, as belonging to a certain class, or as having a certain quality.³⁸

Keśavamiśra raises an interesting question here. There are three factors in the production of an effect. There is an instrument (*karana*); there is an operation of the instrument (*vyāpāra*); and there is a result of the instrument (*phala*). When a tree is cut by an axe, the axe is the instrument of cutting; the conjunction of the axe with the tree is the operation of the axe; and the cutting of the tree is the result. So in every act of perception there are three factors. When we have indeterminate perception just after sense-object-contact, the sense-organ is the instrument

³⁷ NSPP., p. 14.

³⁸ TBh., p. 5.

(*karāṇa*) of indeterminate perception, the sense-object-contact is the operation (*vyāpāra*) or intermediate agency, and indeterminate perception is the result (*phala*) of the operation. When we have determinate perception after indeterminate perception, the sense-object-intercourse is the instrument (*karāṇa*), indeterminate perception is the intermediate agency (*vyāpāra*), and determinate perception is the result (*phala*). When after determinate perception we perceive that the object ought to be accepted, or rejected, or neither accepted nor rejected, indeterminate perception is the instrument (*karāṇa*), determinate perception is the intermediate agency (*vyāpāra*), and the apprehension of acceptability, rejectability, or neutrality of the object is the result (*phala*).³⁹

Gaṅgeśa defines indeterminate perception as the non-relational apprehension of an object free from all associations of name, genus, and the like. Viśvanātha elaborates the view of Gaṅgeśa. He defines indeterminate perception as the apprehension of an object and its generic character as unrelated to each other immediately after the intercourse of a sense-organ with the object. For instance, immediately after the contact of a jar with the visual organ we cannot perceive it as belonging to the class of jars; we perceive the mere jar (*ghaṭa*) and mere jariness (genus of jar, *ghaṭatva*) without their mutual connection.⁴⁰ It is only by determinate perception that we can apprehend the relation between an object and its generic character, and perceive it as belonging to a particular class.

According to Viśvanātha, indeterminate perception is not an object of perception. It is a non-relational mode of consciousness. It apprehends an object and its generic character, but not the relation between them. It does not apprehend any subject-predicate relation. And since it is purely non-relational in character, it cannot be appropriated by the self. A cognition can be appropriated by the self only when it apprehends a property (*ghaṭatva*) as qualifying an object (*ghaṭa*). For instance, when the self has the determinate perception of a jar as qualified by its generic character, it can appropriate it and distinctly apprehend it as its own experience. Here the cognition of the jar qualifies the self-appropriated cognition (*anuvyavasāya*). The jar qualifies

³⁹ TC., vol. i, p. 809.

⁴⁰ Prathamataḥ ghaṭaghaṭatvayorvaliṣṭyānavagāhi jñānaḥ jāyate, tadeva nirvikalpam. SM., 58.

the cognition of the jar. And the generic character of the jar (*ghaṭatva*) qualifies the jar. All these qualifications qualify the self-appropriated determinate perception of the jar. But in indeterminate perception there is no apprehension of any qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) as qualifying an object (*viśeṣya*). Though it apprehends an object and its generic character, it does not apprehend the relation between them. It cannot apprehend the object as qualified by its generic character. So in indeterminate perception of a jar its generic character is not the qualification (*prakāra*) of consciousness; and unless there is a qualification of consciousness, it cannot be appropriated by the self and be an object of distinct apprehension. Indeterminate perception is not an object of perception. It is supersensuous and imperceptible.⁴¹

Annambhaṭṭa defines indeterminate perception as the immediate apprehension of an object with its properties without apprehending the relation between them.⁴² He defines determinate perception as the apprehension of the relation between the qualified object (*viśeṣya*) and its qualifications (*viśeṣaṇa*), viz. name, genus, and the like.⁴³ Nīlakaṇṭha holds a slightly different view. He holds that indeterminate perception is the mere apprehension of an object (*viśeṣya*), its qualifications (*viśeṣaṇa*), and the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) without their mutual connection. It does not recognize its object as a qualified thing (*viśeṣya*), its qualifications as qualifications (*viśeṣaṇa*), and the relation of inherence as subsisting between the two. The mutual connection among these elements is apprehended by determinate perception. Thus unlike Viśvanātha and Annambhaṭṭa, Nīlakaṇṭha makes the relation of inherence also an object of indeterminate perception, though not the connection of this relation with the qualified object and the qualifications.⁴⁴ But he agrees with them in regarding indeterminate perception as an immediate sensory presentation of an object. These are the views of the Naiyāyikas.

Dharmarājadhvarīndra, the author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, also holds that indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehension of an object without apprehending its relations; but it may not be sensuous in character.⁴⁵ The cognitions produced by such

⁴¹ SM., 58.

⁴² Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandhānavagāhī jñānam. TSD., p. 30.

⁴³ Nāmajāryādiviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasambandhānavagāhī jñānam. Ibid., p. 30.

⁴⁴ TSN., p. 42.

⁴⁵ Nirvikalpakarṇ tu sarvasargānavagāhī jñānam. VP., p. 89.

sentences as 'this is Devadatta', 'that thou art', etc., are indeterminate perceptions. Determinate perception is the relational apprehension of an object such as 'I know the jar'.⁴⁶ But how can these cognitions be perceptual in character, since they are not produced by the sense-organs? Are they not verbal cognitions, since they are produced by sentences? Dharmarājādhvarīndra argues, the perceptual character of a cognition does not lie in its sensuous origin, but in the identification of the apprehending mode (*pramāṇa-caitanya*) with the apprehended object (*prameya-caitanya*), which is capable of being perceived and present at the time of the cognition. And these characteristics of perception are found also in a cognition produced by such a sentence as 'this is Devadatta'. In this case, Devadatta, the apprehended object, is present to the apprehending mental mode which goes out to the object and identifies itself with its object. So the cognition produced by such a sentence as 'this is Devadatta' satisfies all the conditions of perception, and consequently must be regarded as perceptual in character. Likewise, in the cognition produced by such a sentence as 'that thou art', the cognizing self itself becomes the object of cognition so that there is an identification of the apprehending mental mode with the apprehended object. Hence this cognition also must be regarded as perceptual in character. It may be objected: How can the cognition of such a proposition as 'that thou art' be indeterminate in character? Does it not apprehend the relation between the subject and the predicate? Does it not apprehend the meaning of the subject, the meaning of the predicate, and the relation between the two? If it does not apprehend the relation between the two terms of the proposition, it cannot understand the meaning of the proposition. If it apprehends the relation between the two, then it cannot be regarded as an indeterminate perception. Dharmarājādhvarīndra argues that it is not necessary to apprehend the meaning of the subject, the meaning of the predicate and the relation between the two to comprehend the meaning of a proposition. If we can understand only the intention of the speaker, we can understand the meaning of a proposition. The import of a proposition, therefore, is not always understood by apprehending the relation between the different parts of the proposition. Moreover, according to the Śāṅkarite, the proposition 'that thou art' is

⁴⁶ *Savikalpakarṇa vaidiṣṭyāvagāhi jñānam*. VP., p. 89.

an analytical proposition; it is not a synthetic proposition as Rāmānuja and Madhva hold. There is no synthetic relation between the subject and the predicate of this proposition; but there is simply an identity of essence or co-essentiality between the subject and the predicate. In this proposition there is no relation of conjunction, inherence, cause and effect, or any other kind of relation; such a proposition is called an *akhaṇḍārtha* proposition, the import of which can be understood without apprehending the relations among its different parts. Hence the perception of the import of such a proposition as 'that thou art' does not apprehend the relation between its subject and predicate; and, therefore, it is non-relational or indeterminate.⁴⁷ Thus, according to the Neo-Sāṃkarite, any non-relational consciousness of a presentative character, in which there is an identification of the apprehending mental mode with the apprehended object, be it produced by the sense-organs or not, must be regarded as an indeterminate perception.⁴⁸ This is the Neo-Sāṃkarite view.

But Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī differs from other Sāṃkarites. He does not recognize the distinction of indeterminate and determinate perception. The Vaiśeṣikas divide perception into two kinds, viz. indeterminate perception and determinate perception, and regard the former as non-relational apprehension and the latter as relational apprehension. But this view is wrong. There is no proof for the existence of nameless indeterminate perception.⁴⁹ The Vaiśeṣikas argue that indeterminate perception is inferred from determinate perception as its invariable condition. Determinate perception is the apprehension of an object as qualified by its properties. But there can be no perception of an object as qualified, unless there is already the perception of its qualifying properties, which is indeterminate. This argument is wrong. The determinate perception of a qualified object is not produced by the indeterminate perception of the qualifications but by the intercourse of the qualifications with the sense-organs.⁵⁰ So the hypothesis of indeterminate perception is gratuitous. Mahādevānanda's view resembles the Sābdika view.

According to Rāmānuja, both indeterminate perception and determinate perception apprehend objects affected with difference.

⁴⁷ VP., pp. 90-101, and Śikhāmaṇi.

⁴⁸ Chapter VIII.

⁴⁹ *Asābdanirvikalpa-jñāne mānābhāvāt. Tattvānusandhāna.* ACK., p. 141.

⁵⁰ *Viśeṣaṇasannikarṣādviśiṣṭajñānopapattēh. Ibid., p. 141.*

Indeterminate perception is not the apprehension of an absolutely unqualified and undifferentenced object or mere 'Being', as Śāṅkara holds, nor the apprehension of a qualified object and its qualifications unrelated to each other, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsaka hold, but it consists in the apprehension of an object *qualified* by some difference or qualification. It can never apprehend an object devoid of all difference or qualifications, but of *some* qualifications.⁵¹ We never perceive an entirely unqualified object, and, moreover, it is impossible; for discrimination is the most fundamental condition of all consciousness, and consequently no consciousness is possible without some distinction. We can never perceive an object without apprehending some special feature of the object, e.g. the particular arrangement of its parts (*saṁsthāna-viśeṣa*). We can never perceive a cow without apprehending the peculiar arrangement of her parts, e.g. dewlap and the like. Indeterminate perception must apprehend an object qualified by some qualities, e.g. its generic character in the shape of a particular configuration (*saṁsthāna*) of its parts, etc., because in determinate perception only those qualities which were apprehended by indeterminate perception are remembered and recognized.⁵² The only difference between indeterminate perception and determinate perception lies in the fact that the former is the perception of the first individual among a number of objects belonging to the same class, while the latter is the perception of the second individual, the third individual, and so on. In the perception of the first cow, there is indeed the apprehension of the class-character of the cow in the shape of her particular configuration, viz. dewlap and the like, but there is no consciousness of this generic character being common to all the cows, since there is no perception of other cows except the first cow in indeterminate perception. But in the perception of the second individual, the third individual, and so on, this generic character is recognized as the common character of the whole class. In the indeterminate perception of the first individual there is an apprehension of its generic character in the shape of a particular arrangement of parts, but it is not recognized as common to the whole class. Thus what was indeterminate in the perception of

⁵¹ Nirvikalpakaṁ nāma kenacidviśeṣa viyuktasya grahaṇaṁ na sarvaviśeṣarahitasya. R.B., I, 1, 1.

⁵² Nirvikalpamāpi saviśeṣaviśayameva, savikalpake svasminnanubhūta-padārthaviśiṣṭapratibandhānetutvāt. R.B., I, 1, 1.

the first individual of a class becomes determinate in the perception of the second individual, the third individual, and so on. Hence, the former is called indeterminate perception, and the latter, determinate perception. In indeterminate perception there is the apprehension of the generic character in the shape of a particular structure, since an object having a structure (*saṁsthānin*) can never be perceived apart from its structure (*saṁsthāna*). In determinate perception we perceive in addition to the object possessing a structure, and the structure itself, the character of the structure as being common to the whole class.⁵³

Veṅkaṭanātha elaborates the view of Rāmānuja. He defines indeterminate perception as perception devoid of recognition, and determinate perception as perception involving recognition. The former is pure perception, while the latter is recognitive perception. The former is a presentative process, while the latter is a presentative-representative process.⁵⁴ The object of both indeterminate and determinate perception is qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) or affected with difference. Indeterminate perception does not apprehend an unqualified object as some suppose. We are never conscious of a cognition apprehending an unqualified object. Nor is there a proof for its existence. It is generally held that perceptions of the dumb, babies, and animals are nameless and indeterminate, and apprehend unqualified objects.⁵⁵ Veṅkaṭanātha admits that these perceptions are indeterminate and devoid of the apprehension of names. But he does not admit that they apprehend unqualified objects. Babies and animals do not, of course, perceive objects as having particular names. But they do perceive them as having certain qualities. They never perceive unqualified objects. They react to different objects in different ways. They appropriate those objects which are beneficial to them, and avoid those which are injurious to them. This clearly proves that they never perceive objects without qualities.

The Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas and others hold that indeterminate perception apprehends an unqualified object. But Veṅkaṭanātha asks: Does it apprehend an unqualified object because it does not apprehend the qualifications (*viśeṣaṇa*), or the

⁵³ R.B., i, 1, 1.

⁵⁴ *Sapratyavamarśapratyakṣaṇaṁ savikalpam. Tadrahitaṁ pratyakṣaṁ nirvikalpam.* NP., p. 77.

⁵⁵ *SV.*, iv. 112.

qualified object (*viśeṣya*), or the relation between the two (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyasambandha*)? It does apprehend qualifications. We can never have a cognition without an object. An objectless cognition is a logical abstraction. It is never a concrete fact of experience. And no cognition of an object, pure and simple, without qualifications is possible. So indeterminate perception cannot but apprehend objects with their qualifications. In fact, even the Naiyāyika admits that indeterminate perception apprehends objects and their qualifications, but not their relation to each other. But what is the nature of this relation? It is either inherence or *svarūpa-sambandha*. If it is inherence, as the Naiyāyika supposes, why should he hold that it is apprehended by determinate perception, and not by indeterminate perception? There is nothing to hinder the apprehension of the relation of inherence by indeterminate perception. If it apprehends the qualified object (*dharmin*) and the qualifications (*dharma*) through the sense-organs because of their fitness (*yogyatā*) and intercourse with the sense-organs, it may as well apprehend the relation of inherence between them for the same reason. If the relation cannot be apprehended by indeterminate perception, it can neither be apprehended by determinate perception. The Naiyāyika should not arbitrarily reserve the apprehension of the relation of inherence for determinate perception. If the relation between the qualified object and the qualifications is *svarūpa-sambandha*, then as soon as indeterminate perception apprehends them it also apprehends the relation between them. *Svarūpa-sambandha* is not an external relation. It is internal and constitutive. It constitutes the essence of the terms it relates. So as soon as indeterminate perception apprehends the terms of the relation, it also apprehends the relation between them. Thus indeterminate perception apprehends not only the qualified object and the qualifications but also the relation between them.⁵⁶ Both indeterminate and determinate perceptions are of the nature of relational consciousness, and apprehend qualified objects. The only difference between them lies in the fact that the former is free from representative elements, while the latter involves memory and recognition.⁵⁷

Indeterminate perception, according to Śaṅkara, is a purely non-relational apprehension which apprehends the mere 'Being'

⁵⁶ Cf. Nīlakaṇṭha.

⁵⁷ NP., pp. 77-80.

(*sattā*). The Buddhist makes it more determinate by regarding the specific individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) as its object. The indeterminate perception of Kumārila also is more determinate than that of Śaṅkara, since it apprehends an individual object in which the generic character and the specific character subsist. Prabhākara and Śrīdhara make it more determinate, since they make it apprehend the generic character and the specific character as undistinguished from each other. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa makes it more determinate, and regards it as a nameless perception which apprehends generality, quality, action, etc. Pārthasārathimīśra makes it more determinate since he makes it apprehend an object with its multiple forms such as genus, substance, quality, action, and name, but not in subject-predicate relation. The Śaṅkarite, the Buddhist, the Sāṃkhya, the Mīmāṃsaka, and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regard indeterminate perception as non-relational apprehension.

But Rāmānuja regards it as relational apprehension, which apprehends the generic character of an object in the shape of a structure (*saṃsthāna*) and also the relation of the structure to the object itself. Indeterminate perception apprehends an object not devoid of all qualifications but as qualified by some qualifications. It apprehends the *relation* between its object and some qualifications. Venkaṭanātha also holds that indeterminate perception apprehends not only the qualified object and its qualifications, but also relation between them. Thus the Rāmānujist does not regard indeterminate perception as a non-relational mode of consciousness, as all others hold, but as a relational experience. This is almost a denial of indeterminate perception. But if the indeterminate perception of the Rāmānujist has a semblance of indeterminateness, Madhva, Vallabha, and Bhartṛhari deny the possibility of indeterminate perception altogether.

The Mādhva Vedāntist regards all perception as determinate. He defines perception as the concrete apprehension of an object with its determinate forms. It is of eight kinds. It may be the apprehension of an object as qualified by a substance, or a quality, or an action, or a name, or generality, or particularity, or inherence, or non-existence. Perception is always concrete and determinate; it is never without any form. The Mādhva Vedāntist does not recognize formless, indeterminate, non-relational apprehension.⁵³

⁵³ *Pramāṇapaddhati*, p. 11, quoted in Nyāyakośa (1893), pp. 896—7.

The Vallabhite also does not admit the possibility of indeterminate perception. Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja, a follower of Vallabha, asserts that all knowledge is determinate. All knowledge is in the form of judgment, and all judgment involves a subject-predicate relation. So perceptual judgment also is a determinate relational consciousness involving a subject-predicate relation. Determinate relational consciousness does not presuppose indeterminate consciousness of the terms of the relation. The consciousness of the terms of the relation is as determinate as the consciousness of the relation. For example, determinate perception of a man with a stick does not presuppose indeterminate perception of the stick, but definite and determinate perception of it. Otherwise the stick can never be used as a term of the relation.⁵⁹ Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja recognizes two kinds of determinate perception: (1) *viśiṣṭabuddhi*, and (2) *samūhāvalambana*. *Viśiṣṭa-buddhi* is the determinate apprehension of an object as qualified by some properties. It may assume another form called *viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-buddhi*. It is the qualified form of determinate apprehension. It apprehends an object (e.g. man) qualified by a qualification (*daṇḍin*), which again is qualified by another qualification (*daṇḍa*). *Viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-buddhi* is more complex than *viśiṣṭa-buddhi*. Both are determinate and relational consciousness. The former is qualified relational consciousness, while the latter is unqualified relational consciousness. *Viśiṣṭa-buddhi* apprehends the relation between a subject and a predicate. *Viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-buddhi* apprehends the relation between a subject and a predicate, which, in its turn, involves a subject-predicate relation. *Samūhāvalambanabuddhi* is the determinate consciousness of the relation of a qualified object and its qualification, e.g. a man, a stick, and the conjunction between them. It assumes another form. The determinate consciousness of a collection of objects such as a jar, a cloth, and a pillar is qualified form of *samūhāvalambanabuddhi* or combining consciousness. It is called *viśiṣṭa-samūhāvalambanabuddhi*.⁶⁰

3. The Sābdika denial of Indeterminate Perception

According to Bhartṛhari, an object is identical with its name; so when an object is apprehended, it is apprehended

⁵⁹ FR., p. 9.

⁶⁰ FR., p. 13.

along with its name. There can be no thought without language. All cognitions are, as it were, interpenetrated by names. Even children and dumb persons perceive objects along with their names known in their previous births. Hence there can be no nameless or indeterminate perception.⁶¹ Further, the Śābdikas argue that all practical uses and actions follow upon determinate perceptions; hence there is no need of assuming the existence of indeterminate perception.⁶²

Vācaspatimiśra elaborately criticizes the Śābdika doctrine. If objects are identical with their names, as the Śābdika holds, are they identical with the eternal sound (*śabda Brahma*) or with conventional words which are heard? The first alternative is untenable. We never perceive the identity of sensible sounds with the supersensible eternal sound. The second alternative also cannot be maintained. If objects are identical with their names, then children and dumb persons can never perceive objects, since they never perceive names. It is absurd to hold that they perceive the identity of objects with their names heard in their past lives. Moreover, different cognitions are produced by different objects, and not by different names. A visual perception can apprehend only a colour; it can never apprehend a sound or a name. Likewise an auditory perception can apprehend only a sound; it can never apprehend a colour. If an object, say, a colour, were identical with its name, then a blind man would perceive colour through his auditory organ as he perceives its name through it; and a deaf man also would perceive a name through his visual organ as he perceives the object through it. But this is absurd. Hence Vācaspatimiśra concludes that those who have not yet learned the meanings of words, or the relation of words to their objects, must have nameless, indeterminate perception of objects. Even those who are well versed in the meanings of words, have at first a nameless, indeterminate perception of an object, which revives the subconscious impression of its name perceived in the past, and, together with the recollection of the name, forms determinate perception.⁶³

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa wrongly represents the Śābdika view of percep-

⁶¹ Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādrte. Anuviddhamiva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena gamyate. VPD., i. 123.

⁶² Vyavasāyātmakatvena sarvasya vyavahārayogyatrāt. NK., 189. HIP., I, pp. 474-5.

⁶³ NVTT., pp. 83-4. HIP., I, pp. 475-6.

tion and criticizes it. He says that according to some, the object of indeterminate perception is the word or name which constitutes the essence of the object.⁶⁴ Evidently he refers to the *Śābdika* doctrine here, according to which, all cognitions apprehend objects together with their names; there is no nameless apprehension. Indeterminate perception, which is supposed to be nameless, is impossible. So the *Śābdika* does not hold that the object of indeterminate perception is the word or name, but he denies the existence of indeterminate perception altogether. However, Jayanta argues that the *Śābdika* is wrong in holding that all cognitions apprehend objects with their names because they constitute their very essence. Indeterminate perception can never apprehend the name of an object. If we perceive an object through the visual organ, it is absurd to suppose that we perceive also its name through it. A name can never be an object of visual perception. Moreover, we can never comprehend the meaning of a name unless we apprehend the relation between the name and the object denoted by it. There can never be the comprehension of a name, if the relation between the name and its object has not already been apprehended, or if being perceived in the past it is forgotten, or the impression left by the previous perception is not revived. But in indeterminate perception the relation between its object and its name is not apprehended; nor does it revive the name in memory by association. It is a purely non-relational presentative cognition. Hence it cannot apprehend the name of an object.⁶⁵

Varadarāja also repeats the arguments of Vācaspati and Jayanta. The *Śābdika* doctrine, that there can be no cognition of an object without its name, contradicts an actual fact of experience. We do perceive an object even without knowing its name. And even if we know the name of an object, at first we perceive the object in itself, apart from its name, just after its contact with a sense-organ, and then remember its name perceived in the past. The object was seen in the past and its name was heard, and the relation between them was perceived. Thus an association was established between the idea of the object and the idea of its name. Now just after peripheral stimulation the object is perceived apart from its name; and then the perception of the object reminds us of its name. And when the name is remembered, the object is

⁶⁴ Vāgrūpam apare tattvaṃ prameyaṃ tasya manvate. NM., p. 98.

⁶⁵ NM., p. 99. HIP., I, pp. 476-7.

perceived as qualified by its name. And this is determinate perception. The recollection of the name is due to no other condition than indeterminate perception of the object apart from its name owing to association and revival of the subconscious impression of the name.⁶⁶ Thus determinate perception of an object qualified by its name presupposes indeterminate perception of the object in itself apart from its name.⁶⁷

4. *Proof of the Existence of Indeterminate Perception*

Pārthasārathimiśra argues that the denial of indeterminate perception is contradicted by our experience. Just after the contact of an object with the sense-organ we do experience an immediate cognition of an object devoid of all relations, viz. the relation between the qualified and the qualifications, in which there is not yet a differentiation of the generic characters from the specific characters.⁶⁸ If there were no indeterminate perception there would be no determinate perception too. For determinate perception is the apprehension of the relation between the qualified object and the qualifying properties, and the apprehension of this relation depends upon the previous perception of the terms of the relation, viz. the qualified object and the qualifications. Unless these are implicitly known together by indeterminate perception they can never be differentiated from, and related to, each other by determinate perception. So indeterminate perception must be the invariable antecedent of determinate perception. In the determinate perception of an object we remember the particular class to which it belongs and the particular name which it bears, which were already apprehended implicitly by indeterminate perception, and refer them to the object present to the sense-organs.⁶⁹ If the class and the name were not perceived at all, they could never be remembered. Hence we must admit the existence of indeterminate perception.

The Neo-Naiyāyikas hold that indeterminate perception is not an object of perception. There can be no perception of

⁶⁶ Saṃjñānirvikalpakameva sāhacaryāt saṃskārod bodhadvārā pratiyogisaṃjñāsmṛtihetuḥ. Śārasaṃgraha on TR., p. 62.

⁶⁷ TR., pp. 61-2.

⁶⁸ Pratīto hi vāyamaśasannipātānantaramaviviktasāmānyaviśeṣabhāgaṃ sammugdhavastumātragocaramālocanaññānam. SD., p. 125.

⁶⁹ Vikalpayatā hi pūrvānubhūtaṃ jātiviśeṣaṃ saṃjñāviśeṣaṃ cānuṣṛtya tena puraścchitaṃ vastu vikalpayitavyam. SD., p. 125.

indeterminate perception, because there can be no self-appropriation (*anuvyavasāya*) of it. Indeterminate perception is purely non-relational in character ; if it were related to the self, it would cease to be non-relational and indeterminate. It can be known only by inference. The determinate perception of an object as qualified by some qualifications presupposes an indeterminate perception of the qualifications of the object, without which there can be no determinate perception. Viśvanātha's argument has already been given in detail. If it is urged that the perception of the qualifications also is determinate, then it would presuppose the perception of the qualifications of those qualifications and so on *ad infinitum*. To avoid this infinite regress we must admit that the perception of the qualifications of an object, which is presupposed by the determinate perception of the object as qualified by the qualifications, is indeterminate.⁷⁰ Jānakīnātha elaborates this argument further. The cognition of a qualified object (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) presupposes the cognition of qualifications (*viśeṣaṇajñāna*), which is its cause. And this cognition is indeterminate. When we have a determinate perception 'this is a jar', the jar is perceived as possessed of its generic character. This perceptual judgment presupposes the cognition of the genus of jar (*ghaṭatva* or jariness). If there were no cognition of the qualification (jariness) there would not be the cognition of the qualified object (e.g. 'this is a jar'). And when there is the cognition of the mere qualification (jariness), there is not yet the cognition of a qualified object. The apprehension of the qualification is entirely indeterminate. This is indeterminate perception. It is presupposed by determinate perception. It is childish to argue that the determinate cognition of the qualification (jariness) in the past life is the cause of determinate perception of a qualified object in this life, because the cause must be an immediate antecedent of the effect. A cognition in the past life has nothing to do with a cognition in this life. It is also foolish to argue that the divine cognition of the qualification (jariness) is the cause of the determinate perception of the jar, since the two cognitions of the qualified object and the qualification abide in different substrata ; they must co-inhere in the same substratum to be related to each other as cause and effect. The cognition of a qualification (e.g. a stick) in one

⁷⁰ Viśiṣṭajñānam viśeṣaṇajñānanyam viśiṣṭajñānatvāt danditijñānavat. Viśeṣaṇajñānasyāpi savikalpatve anavasthāprasāṅgāt nirvikalpasiddhiḥ. TSD., p. 42.

person is not the cause of the cognition of a qualified object (e.g. a man with a stick) in another person. The determinate recollection of the qualification (jarness) also cannot be the cause of the determinate perception of a qualified object (jar). Even this determinate cognition is not possible without the cognition of qualifications. A determinate cognition is always produced by the cognition of qualifications. And even the determinate recollection is not possible without the previous cognition of qualifications. The recollection of the qualification cannot be indeterminate. There can be no recollection without previous perception. And if there is no determinate perception of the qualification, there can be no recollection of it. Recollection depends upon previous perception. If it depends upon previous recollection, it will lead to infinite regress. Besides, if the qualification is not remembered, the determinate perception of a qualified object is not possible. And the conditions of the determinate perception of a qualified object being absent, and the conditions of the immediate apprehension of the qualifications (e.g. jar and the genus of jar) being present, there is nothing to hinder the production of the immediate apprehension of the qualifications. And this immediate apprehension is called indeterminate perception.⁷¹

Let us briefly review the main doctrines of indeterminate and determinate perception. According to the older Naiyāyikas, indeterminate perception is the perception of an object without a name, while determinate perception is the perception of an object together with its name. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa emphasizes this doctrine in unequivocal terms. The object of indeterminate perception is essentially the same as that of determinate perception; the only difference between them lies in the fact that the former apprehends an object without a name, while the latter apprehends an object together with its name; both of them apprehend substance, generality, quality, and action.⁷² But according to Śrīdhara, Prabhākara, Pārthasārathimīśra, Neo-Naiyāyikas, and Neo-Śaṅkarites, indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehension of an object and its qualifications without their mutual relation, while determinate perception is the apprehension of an object as qualified by its qualifications with their mutual relations. Indeterminate perception is an undifferentiated and non-relational mode of apprehension, while determinate perception is a relational and discriminative

⁷¹ NSM., pp. 20-5.

⁷² NM., p. 99.

apprehension of an object. In indeterminate perception we are merely conscious of the terms of relations in an object viz. generality, particularity, substantiality, quality, action, etc.; but we are not conscious of the relations among the terms. Indeterminate perception apprehends an object and its qualifications as mere *thats*, and not as *whats*, while determinate perception apprehends them as *whats*. In the language of William James, in indeterminate perception we have a 'knowledge of acquaintance' with the 'bare immediate natures' without their relations, while in determinate perception we have a 'knowledge-about' them and of their relations *inter se*.

5. *Proof of the Existence of Determinate Perception*

The Buddhists deny the perceptual character of the determinate cognition following upon a peripheral stimulation, and regard indeterminate cognition alone as truly perceptual in character. According to them, perception is always indeterminate; the determinate cognition following upon an indeterminate perception cannot be regarded as perceptual in character, since it depends upon the recollection of the name denoting its object, and not upon the direct contact of an object with a sense-organ. Between peripheral stimulation and the determinate cognition of an object there is an intervening factor of the recollection of the name of the object. The determinate cognition, therefore, is not directly produced by peripheral stimulation but by the recollection of the name of its object; it is not a purely sensory presentation but a complex of a sensory presentation and a memory-image; it is not purely presentative but presentative-representative.⁷³ This objection of the Buddhists is more apparent than real. Peripheral stimulation is the principal cause of the determinate cognition, and the recollection of the name is only an auxiliary cause. Peripheral stimulation by itself cannot produce a determinate cognition; it requires the help of the recollection of the name of the object to bring about a determinate cognition.⁷⁴ A determinate cognition is produced by peripheral stimulation, for the sense-organ continues to operate at the time of this cognition, and produces a direct presentation of an object. Thus a determinate cognition is perceptual in character, because it is produced by peripheral stimulation which does not cease at the time of the determinate cognition, and because it

⁷³ NK., p. 191.

⁷⁴ NK., pp. 191—2.

consists in the direct presentation of an object, which is not possible without peripheral stimulation.⁷⁵ Thus, though a determinate cognition apprehends an object connected with a name, it cannot but be regarded as perceptual in character, because it is produced by peripheral stimulation and brings about a direct and distinct manifestation of its object, as an indeterminate cognition does.⁷⁶ The Buddhists contend that a determinate cognition is not a direct presentation ; that it is an indirect cognition of its object, since it is not directly produced by peripheral stimulation. Śrīdhara argues : Cognitions are indirect whenever they are not produced by peripheral stimulation or the contact of an object with a sense-organ, as we find in the case of inferential cognitions ; but a determinate cognition is produced by peripheral stimulation ; hence it cannot be regarded as an indirect cognition. The Buddhists may argue, a cognition is non-perceptual, if it is preceded by recollection, like an inferential cognition ; a determinate cognition is preceded by recollection, and hence it is non-perceptual in character. Śrīdhara criticizes it. If sensuousness is ever perceived, it is perceived only in a determinate cognition, and hence it cannot be denied.⁷⁷ And a determinate cognition is perceptual in character, not only because it is produced by peripheral stimulation, and directly manifests an object, but also because we find in it no such factors as inferential mark and so forth as we find in inference.⁷⁸

The Buddhists argue that it is self-contradictory to assert that a cognition is determinate (*vikalpa*) and, at the same time, a direct presentation (*aparokṣāvabhāsa*). A direct presentation consists in the apprehension of the specific individuality of an object (*svalakṣaṇa*), and the specific individuality is apprehended only by indeterminate perception, and not by determinate cognition. A determinate cognition apprehends an object connected with a word ; and because a word is not connected with the specific individuality, being a conventional sign for many objects in general, a determinate cognition cannot apprehend the specific individuality of an object. If a word could denote the specific individuality of an object, it would bring about a direct presentation of it even without the operation of the sense-organs, and we should have a perception

⁷⁵ Savikalpamāpyanuparatendriyavyāpārasya jñāyamānamaparokṣāvabhāsa-
satvāt pratyakṣameva. *ŚD.*, p. 119. See also *PP.*, p. 56.

⁷⁶ *NK.*, p. 193.

⁷⁷ *NK.*, p. 193.

⁷⁸ *NK.*, p. 191.

of it. But, in fact, it does not bring about a direct presentation. Hence a determinate cognition, too, which apprehends an object connected with a word, cannot apprehend its specific individuality. And because it cannot apprehend the specific individuality of an object, it is not a direct presentation (*aparokṣāvabhāsa*), and because it is not a direct presentation, it is not a distinct cognition or perception (*viśadāvabhāsa*).⁷⁹ But when we see a cow with our eyes wide open and have a determinate perception such as 'this is a cow', is it not a direct presentation (*aparokṣāvabhāsa*) or a distinct perception (*viśadāvabhāsa*)? The Buddhists urge that such a determinate cognition is not really a direct and distinct presentation, but it appears to be so, inasmuch as it borrows a semblance of directness (*āparokṣya*) and distinctness (*viśadya*) from its connection with the immediately preceding indeterminate perception, which is a direct and distinct presentation of the specific individuality of its object.⁸⁰ If the directness or distinctness of a determinate cognition following upon an indeterminate perception were not derived from its connection with the immediately preceding indeterminate perception—if it were not an adventitious mark of a determinate cognition but its intrinsic character, then even verbal and inferential cognitions too, which are not connected with indeterminate perceptions, would be regarded as direct cognitions because they are determinate cognitions. But they are regarded by none as direct cognitions. Hence only the indeterminate cognition of the specific individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) produced by peripheral stimulation is perceptual in character; the determinate cognition following upon an indeterminate perception cannot be regarded as perceptual in nature, since it contains representative elements and is not of the nature of a direct and distinct cognition. There is only indeterminate perception, and no determinate perception.

Pārthasārathimīśra criticizes the Buddhist view. When we perceive a cow with our eyes wide open, we have a direct apprehension of the cow as a cow; we feel it as a direct presentation. And the directness of this presentation is not an adventitious character of the determinate cognition due to its connection with an indeterminate perception, as the Buddhists suppose, but it is an intrinsic character of the determinate cognition, constituting its essential nature. And it cannot be proved that the directness of the determinate cognition is due to its connection with an indeterminate

⁷⁹ ŚD., pp. 119-120.

⁸⁰ ŚD., p. 121.

perception. The Buddhists labour under a misconception that directness or indirectness of a cognition is due to the nature of its object, when they argue that a cognition is direct if it apprehends the specific individual, and that a cognition is indirect if it fails to apprehend the specific individual. Were it so, then generality (*sāmānya*) would always be apprehended by an indirect cognition (e.g. inference), and the specific individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) would always be apprehended by a direct cognition or perception. But, as a matter of fact, we know generality both by perception and inference, and the specific individual also both by perception and inference. Even the same object may be apprehended both by a direct cognition and an indirect cognition; when it is known through a sense-organ it is known by a direct cognition; and when it is known through marks of inference, and so forth, it is known by an indirect cognition. Hence the directness or indirectness of a cognition is not due to the nature of its object,⁸¹ but to the instrument of the cognition. If the cognition of an object is brought about by peripheral stimulation, it is direct, and if it is produced by words, marks of inference, and so forth, it is indirect. When a determinate cognition is produced by peripheral stimulation, even with the help of recollection, we must regard it as a direct cognition or perception, just as an indeterminate cognition produced by peripheral stimulation is regarded as a direct cognition or perception. Hence directness is not the special characteristic of indeterminate perception alone, but also of determinate perception, since both of them are produced by peripheral stimulation. Though determinate perception is not purely presentative in character, being a complex of presentative and representative processes, it must be regarded as perceptual in character, because the presentative element in it preponderates over the representative element owing to peripheral stimulation. Hence we must admit that determinate cognition produced by peripheral stimulation is of the nature of perception.⁸²

6. *The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Analysis of a Definite and Determinate Perception*

We have distinguished between indeterminate perception and determinate perception. We have found that indeterminate

⁸¹ Na hyaśaṃ paroḥāparokṣavibhāgo viśayakṛtāḥ. *śD.*, p. 122.

⁸² *śD.*, and *śDP.*, pp. 122-4.

perception is a purely presentative cognition of an object, devoid of assimilation and discrimination, while determinate perception is a complex presentative-representative process, involving a direct perception of an object, and assimilation of it to other like objects, and discrimination of it from other unlike objects reproduced in memory by association. Thus determinate perception involves a presentative element and a representative element. When it is definite and certain, it involves an act of recognition of the particular class to which its object belongs; and it also involves a feeling-tone either pleasant or unpleasant, and also a conative attitude of the self to react to the object for its appropriation or rejection.⁸³

Some hold that a full-fledged perception involves an element of inference also. According to them, a complete perception involves the following process: (1) At first after the peripheral contact of a sense-organ with an object, e.g. a fruit, we *perceive* the fruit. (2) Then we *remember* that this kind of fruit (e.g. *kapittha*) gave us pleasure in the past. (3) Then after recollection we have a *parāmarśajñāna* (knowledge that the middle term which is an invariable concomitant of the major term exists in, or is related to, the minor term), such as 'this fruit belongs to the class of *kapitthas*'. (4) After this *parāmarśajñāna* we *infer* the pleasure-giving property (*sukhasāadhanatva*) of the *kapittha* fruit perceived, such as 'therefore, the fruit perceived must be pleasure-giving'. The process of inference may be shown as follows: All *kapitthas* are pleasure-giving; the fruit perceived is a *kapittha*: therefore, the fruit perceived must be pleasure-giving. (5) Then after this act of inference, there is another act of *inference* such as the following: All pleasure-giving things are acceptable (*upādeya*); the *kapittha* perceived is pleasure-giving; therefore, the *kapittha* perceived is acceptable. And when we have come to know that the fruit perceived is acceptable, the perception of the fruit produced by peripheral stimulation has vanished, and no trace of the perception is left. Therefore a complete act of perception must be regarded as rather an act of inference than an act of perception, inasmuch as the knowledge of the acceptability of the object of perception is the result of inference.⁸⁴

Vācaspatimiśra admits that this is the order of the successive steps of a complete perception. At first the perception of the fruit

⁸³ NM., pp. 66-7.

⁸⁴ NM., p. 66.

is produced by the peripheral contact of a sense-organ with the object. Then this perception brings about a recollection of the pleasure-giving property (*sukhasādhanaत्वस्मृति*) of this kind of fruit. Then this recollection in co-operation with the intercourse of the sense-organ with the object produces a *parāmarśajñāna* that 'this fruit belongs to the class of *kapittha*'. Then this *parāmarśajñāna* produces an inferential cognition that 'this *kapittha* must be pleasure-giving'. Then this inferential cognition, in co-operation with the sense-object-contact, brings about the perception that 'this *kapittha* is acceptable'.⁸⁵ Thus, according to Vācaspatimiśra, a complete act of perception involves not only an element of recollection but also an element of inference. But he contends that, on this ground, perception should not be identified with inference because the act of inference involved in a complete perception is not independent of sense-perception produced by peripheral stimulation; that it co-operates with the peripheral contact of a sense-organ with its object to produce the perception that 'the object perceived is acceptable'. Though recollection and inference are involved in a complete act of perception, they enter as constituent elements into the perceptive process not independently of peripheral stimulation; they always act in co-operation with peripheral excitation or sense-object-contact, and thus produce, after all, a complex perception which involves memory and inference as integral factors. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, whatever mental state is produced by sense-object-intercourse must be regarded as perception, though it involves memory and inference.

Others, however, hold that perception never involves an element of inference. According to them, at first there is a sensuous perception of an object, e.g. a fruit, produced by sense-object-intercourse. Then this perception brings about a recollection that this kind of fruit is pleasure-giving. And when this recollection is produced, the initial perception is destroyed; but when it is being destroyed, it produces a definite knowledge that 'the fruit perceived is pleasure-giving'. And this knowledge of the pleasurable nature of the fruit perceived is nothing but the knowledge of its acceptability, because acceptability is nothing but pleasurable nature. Hence there is no *parāmarśajñāna*, or inference, in an act of perception. What is the use of postulating

⁸⁵ NM., pp. 66-7.

an element of inference in perception, which is never experienced? Thus, according to some, though perception involves recollection, it does not involve inference.⁶⁶ But it may be objected, that pleasurable-ness of an object cannot be an object of perception, inasmuch as the power of yielding pleasure is imperceptible; that, therefore, pleasurable-ness of an object is inferred from the knowledge that it belongs to a particular class of pleasurable objects. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa urges that if pleasurable-ness of an object is known by an inference, then that inference also must be proved by another inference, and so on *ad infinitum*. In fact, there is no supersensible power (*śakti*); hence pleasurable-ness of an object is known by direct perception.

But when we see an object through the eyes, we do not perceive its pleasurable-ness through the eyes. How, then, can we perceive through the eyes that the fruit is pleasurable? Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that pleasurable-ness of the object is not perceived through the eyes, but through the mind. Thus there is no need of assuming an inference in an act of perception to know the pleasurable-ness and acceptability of the object of perception.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ NM., p. 67.

⁶⁷ NM., p. 69; HIP., I, p. 473.

CHAPTER III

THE OBJECTS AND CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION

1. *The Objects of Perception*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika divides perception mainly into two kinds, viz. external perception and internal perception. External perception is derived through the external senses, and internal perception through the mind (*manas*). External perception is of five kinds, viz. olfactory, gustatory, auditory, visual, and tactual perception. The objects of these different kinds of external perception are respectively the qualities of odour, taste, sound, colour, and touch as well as their generalities and negations. The objects of internal perception are the qualities of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, cognition, and volition. Substances can be perceived only by the visual organ and the tactual organ; the remaining sense-organs are capable of perceiving qualities only.¹ Let us briefly consider the objects of these different kinds of perceptions.

(1) *Olfactory Perception*.—Through the olfactory organ we cannot perceive a substance which is the substratum of odour. We have olfactory perception of odour, the genus of odour, the genus of fragrance, and the genus of bad odour. We can never perceive potential or infra-sensible (*anudbhūta*) odour; we can perceive odour only when it is in an appreciable degree (*udbhūta*).

(2) *Gustatory Perception*.—Through the gustatory organ we cannot perceive a substance which is the substratum of taste. We can perceive taste and the genus of taste through the gustatory organ. But we can perceive taste only when it is in an appreciable degree (*udbhūta*); we cannot perceive inappreciable or unmanifested (*anudbhūta*) taste.

(3) *Auditory Perception*.—Through the auditory organ we cannot perceive *ākāśa* (ether) which is the substrate of sound. We can perceive only sound and the genus of sound through the auditory organ. But we can perceive sound only when it is in an appreciable degree (*udbhūta*). We cannot perceive unmanifest (*anudbhūta*) sound. (4) *Visual Perception*.—Through the visual organ we perceive not only colours but also

¹ SM., pp. 242-4.

coloured substances. Appreciable colours (*udbhūtarūpa*), substances possessed of appreciable colours, separateness, number, disjunction, conjunction, priority, posteriority, viscosity, liquidity, and magnitude are the objects of visual perception. The movement, the genus, and the inherence existing in visible things are also the objects of visual perception. The conjunction of light with visible objects and appreciable colour are the conditions of visual perception. The heat of summer is infra-visible because it has not an appreciable colour; but it is an object of tactual perception because it has the quality of appreciable touch. (5) *Tactual Perception*.—Through the tactual organ we perceive substances as well as qualities. Appreciable touch (*udbhūtasparśa*) with its genus and substances endued with appreciable touch are the objects of tactual perception. All objects of visual perception other than colour and the genus of colour are the objects of tactual perception. For example, separateness, number, disjunction, conjunction, priority, posteriority, viscosity, fluidity, magnitude and the movements and the universals which subsist in tangible objects are the objects of tactual perception.² (6) *Internal Perception*.—Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, cognition, and volition are the objects of internal perception. They are perceived through the mind (*manas*) along with the genus of pleasure, the genus of pain, etc. The self also is an object of internal perception.³ The conjunction of the mind with the self is the condition of the perception of the self. The united inherence of the mind in the self is the cause of the perception of the qualities of the self.⁴ But according to the older Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the self is not an object of perception but an object of inference; it can be perceived only by the *yogin*.⁵

There are certain objects which can be perceived through the visual organ and the tactual organ both. Numbers, magnitudes, separateness, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, motion, viscosity, fluidity, velocity, and their universals are both visible and tangible, if they inhere in substances having appreciable colours. These are invisible and intangible in uncoloured or inappropriate substances.⁶

Thus certain objects, e.g. colour, sound, odour, taste, and

² SM., pp. 243-5; also SMD.

³ SM., p. 253.

⁶ VSU. and VSV., iv, 1, 11-12.

⁴ See Chapter IV.

⁵ See Chapter XII.

touch are perceived through one sense-organ. Certain other objects, e.g. numbers, magnitudes, etc., are perceived through two sense-organs, viz. the visual organ and the tactual organ. Pleasure, pain, etc., are the objects of internal perception. Existence (*sattā*) and the genus of quality (*guṇatva*) are perceived through all the sense-organs.⁷

2. The Condition of Knowledge

According to the later Vaiśeṣika, the condition of knowledge in general is the contact of the mind or central sensory with the tactual organ.⁸ But what is the proof of this? In dreamless sleep the mind gives up its connection with the tactual organ, which is aerial in nature, and retires into the nerve of *puritat*, which is free from air, where it cannot bring about any cognition. But it may be urged that the mind cannot produce cognition in dreamless sleep because there is no condition of cognition at that time. Supposing that the mind brings about cognition in deep sleep, what kind of cognition is produced by it? Does it bring about apprehension (*anubhava*) or recollection (*smaraṇa*)? It cannot bring about perception, since the conditions of perception are absent. There cannot be any visual perception in dreamless sleep, as there is no contact of the visual organ with the mind. For the same reason there cannot be any other kind of external perception. Nor can there be an internal perception, since there are no cognitions at that time, and in the absence of cognitions there cannot be the perception of the self as well. In dreamless sleep there can be no inference, as the knowledge of invariable concomitance is absent; nor can there be analogy as the knowledge of similarity is absent; nor can there be verbal cognition as the knowledge of words is absent. Thus there can be no apprehension in deep sleep, since all the conditions of apprehension are absent. Nor can there be recollection in deep sleep, as there is no suggestive force (*udbodhaka*) at the time to revive the subconscious traces of previous perceptions. Thus there can be no cognition in deep sleep, either in the form of apprehension or recollection, because the conditions are non-existent. What, then, is the necessity of postulating the contact of the mind with the tactual organ as the general condition of all knowledge? Viśvanātha contends that it

⁷ V.S. and VSU., iv. 1, 13.

⁸ SM., pp. 247-8.

cannot be said that there is no possibility of cognition in deep sleep, for the individual acts of cognition, volition, etc., which are the psychoses immediately preceding deep sleep, can be apprehended during sleep and the self can be perceived in relation to them. And there is no evidence to prove that the psychoses immediately preceding deep sleep are supra-sensible (*afindriya*); nor is there any evidence to prove that those cognitions which immediately precede deep slumber are indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and hence supra-sensible (*afindriya*). Hence we must reasonably conclude that there is no cognition in deep slumber, because there is no contact of the mind with the tactual organ at that time, the mind retiring into the nerve of *puritat*, which is free from air and consequently free from contact with the tactual organ.

But if the contact of the mind with the tactual organ, which is aerial in nature, be regarded as the general condition of all knowledge, then either visual perception and gustatory perception must involve tactual perception, because at the time of visual or gustatory perception there is the contact of the tactual organ (*tvak*) with an object as well as the contact of the mind with the tactual organ, or there will be no cognition at all, owing to the inhibition of both visual or gustatory perception and tactual perception by each other. To explain this difficulty, some argue, the contact of the mind with the tactual organ is, no doubt, the condition of knowledge in general, but visual perception does not involve tactual perception, because the conditions of visual perception inhibit the emergence of tactual perception. Others, again, suppose that the contact of the mind with the skin (*carman*) and not with the tactual organ (*tvak*) is the condition of all knowledge. According to them, the absence of consciousness in deep sleep is due to the absence of the contact of the mind with the skin, and the absence of tactual perception at the time of visual perception is due to the absence of the contact of the mind with the tactual organ, which is aerial in nature, though there is the contact of the mind with the skin.⁹

3. *The General Conditions of External Perception*

The older Vaiśeṣikas hold that external perception depends upon the following conditions: (1) The object of external perception

must have extensity (*mahattva*) or appreciable magnitude. Atoms are imperceptible, because they have no appreciable magnitude. (2) The object of external perception must consist of many substances. It must be a composite of many parts (*anekadravyavat*). A mote is perceptible but an atom is not, because the former has magnitude while the latter has none. A mote has magnitude because it is composed of many parts. An atom has no magnitude because it does not consist of parts. Therefore, an object, in order to be perceived, must not be a simple, indivisible atom, but a composite substance in which a plurality of substances co-inhere. It must be composed of many parts and consequently it must have an appreciable magnitude.¹⁰ (3) The object of perception must have colour (*rūpa*). The air is made up of many parts, and so it has an appreciable magnitude. But still it is not perceived through the visual organ because it is devoid of the impression of colour. The term 'impression of colour' (*rūpasamśkāra*) means inherence of colour (*rūpasamavāya*), or appreciability of colour (*rūpodbhava*), or non-obscuration of colour (*rūpānabhibhava*). The light of the eye has colour and magnitude. But it is not visible because there is not appreciable or manifested colour in it. The light of a meteor also has colour and magnitude. But it is not visible in midday because it is obscured by the stronger light of the sun.¹¹

The older Vaiśeṣikas hold that manifest or appreciable colour (*udbhūtarūpa*) is a necessary condition of every kind of external perception of a substance. But the later Vaiśeṣikas hold that manifest or appreciable colour is the necessary condition of visual perception only, and that manifest or appreciable touch (*udbhūta-sparśa*) is the necessary condition of tactual perception, and so on. This is proved by the double method of agreement in presence and agreement in absence. What, then, is the general condition of all kinds of external perception? Either there is none, or it is the possession of a distinctive quality (*viśeṣa-guṇa*) other than sound and those which exist in the self. Ether (*ākāśa*) cannot be an object of sense-perception, though it is endued with a distinctive quality, viz. sound. The self is not an object of external perception, though it is endued with the distinctive qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, desire, aversion, and volition. So the possession of any other distinctive quality than sound and the

¹⁰ V.S. and VSU., iv, 1, 6.

¹¹ V.S. and VSU., iv, 1, 7.

qualities of the self may be regarded as the general condition of all kinds of external perception.¹²

The older Vaiśeṣikas may argue that there is a parsimony of hypotheses, if colour be regarded as the general condition of all kinds of external perception. But, in that case, air would not be an object of tactual perception as it is devoid of colour. If the opponent admits that air cannot be an object of tactual perception, then it may be argued that there is a parsimony of hypotheses even if we suppose that appreciable touch (*udbhūtasparśa*) is the general condition of all kinds of external perception. If the opponent contends that on this view a ray of light would not be an object of visual perception as it is devoid of appreciable touch, why should we not admit that it cannot be an object of visual perception, just as the opponent admits that air cannot be an object of tactual perception? In fact, just as we perceive a ray of light through our visual organ, so we perceive air through our tactual organ; these are the facts of experience; the tactual perception of air is as much a fact of experience as the visual perception of a ray of light is. So neither colour nor touch is the general condition of all kinds of external perception of substances.¹³

The later Vaiśeṣikas agree with the older Vaiśeṣikas in holding that extensive magnitude (*mahattva*) is the general condition of six kinds of perception.¹⁴ Extensity is the cause of the perception of a substance in consequence of its inherence in it. It is the cause of the perception of the qualities, actions, and generalities inhering in substances in consequence of its inherent-inherence or inherence in the qualities, etc., which inhere in substances. It is the cause of the perception of the genus of quality (*guṇatva*), the genus of actions (*karmatva*), etc., which inhere in qualities and actions respectively, which, again, inhere in substances in consequence of their inherent-inherent-inherence.¹⁵ By *mahattva* we mean proportionate extensity, neither infinite magnitude nor atomic magnitude. Neither all-pervading ether nor atoms are perceptible.

4. The Conditions of Visual, Tactual, Olfactory, and Gustatory Perceptions

The older Vaiśeṣikas hold that perception of colour depends on two conditions, viz. co-inherence of many substances (*anekadra-*

¹² SM., p. 245.

¹³ SM., pp. 245-6.

¹⁴ BhP., 58.

¹⁵ SM., p. 256.

vyasamavāya) and particularity of colour (*rūpaviśeṣa*).¹⁶ We cannot perceive the colour of an atom (*paramāṇu*) and of a dyad (*dvaṇuka*), since an atom does not consist of parts, and a dyad is composed of two atoms only. The colour of an atom and a dyad cannot be perceived, because they are not composed of many substances or a plurality of substances do not inhere in them. Perception, therefore, depends on the co-inherence of a plurality of substances in its object. Triads, quartrads and the like are objects of perception. Besides the co-inherence of a plurality of substances (*anekadravyasamavāya*) there is another condition of the perception of colour, viz. particularity of colour (*rūpaviśeṣa*). 'Particularity of colour' means particularity abiding in colour. It has three forms, viz. appreciability (*udbhūtatva*), non-obscuration (*anabhibhūtatva*), and the genus of colour (*rūpatva*).¹⁷ We have no visual perception of taste, touch, etc., because they are devoid of the genus of colour (*rūpatva*). There can be no visual perception of the light of the eye owing to the absence of appreciability (*udbhūtatva*). According to Viśvānatha, conjunction with light (*āloka-samyoga*) and appreciable colour (*udbhūtarūpa*) are the conditions of visual perception.¹⁸

According to the older Vaiśeṣikas, tactual, olfactory, and gustatory perceptions also depend upon similar conditions. Just as visual perception of colour depends on a particularity of colour (*rūpaviśeṣa*), that is, on the distinctive qualities of non-obscuration (*anabhibhūtatva*), manifestness (*udbhūtatva*), or the genus of colour (*rūpatva*), so the gustatory perception of taste depends on a particularity of taste (*rasaviśeṣa*), i.e. on the peculiar qualities of non-obscuration, appreciability, and the genus of taste. There are similar conditions also in other kinds of external perception (viz. olfactory and tactual) which also depend upon the co-inhesion of a plurality of substances. Those smells, tastes, and touches are not apprehended, which are infra-sensible to the organs of smell, taste, and touch. In a stone we cannot apprehend smell and taste, because these are inappreciable to the corresponding sense-organs. But in the ashes of a stone we can perceive its smell and taste, because they are there in an appreciable degree. Some hold that we can apprehend the smell and taste of a stone, no doubt, but not distinctly. We cannot perceive the light (*tejas*)

¹⁶ V.S., iv, 1, 8.

¹⁷ SM., p. 244.

¹⁸ VSU., iv, 1, 8.

in hot water, since it is inappreciable or obscured by touch. Likewise we cannot perceive the colour, taste, and touch in comminuted camphor, *campaka* perfume, etc., owing to their inappreciability. In gold the colour is appreciable; but its whiteness and brightness are much obscured.¹⁹ But it may be urged: Gravity inheres in a composite object made up of many substances, which has thus extensive magnitude and colour; but why is it not perceived through the visual organ? It cannot be perceived because the genus of colour (*rūpatva*) and appreciability are not existent in gravity. Praśastapāda and others hold that gravity is supra-sensible (*atīndriya*). But Vallavācārya holds that gravity is not an object of visual perception, but of tactual perception.²⁰

The Mīmāṃsaka accepts the Vaiśeṣika view of the conditions of perception. Extensive magnitude (*mahattva*) is the general condition of all kinds of external perception. In the perception of a substance, extensity is a condition through inherence. In the perception of qualities, actions, and universals, it is a condition through inherent-inherence. In the perception of the universals of qualities and actions, it is a condition through inherent-inherent-inherence.²¹ Appreciable colour and the conjunction of light with manifest or unobscured colour are the conditions of visual perception. Some hold that extensive magnitude and manifest or unobscured colour are not the conditions of the visual perception of time. The manifest or appreciable touch is the condition of tactual perception. Colour is not a condition of tactual perception. So air also is an object of tactual perception, though devoid of colour. Manifest colour is not the general condition of every kind of external perception, as the older Vaiśeṣika holds. It is a condition of visual perception only. Some hold that extensity is a condition of internal perception too. Others hold that it is not a condition of internal perception. Some hold that motion is not an object of perception, but an object of inference. Hence extensity is not a condition of the perception of motion, according to them.²²

¹⁹ VSU., iv, 1, 9.

²⁰ VSU., iv, 1, 10.

²¹ See Chapter IV.

²² Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, p. 21.

BOOK III

CHAPTER IV

PERCEPTION AND SANNIKARṢA

(Or Intercourse of the Sense-organs with their Objects)

1. *Introduction*

In this Book we shall deal with the different kinds of intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects, acquired perception, and recognition. Perception is presentative knowledge, which depends upon the presentation of an object to the self. And most Indian philosophers are of the opinion that for the presentation of an object it must enter into some sort of relation with a sense-organ. Perception depends upon some sort of intercourse (*sannikarṣa*) or dynamic communion between its object and a particular sense-organ. External perception depends upon the intercourse between external objects and the external sense-organs. And internal perception depends upon the intercourse between the self or its qualities and the internal organ (*manas*). The objects of perception may be material or spiritual substances (*dṛavya*), their qualities (*guṇa*), and actions (*karma*), and their generic characters (*jāti*). These diverse objects of perception must enter into direct or indirect relation with the external sense-organs or the internal organ according to their nature. The Indian philosophers hold the peculiar doctrine that substances alone can enter into direct communion with the appropriate sense-organs; and that the qualities, actions, and communities inhering in them can enter into communion with the sense-organs through the medium of the substances in which they inhere. And the communities of qualities and actions can enter into communion with the sense-organs through the qualities or actions in which they inhere, which, again, inhere in substances. Thus the abstract qualities are related to the concrete qualities which, again, are related to a substance; and a substance alone can have a direct intercourse with a sense-organ. Thus some sort of direct or indirect relation

must be established between the perceptible objects and the appropriate sense-organs. In all kinds of perception the objects must be directly or indirectly *presented* to consciousness. Let us discuss the different views in connection with the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects.

2. The Earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

According to the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, perception depends upon the intercourse (*sannikarṣa*) of the sense-organs with their objects. *Sannikarṣa* is the function of the sense-organs by means of which they enter into a particular relation with their appropriate objects and bring about the perception of the objects. This intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects is of six kinds so far as our ordinary perception is concerned, viz. (1) union (*saṁyoga*), (2) united-inherence (*saṁyukta-samavāya*), (3) united-inherent-inherence (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*), (4) inherence (*samavāya*), (5) inherent-inherence (*samaveta-samavāya*), and (6) the relation of qualification and the qualified (*viśeṣaṇatā*). These different kinds of sense-object-intercourse (*indriyārtha-sannikarṣa*) are illustrated in the following examples. (1) Union (*saṁyoga*). The perception of a substance (*dravya*) is due to its union with a sense-organ. For instance, in the visual perception of a jar there is a union of the visual organ with the jar.¹ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not hold with the western psychologists that a substance is perceived through its qualities. He holds a contrary view. According to him, qualities are perceived through the substances in which they inhere. (2) United-inherence or inherence in that which is in union (*saṁyukta-samavāya*). The perception of a quality or an action is due to its inherence in a substance which is in union with a sense-organ. For instance, in the visual perception of the colour of a jar there is a union of the visual organ with the jar in which colour inheres. (3) United-inherent-inherence, i.e. inherence in that which inheres in what is in union (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*). For instance, in the visual perception of the generic character of the colour (*rūpatva*) of a jar, there is a union of the visual organ with the jar in which inheres colour in which again inheres the generic character of colour.

¹ A ray of light goes out of the visual organ to the object and comes into contact with it. See Chapter I.

(4) Inherence (*samavāya*). For instance, in the auditory perception of sound there is the inherence of sound in the sense-organ, viz. the ear-drum which is pervaded by *ākāśa* (ether), the substratum of sound. (5) Inherent-inherence, i.e. inherence in that which inheres in a sense-organ (*samaveta-samavāya*). For instance, in the auditory perception of the generic character of sound (*śabdātva*) there is the inherence of the generic nature of sound in sound which again inheres in *ākāśa* (ether) of the ear-drum. (6) The relation of qualification and the qualified (*viśeṣaṇatā* or *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-sambandha*). For instance, in the perception of the absence of a jar on the ground, there is a union of the visual organ with the ground which is qualified by the absence of the jar. According to the Naiyāyika, inherence (*samavāya*) and negation (*abhāva*) are perceived through this kind of intercourse. But, according to the Vaiśeṣika, inherence is not an object of perception; it is an object of inference. So, according to him, negation alone can be perceived through this kind of intercourse.² "All that is the object of perception must fall within one or other of these modes of contact. The divergence of modes rests on ontological theories: the eye, for instance, as a substance can come into direct conjunction with another substance, but only indirectly with colour which inheres in that substance, and at a further remove with the class concept which inheres in the colour which inheres in the object with which the eye is in conjunction."³

The last kind of the sense-object-intercourse, i.e. *viśeṣaṇatā* is of several kinds. (i) *Samyukta-viśeṣaṇatā*. For instance, the visual perception of the absence of a jar on the ground is due to its qualifying the ground which is in direct contact with the visual organ. Thus a negation also must directly or indirectly enter into relation with a substance which is in direct contact with a sense-organ. (ii) *Samyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā*. For instance, the perception of the absence of taste in colour is due to its qualifying that which inheres in something in contact with a sense-organ. Here, the absence of taste qualifies colour; colour inheres in a substance; and the substance is in direct conjunction with a sense-organ. (iii) *Samyukta-samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā*. For instance, the perception of the absence of colour in the generic nature of number is due to its qualifying that which inheres in something inhering in that which is in direct contact with a

² H.I.L., p. 412.

³ I.L.A., p. 75.

sense-organ. The absence of colour qualifies the generic nature of number ; the generic nature of number inheres in number ; number inheres in a substance, and the substance is in direct conjunction with a sense-organ. (iv) *Samyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣaṇatā*. For instance, the perception of the absence of *rasatva* or the generic nature of taste in *rūpatva* or the generic nature of colour is due to its qualifying the qualification existing in something inhering in that which is in conjunction with a sense-organ. (v) *Viśeṣaṇatā*. For instance, the perception of the absence of sound is due to its qualifying the sense-organ, viz. the ear-drum pervaded by *ākāśa* (ether) which is the substratum of sound. (vi) *Samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā*. For instance, the perception of the absence of the sound '*kha*' in the sound '*ka*' is due to its qualifying that which inheres in the sense-organ, viz. the ear-drum. The absence of the sound '*kha*' qualifies the sound '*ka*' which inheres in the ether of the ear-drum. (vii) *Samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā*. For instance, the perception of the absence of '*khatva*' (the generic nature of the sound '*kha*') in '*gatva*' (the generic nature of the sound '*ga*') is due to its qualifying that which inheres in something inhering in a sense-organ. Here the absence of '*khatva*' qualifies '*gatva*'; '*gatva*' inheres in '*ga*'; and the sound '*ga*' inheres in the ether of the ear-drum. (viii) *Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣaṇatā*. For instance, the perception of the absence of '*gatva*' in the absence of '*katva*' is due to its qualifying that which qualifies a sense-organ. The absence of '*gatva*' qualifies the absence of '*katva*'; the absence of '*katva*' qualifies the ether of the ear-drum. (ix) *Samyukta-viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣaṇatā*. For instance, the perception of the absence of a cloth from the absence of a jar is due to its qualifying that which qualifies something in conjunction with a sense-organ. The absence of a cloth qualifies the absence of a jar ; the absence of a jar qualifies the ground ; and the ground is in conjunction with the visual organ.⁴

Some people regard either union (conjunction) or inherence only as the cause of perception ; and deny the intervening relationships described above.⁵ But the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika generally admits six kinds of intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects, viz. union, united-inherence, united-inherent-inherence, inherence, inherent-inherence, and the relation of the

⁴ SM., p. 263 ; NK., p. 195 ; I.L.A., pp. 77-8.

⁵ NK., p. 195.

qualified and the qualification. Substances are perceived through the first kind of *sannikarṣa*; qualities, actions, etc., through the second; the genus of qualities, through the third; sound, through the fourth; the genus of sound, through the fifth; and the absence of a substance, through the sixth.* All objects of perception must depend upon one or other of these kinds of sense-object-intercourse.

3. *The Later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or the Neo-Naiyāyika* (*alaukika sannikarṣa*)

In addition to the above six kinds of intercourse, which are called ordinary intercourse (*laukika sannikarṣa*), the Neo-Naiyāyikas recognize three other kinds of extraordinary intercourse (*alaukika-sannikarṣa*) between the sense-organs and their objects. Ordinary sensuous perception depends upon one of the six kinds of ordinary intercourse between an external or internal sense-organ and its object. But super-sensuous perception is not produced by any of these six kinds of ordinary intercourse; it is produced by an extraordinary intercourse. The extraordinary intercourse is of three kinds: (1) the intercourse (with all individual objects of a particular class) through their generic character (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*), which brings about the perception of these individual objects at all times and places; (2) the intercourse (with an object not present to a sense-organ) through its idea revived in memory (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*) which brings about an indirect perception of that object; (3) the intercourse with remote, subtle, past, and future objects produced by meditation (*yogaja-sannikarṣa*), which brings about the perception of these objects. Let us explain these different kinds of extraordinary intercourse. (i) *The Intercourse through the Knowledge of Generic Character* (*Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*). Sometimes through the knowledge of the generic nature of an individual we perceive all other individuals of that kind at all times and all places, which are possessed of the same generic nature. In such a case, the knowledge of the generic nature (*sāmānya*) of an object constitutes the extraordinary intercourse. When, for instance, we see a particular case of smoke with the visual organ, and perceive its generic character (*dhūmatva*), we have a perception of smoke of

* NK., p. 195.

all times and all places. In this perception there is an ordinary intercourse, viz. union (*samhyoga*) between the visual organ and the particular case of smoke, and there is an ordinary intercourse, viz. united-inherence (*samyukta-samavāya*) between the visual organ and the generic character of this smoke; but the intercourse between the visual organ and all cases of smoke of all times and all places is not an ordinary one; it is an extraordinary intercourse because there cannot be an ordinary intercourse of the visual organ with all cases of smoke of all times and all places. The extraordinary intercourse consists here in the knowledge of the generic character of smoke (*dhūmatva*), which is possessed by all cases of smoke of all times and all places. This kind of intercourse, which consists in the knowledge of a generic character, is called an extraordinary intercourse through the knowledge of a generic character (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*).

But what is the use of admitting such an extraordinary perception of all the objects at all times and all places possessed of a generic character, and for that reason, an extraordinary intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects? The following reply is given. The connection between a particular case of smoke and fire was perceived in a kitchen, but not the connection between all cases of smoke and fire, since all other cases of smoke were unperceived at the time; and, if all cases of smoke and all cases of fire were not perceived through an extraordinary intercourse, then there would not arise any doubt whether *all* cases of smoke are accompanied by fire; and, unless there is such a doubt, there can be no inference that this case of smoke is attended by fire, which removes the doubt. According to Viśvanātha, when all cases of smoke are brought to consciousness through their generic character (e.g. *dhūmatva*), which is perceived owing to its inherence in the smoke which is in conjunction with the visual organ, there arises a doubt in us as to the Invariable concomitance between fire and the cases of smoke in other times and places, which are not in direct contact with the visual organ. It may be objected that if there were an extraordinary intercourse with all objects through the knowledge of their generic character, we should become omniscient, inasmuch as in perceiving an object of knowledge (*prameya*) we could perceive, through the knowledge of its generic character (*prameyatva*), all objects of knowledge of all times and places. But Viśvanātha urges that though we can

perceive all objects of knowledge through the knowledge of their generic character, we cannot perceive their mutual differences through this kind of intercourse and hence we cannot become omniscient.⁷ (ii) *The Intercourse through Association (jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa)*. Sometimes an object is not present to a sense-organ, but is revived in memory; and through the medium of its idea revived we perceive the object. This is called the intercourse through association, which brings about an indirect perception of the object. For instance, when we see a piece of sandal-wood we perceive that it is fragrant. What is the cause of this visual perception of fragrant sandal? Here, there is a conjunction of the visual organ with the piece of sandal-wood, which gives rise to the direct visual perception of the sandal⁸; but the fragrance of the sandal cannot come into contact with the visual organ, and so there cannot be direct visual perception of its fragrance. But the visual perception of the sandal brings to consciousness the idea of fragrance by association, which serves as the extraordinary intercourse in the visual perception of the fragrant sandal. This will be explained more elaborately in the next chapter.

There is a difference between the intercourse through the knowledge of generic character (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*) and the intercourse through the knowledge of an object revived in memory (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*), though in both there is the intercourse through *knowledge*. In the former, the knowledge of the generic character (e.g. *dhūmatva*) does not bring about the perception of itself but of its substrata, i.e. the individual objects of all times and places (e.g. all cases of smoke), which are possessed of the generic nature. In the latter, the knowledge of an object (e.g. fragrance of sandal) revived in memory does not bring about the perception of its substratum (e.g. sandal) but of the object itself (fragrance).⁹

Some have urged that the visual perception of fragrant sandal may be explained by the intercourse through the knowledge of generic character (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*). For instance, when we see a piece of sandal, the visual perception of the sandal reminds us of its fragrance (*saṃrabha*) perceived in the past, and

⁷ SM., pp. 275-283. H.I.L., pp. 412-13. H.I.P., I, pp. 724-7.

⁸ The visual qualities of the sandal-wood.

⁹ SM., p. 282.

the generic character of fragrance (*saurabhatva*) which abides in the sandal in the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) and inherent-inherence (*samaveta-samavāya*) respectively. The recollection of the generic nature of fragrance (*saurabhatva*) through the intercourse through the generic character (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*) produces in us the perception of all individual fragrances, including the fragrance of this piece of sandal. To this objection the Neo-Naiyāyika replies, that though through the intercourse of the knowledge of the generic nature of fragrance (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*) we may perceive the fragrance of the sandal, we cannot perceive through this intercourse the generic nature of fragrance itself, owing to the absence of the intercourse of the visual organ with fragrance. Had there been the generic nature of the generic nature of fragrance (*saurabhatvatva*), we could have perceived the generic nature of fragrance (*saurabhatva*) through the intercourse of the knowledge of its generic character (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*). But, in fact, there is no generic character of the generic character of fragrance. Hence we cannot perceive the generic character of fragrance through the intercourse of the knowledge of its generic character which is non-existent. So we must admit that there is another extraordinary intercourse through association (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*) to account for our perception of the generic character of the fragrance of the sandal. In illusory perception generally there is the intercourse through association (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*). For instance, in the illusory perception of silver in a nacre, no silver comes into contact with the visual organ; but still the *idea* of silver revived in memory by association produces the visual *perception* of silver.¹⁰

(iii) *The Intercourse produced by Meditation (Yogaja-sannikarṣa)*. Besides the intercourse through the knowledge of generic character and the intercourse through association, there is another extraordinary intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects, produced by meditation (*yogaja-sannikarṣa*). This kind of intercourse again is of two kinds: (1) the intercourse in the perception of a person who is in an ecstatic condition (*yukta*), and (2) the intercourse in the perception of a person who is out of the ecstatic condition (*yuñjāna*). The nature of yogic perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) will be fully discussed in a subsequent chapter.¹¹

¹⁰ H.I.L., pp. 413-14. SM., pp. 283-4; SMD., pp. 283-4.

¹¹ SM., pp. 284-5; Chapter XVII.

4. The Mīmāṃsaka

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa holds that there are three kinds of intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects, (1) union (*saṁyoga*), (2) united-inherence (*saṁyukta-samavāya*), and (3) united-inherent-inherence (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*). Substances are perceived through their conjunction with the sense-organs. The qualities, actions, and generalities inhering in the substances are perceived through united-inherence (*saṁyukta-samavāya*). The communities of these qualities and actions are perceived through united-inherent inherence (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*). So far the Mīmāṃsaka agrees with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But he does not recognize inherence and inherent-inherence. According to him, sound is not perceived through inherence (*samavāya*) as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds, because sound is not a quality but a substance ; so it is perceived through conjunction (*saṁyoga*) with the ear. And consequently the generic character of sound also is not perceived through inherent-inherence ; it is perceived through united-inherence like the generic character of any other substance (e.g. a jar). Thus, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, there are only three kinds of intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects.¹²

Śālikānātha holds that there are three kinds of sense-object-intercourse, viz. union (*saṁyoga*), united inherence (*saṁyukta-samavāya*), and inherence (*samavāya*).¹³

5. The Vedānta

According to the Śaṅkārīte, there is no relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Inherence, according to him, is nothing but identity or co-essentiality (*tādātmya*). So the Śaṅkarīte recognizes the following six kinds of intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects. (1) *Samyoga*.—For instance, the visual perception of a jar is due to its direct conjunction with the visual organ. (2) *Samyukta-tādātmya*.—For instance, the perception of colour is due to its co-essentiality or identity with something (e.g. a jar) which is in conjunction with the visual organ. (3) *Samyuktā-bhinnatādātmya*.—For instance, the perception of the generic character of colour (*rūpatva*) is due to its co-essentiality with

¹² Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, p. 20.

¹³ PP., p. 46.

something (e.g. colour) which is co-essential with that (e.g. a jar) which is in conjunction with the visual organ. (4) *Tādātmya*.—For instance, the perception of sound is due to its co-essentiality with the sense-organ, viz. the ear-drum, which is pervaded by ether (*ākāśa*). (5) *Tādātmyavadabhinnatva*.—For instance, the perception of the generic character of sound (*śabdatva*) is due to its co-essentiality with something (e.g. sound) which, again, is co-essential with the sense-organ, viz. the ear-drum, which is pervaded by ether (*ākāśa*). (6) *Viśeṣya-Viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*.—For instance, the perception of the absence of a jar on the ground is due to the absence qualifying something (e.g. the ground) which is, therefore, possessed of this qualification (e.g. the absence of the jar).¹⁴

Thus the Śāṅkārīte's concepts of *saṁyoga*, *saṁyukta-tādātmya*, *saṁyuktābhinna-tādātmya*, *tādātmya*, *tādātmyavadabhinnatva*, and *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva* correspond to the Naiyāyika's concepts of *saṁyoga*, *saṁyukta-samavāya*, *saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*, *samavāya*, *samaveta-samavāya*, and *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-sambandha* respectively.

The Rāmānujīst holds that there are only two kinds of sense-object-intercourse, viz. *saṁyoga* and *saṁyuktāśrayaṇa*. The perception of substances is due to their conjunction with the appropriate sense-organs; the perception of their qualities is due to the contact of the sense-organs with the substances in which the qualities subsist. The qualities are brought into relation with the sense-organs through the direct contact of their substances with the senses.¹⁵

The Vallabhīte recognizes five kinds of sense-object-intercourse, viz. *saṁyoga*, *tādātmya*, *saṁyukta-tādātmya*, *saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇatā*, and *svarūpa*. The perception of a jar is due to its contact (*saṁyoga*) with the visual organ. The perception of the colour of a jar is due to the contact of the visual organ with the jar which is identical with its colour. The internal perception of cognition, pleasure, and other properties of the mind (*svadharma*) is due to the relation of identity (*tādātmya*); there is identity between the mind and its properties. The perception of the absence of a jar on the ground is due to the contact of the visual organ with the ground, which is the locus of the absence

¹⁴ VP. and Śikhāmaṇi, p. 87.

¹⁵ Nyāyapariśuddhi, p. 77.

of the jar. "The locus is perceived by contact, *saṁyoga*, the negation as a predicate of the locus."¹⁶ The perception of the mental modes (*vṛtti*) is due to *svarūpasambandha*; they are perceived in themselves without implying any relation beyond themselves.¹⁷

Janārdana Bhaṭṭa, a follower of Madhva, refutes all kinds of sense-object-intercourse except union (*saṁyoga*). We directly perceive objects and their qualities through the sense-organs. There is a direct contact of all perceptible objects with the sense-organs. And contact implies union. There are no other intervening relations between the senses and their objects. "The *guṇa* (quality) is identical with the *guṇin* (substance), and no relation can be conceived among them. *Samavāya* is refuted as involving an infinite regress and with the refutation of *samavāya*, the forms of *samavāya* can have no hold. *Abhāva* (non-existence) is directly perceived, and we require no conception of relation."¹⁸

¹⁶ CSV., p. 242.

¹⁷ PR., pp. 117-18. CSV., pp. 242-43.

¹⁸ CSV., p. 237.

CHAPTER V

ACQUIRED PERCEPTION

1. *Introduction*

In the last chapter we have found that, according to the Neo-Naiyāyikas, there are not only different kinds of ordinary intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects, but also there are three kinds of extraordinary intercourse. For instance, the visual perception of fragrant sandal is explained by the Neo-Naiyāyikas as due to an extraordinary intercourse through the knowledge of fragrance, though it is not the proper object of the visual organ. In western psychology such a perception is generally regarded as an acquired perception. And this acquired perception has been analysed by the different schools of Indian philosophers and explained in slightly different ways. According to the Jaina, the so-called acquired perception is a complex psychosis made up of presentative and representative processes mechanically associated with each other and involving judgment and inference. According to the Vedāntist also, it is a psychic compound made up of presentative and representative elements integrated together into a compound perception. But, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, an acquired perception is a single integral pulse of consciousness which is presentative in character, though it is preceded by recollection. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the possibility of a psychic compound of distinct psychic entities. Let us now discuss these different views about acquired perception.

2. *The Jaina*

The Jaina regards the visual perception of fragrant sandal as a case of acquired perception. The visual organ alone cannot produce the perception of fragrant sandal, since fragrance cannot be apprehended by the visual organ. Nor can the visual organ produce this perception, even in co-operation with the recollection of fragrance; for, in that case, odour will be apprehended by the

visual organ, which is impossible. The perception of odour cannot be produced by the visual organ. So the perception of fragrant sandal can neither be perceived by the visual organ singly, nor in co-operation with the recollection of odour.¹ We have, indeed, an apprehension of fragrant sandal after the operation of the visual organ in co-operation with the recollection of fragrance. But from this it does not follow that it is a simple psychosis of the nature of visual perception produced by the visual organ. In fact, it is a complex psychosis of presentative and representative processes mixed up together. It is a mixed mode of consciousness made up of presentative and representative elements mechanically associated with each other. There is an integrative association of two co-ordinate and co-existent elements, the visual percept of the sandal and the idea of fragrance freely reproduced in memory. The apprehension of fragrant sandal is simply a sum of two distinct psychic entities, the present optic sensation of the sandal *plus* an image of its fragrance reproduced from past experience by association and integrated together into a complex psychosis. And not only so; it involves a judgment and an inference. Though the sandal is perceived by the visual organ, and the fragrance is reproduced in memory by the law of association, the apprehension of the sandal as qualified by fragrance, or fragrant sandal, involves a process of judgment and an inference. Thus, according to the Jaina, in the acquired perception of fragrant sandal there is a free association of ideas, judgment, and inference. An acquired perception is rather an act of inference than perception, though it depends on both perception and recollection.² This account of an acquired perception is similar to the account of the associationist psychology of the west.

3. *The Sāṃkhya Vedāntist*

The Sāṃkarite also holds that the visual perception of fragrant sandal is not a simple psychosis but a psychic compound of a presentative element and a representative element. It is a mixed

¹ Na hi parimalasmarāṇasavyapekṣaṃ locaṇaṃ surabhi candanamiti pratyayamutpādayati . . . gandhasyāpi locanajñānaviśayatvaprasaṅgāt. PKM., p. 150. See also p. 143.

² Gandhasmarāṇasahakārilocanavyāpārānantaraṃ surabhi candanamiti-pratyayapratīṭh. Tanna pratyakṣeṇāsau pratīyate. PKM., p. 150.

mode of consciousness made up of a perceptual consciousness and a non-perceptual consciousness. There is a presentation of the sandal (i.e. its visual qualities) through the visual organ; and there is a representation of fragrance, since it cannot be perceived by the visual organ; these two heterogeneous elements are mixed up together and produce the compound perception of fragrant sandal. This psychic compound is not of the nature of a chemical compound but of the nature of a mechanical mixture. The presentative element and the representative element do not lose their identity in the mixed mode.³ The Naiyāyika may urge that if we recognize a mixed mode of presentative and representative processes, then presentation and representation will not be regarded as natural kinds. There cannot be an intermixture of natural kinds. But the Śaṅkarite contends that there is no contradiction in the intermixture of presentative and representative elements in perception.⁴ The Naiyāyika prejudice against intermixture of natural kinds (*sāṃkaryā*) does not find place in the Vedāntic monism. It may be asked: In the visual perception of fragrant sandal is the apprehension of fragrance presentative or non-presentative? It may be said that it can be neither. It cannot be presentative because here the apprehending mental mode does not assume the form of fragrance and identity itself with it, which is a condition of perception, according to the Śaṅkarite. Nor can it be non-presentative, because the conditions of non-presentative knowledge are absent. For example, the knowledge of invariable concomitance between sandal and fragrance being absent, there can be no inference of fragrance in the visual perception of fragrant sandal. But the Śaṅkarite holds that the apprehension of fragrance must be non-presentative; for if fragrance of this piece of sandal were already perceived, then the apprehension of fragrance in this case would be a recollection (*smṛti*), and if it were not already perceived, then the apprehension of fragrance in this case would be inferential.⁵ It can never be presentative because fragrance is not an object of visual perception. Thus, according to the Śaṅkarite, the visual perception of fragrant sandal is a mixed mode of consciousness made up of a presentative element and a representative element. It is a compound perception

³ Surabhicandanamityādijñānamapi candanakhaṇḍāṁśe' paroḥṣam, saurbhāṁśe paroḥṣam. VP., p. 67.

⁴ VP., p. 68.

⁵ Śikhāmaṇi, p. 67.

in which an idea is tied to a percept. It is a presentative-representative complex. In this way the visual perception of sweet mangoes also may be explained.*

The Śaṅkarite does not hold that such an experience is not a kind of perception at all but a case of inference. According to him, even an act of inference involves an element of perception as a constituent factor; for instance, in the inferential cognition of fire in a mountain the apprehension of fire is inferential, but the apprehension of the mountain is perceptual; these two psychoses are the integral factors of inferential knowledge. So, here, an act of perception involves an element of recollection and sometimes an act of inference as an integral factor.⁷ Herein lies the difference between the Jaina and the Vedāntist in their views of acquired perception.

4. *The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*

According to both the Jaina and the Śaṅkarite, the visual perception of fragrant sandal is a psychic compound of presentative and representative processes. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, like William James, does not admit the possibility of a mixed mode of consciousness. Every psychosis is simple. There cannot be a psychic compound of simultaneous psychoses owing to the atomic nature of the *manas*, without which there can be no psychosis at all. According to this view, the visual perception of fragrant sandal is a simple psychosis, though it is preceded by the visual perception of the sandal and the recollection of its fragrance. It is an integral pulse of consciousness in the language of William James.

Śrīdhara refutes the theory of psychic fusion in explaining an acquired perception. In the visual perception of fragrant sandal, fragrance is the qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) and sandal is the qualified object (*viśeṣya*). Some hold that both the qualification and the qualified object—the fragrance and the sandal—are apprehended by a single compound psychosis. They explain this perception in the following manner. The visual organ cannot apprehend odour (fragrance), and the olfactory organ cannot apprehend the

* *Śikhāmaṇi*, p. 68.

⁷ *Śikhāmaṇi* and *Muṇiprabhā*, pp. 68-9.

sandal (i.e. the visual qualities of the sandal); and hence these two sense-organs cannot apprehend the relationship between fragrance and the sandal, since the perception of relationship depends upon the perception of the two factors related. But just as the single psychosis of recognition, which is a kind of perception, is produced by a sense-organ in co-operation with the sub-conscious impressions of past experience, and thus apprehends both the past and the present, so the visual perception of fragrant sandal is produced jointly by the visual organ and the olfactory organ, and hence it apprehends both the sandal and its fragrance.* This requires a word of explanation. According to this view, the visual perception of fragrant sandal is a compound perception involving two factors, viz. the visual perception of the sandal and the recollection of fragrance. Here the second psychosis depends upon the past experience of fragrance produced by the olfactory organ. Thus ultimately the visual perception of fragrant sandal is produced by both the visual organ and the olfactory organ. But Śrīdhara contends that this explanation is not satisfactory. A cognition is not made up of parts; if it were so, then one part of it could be produced by the olfactory organ, and the other by the visual organ. But, in fact, there can be no composite consciousness. A cognition is a simple psychosis. And if such a simple psychosis produced by both the visual organ and the olfactory organ apprehends the sandal as well as its fragrance, then from this it will follow that the odour (fragrance) is apprehended by the visual organ, and the sandal (apart from fragrance) by the olfactory organ; because that thing is apprehended by an organ which is the object of the cognition produced by that organ. But since the internal organ (*manas*) is atomic, it cannot operate upon the two sense-organs at one and the same time. Hence it must be admitted by all that in the visual perception of fragrant sandal at first the fragrance of the sandal (*viśeṣaṇa*) is perceived by the olfactory organ, and then afterwards the visual organ produces the visual perception of the sandal alone (*viśeṣya*) in co-operation with the previous olfactory perception of fragrance.*

* NK., p. 117.

* Ghrāṇena gandhe grhīte paścāttadgrahanasahakāriṇā cakṣuṣā kevala-viśeṣyāḥ lambanamevedam viśeṣyajñānam janyate ityakāmenāpyabhyupagantavyam. NK., p. 117.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also gives a similar account of acquired perception. He analyses the visual perception of a fragrant flower. In this perception there is a visual perception of the flower, but not of its fragrance, since odour is not an object of visual perception. So there cannot be a visual perception of the flower as qualified by fragrance, or the fragrant flower. What happens in this case is that the present visual perception of the flower is qualified by the previous cognition of the fragrance produced by the olfactory organ on a previous occasion, and the flower is perceived as fragrant not by the visual organ, because it cannot apprehend odour, but by the internal organ (*manas*). Thus, according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, though there is a visual perception of the flower, there is not a visual perception of the fragrant flower. The visual presentation of the flower is qualified by the idea of fragrance perceived in the past by the olfactory organ, and the single unitary perception of the fragrant flower is not produced by the visual organ but by the internal organ (*manas*), even as the single unitary process of recognition—which is a kind of qualified perception or a perception produced by peripheral stimulation qualified by the recollection of a past experience—is produced by the internal organ (*manas*).¹⁰ Thus Jayanta Bhaṭṭa regards an acquired perception as a new type of a synthetic unity of apperception. It may be objected that the flower is qualified by present qualifications. But the fragrance that is manifested in consciousness in the perception of the fragrant flower does not exist at present, but existed in the past and was apprehended by the olfactory organ. How can a past qualification qualify a present object? Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that just as after eating ninety-nine fruits we come to the hundredth fruit and recognize it as such, only because the perception of this fruit is qualified by the previous perceptions of the ninety-nine fruits which no longer exist, so in the perception of a fragrant flower the present visual perception of the flower is qualified by the previous olfactory perception of fragrance.¹¹

Thus Jayanta Bhaṭṭa holds that there cannot be a visual perception of a fragrant flower, since odour can never be perceived

¹⁰ Locanagocare'pi kundakusume tadaviṣayagandhaviśeṣite bāhyendriyad-vāraḥgrahanaṁmaghaṭamānamiti mānasameva surabhi kusumamiti jñānam. NM., p. 461.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 461.

by the visual organ. When the flower is perceived by the visual organ, and the idea of fragrance is revived from past experience, the fragrant flower is perceived by the central sensory (*manas*), which can apprehend all sensible objects, colour, odour, etc. But this is rather avoiding the difficulty. When we see a flower, or a piece of sandal-wood, we distinctly feel that it is fragrant. We distinctly feel that we have a *visual* perception of the fragrant flower or the fragrant sandal.

The Neo-Naiyāyikas, Gaṅgeśa and his followers, hold that when we see a piece of sandal-wood and feel that it is fragrant, we have not an internal perception of fragrant sandal through the *manas*, as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa holds, but a distinctly *visual* perception of the fragrant sandal. But how can we have a visual perception of fragrant sandal, since fragrance can never be an object of visual perception? Gaṅgeśa replies that the visual perception of fragrant sandal is not an ordinary perception (*laukika-pratyakṣa*) due to an ordinary intercourse (*laukika-sannikarṣa*), but that it is an extraordinary perception (*alaukika pratyakṣa*) due to an extraordinary intercourse (*alaukika sannikarṣa*). There cannot be an ordinary intercourse of the visual organ with the fragrance of the sandal, since odour is not an object of visual perception. But the fragrance of the sandal revived in memory by association constitutes an extraordinary intercourse called *jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*, and through it gives rise to the visual perception of the fragrant sandal. Here, though there is an ordinary intercourse of the visual organ with the sandal—and thus there is a direct visual perception of the sandal—there is an extraordinary intercourse through the idea of fragrance revived in memory by association, and thus there arises a visual perception of the fragrant sandal. Thus the Neo-Naiyāyika differs from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, who holds that though the sandal is perceived by the visual organ, the fragrant sandal is not perceived by ~~the~~ but by ~~the~~ *manas*, when there is a visual perception of the sandal with a recollection of its fragrance perceived by the olfactory organ in the past.¹³

Vardhamāna distinguishes between the visual perception of fragrant sandal and the olfactory perception of the fragrance of sandal. Sometimes we see a piece of sandal and at once perceive

¹³ SM., pp. 283-4. See SMD., also, pp. 283-4. TA., p. 14. See Ch. IV.

that it is fragrant. And sometimes we smell an odour and at once perceive that it is the fragrance of sandal. The former perception is produced by the visual organ in co-operation with the recollection of fragrance perceived by the olfactory organ on a previous occasion. And the latter perception is produced by the olfactory organ in co-operation with the recollection of sandal perceived by the visual organ in the past.¹³

According to both the earlier and later Naiyāyikas, the perception of fragrant sandal is a single unitary presentation; it is not a compound of presentative and representative elements but a presentation qualified by a representative process which is its immediate antecedent. The Naiyāyika does not admit a mixed mode of consciousness, which is admitted by the Śaṅkarite. According to him, there is no simultaneity of psychoses owing to the atomic nature of the *manas*, and, moreover, there cannot be an intermixture of two heterogeneous psychoses, e.g. a presentative process and a representative process. This has been clearly pointed out by Udayana.¹⁴

¹³ NKSP., p. 105.

¹⁴ NKS., p. 104.

CHAPTER VI

RECOGNITION.

1. *The Nature of Recognition*

The process of recognition has been analysed by all the schools of Indian thinkers from both the standpoints of psychology and epistemology. Here we shall attempt only a psychological analysis of recognition from the different standpoints of Indian thinkers.

Recognition is a complex psychosis depending upon presentative and representative processes. It depends both upon peripheral stimulation and ideal reproduction of a past experience. A cognition produced by peripheral stimulation is admitted by all to be perception, and a cognition reproduced in imagination by the revival of the impressions of past experience is admitted by all to be recollection. But recognition is a complex psychosis which depends both upon peripheral stimulation and reproduction of a past experience. Is it, then, to be regarded as a single psychosis or two psychoses? If it is a single psychosis, is it a kind of perception, or quite a new psychosis? The Buddhist holds that recognition is not a single unitary psychosis, but a mechanical composition of two psychoses, presentative and representative. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsaka, and the Vedāntist hold that recognition is a single psychosis of the nature of perception. According to them, it is a qualified perception. According to the Jaina, recognition is a single psychosis, but it is not a kind of perception; it is a *unique* psychosis; it is neither presentative nor representative, nor both, but *sui generis*; it is a chemical compound, as it were, of presentation and representation, different from both. Let us now consider the different views of recognition in detail.

2. *The Buddhist*

When we perceive a pot and recognize it to be an object of our past experience, we have a recognitive consciousness such as

'*this is that* pot'. Is this recognition a single psychosis or a combination of two psychoses, presentative and representative? If it is a single psychosis, the Buddhist asks, what is its cause? (1) The sense-organ cannot be the cause of recognition, since it requires a present object for its stimulation to produce a cognition; it can never come into contact with a past object and so cannot account for the consciousness of *thatness* or the past condition of the object involved in recognition. (2) The subconscious impressions (*samskāra*) left by previous perceptions cannot be the cause of recognition, because they refer to past perceptions of which they are residua, and therefore cannot account for the consciousness of *thisness* or the present condition of the object involved in recognition. (3) Nor can recognition be brought about by the co-operation of the sense-organ with subconscious impressions, because they are found to operate separately and produce different effects. The sense-organ always produces direct apprehension, and subconscious impressions always produce memory; so they can never bring about a single effect in the shape of recognition, when they co-operate with each other.¹

Hence recognition is not a single psychosis produced either by the sense-organs or by subconscious impressions or by both together, but it involves two discrete psychoses, presentative and representative, mechanically associated with each other. It cannot be a single unitary process, for one and the same psychosis cannot apprehend the past as well as the present condition of an object, and thus can never apprehend its identity in the past and the present. It is a mechanical composition of presentative and representative processes, of which the former apprehends the present character of its object and the latter apprehends its past character. We have no psychosis to apprehend the identity of an object in the past and the present. Even if we concede that recognition is a single psychosis, what is the nature of its object? If it apprehends a past object, it does not differ from recollection; if it apprehends a future object, it does not differ from constructive imagination; if it apprehends only what exists at the present moment, then it does not recognize the identity of its object in the past and the present; and it is self-contradictory to hold that it can apprehend an object as existing in the past, the present,

¹ NM., pp. 448-9.

and the future.² For the same reason it cannot be held that recognition apprehends an object as qualified by a previous cognition, for a past cognition does not exist at present, and therefore cannot qualify the object of the present cognition; and if the past cognition, which is supposed to qualify the object of recognition, is not at all apprehended as past, an object cannot be perceived as qualified by the previous cognition in an act of recognition. Thus recognition cannot be regarded as a kind of qualified perception.³ It consists of two distinct psychoses, presentative and representative.

3. *The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards cognition as a single unitary process. It apprehends both the past condition of its object and its present condition by a synthetic act of apperception. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa severely criticizes the Buddhist theory of recognition. The Buddhist argues that there is no recognition as a single psychosis, because there is no cause of recognition. The effect cannot exist if there is no cause of it. But this is reversing the order of things. We may infer a cause of a given effect, but we cannot deny the existence of the effect, even if we cannot account for it. Though neither sense-organs nor subconscious impressions by themselves can account for the fact of recognition, still when they co-operate with each other, their co-operation can account for it. Though sense-organs can produce only perception, and subconscious impressions can produce only recollection, yet when they co-operate with each other, they can produce recognition, which is a kind of qualified perception.⁴

What is the object of recognition, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika? The object of recognition is something existing at present but also qualified by the past time. Thus recognition apprehends both the past and present character of its object.⁵ But the Buddhist contends that it is self-contradictory to suppose that one and the same mental process, viz. recognition, apprehends the past as well as the present character of its object, inasmuch as

² NM., p. 449.

⁴ NM., p. 459.

⁵ NM., p. 449.

⁶ Atītakālavaiśiṣṭo vartamānakālāvacchinnaścārtha etasyāṃavabhāṣate. NM., p. 459.

the past and the present cannot exist at the same time, and so cannot simultaneously qualify an object. The past is past ; it does not exist at present ; both the past and the present cannot be apprehended by the same act of recognition, and qualify its object. The Naiyāyika replies that the past is apprehended as past, and the present is apprehended as present by recognition ; so that the object of recognition is one and the same, being qualified by the past and the present both. Hence there is no contradiction in holding that recognition apprehends an object qualified by the past and the present both.⁶ But the Buddhist contends that a presentative cognition produced by peripheral stimulation cannot apprehend an object qualified by the past time. The Naiyāyika replies that the object which existed in the past exists at present also ; so that in recognition the object is presented to consciousness as existing at present and also qualified by the past. And there is nothing incongruous in this. When we eat a number of fruits, say, one hundred, and after eating ninety-nine fruits come to the hundredth fruit, we have the consciousness of having eaten ninety-nine fruits, so that the cognition of the hundredth fruit is qualified by the fruits which existed in the past, many seconds before the hundredth fruit is eaten, and the number hundred recognized ; and even though what is past is not present at the time, yet the relation which the object had with the past time is certainly present in the object, and the qualification of an object by its relation to the past time is all that is necessary for recognition apprehending an object as qualified by the past time.⁷

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, recognition is perceptual in character, though it is produced by the sense-organs with the help of subconscious impressions. For, according to him, whatever mental state is produced by peripheral stimulation is an immediate, presentative or perceptual cognition. Recognition is produced by peripheral stimulation, though with the help of subconscious impressions left by previous perceptions ; hence it must be regarded as a kind of presentative cognition or perception. Though the sense-organs by themselves cannot produce the cognition of a past object, yet in co-operation with the subconscious impressions of past experience they can produce the cognition of

⁶ NM., pp. 459-60.

⁷ NM., pp. 459-460.

an object as qualified by the past time. Hence recognition is defined by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa as the perception of a present object qualified by the past time, due to the contact of a sense-organ with the present object, or as the perception of a present object, as modified by its past cognition. Just as the visual perception of a flower is modified by the previous olfactory perception of its fragrance, which is not perceived by the visual organ at the present, and thus brings about the indirect visual perception of a fragrant flower through the *manas*, so in recognition the perception of a present object is modified by a past cognition reproduced in imagination. Though pure perception is produced by the peripheral organs, and pure recollection is produced by subconscious impressions, yet recognition is produced by the co-operation of both, and the object of recognition is perceived through the *manas*, as qualified by the past cognition of the object.⁸ Śivāditya also defines recognition as the apprehension of an object as qualified by the past time.⁹ Mādhava Sarasvatī regards recognition as the apprehension of an object as qualified by the present and the past time.¹⁰ Viśvanātha refers to a doctrine which regards recollection as a cause of recognition, since a subconscious impression without being revived cannot bring about recognition, and it is better to hold that a recollection, rather than a revived impression, is the cause of recognition.¹¹

Thus recognition is not a mixed mode of consciousness made up of presentative and representative elements, for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the simultaneity of two or more cognitions owing to the atomic nature of the *manas*. According to his view, recognition is a single presentative cognition or perception, but qualified by the past time or by the past cognition of the object. Recognition, therefore, is a kind of qualified perception.

4. *The Mīmāṃsaka and the Advaita Vedāntist*

Kumārila agrees with the Naiyāyika in regarding recognition as a presentative cognition. He puts forward the following reason. Whatever cognition is produced by peripheral stimulation is presentative or perceptual in nature. Recognition is present

⁸ NM., p. 461.

⁹ SP., p. 68.

¹⁰ MB., p. 25.

¹¹ SM., p. 497.

when there is peripheral stimulation. Though recognition is preceded by an act of recollection, it is not to be regarded as non-perceptual in character, inasmuch as it is produced by the contact of sense-organ with a present object. There is no injunction that only such a cognition is to be regarded as a perception, as is prior to recollection. Nor is the operation of the sense-organs, after recollection, precluded by any valid reason. Thus the fact of following upon recollection cannot deprive a cognition of its perceptual character, if it is produced by peripheral stimulation. For these reasons, Kumārila regards every cognition as a perception, which is produced by peripheral stimulation, whether it appears before or after recollection. Hence he regards recognition as a kind of perception.¹²

The Śaṅkarite agrees with the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka in holding that recognition is a perceptual cognition produced by peripheral stimulation and subconscious impressions co-operating together. Akhaṇḍānanda Muni asks: What is the cause of recognition? Is it produced by the residua of past experience? Or is it produced by peripheral stimulation? Or is it produced by both together? The first alternative is false. Residua of past experience can apprehend only the past condition of an object; they cannot apprehend the distinctive character of the object as determined by the present time and space. The second alternative also is false. The sense-organs can apprehend only the present condition of the object; they cannot apprehend the distinctive character of the object as determined by the past time and space. And the Buddhist contends that the third alternative also is false for the following reason. If recognition were produced by peripheral stimulation and subconscious impressions together, it would be characterized by the dual nature of perception and recollection, and thus would not be able to apprehend the identity of the object in the past and the present. According to the Buddhist, one and the same cognition cannot be both immediate and mediate, presentative and representative. But the Vedāntist believes in the fusion of psychoses, and thus regards recognition as a single complex psychosis apprehending the identity of an object in the past and the present, due to peripheral stimulation in co-operation with subconscious impressions. Akhaṇḍānanda Muni points out that though recognition is

¹² ŚV., iv, 234-7.

produced by the co-operation of peripheral stimulation and sub-conscious impressions, it is *perceptual* in character and does not involve the twofold element of perception and recollection, for recollection is produced by subconscious impressions alone. But it may be objected that if recognition is perceptual in character, it cannot apprehend the past condition of the object, which is involved in recognition. The Vedāntist replies that recognition apprehends the past condition of the object, because it is not produced by peripheral stimulation alone but by peripheral stimulation together with subconscious impressions¹³

Thus both the Vedāntist and the Naiyāyika regard recognition as a kind of perception. But there is a slight difference between the two views. According to the Vedāntist, recognition is a single complex psychosis containing presentative and representative elements; it is a presentative-representative process. According to the Naiyāyika, recognition is a single simple psychosis which is presentative in character; it does not contain both presentative and representative elements; it is a kind of perception which is produced by peripheral stimulation and sub-conscious impressions together. The Vedāntist believes in the fusion of elementary psychoses into a composite psychosis. But the Naiyāyika cannot believe in psychic fusion for two reasons. In the first place, two psychoses cannot be simultaneously present in the self, owing to the atomic nature of the *manas*. In the second place, perception and memory are entirely different kinds of psychoses, and there can be no intermixture of two distinct classes. But the Vedāntist does not believe in the atomic nature of the *manas*, and he has no prejudice against the intermixture of distinct kinds of psychoses. So he believes in the simultaneous occurrence of two distinct kinds of psychoses and their fusion into a unitary composite psychosis. Herein lies the difference between the Naiyāyika view of recognition and the Vedāntist view.

5. The Jaina

The Jaina regards recognition as a single unitary psychosis produced by perception and recollection both, which apprehends the identity of an object in the past and present. It is neither of the nature of perception nor of the nature of recollection, nor a

¹³ Tattvadīpana, p. 273. See also Tattvapradīpikā, pp. 214-15.

mechanical association of perception and recollection both, nor a composite psychosis containing the twofold element of perception and recollection. It is a unique psychosis; it is *sui generis*; it is a single unitary psychosis produced by perception and recollection both. Perception apprehends the present condition of an object. Recollection apprehends the past condition of an object. Recognition which is quite a new psychosis apprehends the identity of an object in the past and the present. So recognition is different from perception and recollection and its object also is different from that of perception and recollection. Thus the Jaina differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsaka and the Vedāntist, who regard recognition as a kind of perception, and from the Buddhist, who regards it as a mechanical association of two distinct psychoses, viz. perception and recollection.

The Jaina criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsaka and the Vedāntist regard recognition as a kind of perception. But it cannot be regarded as a kind of perception. For, wherever peripheral stimulation is present, perception is present, and wherever peripheral stimulation is absent, perception is absent. But wherever peripheral stimulation is present, recognition is not present, and wherever peripheral stimulation is absent, recognition is not absent. In other words, recognition does not directly follow upon peripheral stimulation. If it did, then we should have recognition even at the time of the perception of an individual object for the first time. Nor can it be said that recognition is produced by a sense-organ in co-operation with the recollection of the object owing to the revival of the residua left by the previous perceptions of the object, because perception is quite independent of memory. If perception did depend upon memory, it would never apprehend an object which was never perceived in the past—it would never apprehend a new object. It may be argued, recognition is different from recollection, since it apprehends an object existing here and now; and hence it is a kind of perception. The Jaina contends, perception is produced by peripheral stimulation; and peripheral stimulation is possible only when the stimulus is present; and hence perception apprehends only a present object. But as recognition apprehends the identity of an object in the past and the present, its object cannot be apprehended by perception which depends upon the stimulation of a sense-organ by a present object. It has been

urged that the recollection of an object of past experience gives rise to a cognition in response to peripheral stimulation, which is called recognition. Thus recognition is a kind of perception, inasmuch as it is produced by peripheral stimulation not independently, but in co-operation with the recollection of a past experience. But this also is impossible. A perception can never apprehend the past condition of an object. So it cannot incorporate in itself the recollection of past experience.¹⁴ In fact, recognition is neither perception nor recollection, but a *sui generis* psychosis produced by both.¹⁵ It is not a kind of perception, since it is not direct and immediate knowledge.

The Jaina criticizes the Buddhist view. The Buddhist holds that recognition is not a single psychosis, but a mechanical association of two distinct psychoses, presentative and representative, there being no third kind of cognition different from perception and memory, which may be called recognition. The Jaina contends that recognition is distinctly felt as a single unitary process produced by perception and memory both, which apprehends the identity of an object in the midst of past and present modifications.¹⁶ Recollection cannot apprehend the identity of an object in the past and the present, since it can apprehend only the past condition of an object. Nor can perception apprehend the identity of an object in the past and the present, since it can apprehend only the present condition of an object. And if it is said that a determinate cognition arising out of the residua of both perception and recollection apprehends the identity of an object in the past and the present, then that is nothing but recognition which is quite a new psychosis.

The Buddhist himself admits the possibility of a psychic fusion in the consciousness of a motley colour (*citrajñāna*) in which many cognitions of blue, yellow, etc., are fused together. Why, then, should he object to the possibility of a new psychosis of recognition produced by presentation and representation both? Even supposing that recognition consists of two discrete psychoses—presentative and representative—mechanically associated with each other, are they felt in consciousness as interpenetrating each other, or in mechanical juxtaposition with each other? In the

¹⁴ PKM., p. 97.

¹⁵ Darśanasmaranākāraṇakam saṅkalanam pratyabhijñām. PMS., p. 2.

¹⁶ Smaraṇapratyakṣajanyasya pūrvottaravivartavarttyekadravyaviśayasya saṅkalanajñānasyaikaśya pratyabhijñānatvena supratītatvāt. PKM., p. 97.

former case, recognition will be felt either as perception or as recollection. In the latter, it will be felt as a dual consciousness, both presentative and representative, distinct from each other. But, in fact, recognition is never felt either as perception or recollection or both together. Hence it must be regarded as a unique psychosis differing from both perception and recollection. And the object of recognition is neither a past object nor a present object, but the identity of an object in the past and the present, which can never be apprehended by perception and recollection.

According to the Jaina, there is a sort of mental chemistry in the production of the state of recognition; it is not a result of mechanical composition and association of presentative and representative processes, as the Buddhist supposes. Recognition is *sui generis*. It is a compound psychosis, no doubt, but, like a chemical compound, it differs in quality from its constituent elements. It differs from perception and recollection both, and is yet a combination of the two psychoses.¹⁷ Prabhācandra includes all kinds of presentative-representative cognition of relations in recognition. The perceptions of identity, similarity, dissimilarity, relation of sign and signate, etc., are involved in recognition. It implies the elaborative processes of comparison, assimilation, discrimination, spatial and temporal localization.¹⁸ Prabhācandra agrees with Herbert Spencer and William James in holding that not only the ultimate feelings and sensations are presentations, but that the relations among them also are presentations. The relational processes do not imply the synthetic activity of the understanding, and consequently are not necessarily involved in the operations of conceptual thinking. Thus Prabhācandra differs from Bradley and Green who regard relational processes as the synthetic operations of the understanding. But it is contended that it is self-contradictory to say that one and the same psychosis has two temporal marks. The Jaina replies that if there is dual nature in the process of recognition, it is not self-contradictory, because the manifoldness of one and the same object of knowledge is usual, since contradiction is the very essence of the reality. The manifoldness of recognition is a datum; we cannot deny its existence or explain it away.

¹⁷ PKM., pp. 97-9.

¹⁸ PMS., p. 2, and PKM., p. 97.

BOOK IV

CHAPTER VII

THEORIES OF PERCEPTION

1. *The Buddhist Theory of Perception*

There are four schools of Buddhists. The Vaibhāṣikas hold that the external world is an object of perception. They maintain the independent existence of nature and mind; nature is extra-mental and is immediately perceived by the mind. The Sautrāntikas also hold that the external world exists. But according to them, it is not an object of direct perception. The external objects produce presentations in the mind through which we infer the existence of external objects. From the epistemological point of view, both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas are realists; but the former are advocates of direct realism, while the latter are advocates of indirect realism or representationism. The Yogācāras do not believe in the existence of extra-mental objects. According to them, the immediate objects of our consciousness are the ideas of the mind; these ideas can never carry us beyond themselves to extra-mental objects. Thus the Yogācāras are subjective idealists. The Mādhyamikas annul the existence of mind and matter, subject and object, and go beyond them to the void (*śūnya*) which is beyond the scope of intellectual knowledge. Thus the Mādhyamikas are nihilists. But here we are not concerned with the epistemological theories of perception. We shall deal here only with the psychological analysis of perception given by the Buddhists. The only Buddhist work in which we find a psychological analysis of perception is *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti with its commentaries. Here the subject has been treated probably from the Sautrāntika point of view.¹

Diñnāga defined perception in his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* as the cognition which is free from *kalpanās* or mental concepts, e.g. name, class, and the like.² Dharmakīrti defined perception as the

¹ BP., p. 308.

² *Pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpodhaṁ nāmajātyādyasamhyutam.*

non-erroneous cognition devoid of mental concepts or *kalpanās*.³ Perception must be non-erroneous. This is the logical condition of valid perception. But here we shall not discuss the conditions of valid perception. So far as its psychological nature is concerned, perceptual cognition must be free from mental constructs (*kalpanā*). Perception is direct or immediate knowledge. If perception is defined as the cognition produced by the sense-object-contact, as the Naiyāyika does, mental perception will be excluded from the category of perception. Perception is direct presentation of an object (*sākṣātkārijñānam*).⁴

Perception must be free from *kalpanās*. But what is *kalpanā*? *Kalpanā*, according to Dharmakīrti, is a name which denotes an object. Perception, therefore, must be free from all association with names. It must be inarticulate, nameless, or indeterminate perception. Names are artificial verbal signs which are assigned by the mind to the objects of perception, when it recognizes them as members of a particular class or as the same as perceived before. To associate an object of perception with a name, therefore, is to remember similar objects perceived in the past and recognize them. This is not produced by the object of perception. When the sense-organs come into contact with their appropriate objects, they produce direct presentations or perceptual cognitions. The objects are presented to the mind, when they come into contact with the proper sense-organs. But the act of recognition or assigning a name to the object of perception is not directly produced by the sense-object-contact. Names of objects are never presented to the sense-organs. They are never presented to the senses by the objects of perception. The acts of recognition and naming involve the unification of the objects of present experience with the objects of past experience, so that they are not directly produced by objects coming into contact with the proper sense-organs, for past objects can never be presented to the senses.

Sometimes though the objects of perception are not associated with definite names, they are capable of being associated with names. For instance, though an infant does not know the names of objects, and as such his perception is not associated with any name, it may not be free from mental construct (*kalpanā*). Even an infant does not begin to suck the breast of his mother, until

³ *Kalpanāpodham abhantaṁ pratyakṣam*. NB., p. 11.

⁴ NBT., p. 12.

he recognizes the breast to be the same as experienced before. Thus perception must be free from all association with names, and it must not involve any content of consciousness which may be represented by names; it must not involve naming and recognition; it must not contain any ideal factor or mental construct. It must be the direct and immediate presentation of an object, free from all elaborative or interpretative processes. It must represent only the given element in experience. It must not import anything new into the given order from within the mind from past experience.⁴

The Naiyāyikas and others hold that indeterminate perception apprehends the qualified object (*viśeṣya*) and qualifications (*viśeṣaṇa*), but not their relations to each other. But the Buddhist contends that indeterminate perception does not at all apprehend the qualifications of its object, viz. generality, substantiality, quality, action, and name, but it simply apprehends the mere object apart from its qualifications. It cannot apprehend both the qualified object and its qualifications. It merely apprehends the specific individuality of an object (*svalakṣaṇa*) devoid of all qualifications. The specific individuality of an object is unique and *sui generis*; it is quite different from anything other than itself; it can never be expressed by words; it is apprehended only by perception. So perception is always indeterminate. There is no determinate perception. The so-called determinate perception is not perceptual in character because it is not produced by peripheral stimulation. It is produced by the recollection of the name of the object perceived. Between peripheral stimulation and the determinate cognition there is an intervening factor of the recollection of the name. So the determinate cognition is not purely presentative in character, but it is a presentative-representative process. But the Buddhist regards perception as entirely free from factors of imagination. So he does not admit the possibility of determinate perception.⁵

Dharmakīrti recognizes four kinds of perception: sense-perception (*indriyajñāna*), mental perception (*manovijñāna*), self-consciousness (*svasamvedana*), and yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*). Sense-perception is produced by the sense-organs. It is an "immediate feltness",⁶ a bare sensation. It gives rise to mental

⁴ NB. and NBT., pp. 13-14. See also BP., p. 309.

⁵ See Chapter II.

⁶ BP., p. 310.

perception which immediately succeeds it, and belongs to the same series. Mental perception is due to four causes: the objective datum, e.g. external stimulus (*ālambana-pratyaya*), the co-operative cause (*sahakāripratyaya*), e.g. light in visual perception, the dominant cause, e.g. the sense-organ (*adhipatipratyaya*), and the immediate cause, e.g. the immediately preceding cognition (*samanantarapratyaya*). Dharmottara distinguishes mental perception from sense-perception. When the visual organ has ceased to operate, we have mental perception. So long as the visual organ continues to operate, the perception of colour is nothing but sense-perception.⁷ So mental perception is continuous with sense-perception, and immediately follows upon it. Self-consciousness is the perception of the mind and mental states like pleasure and pain. The direct and immediate apprehension of mental states is of the nature of self-conscious awareness (*svasamvedana*). They are not perceived by other cognitions, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds. They are directly perceived by themselves. Self-consciousness is perception, since it directly intuits itself, is devoid of concepts, and free from error.⁸ Yogic perception is the direct intuition of the real, due to intense meditation on the four truths of Buddhism.⁹ We shall discuss the Buddhist doctrine of yogic intuition later on.¹⁰

2. The Jaina Theory of Perception

The Jaina recognizes only two kinds of valid knowledge: direct knowledge (*aparokṣa*) and indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*).¹¹ Knowledge is direct when it is immediate or distinct. Knowledge is indirect when it is mediate. Perception is direct or immediate knowledge because it is directly derived from the senses and the mind, while mediate knowledge (e.g. inferential knowledge, verbal knowledge, etc.) is derived through the medium of some other knowledge. Māṇikyanandin defines perception as distinct apprehension (*viśadam pratyakṣam*).¹² What is the meaning of distinctness? That knowledge is distinct, which is not mediated by

⁷ NBT., p. 19.

⁸ Tacca jñānarūpaṃ vedanamātmanah sākṣātkāri nirvikalpakam abhīrāntam. NBT., p. 20; BP., p. 317.

⁹ NBT., pp. 20-1.

¹⁰ Chapter XVII.

¹¹ PMS., ii, 1-2.

¹² PMS., ii, 3.

some other kind of knowledge. And that knowledge is distinct, which apprehends an object in all its details.¹³ Perception is of two kinds: *sāṃvyaṭvahārika pratyakṣa* and *mukhya pratyakṣa*.¹⁴ The former is the ordinary perception of everyday life. The latter is super-normal perception. *Sāṃvyaṭvahārika pratyakṣa*, again, is of two kinds: perception produced by the senses (*indriya-nibandhana*) and perception not produced by the senses (*anindriya-nibandhana*).¹⁵ The Jaina regards the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin only as sense-organs. He does not regard the mind (*manas*) as a sense-organ. The mind is called no-sense-organ (*anindriya*). Hence the two varieties of ordinary perception are sense-perception and mental perception. *Mukhya pratyakṣa* is of three kinds: *avadhi* or clairvoyant perception of objects at a distance of time and space, *manahparyaya* or telepathic knowledge of thoughts in other minds, and *kevala* or infinite knowledge unlimited by time and space, or omniscience.¹⁶ All of them are perceptual in nature.

The Jaina distinguishes between *darśana* and *jñāna*. *Darśana* is the simple apprehension of an object. Just after peripheral stimulation there is the bare cognition of an object in a general way. It apprehends only its general features (*sattāmātra*) and not its particular features. *Jñāna* is the apprehension of the special features of an object. *Darśana* is the "knowledge of acquaintance", while *jñāna* is the "knowledge about" an object. *Darśana* is called indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa jñāna*) in other systems of philosophy. But the Jaina does not recognize it as *jñāna* or knowledge. *Jñāna* is always determinate; it must have a definite form (*sākāra*); it must apprehend the special features (*viśeṣa*) of its object.¹⁷ So the Jaina does not regard *darśana* as indeterminate perception, because perception is always definite and determinate.

In our ordinary perception (*sāṃvyaṭvahārika pratyakṣa*) there are four stages: (1) *Avagraha*, (2) *Ihā*, (3) *Avāya*, and (4) *Dhāraṇā*.¹⁸ Just after *darśana* there is *avagraha*. *Darśana* is the simple apprehension of an object in a general way. When a stimulus

¹³ PMS., ii, 4.

¹⁴ PMS., ii, 5, 11. PNT., ii, 4-5.

¹⁵ PMS., ii, 5.

¹⁶ PNT., ii, 19, 20, and 23.

¹⁷ DSV., 4.

¹⁸ PNT., ii, 6. U.T.S., i, 15.

acts upon a sense-organ, there is an excitation in consciousness, and the person is barely conscious of the mere existence (*sattāmātra*) of an object. This is *darśana*. It is indistinct and indefinite. Just after this simple apprehension there is the cognition of an object together with its general and special features (e.g. white colour). This is *avagraha*.¹⁹ It grasps the details of an object. But it does not apprehend all the details of the object. It excites a desire in the person to know more about the object. This desire to know the particulars of the object is called *īhā*.²⁰ It is a desire to know whether the object is this or that. In the stage of *avagraha* we have the perception of white colour. But in the stage of *īhā* we desire to know whether the white object is a row of herons or a flag.²¹ Then there is *avāya*. It is the ascertainment of the true nature of the object.²² "In the third stage, *avāya*, there is a definite finding of the particulars which we desired to know in the second stage. The second stage (*avagraha*) is merely an attempt to know the particulars, while the third stage consists in the ascertainment of these particulars."²³ When we observe the upward and downward movement of the birds and the fluttering of their wings we definitely know that there is a row of herons and not a flag.²⁴ *Avāya* is the definite perception of an object as this and not that. It involves assimilation and discrimination. In it we clearly perceive the similarities of the object with other objects perceived in the past, and its differences from others. It involves the recognition of an object as belonging to a definite class. It is definite and determinate perception. Then it gives rise to *dhāraṇā* or retention. "*Dhāraṇā* consists of the lasting impression which results after the object, with its particulars, is definitely ascertained. It is this impression (*samskāra*), which enables us to remember the object afterwards."²⁵ Retention is the cause of recollection. Thus the Jaina recognizes four stages of ordinary perception: *avagraha* or the perception of some features of an object; *īhā* or the desire to know more about it; *avāya* or the definite ascertainment of its real nature; and *dhāraṇā* or retention of the perception. Of these the last can hardly be regarded as a stage in perception. *Avāya* or definite and determinate perception should be regarded as the last stage

¹⁹ PNT., ii, 7. SS., i, 15.

²⁰ PNT., ii, 8.

²¹ SS., i, 15.

²² PNT., ii, 9.

²³ DS., p. 15.

²⁴ SS., i, 15.

²⁵ DS., p. 15.

of perception. The Jaina does not recognize *darśana* as a distinct stage in perception. It is quite different from *jñāna* or knowledge. And perception is a kind of *jñāna*. *Darśana* is presupposed by perception but not involved in it. Perception gives us knowledge of an object with its qualities and relations. Different accounts are given by different authors, of the four stages of perception given above.

Thus the Jaina theory of perception differs from the Buddhist theory mainly in that perception, according to the latter, is the direct presentation of an object, while, according to the former, it is presentative-representative. According to the Buddhists perception is always indeterminate, while according to the Jaina perception is always determinate. According to the Buddhists, perception is the immediate knowledge of the specific individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) devoid of all association with names or facts of past experience. According to the Jaina, however, perception is the presentative-representative cognition of extra-mental objects and their relations to one another. According to the Buddhists, perception does not represent the relations of extra-mental objects; these are imported by thought or imagination from within the mind into the sense-data to bring about determinate cognitions, which are, therefore, not perceptual in character. According to the Jaina, on the other hand, the extra-mental objects and their relations to one another are facts of direct and immediate experience. The Jaina, therefore, agrees with James and Herbert Spencer in holding that relations are not imposed by the intellect upon the raw sense-materials to convert them into a system of intelligible experience, but that they are embedded in direct and immediate experience as contents of consciousness.

3. The Naiyāyika Theory of Perception

Gautama defines perception as the non-erroneous cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects, not associated with any name, and well-defined.²⁶ In this definition the different kinds of perception, the condition of valid perception, and the genesis of perception have been described. Perception is of two kinds, viz., indeterminate (*avyapadeśya*) and

²⁶ *Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam.* NS., I, 1, 4.

determinate (*vyavasāyātmaka*). We have already discussed the nature of indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and determinate (*savikalpa*) perception in detail. Here we shall briefly discuss the nature and origin of perception, and not the conditions of valid perception. Perception is that cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects.²⁷ This is Keśavamisra's definition. In this definition only the specific condition of perception has been stated. In perception there is not only the contact of the sense-organs with the objects, but also the contact of the sense-organs with *manas*, and the contact of *manas* with the self. Thus there is a fourfold contact between the sense-organs and the objects, the sense-organs and *manas*, and *manas* and the self.²⁸ This definition, therefore, does not give us an exhaustive enumeration of all the factors that co-operate in producing perception. It points out only that condition which is the specific cause of perception, and which distinguishes it from all other forms of cognition. It does not mention the other conditions, viz., the contact of *manas* with the sense-organs, and the contact of *manas* with the self, because they are common to inference and other forms of cognition also.²⁹ But it may be contended that the contact of *manas* with the sense-organs also is a specific condition of perception, which is not present in other forms of cognition. So this condition also should be distinctly mentioned. Vātsyāyana rightly points out that the contact of the sense-organs with the objects is as good a distinctive feature of perception, as the contact of *manas* with the sense-organs. So when one distinctive feature has been mentioned, there is no need of mentioning the other similar features, since the definition is not meant to be an exhaustive enumeration of all the conditions of perception.³⁰ Uddyotakara offers other explanations too. Firstly, the sense-object-contact is the distinctive feature of every individual perception. In every individual perception, which is produced by the sense-object-contact, what differentiates it from every other perception is either the sense-organ concerned, or the object perceived; and each individual perception is called either after the sense-organ, or after the object. For example, the perception of colour is called either *visual* perception or *colour*-perception;

²⁷ *Indriyārthasannikarṣajanyam jñānam pratyakṣam*. TS., p. 29.

²⁸ NBh., i, 1, 4.

²⁹ NBh., i, 1, 4.

³⁰ NBh., i, 1, 4.

and no perception is ever called after the mind-sense-contact ; the perception of colour, for instance, is never called *mental* perception. Secondly, the mind-sense-contact is the common factor among all kinds of perception, which are otherwise different. In other words, the contact of the mind with the sense-organs does not differ in different kinds of perception ; it remains the same in different kinds of perception. Thirdly, the mind-sense-contact is not mentioned as the distinctive feature of perception, since with regard to perception the mind-sense-contact stands on the same footing as the mind-soul-contact, firstly because individual perceptions are never called either after the mind or after the soul ; and secondly because both these contacts subsist in a substratum which is imperceptible by the senses ; thirdly because neither of these two contacts belongs to the perceived object ; and lastly because both these contacts subsist in the mind. These are the reasons why the mind-sense-contact has not been mentioned in the definition of perception.³¹

An objection has been raised against this definition that it excludes cognition of the self and its qualities of pleasure, pain, etc., from the category of perception, because the mind (*manas*) is not a sense-organ. Gautama does not mention the mind as a sense-organ, when he enumerates the sense-organs.³² Thus the cognition of pleasure, pain, etc., which is produced through the instrumentality of the mind, cannot be regarded as perception, since the mind is not a sense-organ. But, as a matter of fact, the cognition of pleasure and pain is neither inferential nor verbal, since the conditions of inference and verbal cognition are absent. So it is absolutely necessary that the cognition of pleasure, pain, etc., should be included in perception, and yet the above definition excludes it. Vātsyāyana points out that the cognition of pleasure, pain, etc., is included in perception by Gautama, since perception is defined by him as that kind of cognition which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object, and the mind is a sense-organ. Gautama has not mentioned the mind as a sense-organ when he has enumerated the sense-organs owing to the fact that the mind is different in character from the other sense-organs. What is the difference between the mind and the other sense-organs? Vātsyāyana mentions three points of difference.

³¹ NV., i, 1, 4 ; S.L., *Indian Thought*, vol. vi, pp. 135-7.

³² NS., i, 1, 12.

In the first place, the external sense-organs are material, while the mind is immaterial. In the second place, the external sense-organs operate upon only a limited number of objects, while the mind is effective on all objects. For instance, colours are apprehended by the visual organ; odours are apprehended by the olfactory organ; tastes are apprehended by the gustatory organ; sounds are apprehended by the auditory organ; and touch is apprehended by the tactual organ. But the mind apprehends all objects. In the third place, the external sense-organs are of the nature of sense-organs owing to the fact that they are endued with the same qualities as are apprehended by them. The olfactory organ is endued with the quality of odour and consequently it can apprehend odour. The visual organ is endued with the quality of colour, and consequently can apprehend colour. The gustatory organ is endued with the quality of taste; so it can apprehend taste. The auditory organ is endued with the quality of sound; so it can apprehend sound. And the tactual organ is endued with the quality of touch; so it can apprehend touch. But the mind is not endowed with the qualities of pleasure, pain, etc., which are apprehended by the mind.³³ Thus when perception is defined as the cognition produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the objects, the cognition of pleasure and pain also is included in perception, inasmuch as the mind is a sense-organ.

Though both the contact of the mind with the self and the contact of the sense-organs with the objects are necessary conditions of all external perceptions, the latter must be regarded as the principal cause. For sometimes a man goes to sleep with the determination that he will wake up at a certain time, and by force of this determination wakes up at that time; but sometimes when a man is awakened from deep sleep either by a very loud sound or by a rude shaking, his waking perceptions of the sound or the touch are primarily due to the contact of the sense-organs with the objects. So predominance must be given not to the mind-soul-contact, but to the sense-object-contact; because in such cases the soul has no desire to know and does not put forth an effort to direct the mind towards the object. Moreover, when a man with his mind entirely pre-occupied with one thing, desires to know another thing, he puts forth energy to direct

³³ NBh., i, 1, 4,

his mind towards the object and perceives it; in such a case we cannot say that the sense-object-contact is the principal cause. But when a man with his mind entirely pre-occupied with one thing suddenly comes to have the cognition of another thing, brought about by the forcible impact of the object upon a sense-organ, without any desire or mental effort on his part, the contact of the sense-organ with the object must be regarded as the principal cause of perception, since in this case there is no desire or effort on the part of the self to know the object.³⁴ In the case of the man whose mind is pre-occupied, the cognition that suddenly appears is sometimes entirely due to the force of a particular object of sense-perception; its force stands for intensity (*tīvratā*) and vigour (*paṭutā*); and this force of the object affects the sense-object-contact, and not the mind-soul-contact.³⁵ This clearly shows that the sense-object-contact is the principal cause of perception. The different kinds of sense-object-contact have already been dealt with. Jayanārāyaṇa holds that the soul is the constituent cause, the mind-soul-contact is the non-constituent cause, and the sense-object-contact is the efficient cause of perception.³⁶ Thus the Naiyāyika explains the origin of perception by a concatenation of conditions, viz., the sense-object-contact, the mind-sense-contact and the mind-soul-contact. It does not describe the specific functions of the different factors involved in perception, as the Sāṃkhya does. It, indeed, overcomes the Sāṃkhya dualism of *buddhi* (intellect) and *puruṣa* (self) by regarding the former as a quality of the self; but it does not explain the relation between the self and the object, and the correspondence between knowledge-forms and object-forms. An unwarranted and uncritical assumption on which the Naiyāyika theory of knowledge is based is that knowledge is produced, like any other physical effect, out of a collocation of causal conditions; psychic causation and physical causation are quite the same in nature. "The production of knowledge is no transcendental-occurrence, but is one which is similar to the effects produced by the conglomeration and movements of physical causes."³⁷ The self, the mind, the sense-organs, and the objects are the main factors which bring about perceptual knowledge by their contact

³⁴ NBh., ii, 1, 26; E.T., *Indian Thought*, vol. ii, pp. 38-9.

³⁵ NBh., ii, 1, 29; E.T., *Indian Thought*, vol. ii, p. 42.

³⁶ VSV., viii, 1, 3.

³⁷ DHIP., Vol. I, p. 336.

with one another. They have no specific functions in the production of perceptual knowledge; they simply come into contact with one another, and by their mutual contact generate perception.

4. *The Neo-Naiyāyika Theory of Perception*

The older Naiyāyika defined perception as the non-erroneous cognition produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the objects, not associated with any name, and well-defined.³⁸ This definition describes the nature of perception as well as the conditions and kinds of perception. Perception is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their appropriate objects. The logical condition of right perception consists in the want of contradiction or in its correspondence with reality. It is of two kinds, indeterminate (*avyapadeśya*) and determinate (*vyavasāyātmaka*). But this definition does not apply to the perception of God or to the perception of Yogis. So Bhāsarvajña defines perception as right and direct or immediate cognition.³⁹ This definition is peculiar to Bhāsarvajña. Rāghava points out in his commentary that if we adopt the definition of Gautama, we exclude from perception the direct cognition acquired by the Yogins, which is undoubtedly a perceptual knowledge and yet it is not produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects. The word *aparokṣa* in the definition is explained by Rāghava as the cognition not produced by the word (*śabda*) or the mark or sign of inference (*liṅga*), for the former is the instrument of verbal knowledge or knowledge derived from authoritative statement (*śabdajñāna*), and the latter is the instrument of inferential knowledge (*anumitā*). Viśvanātha defines perception as the cognition which is not produced through the instrumentality of another cognition.⁴⁰ It is direct or immediate knowledge. It is not derived through the medium of some other knowledge. This definition applies to both human perception and divine perception. It excludes inferential knowledge, analogical knowledge, memory and verbal knowledge, because inferential knowledge is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of universal concomitance, analogical knowledge is produced

³⁸ NS., i, 1, 4.

³⁹ *Samyagaparokṣānubhavasādhanaṁ pratyakṣam*. NSar., p. 2.

⁴⁰ *Jñānākaraṇakaṁ jñānaṁ pratyakṣam*. SM., p. 237.

through the instrumentality of the knowledge of similarity, verbal knowledge is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of words, and memory is produced through the instrumentality of previous apprehension (*anubhava*).⁴¹

This is the Neo-Naiyāyika definition of perception. Gaṅgeśa, the founder of Navya Nyāya, defined perception in this way. Perception is direct or immediate knowledge. This is the characteristic of perception. It may be produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their proper objects. Or, it may be produced directly by the contact of the mind with the objects owing to certain occult powers of the mind. So it is proper to define perception as direct immediate knowledge not derived through medium of some other knowledge.

5. The Mīmāṃsaka Theory of Perception

Jaimini defines perception as the cognition produced in the self by the intercourse of the sense-organs with objects, and he points out that it cannot apprehend super-sensuous Moral Law (*Dharma*).⁴² This definition is practically the same as that of the Naiyāyika. Gautama defines perception as the non-erroneous cognition produced by the sense-object-contact, inexpressible by words, and well-defined. This definition states the conditions and kinds of perception. It shows that perception is of two kinds, viz., indeterminate (*avyapadeśya*) and determinate (*vyayasāyāt-maka*). It lays down the condition of valid perception. Perception must be non-erroneous, in order to be valid. Jaimini's definition does not describe the different kinds of perception. Nor does it lay down the condition of valid perception. Barring these, the two definitions are practically the same. Annambhaṭṭa defines perception as the cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with objects.⁴³ This definition is almost identical with that of Jaimini. If we analyse Jaimini's definition we find that perception requires the existence of (1) a present object of perception, (2) a sense-organ with which the object comes into contact, and (3) the self (*puruṣa*) in which the cognition is produced. In perception there must be an intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects. And there must be something more. The sense-organs must be connected with the mind, and

⁴¹ SM., pp. 237-240.

⁴² M.S., i, 1, 4.

⁴³ TS., p. 29.

the mind with the self. Thus there must be the sense-object-contact, the mind-sense-contact, and the mind-soul-contact in external perception.⁴⁴ The Naiyāyika contends that this definition includes doubtful perception and illusion in perception. Though perception is said to be produced by a real object, and as such excludes hallucinations which are not produced by external stimuli, it does not exclude doubtful perception and illusion which are produced by external stimuli.⁴⁵ Kumārila tries to avoid this objection by saying that *samprayoga* means the right application of the sense-organs to their objects, so that doubtful perception and illusion are excluded from perception.⁴⁶ Pārthasārathimīśra points out that Jaimini has not defined perception in the above *sūtra*.⁴⁷ He simply says that perception is not the condition of the apprehension of supersensuous Dharma.⁴⁸ So the Naiyāyika's objection is beside the mark. It cannot be urged that this definition does not include the perception of pleasure, pain, etc., since it does not depend upon the external sense-organs. For it depends upon the contact of pleasure, pain, etc., with the internal organ or mind.⁴⁹

Prabhākara defines perception as direct apprehension (*sākṣāt pratītiḥ*).⁵⁰ In every act of perception there is a triple consciousness (*tripuṭīsamvit*), viz., the perception of the knowing self, the known object, and knowledge itself. As regards the objects of perception, they are to be classified into substances, qualities, and classes.⁵¹ As regards the act of perception itself, it is of two kinds, viz., indeterminate perception and determinate perception.⁵² As regards the knowing self, it is manifested as the knower or subject of all kinds of knowledge, e.g., perceptual, inferential, verbal, etc., because all cognitions are appropriated by the self. And direct apprehension itself also is always self-cognized; it is not cognized by another cognition, as in that case there would be *regressus ad infinitum*.⁵³ According to Prabhākara, consciousness is self-luminous; it manifests both the self and the not-self, the knowing subject and the known object. This is the peculiarity of the Prābhākara doctrine of perception as distinguished from the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of perception explained above.

⁴⁴ YSP., p. 98.

⁴⁵ ŚV., iv, 38.

⁴⁶ SD., p. 111; also ŚV., iv, 19.

⁴⁷ PP., p. 51.

⁴⁸ Chapter II.

⁴⁹ NM., pp. 100-101.

⁵⁰ M.S., I, 1, 4.

⁵¹ SD., pp. 111-12.

⁵² PP., p. 52.

⁵³ Chapter XII.

6. *The Sāṃkhya Theory of Perception*

Kapila defines perception as a cognition which takes the form of an object, being related to it.⁵³ Vijñānabhikṣu elucidates the definition by saying that perception is the mental function (*buddhivṛtti*) which goes out to the object and is modified by the particular form of that object to which it is related. The mental function itself is not produced by the proximity of the object, but only its particular mode is produced by it, which inheres in the mental function. The mental function goes out, like the flame of a lamp, through the gateways of the sense-organs, to the external object which is proximate to it, and is modified by the particular form of the object.⁵⁴ Thus the proximity of an external object to *buddhi* (intellect) is the indispensable condition of perception in general. And the proximity of the sense-organs is a special condition of external sense-perception. But if the proximity of the object to *buddhi* were the condition of perception in general, perception would be possible even when there was no contact of the sense-organs. But such perception is unknown. The Sāṃkhya holds that inertia (*tamas*) of *buddhi* obstructs its functioning, and when it is overcome by the contact of the sense-organs with objects, or by certain intuitive powers of the Yogins, we come to have mental modes. And it is for this inertia of *buddhi* that there are no mental modes in dreamless sleep.⁵⁵

Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines perception as determinate cognition of an object, produced by its proximity to a sense-organ.⁵⁶ Vācaspati-miśra fully brings out the significance of this definition. In the first place, there must be a real object of perception. This characteristic differentiates perception from illusion. The object transforms the mental mode into its own particular form, which is in itself formless. The objects of perception are both external and internal, external as the gross sensible objects, e.g. earth, water, etc., and internal, as pleasure, pain, and the like. Even the subtle *tanmātras*, which are infra-sensible to us, are the objects of perception to the Yogin. In the second place, the perception of a particular kind of object (colour, sound, etc.) involves the operation of a particular sense-organ (eye, ear, etc.), which consists

⁵³ "Yatsambandhasiddham tadākārolekhi vijñānam tat"pratyakṣam. SPS. i, 89.

⁵⁴ SPB., i, 89.

⁵⁵ SPB., i, 91.

⁵⁶ Prativṣyādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam. Sk., 5.

in its intercourse with its object. This characteristic differentiates perception from memory, inference, etc. In the third place, perception not only involves the existence of an object, and the intercourse of a sense-organ with the object, but it also involves the operation of the intellect (*buddhi*) which produces a definite and determinate cognition of the object. When the sense-organs come into contact with the objects, the inertia (*tamas*) of the intellect is overcome, and the essence (*sattva*) springs forth in it, in consequence of which a definite and determinate cognition of the object is produced. This characteristic of perception excludes doubtful cognitions.⁵⁷

Vācaspatimiśra illustrates the process of perception by an example. Just as the headman of a village collects taxes from the villagers and gives them over to the governor of the province, and the governor hands them over to the minister, and the minister, to the king, so the external sense-organs, having immediate apprehensions of external objects, communicate the immediate impressions to the mind (*manas*), and the mind reflects upon them and gives them over to the empirical ego (*ahamkāra*) which appropriates them by its unity of apperception and gives these self-appropriated apperceived impressions of the objects to the intellect (*buddhi*) for the experience of the self (*puruṣa*).⁵⁸ Thus perception involves the functioning of certain organs. It involves the operation of the external sense-organs, the central sensory or the mind (*manas*), empirical ego (*ahamkāra*) and the intellect (*buddhi*).

The sense-organs have only an immediate apprehension (*ālocanamātra*) of objects.⁵⁹ Vācaspatimiśra explains this immediate apprehension (*ālocanajñāna*) as *sammugdha-vastu-darśana*, i.e. intuitive apprehension of an object as a homogeneous unit. The external sense-organs apprehend an object as an undifferentiated homogeneous unit, as merely *this*, but not as like this or unlike this.⁶⁰ But while Vācaspatimiśra interprets the *ālocanajñāna* as *nirvikalpajñāna* (indeterminate perception), Vijñānabhikṣu interprets it as both *nirvikalpa* (indeterminate) and *savikalpa* (determinate) apprehension. Some hold that the external sense-organs produce an immediate, indeterminate apprehension of objects, and regard the definite and determinate apprehension as

⁵⁷ STK., 5.

⁵⁸ SK., 28.

⁵⁹ STK., 36.

⁶⁰ STK., 28, also STK., 27.

the product of the *manas*. But Vijñānabhikṣu cites the authority of Vyāsa who holds that the sense-organs give us definite and determinate apprehension of objects. Vijñānabhikṣu further asserts that there is nothing to contradict the determinate apprehension of the sense-organs.⁶¹

When the sense-organ has an immediate apprehension of the object, the mind (*manas*) reflects upon it, breaks up its object into its component factors, viz. the substance, and its adjuncts, its *thatness* and *whatness*, and thus assimilates it to similar objects and discriminates it from disparate objects. Thus Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines the function of *manas* as reflection or discrimination.⁶² Vācaspatimiśra explains it thus: The mind carefully reflects upon the object intuitively apprehended by a sense-organ, and determines it as *like* this and *unlike* this, and thus discriminates it by relating the object to its properties in the subject-predicate relation (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*). The first apprehension is simple and immediate, like the apprehension of a child, a dumb person, and the like; it is produced by the mere thing; but when after this, the thing as distinguished from its properties, by its genus and the like, is recognized, that process of determination is the operation of the mind.⁶³ Vijñānabhikṣu also describes the function of the mind as determination or ascertainment.⁶⁴ Thus the function of the mind may be interpreted as the power of selective attention which, by its analytico-synthetic function of dissociation and association, breaks up the non-relational immediate intuition of the object, brings out all the relations involved in it, and thus renders it definite and determinate by assimilation and discrimination. When the mind renders the immediate and indeterminate apprehension of the sense-organs definite and determinate by assimilation and discrimination, the empirical ego (*ahamkāra*) appropriates it, and transforms the impersonal apprehension of the object into a personal experience suffused with egoism. Īśvarakṛṣṇa identifies egoism (*ahamkāra*) with self-appropriation (*abhimāna*).⁶⁵ Vācaspatimiśra explains the function of *ahamkāra* thus: "I alone preside over the object that is intuited by the sense-organ, and definitely perceived by the mind, and I have the power over all that is perceived and known, and all those objects

⁶¹ SPB., ii, 32. See Chapter II.

⁶² SK., 27.

⁶⁴ SPB., i, 71.

⁶³ STK., 27.

⁶⁵ SK., 24.

are for my use. There is no other supreme except 'I'. *I am*. This self-appropriation is called *ahamkāra* or egoism from its exclusive application."⁶⁶ Viññānabhikṣu also regards self-appropriation as the function of *ahamkāra*.⁶⁷ When the empirical ego (*ahamkāra*) appropriates the determinate apprehension of the mind to itself by its empirical unity of apperception, the intellect (*buddhi*) assumes a conative attitude to react to it, and resolves what is to be done towards the object. The function of the intellect is the ascertainment of its duty towards the object known. This explanation has been offered by Vācaspatimiśra, who observes: "Every one who deals with an object first intuits it, then reflects upon it, then appropriates it, then resolves, 'this is to be done by me,' and then he proceeds to act. This is familiar to every one." Thus the act of ascertainment that such an act is to be done is the operation of the intellect. This is the specific function of the intellect, not differing from the intellect itself. This will be clear from another example of Vācaspatimiśra, which illustrates the successive operations of the internal and external organs in perception. "In dim light a person at first apprehends the mere object as an undifferentiated unit, then attentively reflects upon it, and determines it to be a terrible thief by his bow and arrow, then thinks him in reference to himself, e.g. 'he is running towards me', and then resolves: 'I must fly from this place.'"⁶⁸ Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha gives the same explanation of *adhyavasāya* in *Sāṃkhya-Candrikā*. *Adhyavasāya* is a modified condition of the intellect, as flame is that of a lamp; it is determination in such a form as 'such an act is to be done by me.'⁶⁹ But Gauḍapāda explains *adhyavasāya* as intellectual determination of the object of perception as belonging to a definite class, such as 'this is a jar', 'this is a cloth', etc.⁷⁰ Vācaspatimiśra also explains *adhyavasāya* elsewhere as ascertainment or determinate knowledge consequent upon the manifestation of the essence (*satva*) of the intellect, when the inertia (*tamas*) of the intellect is overcome by the operation of the sense-organs in apprehending their objects.⁷¹

According to the Sāṃkhya, external perception involves the co-operation of the internal organs with the external sense-organs.

⁶⁶ STK., 23.

⁶⁷ STK., 30.

⁷⁰ SKG., 23.

⁶⁸ SPB., i, 72.

⁶⁹ Sāṃkhyacandrikā, 23.

⁷¹ STK., 5.

But the internal organs are not to be regarded as three different and independent substances or faculties, but only as *antaḥkaraṇa* in its three grades of functions. *Buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, and *manas* are one in nature; they together constitute the one internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). The Sāṃkhya does not believe in faculty psychology. *Vijñānabhikṣu* clearly brings out the organic unity of these three internal organs and their functions. Every one has, at first, a definite knowledge (*niścayaajñāna*) of an object, and then thinks it in reference to himself in this way: 'Here am I', 'this is to be done by me.' Thus self-apperception (*abhimāna*) is an effect of determinate knowledge (*niścayaajñāna*). The function of the empirical ego (*ahamkāra*) is self-appropriation (*abhimāna*) and that of the intellect (*buddhi*) is determinate knowledge (*niścayaajñāna*); but self-appropriation is the effect of determinate knowledge, since it is invariably preceded by determinate knowledge. And if the functions of two substances are related to each other as cause and effect, the substrata of these functions too must be related to each other as cause and effect. So empirical ego (*ahamkāra*), the substratum of self-appropriation (*abhimāna*), must be the effect of the intellect (*buddhi*), the substratum of determinate knowledge (*niścayaajñāna*). Hence though the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is one and the same, it appears in its threefold character as it has three distinct functions. *Buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, and *manas* are three successive functional modifications of one and the same *antaḥkaraṇa*.⁷² *Vijñānabhikṣu* supposes that self-appropriation follows upon determinate knowledge.⁷³ But *Vācaspatimiśra* interprets *adhyavasāya* as the volition of the agent to react to the object of perception in a definite way, and holds that this volition follows upon self-appropriated knowledge.

The relation of the external organs to the internal organs has been well defined by calling the former the gateways of knowledge and the latter the gatekeepers.⁷⁴ The external organs receive immediate impressions from external objects, and communicate them to the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which, in its different functions of reflection (*manana*), self-apperception (*abhimāna*), and determination (*adhyavasāya*), makes them definite and determinate, and receives them for the experience

⁷² SPB., i, 64.

⁷³ SPB., i, 64.

⁷⁴ SK., 35; see Chapter I.

of the self. The external sense-organs come into contact with external objects and thereby supply us with the 'manifold of intuitions' in the language of Kant. The function of the particular senses is simple apprehension. What they apprehend is a mere manifold, a congeries of discrete impressions, though each apprehends only a manifold of a particular kind. The mind operates on this 'manifold of intuitions' and synthesizes the congeries of discrete impressions into distinct aggregates or groups. Until the discrete sensations given by sensibility (or the external senses) are formed into groups, there can be no perception of them as things. It is the function of the mind (*manas*) to form these groups and thereby to transform a certain number of sensations into one distinct percept. Then the fluctuating sensations are referred to the unity of the empirical ego, when the consciousness supervenes that the sensations are *mine*, that I perceive. This self-apperception is the function of the empirical ego (*ahamkāra*). The perception is not complete, till the object has been determined by a further process of thought, till it has been identified by reference to the category to which it belongs. It is the function of the intellect (*buddhi*) to define and ascertain objects by recognizing that they realize a certain type. And it is the intellect which imports the empirical relations of space and time, which are nothing but the constructions or categories of the understanding (*buddhi-nirmāṇa*) into the spaceless and timeless continuum of discrete impressions synthesized by the mind into distinct groups and referred to the unity of the empirical ego. When the percept has been fully determined in this way, it is presented by the intellect to the self (*puruṣa*), in order that it may have an experience of it. According to Kant, sensibility supplies us with mere 'manifold of intuitions'; the unity of the manifold is contributed entirely by the understanding. According to the Sāṃkhya, synthesis proceeds from the three internal organs, mind, empirical ego, and the intellect or understanding. According to Kant, time and space are the forms of sensibility. According to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, they are the categories of the understanding. But according to both, knowledge is the joint product of sensibility and understanding (or the intellect). But the Sāṃkhya does not oppose sensibility and understanding to each other; sensibility, mind, self-apperception, and understanding all are the channels of perception; all these

are opposed to the self (*puruṣa*) which alone is conscious,—sensitivity, mind, empirical ego, and intellect being but insentient evolutes of Prakṛti for the experience of the self.

We have explained the function of the external and internal organs in the process of perception. But how is it that the external and internal organs, which are insentient principles, can have conscious apprehension of objects? It is the self (*puruṣa*) that makes them apprehend objects. According to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, perception depends upon two metaphysical conditions. In the first place, it implies the existence of an extra-mental object. In the second place, it implies the existence of the self (*puruṣa*). Vyāsa observes, the object is independent of the mind and common to all persons; and the minds, too, are independent of objects, which operate for the experience of the self; the experience of the self (in the form of the knowledge of an object) arises from the relation of the mind to the object.⁷⁵ The Buddhists, however, deny the existence of the self and hold that the mind is self-conscious and self-luminous. But the Sāṃkhya-Yoga holds that the mind (*citta*) is not self-luminous, since it is an *object* of consciousness.⁷⁶ Just as the other sense-organs and sensible objects are not self-luminous, inasmuch as they are objects of consciousness, so the mind, too, is not self-luminous inasmuch as it is an object of consciousness. The mind cannot be self-conscious (*svābhāsa*) because it is the effect of the unconscious *prakṛti*. How, then, can it manifest the object? The Sāṃkhya-Yoga admits the existence of the self (*puruṣa*) as the cognizer of the mind. The essence of the self is consciousness; it is not an attribute of the self. The self-luminous self is reflected upon the unconscious mind (*buddhi*) and mistakes the state of the mind for its own state.⁷⁷ The self is neither entirely similar to the mind nor entirely different from it. It is different from the mind for the following reasons. Firstly, the mind (*buddhi*) undergoes modification, since its objects are sometimes known and sometimes unknown; but the self is immutable, since its object, the mind is always known. Secondly, the self realizes its own end; but the mind (*buddhi*) realizes the end of the self, which is different from it, since it co-operates with the body and

⁷⁵ YBh., iv, 16.

⁷⁶ Na tat svābhāsam drśyatvāt. YBh., iv, 19.

⁷⁷ Here we take the word 'mind' in the sense of *buddhi* (intellect).

the sense-organs. Thirdly, the mind (*buddhi*) takes the forms of all insentient objects which are the combinations of the three ultimate reals, viz. essence (*sattva*), energy (*rajas*), and inertia (*tamas*), and thus apprehends them. Hence the mind itself is made up of the three fundamental reals and is thus insentient; but the self is the witness of the unconscious *buddhi* and the ultimate reals. But if the self is not quite similar to the mind (*buddhi*), it is not quite different from it, since the self, though pure in itself, knows the state of the unconscious mind (*buddhi*) intelligized by the reflection of the self in it, and erroneously supposes it to be its own state.⁷⁸ The *buddhi*, though unconscious in its nature, is intelligized by the reflection of the self-luminous *puruṣa*. But on this point there are two slightly different views.⁷⁹ Vācaspatimiśra holds that the self-conscious *puruṣa* is reflected on the unconscious *buddhi* and thus intelligizes it. Vijñānabhikṣu, on the other hand, holds that not only is the self reflected on the *buddhi* in its particular state, but the illuminated mode of the *buddhi*, too, is reflected back on the self. Thus there is mutual reflection of the self on the *buddhi* and of the *buddhi* on the self. Thus the Sāṃkhya-Yoga avoids the theory of interaction, but it does not commit itself to the theory of psycho-physical parallelism, since there is a mutual reflection of the conscious self and the unconscious *buddhi* upon each other.

The Sāṃkhya doctrine of perception is based upon dualistic metaphysics. But the Sāṃkhya does not advocate the Cartesian dualism of matter and mind because both these are made up of the same stuff, viz. the ultimate reals, e.g. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, and both are unconscious. The Sāṃkhya dualism is the dualism of *puruṣa* (conscious self) and *prakṛti* (unconscious primal nature) of which *buddhi* is an evolute. The Sāṃkhya dualism is not the uncompromising dualism of the Cartesians. The dualism of the Sāṃkhya is modified by the admission that there are different grades of existence among the modifications of *prakṛti*, the highest of which is *buddhi*. *Buddhi* is unconscious, no doubt, but it is so transparent and light owing to the predominance of *sattva* that it can catch the reflection of the *puruṣa*, whereas gross material objects cannot reflect the light of the *puruṣa* owing to the predominance of mass-stuff (*tamas*), the factor of obstruction. Thus, according to the Sāṃkhya, *buddhi* is an intermediate reality

⁷⁸ YB., ii, 20.

⁷⁹ See Chapter XII.

between gross matter and the conscious *puruṣa*, which partakes of the nature of both ; it is unconscious like gross material objects, but it is transparent like the self-luminous *puruṣa*. It is only in *buddhi* that the conscious *puruṣa* and the unconscious material objects come into contact with each other. This supposition may be compared with the hypothesis of Descartes, that it is only in the pineal gland of the brain that the body and the mind, which are entirely heterogeneous in nature, can interact upon each other. The Sāṃkhya, however, does not believe in the theory of interaction. Nor does it believe in the theory of parallelism. It advocates an intermediate theory which partakes of the nature of both. It advocates the theory of mutual reflection⁸⁰ of the conscious *puruṣa* on the unconscious *buddhi* and of the unconscious but intelligized *buddhi* on the conscious *puruṣa*. Thus the conscious *puruṣa* seems to act upon the unconscious *buddhi*, when it is reflected on it ; and the unconscious *buddhi* seems to act upon the conscious *puruṣa*, when the intelligized *buddhi* is reflected on the conscious *puruṣa*. The Sāṃkhya doctrine of mutual reflection of *puruṣa* and *buddhi* on each other thus looks like the theory of interaction. And since corresponding to the consciousness of the self there is a modification of the unconscious *buddhi* and corresponding to the modification of *buddhi* there is a consciousness of the self, the Sāṃkhya theory looks like the theory of parallelism. But really it is neither of the two. *Buddhi* is unconscious but active ; but *puruṣa* is conscious but inactive. But the inactive *puruṣa* erroneously regards itself as active owing to the reflection of active *buddhi* on it, and the unconscious *buddhi* seems to be conscious owing to its proximity to the conscious *puruṣa*.⁸¹ But how is contact or proximity possible between two beings, which are entirely heterogeneous in nature and thus independent of each other? Though *puruṣa* and *buddhi* are heterogeneous, they stand in a definite relation to each other. They are related to each other as a means to an end ; *buddhi* serves the purpose of the *puruṣa* ; the activity of *buddhi* is for the realization of an end of the *puruṣa*. Thus though the self is changeless and inactive and consequently cannot act upon the unconscious *buddhi* to make it conscious, still it reflects itself upon the transparent essence of the *buddhi* (*buddhisattva*), when

⁸⁰ This is the doctrine of Vijñānabhikṣu. See Chapter XII.

⁸¹ SPB., i, 87, 99, and 104.

it is transformed into the form of its object, and appears to have the same function in itself, and the unconscious *buddhi* appears to be conscious by receiving the reflection of the *puruṣa*.⁸²

We have discussed at length the relation of *puruṣa* to *buddhi*. Let us consider the general relation of the organs of perception, both external and internal, to the *puruṣa* and to their appropriate objects. Why do the organs of perception act at all? What induces them to perform their respective functions? They are not guided by the *puruṣa* in performing their functions. The external and internal organs perform their respective functions for the accomplishment of the purpose of the *puruṣa*. They have a spontaneous disposition to realize the ends of the *puruṣa* and perform their respective functions by mutual incitements.⁸³ There is an unconscious adaptation of the external and internal organs to their appropriate objects, and there is also an unconscious adaptation of the organs of perception to the self.⁸⁴ Vācaspatimiśra explains the operation of the sense-organs by the thirst for enjoyment (*bhogatṛṣṇā*). So long as it persists in the mind, the sense-organs apprehend their proper objects for the enjoyment of the 'self'; but when it is uprooted from the mind, the activity of the sense-organs ceases and consequently there is the cessation of the enjoyment of the *puruṣa* too. Vyāsa says that even as an inactive loadstone attracts a piece of iron to it by its own power, so the objects, though inactive in themselves, attract the active mind by their own influence, relate it to themselves, and transform it into their forms. Hence that object which colours the mind in a particular state is known by it in that state and all other objects are unknown.⁸⁵

We may summarize the conditions of perception thus: (1) A real object of perception must exist. This characteristic distinguishes perception from illusion. (2) The external sense-organs yield an immediate apprehension of their objects. (3) *Manas* reflects upon this immediate apprehension of the external sense-organs and makes it definite by assimilation and discrimination. (4) *Ahaṁkāra* (empirical ego) appropriates to itself this determinate apprehension of the mind and refers it to the empirical unity of apperception. (5) *Buddhi* (intellect) resolves what is to be done towards the object perceived; it is the will to react to

⁸² YBh., ii, 20.

⁸³ STK., 31.

⁸⁴ SK., 31.

⁸⁵ YBh., iv, 17.

the object perceived. (6) The *puruṣa* (self) enjoys the perception of the object. It is the transcendent principle of intelligence which intelligizes the unconscious *buddhi* and makes perceptive consciousness possible. Perception, therefore, involves many processes from the mere sense-cognition to the conative attitude of the mind to react to the object perceived; it involves immediate apprehension as well as many interpretative processes.

7. The Vedānta Theory of Perception

According to the Advaita Vedānta, there is one universal, eternal, ubiquitous, changeless light of consciousness, which is called *Brahman*. This eternal consciousness is modalized in three ways. (1) It is modalized by different objects and called object-consciousness (*viśaya-caitanya*). (2) It is modalized by mental modes and called cognitive-consciousness (*pramāṇa-caitanya*). (3) And it is modalized by different minds and called cognizing-consciousness (*pramātṛcaitanya*). Thus though there is only one universal consciousness, it is determined by the mind or internal organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*), the activities of the mind or mental modes (*antaḥkāraṇavṛtti*), and the objects cognized (*viśaya*). These are the determinants of the universal light of consciousness.⁶⁶

Perception, according to the Śaṅkarite, is only *caitanya* or consciousness.⁶⁷ Though the universal and eternal consciousness (*Brahman*) can never be produced, the empirical modalities of this consciousness as determined by the mental modes may be said to be produced by the sense-organs; for the sense-organs produce the mental mode or activity of the internal organ, which serves to manifest and modalize the eternal light of consciousness. And the activity of the mind or internal organ is said to be cognition (*jñāna*), inasmuch as it serves the purpose of qualifying or determining the consciousness.⁶⁸

Perception involves the function (*vṛtti*) of the internal organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*). The translucent *antaḥkāraṇa*, which is of the nature of light (*taijasa*), moves out to the object through the channel of the sense-organs, and is modified into its form. This modification of the internal organ into the form of the object cognized is called *vṛtti*. *Vṛtti*, therefore, is the mental mode which apprehends the object.⁶⁹ This out-going of the apprehending

⁶⁶ VP., pp. 55-6.

⁶⁷ VP., p. 42.

⁶⁸ VP., p. 41.

⁶⁹ VP., p. 57.

mental mode (*vytti*) to the object is involved only in perception. In inference and other kinds of cognition the mental mode does not go out to the object. For instance, in the case of inference of fire from smoke, the mental mode (*vytti*) does not go out to the fire, since the visual organ does not come into contact with the fire but with the smoke. But in the case of the perception of a jar, the mental mode which apprehends the jar goes out to the jar, is modified into its form, and occupies the same position in space with it. So the consciousness determined by the apprehending mental mode becomes identified with the consciousness determined by the jar, since the determinants of the two consciousnesses having an identity of locus cannot bring about any difference in the consciousness determined by them. Thus in the perception of the jar, the consciousness modalized by the jar (*ghaṭāvachhinnacaitanya*) is identified with the consciousness modalized by the mental mode which is modified into the form of the jar (*ghaṭākāravyttiyavachhinnacaitanya*). In other words, there is an identification of the apprehending mental mode (*pramāṇa-caitanya*) with the object (*viśaya-caitanya*)—of the perceptive-consciousness with the percept.⁹⁰

There is a distinction between the bare perception of an object and the perception of the object *as object*. In the former there is only an identification of the cognitive-consciousness (*pramāṇacaitanya*) with the object-consciousness (*viśaya-caitanya*). But in the latter there is not only an identification of the cognitive-consciousness with the object-consciousness, but also an identification of the cognitive-consciousness (*pramāṇa-caitanya*) with the cognizing-consciousness (*pramātṛ-caitanya*). In it the apprehending mental mode is referred to the empirical self (*pramātṛ*) and identified with it. But it may be objected that in the perception 'I see this' the empirical self or *I*-consciousness (*aham*) is clearly distinguished from the empirical object or *this*-consciousness (*idam*). How, then, can the former be identified with the latter? The Śāṅkārīte points out that the perception of an object depends on the identification of the object-consciousness (*viśaya-caitanya*) with the cognitive-consciousness (*pramāṇa-caitanya*), which is not different from the cognizing-consciousness (*pramātṛ-caitanya*), or that the consciousness determined by the activity of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇavyttiya-*

⁹⁰ VP., pp. 58-9.

vacchinnacaitanya) is not different from the consciousness determined by the internal organ itself (*antaḥkaraṇāvachchinnacaitanya*). Thus in the perception of an object as object, not only the object-consciousness is identified with the cognitive-consciousness, but also the cognitive-consciousness is identified with the cognizing-consciousness, so that the object-consciousness becomes identified with the cognizing-consciousness or self-consciousness. Here the identification of the object-consciousness (*prameyacaitanya*) with the self-consciousness (*pramātṛ-caitanya*) does not mean the absolute identity of the two. All that it intends to convey is that the being of the object is not independent of, and separate from, the being of the self. The object becomes a percept, only when there is an identity of the knowing subject with the known object. When I see a jar, the jar becomes identified, in point of being, with my being; hence the jar becomes an object of my perception. In the perception 'I see the jar', though there is a distinction between my self and the jar, the being of the jar (*ghaṭasattā*) is not independent of, and separate from, the being of my self (*pramātṛ-sattā*). The object is not identical with the self, nor is it an evolute or modification of the self. But the object being superimposed on the object-consciousness (*viśaya-caitanya*), the being of the object is identical with the being of its substratum, viz. the object-consciousness, since the Śaṅkarite does not admit that the being of a superimposed entity (*āropitasattā*) is separate from the being of its substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna-sattā*). Thus the being of the substratum of the percept is identical with the being of the percept. The substratum of the percept is the object-consciousness (*viśaya-caitanya*). The object-consciousness is identical with the cognitive-consciousness (*pramāṇa-caitanya*), because when the mental mode is modified into the form of the object, the consciousness determined by the mental mode (*pramāṇa-caitanya*) is identified with the consciousness determined by the object (*viśaya-caitanya*). The cognitive-consciousness (*pramāṇa-caitanya*), again, is identical with the cognizing-consciousness or self-consciousness (*pramātṛ-caitanya*), because the former is the consciousness determined by the activity (*vyrtti*) of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*), while the latter is the consciousness determined by the internal organ itself, and there is not a real difference between the internal organ and its activity. Thus the object-consciousness is identical with the

self-consciousness, and hence the being of the object perceived is identical with the being of the percipient self. The self-consciousness (*pramāṭṛ-caitanya*) is the substratum of the percept, so that the being of the percept is identical with the being of the self. Thus the perception of an object as distinct from the self and yet related to it involves the identification of the object-consciousness (*viśaya-caitanya*) with the cognitive-consciousness (*pramāṇa-caitanya*) and the self-consciousness (*pramāṭṛ-caitanya*).⁹¹ In other words, it involves the identification of the perceived object with the apprehending mental mode and the percipient self. We may graphically represent the Śaṅkarite doctrine of perception by the following equations: (1) The object-consciousness (*viśaya-caitanya*) = the cognitive-consciousness (*pramāṇa-caitanya* or *antaḥkaraṇavṛttyavacchinna-caitanya*). The cognitive-consciousness (*antaḥkaraṇavṛttyavacchinna-caitanya*) = the cognizing-consciousness or self-consciousness (*antaḥkaraṇāvachchinna-caitanya*). ∴ The object-consciousness (*viśaya-caitanya*) = the self-consciousness (*pramāṭṛ-caitanya*). (2) The being of the cognized object (*viśayasattā*) = the being of the substratum of the cognized object (*viśayādhiṣṭhānasattā*) or the being of the object-consciousness (*viśaya-caitanya-sattā*). The being of the object-consciousness (*viśayacaitanyasattā*) = the being of the self-consciousness (*pramāṭṛcaitanyasattā*). ∴ The being of the cognized object (*viśayasattā*) = the being of the cognizing self (*pramāṭṛ-sattā*).

Just as in external perception the object-consciousness is identified with the cognitive-consciousness, so in the internal perception of pleasure the consciousness determined by pleasure is identified with the consciousness determined by the mental mode apprehending the pleasure. Here both the consciousness determined by the pleasure and the consciousness determined by the mental mode are determined by limitations which subsist in the same substratum. In other words, the pleasure and the apprehending mental mode, both of which are determinants of universal consciousness, subsist in one and the same substratum, viz. the internal organ.⁹² Thus both in external perception and internal perception there is an identification of the object-consciousness with the cognitive-consciousness and the self-consciousness. According to the Śaṅkarite, this is the most fundamental

⁹¹ VP., pp. 58-9, and pp. 75-7.

⁹² VP., p. 59.

condition of perception. Thus mental states of pleasure and pain are perceived by the self with the aid of their corresponding mental modes (*vṛttis*). But though pleasure and pain are perceived with the aid of their corresponding *vṛttis*, these *vṛttis* themselves are directly perceived by the self without the intervention of other *vṛttis*. If one *vṛtti* requires another *vṛtti* for its apprehension, then that will require a third *vṛtti* and so on *ad infinitum*. So, according to the Śaṅkarite, *vṛttis* or mental modes are cognized by direct intellectual intuition (*kevalasākṣivedya*), in which the adventitious processes are not necessary. The mind and its qualities, viz. pleasure and pain, are directly perceived by the witness (*sākṣin*) through the agency of the corresponding *vṛttis* or mental modes, but the *vṛttis* themselves are directly perceived by the witness (*sākṣin*) not through the medium of other intervening *vṛttis*.³³

In the perception of an object the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) streaming out of the sense-orifices of the organism reaches the object, and is determined into a mode (*vṛtti*) by taking the form of the object, which occupies the same position in space with the object. In this way there is a correspondence between the mental order and the given order.³⁴ The apprehending mental mode (*vṛtti*) and the object (*viśaya*) are distinct from each other, but still they correspond with each other in occupying the same position in space, and the mental mode (*vṛtti*) having the same form as that of the object. In fact, according to the Śaṅkarite, there is not an ultimate distinction between the mind and the object, both of them being the products of nescience (*māyā*, *avidyā*) and determinants of the one universal, eternal consciousness. It is by means of the empirical mental mode (*vṛtti*) that the mind comes to be related to the object. The *vṛtti*, therefore, relates the mind to the object. But it is not a *tertium quid* between two unrelated terms. The *vṛtti* is an empirical mode of the mind, which takes the form of the object. Therefore it is the meeting-place, as it were, of the two substances, the mind and the object. It is not different from the mind, because it is a mode of the mind. It is not different from the object, because it is the transformation of the mind into the form of the object, i.e. it incorporates the form of the object in itself. Thus the mental

³³ VP., pp. 79-82. See Chapter XI.

³⁴ K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Vedantism*, p. 54.

mode, being identified with the object, occupies the same position in space. In perception the mind and the object occupy the same space-position; they have an identity of locus. This distinguishes perception from inference. In inference the mind does not go out to the object inferred to take the form of the object. It merely *thinks* of the inferred object but does not go out to meet it. But in perception the mind goes out to the object and is transformed into its shape. Professor Bhattacharya rightly observes: "The distinction is practically that drawn in modern psychology, only viewed from the point of view of the Self's spontaneity, that in perception the given element and its interpretation are welded together in a unity, while in inference they are kept distinct. In perception, the self as invested with the mental mode becomes further materialized into the particular function of the sense-organ excited by the particular stimulus."⁵⁵

In perception the apprehending mental mode (*vr̥tti*) and the object (*viśaya*) should not only occupy the same position in space but also the same position in time. The mental mode in the form of a perceptive process occupies the present moment in time. So the object of perception also should occupy the present moment in time. The perceptive process and the perceived object should occupy the same time-position. Otherwise the perception of pleasure would be quite the same as the recollection of pleasure. In the perception of pleasure the pleasure (*viśaya*) and the apprehending mental mode (*vr̥tti*) occupy the same space-position. In the recollection of pleasure also the pleasure remembered (*viśaya*) and the recollection of pleasure (*vr̥tti*) occupy the same space-position. How, then, can we distinguish the perception of pleasure from the recollection of pleasure? We can do so if we admit another condition of perception. In the act of perception, the perceptive process and the perceived object must occupy the same time-position. In the recollection of pleasure, the pleasure, which is the object of recollection, exists in the past, while the apprehending mental mode (*vr̥tti*) in the form of recollection exists at present, so that the two are not co-eval. Hence, in order to exclude the act of recollection from the act of perception, we must lay down another condition of perception, viz. the object of perception must exist in the present time.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ *Studies in Vedantism*, p. 54.

⁵⁶ VP., pp. 59-60.

In order to exclude the *śābdajñāna* or knowledge through authoritative statement by means of which we can apprehend supersensuous objects such as spiritual merit and demerit (*dharmādharmā*), we must add another qualification to the object of perception. The object of perception must be *yogya* or capable of being perceived; it must not be by its very nature imperceptible (*ayogya*). Spiritual merit and demerit are as much qualities of the mind as pleasure and pain. Why, then, are not the former perceived, while the latter are perceived? The Śaṅkarite replies that the former are, by their very nature, imperceptible. What is capable (*yogya*) of being perceived and what is incapable (*ayogya*) of being perceived can be known only by the result of our attempt to perceive them. Some objects are perceptible by their very nature, while others are imperceptible by their very nature.¹⁷ Thus the direct perceptibility of an object consists in the fact that the subjective consciousness underlying the apprehending mental mode becomes united with the consciousness underlying the object, the object existing in the present space and time and capable of being perceived through a specific sense-organ, and the apprehending mental mode also having the same form as that of the object.¹⁸

The author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* divides perception into two kinds, viz. sensuous (*indriyajanya*) perception and non-sensuous (*indriyājanya*) perception. The former is produced by the sense-organs, while the latter is not. Dharmarājādhvarīndra regards the external senses only as sense-organs. He does not regard the mind as a sense-organ. So by sensuous perception he means external perception, and by non-sensuous perception he means internal perception. We have sensuous perception of external objects, and non-sensuous perception of pleasure, pain, and the like.¹⁹ But the Naiyāyika may object that if the mind is not a sense-organ, we cannot speak of the perception of pleasure and pain, because perception is always produced by a sense-organ. The Śaṅkarite replies that the perception of pleasure and pain does not necessarily imply that the mind is a sense-organ through which the self perceives pleasure and pain. The directness (*sākṣāttva*) of a cognition does not consist in its being produced by a sense-organ.

¹⁷ VP., pp. 61-2.

¹⁸ VP., p. 74.

¹⁹ VP., p. 177.

If it did so, then inferential cognition also would be regarded as direct perception, since it is produced by the mind which is regarded by the Naiyāyika as a sense-organ. Moreover, God has no sense-organ, but still He has perception. Hence the Naiyāyika contention is absolutely unfounded. According to the Śaṅkarite, production by a sense-organ (*indriyajanyatā*) is neither a sufficing condition nor a necessary condition of perception (*pratyakṣa-jñāna*); the directness of a cognition (*sākṣāttva*) or its perceptual character (*pratyakṣatva*) depends on the identification of the cognitive-consciousness with the object-consciousness, or of the apprehending mental mode with the perceived object.¹⁰⁰

The Śaṅkarite divides perception, again, into the perception of an object (*jñeyapratyakṣa*) and the perception of a cognition (*jñānapratyakṣa*). The former is perceived through the medium of a mental mode (*vytti*). The latter is perceived in itself without the intervention of a mental mode.¹⁰¹ The Śaṅkarite recognizes the distinction between indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) perception and determinate (*savikalpa*) perception. We have already dealt with them.¹⁰² The Śaṅkarite divides perception into two other kinds, viz. the perception of the witness self (*jīvasākṣīpratyakṣa*) and the perception of the divine witness (*Īśvarasākṣīpratyakṣa*).¹⁰³ We shall deal with them in the last chapter.

We have seen that a mental mode (*vytti*) relates the percipient self to the perceived object. It reveals the consciousness underlying the object. Without it there can be no perception of an object, mental or extra-mental. Pleasure and pain are perceived through the corresponding mental modes, and external objects also are perceived through the corresponding mental modes (*vytti*). And *vytti* is the modification of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) into the form of the object. Therefore, without *antaḥkaraṇa* there can be no perception. But if the empirical self (*jīva*) perceives an object through the instrumentality of a function (*vytti*) of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*), what is the use of the sense-organs? The Śaṅkarite holds that the inter-course of the sense-organs with external objects is necessary for perceiving them, since it is the cause of the mental mode (*vytti*) which reveals the object-consciousness. If the consciousness underlying the object is not revealed, it cannot be perceived.

¹⁰⁰ VP., p. 52.

¹⁰¹ VP., pp. 79-82.

¹⁰² VP., p. 89; Chapter II.

¹⁰³ VP., p. 102.

And if a mental mode (*vyrtti*) does not move out to the object and remove the veil of nescience which conceals the consciousness underlying the object, the object-consciousness cannot be revealed. And a mental mode (*vyrtti*) is not possible, if there is no intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects of perception. It is the sense-object-intercourse that produces a mental mode (*vyrtti*) which is necessary for perception.¹⁰⁴ This is the function of the sense-organs in perception. We have already discussed the different kinds of sense-object-intercourse recognized by the Śāṅkarite.¹⁰⁵

The Śāṅkarite agrees with the Śāṅkhya in holding that the mind (*antahkaraṇa*) goes out to the object and assumes its form, so that the form of the object corresponds to the form of the apprehending mental mode. This account of the Śāṅkhya-Vedānta runs counter to the account of Western psychology, according to which, the object comes into contact with a sense-organ and produces an affection in it, which is carried to the brain, and this affection produces an impression in the mind. Western psychology gives priority to the object which acts upon the mind or subject. The Śāṅkhya-Vedānta, on the other hand, gives priority to the mind or subject which goes out to the object, acts upon it, and assumes its form. The physiological account of the perceptual process is extremely vague. There is a yawning gulf between the cerebral process and the mental process. It cannot be bridged over. How the cortical vibration in the sensory centre in the brain produces a sensation in the mind is a mystery. The Śāṅkhya-Vedānta mitigates the uncompromising dualism of matter and spirit by admitting that *buddhi* or *antahkaraṇa* is an intermediate reality between unconscious matter and conscious spirit. It is material, no doubt, but it is made up of very subtle matter, and is, so to say, a hyper-physical entity. It is plastic and translucent in nature and reflects the light of consciousness, on the one hand, and assumes the form of the object, on the other. According to the Śāṅkhya-Vedānta, the object does not break in upon the mind and imprint its form on it, but the mind goes out to the object and assumes its form. Thus, though both subject and object are necessary for perception, dominance is given to the subject, and the object is regarded as subordinate to

¹⁰⁴ VP., p. 87.

¹⁰⁵ Chapter IV.

the subject. Subject and object, therefore, cannot be regarded as co-ordinate terms in knowledge, but the subject is always the dominant factor. The supreme importance of the *vr̥tti* of the mind in perception proves the dominance of the subject-element. The object can never have priority to the subject. But the subject (mind) can pour itself into the object and incorporate it in itself. This is what is intended by the Sāṃkhya-Vedānta, when it holds that the mind goes *out* to the object and assumes its form. And it is much easier to conceive the *out-going* of the mind intelligized by the conscious self to the object than the *in-coming* of the unconscious object to the mind. Moreover, according to the Sāṃkarite, both the object and the mind (*antaḥkāraṇa*) have only an empirical existence, being modifications of nescience; but the mind has this advantage over the object that it has the power of reflecting the light of consciousness in itself and thus appearing to be conscious. So the mind is supposed to go out to the object and assume its form. Thus the hypothesis of *vr̥tti* is not entirely unreasonable.

Some object that all objects are capable of being illumined by the light (*prasāda*) of the witness self (*sākṣin*). What, then, is the use of the *vr̥tti* or mental mode? Even though it may be necessary to postulate the *vr̥tti* to assume the form of the object, there is no need of admitting that the *vr̥tti* moves outward to the object of cognition. Just as it is held that the witness self (*sākṣin*) illumines an object of inference, which is not present to a sense-organ through the agency of a *vr̥tti* which does not move out to the object, so it may be held that the witness self illumines the object of direct perception, which is present to a sense-organ, with the aid of a *vr̥tti* which does not move out to the object perceived. This theory does not obliterate the distinction between perceptual knowledge and non-perceptual knowledge. The difference between the two lies in the fact that the former is produced through the instrumentality of the sense-organs, while the latter is not produced through the instrumentality of them.¹⁰⁰

This objection has been refuted in three ways by the Vedāntists. (1) Some Vedāntists hold that in perceptual knowledge the light of consciousness determined by the object of perception illumines the object, since the object-consciousness (*viśaya-caitanya*) is the substratum of the object and hence this

¹⁰⁰ SLS., pp. 335 and the gloss. (Jīvananda's edition).

alone can illumine it. The cognizing-consciousness (*pramāṇy-caitanya*) or the consciousness determined by the internal organ cannot illumine the object, because it does not constitute the essence of the object, and is not related to it by the relation of identity in essence (*tādātmya*). And it is the apprehending mental mode (*vytti*) that moves out to the object, removes the veil of nescience that conceals the object-consciousness, and reveals it. When the object-consciousness is thus revealed by the *vytti*, it illumines the object. But in non-perceptual knowledge there is no sense-object-intercourse which is the cause of the moving out of the *vytti* of the mind; so the consciousness determined by the mental mode, which does not move out to the object, illumines the non-presented object.¹⁰⁷ (2) Other Vedāntists hold that just as the perception of pleasure, pain, etc., is due to these being in direct relation to the principle of consciousness underlying them, so the perception of external objects is due to these objects being in direct relation to the light of consciousness underlying them, and the outward movement of the *vytti* of the internal organ is necessary for disclosing the consciousness that underlies these objects. Thus the direct cognition of external objects is due to the direct relation between these objects and the consciousness underlying them. But if the object-consciousness is not disclosed, it cannot be directly related to external objects of which it is the substratum. And the object-consciousness is disclosed by the *vytti* of the internal organ which moves out to the external objects, removes the veil of nescience, and reveals the light of consciousness underlying them.¹⁰⁸ (3) Other Vedāntists hold that in the perceptual knowledge of an object we perceive a certain vividness (*spāṣṭatā*) which is lacking in the object of non-perceptual knowledge. Thus though we might hear of the sweetness and fragrance of the mango from a trustworthy person even a hundred times, our knowledge of the sweetness and fragrance would lack in vividness. This vividness in the object of direct sensuous perception is due to the fact that the consciousness underlying the object, which is disclosed by the mental mode (*vytti*) moving out to the object, is identical in essence with the object itself. In other words, the vividness of the object perceived is due to the disclosure of the object-consciousness which consists

¹⁰⁷ SLS., pp. 335-6.

¹⁰⁸ SLS., p. 336.

in the removal of the veil of nescience which conceals it; and this removal of the veil of nescience is due to the *vytti* moving out to the object. The absence of vividness in the object of non-perceptual knowledge is due to the fact that no *vytti* moves out to the object, and thus does not disclose the identity of the object with the consciousness underlying it.¹⁰⁹ So the outward movement of the *vytti* to an object is the necessary condition only of the direct knowledge of the object.

¹⁰⁹ SLS., p. 337 and pp. 339-40. See also S.L.

BOOK V

CHAPTER VIII

PERCEPTION OF SPACE AND MOVEMENT \

1. *Introduction*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that there is one, eternal, ubiquitous space, which is not an object of perception. It is inferred from the spatial characters of proximity (*aparātva*) and remoteness (*parātva*). But the spatial characters of position, direction, and distance can be perceived directly through vision and touch. The Mīmāṃsakas also hold that these can be perceived directly through vision and touch. According to them, the spatial characters of direction and distance can be directly perceived through the auditory organ also. The Śāṅkhya-Pātañjala, on the other hand, holds that space and time are the categories of the understanding or constructions of the intellect (*buddhinirmāṇa*) according to which it understands the phenomenal world. It is the understanding which imports the empirical relations of space, time, and causality into the world of reals, viz. intelligence-stuff (*sattva*) energy-stuff (*rajas*) and matter-stuff (*tamas*). When we have intellectual intuition (*nirvicārā nirvikalpaprājñā*), we apprehend the reals as they are in themselves without the imported empirical relations of space, time, and causality.¹ According to Śāṅkara also, space, time, and causality are categories of the understanding, according to which the world of phenomena is interpreted. According to the Buddhist idealists, space and time apart from concrete presentations are ideal constructions of the mind.

2. *The Mīmāṃsaka: Direct Auditory Perception of Direction, Distance and Position*

Space must be distinguished as *deśa* (locus) and *dik* (direction). According to the Mīmāṃsaka, both locus and direction are

¹ PSAH., p. 21.

directly perceived through the auditory organ, though they are perceived as qualifying adjuncts (*viśeṣaṇa*) of sounds. The Mīmāṃsaka holds that the ear-drum or the auditory organ is *prāpyakāri*, which produces the perception of a sound, only when it actually comes into contact with the sound. The ear does not go out to its object, viz. the sound which is at a distance, but the sound is produced in a certain point of space at a distance and propagated to the ear-drum through the air-waves. Thus the ear-drum never comes into contact with the locus of a sound; it comes into contact with the sound, when it is carried into it through the air-waves. Thus we perceive a sound, only when the sound is carried to the ear-drum through the air waves. But can there be a direct perception of the locus (*deśa*) of the sound through the ear-drum? The ear-drum produces the perception of a sound when it is in actual contact with the sound, which is propagated to the ear-drum through the air-waves from another point of space. So the audible sound may be said to have its locus in the ear-drum itself. But is a sound perceived to have its locus in the ear-drum? Or, is it perceived to have its locus in another point of space? We find in our actual experience that sound is never perceived without a local colouring; and it is never perceived as having its locus in the ear-drum. It is always perceived as having its locus in another point of space. But if the ear-drum can never produce the auditory perception of a sound without coming into direct contact with the sound, and if it can never go out to the locus of the sound, where it is produced (*śabdopattideśa*), it cannot produce the perception of a sound having its locus in a distant point of space. All that it can do is to produce the perception of a sound having its locus in the ear-drum, because the perception of the sound is produced only when the sound is not in its original locus, i.e. the point of space where it was produced, but when it is in the ear-drum. But, as a matter of fact, we never perceive a sound as having its locus *in* the ear-drum, but in another point of space *outside* it. Sounds coming from different directions are perceived as having different local characters. Whenever sounds are perceived, they are perceived as coming from particular directions; they are never perceived without their local characters. We have a distinct auditory perception in such a form as 'the sound comes from this direction'. Thus when sounds come into the ear-drum from different directions,

they come into it not as mere sounds, but as coloured by the different directions from which they come.³ And the ear-drum, being in contact with these sounds, is in contact with their different local colourings too, and, consequently, it produces the perception of different sounds with different local characters. Thus though the ear-drum cannot come into actual contact with the direction of a sound, yet it can produce the perception of the sound with the local character of its direction. This is the reason why we perceive audible sounds not as seated in the ear-drum but coming from different directions outside it.

According to the Mīmāṃsaka, therefore, just as sounds are directly perceived through the ear, so also the directions from which they come. We never perceive sounds, pure and simple, but sounds with their different local characters; and hence through these local characters of sounds we directly perceive the different directions from which they come. But though according to the Mīmāṃsaka there is a direct auditory perception of direction, we must not suppose that, according to him, there can be a direct auditory perception of direction apart from, and independently of, the perception of sounds. Just as there can be no independent perception of time through the sense-organs apart from the perception of their appropriate objects, so there can be no independent perception of space in the form of direction through the ear apart from the perception of sounds. Thus we perceive space as direction through the auditory organ, not as an independent entity, but only as a qualifying adjunct of sounds which are coloured by the directions from which they come.⁴ Hence, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, we have a direct auditory perception of space in the form of direction.⁴ The Naiyāyika also holds that direction is perceived through the perceptions of east, west, and the like.⁵

The local position of an object can be determined, if its direction and distance from us can be ascertained, because the local position of an object is nothing but its position in a point of space in a particular direction and at a particular distance

³ Yatastu diśa āgatā dhvanayastayā viśiṣṭaḥ śabdah bodhayati, eā hi dik śrotapṛāptyā śakyate śrotreṇa grahītum. ŚD., p. 554.

⁴ Yadyapi na svāntaryeṇa diśaḥ śrotagrāhyatvaḥ tathāpi śabde gṛhamāṇe tadviśeṣanātayā digapi śrotreṇa gṛhyate. ŚD., p. 554.

⁵ ŚD., pp. 553-4.

⁶ NM., p. 137.

from us. Thus the local position of an object in relation to us involves its direction and distance from us. We have already seen that, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, the direction of a sound can be directly perceived as the local character of the sound through the auditory organ. But how can distance be perceived through the ear? Sounds coming from a proximate point of space are perceived as most intense (*tīvra*) but their intensity becomes feebler and feebler as they come from greater and greater distances. Thus sounds are perceived as having different degrees of intensity according to their varying distances. And through these different degrees of intensity of sound-sensations we directly perceive the distances from which they come.⁶ And as we directly perceive the directions of sounds through the local characters of acoustic sensations, and their distances through the different degrees of their intensity, we can easily infer the original position of sounds. As a matter of fact, whenever we perceive sounds, we directly perceive their directions as well as distances through their different local characters and different degrees of intensity respectively, and, consequently, we vaguely perceive their local positions too. But the local positions of sounds cannot be exactly ascertained without an act of inference from the directions and distances of sounds.⁷

3. *The Mīmāṃsaka Explanation of the Extra-organic Localization of Sounds*

According to the Mīmāṃsaka, the perception of a sound is produced only when it has come into the ear-drum which is in direct contact with it; it cannot be perceived when it is in its own original position outside the ear-drum. Thus the real seat (*paramārtthadeśa*) of an audible sound is the ear-drum; it can never be the place where it was originally produced (*dhvanyutpattideśa*). Still we perceive an audible sound as having its seat not in the ear-drum, but in the original position in space. For this the Mīmāṃsaka offers the following reason. When the sound comes into the ear-drum, it comes with a particular local colouring, qualified by the direction and position from which it comes,

⁶ Dhvanayaśca krameṇa mandibhavanataḥ pratyāsannād dūrīd dūratārācca deśādāgatastīvraṁ mandam mandataram ca śabdam bodhayanti. *ŚD.*, pp. 554-5.

pp. 554-5.

and, consequently, we perceive the sound with a particular local character and a particular degree of intensity through which we directly perceive the direction and the original position of the sound. And thus because of the non-apprehension of the real seat of an audible sound, viz. the locus of the ear-drum, and because of the apprehension of the original position of the sound through its local character and intensity, we mistake the original position of the sound for its real seat. Thus in the extra-organic localization of sounds there is an error of judgment. Just as in the illusory perception of silver in a shell we perceive the shell before our eyes, but we reproduce the silver in memory perceived in another place owing to their similarity and erroneously connect the position of the shell with silver, though in reality there is no connection between the two, so we erroneously connect an audible sound with its original position in space outside the ear-drum, though, in fact, the ear-drum itself is the real seat of the audible sound. Thus in the perception of a sound in such a form as 'there is a sound at such a distance to the east' there is an extra-organic localization of the sound in which there is an illusory projection of the sound into the point of space in which the sound was originally produced.⁸

According to the Buddhists, though the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, and the tactual organ apprehend their objects, viz. smell, taste, and touch respectively, when there is a direct contact of the objects with the sense-organs, the visual organ and the auditory organ are *apṛāpyakāri*, i.e. they can apprehend their objects without coming into direct contact with them.⁹ Thus a sound need not come from its locus of origin into the ear-drum in order to be perceived as the Mīmāṃsaka supposes; but it can be perceived through the ear though it is at a distance from the sound. And as there is a real connection between a sound and its place of origin, the extra-organic localization of a sound-sensation is not illusory. There is no error of judgment in referring a sound-sensation to a particular point of space where the sound was originally produced.¹⁰

Kumārila criticizes the Buddhist view thus: On the Buddhist hypothesis, we cannot account for the apprehension of a

⁸ *SD.*, and *SDP.*, p. 555.

⁹ See Chapter I.

¹⁰ *SD.*, and *SDP.*, p. 557.

sound by a person near at hand and the non-apprehension of it by a person far away from it. And also, on the Buddhist view, we cannot account for the fact that a sound is first perceived by a person near it, and then perceived by a person far away from it; nor can we account for the fact that sounds have different degrees of intensity (*śivramandādivyavasthā*) according as they come from greater and greater distances. If the ear could apprehend a sound even from a distance without coming into direct contact with it as the Buddhists suppose, then all sounds far and near would be simultaneously perceived through the ear, and there would be no such order in the perception of sounds as the sounds proximate to the ear are perceived first and then those which are at a distance. But these are the facts of experience. First we perceive those sounds which are near us, and then we perceive those which are at a distance. The same sound is first perceived by a person near it, and then by one at a distance. This order of succession in the perception of sounds can never be explained by the Buddhist theory. If the ear could apprehend a sound from a distance without coming into direct contact with it, then it would simultaneously apprehend all sounds far and near. Hence the Buddhist theory is not sound.¹¹

4. *The Mīmāṃsaka and the Vaiśeṣika: Perception of Movement.*

The Prābhākara holds that movement is not an object of perception; that it is inferred from disjunction and conjunction which are its effects. Śalikānātha says: "We do not perceive anything over and above disjunctions and conjunctions in a moving substance. The movement in a moving object is inferred from its disjunctions and conjunctions."¹² When an object moves, what we actually perceive is not its movement, but only its disjunctions and conjunctions with certain points in space, from which we infer the existence of movement. Movement is not the same thing as disjunctions and conjunctions, since the former subsist in the moving object, while the latter subsist in outside space.¹³

¹¹ ŚD. and ŚDP., pp. 557-8; ŚV., pp. 760-1.

¹² Pratyakṣeṇa hi gacchati dravye vibhāgasamīyogātirikta viśeṣānupalabdheh. Yastivayam gacchatīti pratyayaḥ sa vibhāgasamīyogānumitakṛtyā-lambanaḥ. PP., p. 79.

¹³ PSPM., p. 91.

Pārthasārathimiśra, a Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, on the other hand, holds that movement is an object of perception. The Prābhākara argues, we perceive only the disjunction of an object from one point of space and its conjunction with another point of space which did not exist in the object before; so they must spring out of a cause which is inferred from the effect, and that cause is movement; we never perceive movement but infer it from its effect. The substance itself cannot be regarded as the cause of its disjunctions and conjunctions, since it was there even before they came into being.¹⁴ Pārthasārathimiśra contends that movement can never be inferred, since it could be inferred only as the immaterial cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) of the conjunctions and disjunctions of a thing with points in space, and this would mean that movement would be cognized as subsisting in the thing as well as in space; but, as a matter of fact, we never cognize movement in space but only in the moving thing.¹⁵ So movement cannot be regarded as an object of inference. The Prābhākara argues that we do not perceive anything over and above the conjunctions and disjunctions of a moving object. Pārthasārathimiśra contends that when a snake moves on the ground both the snake and the ground have conjunctions and disjunctions; but that still we apprehend that the snake is moving, and not the ground. Hence the object of apprehension is the movement of the snake which is responsible for our cognition that the snake is moving, and not the ground. And this movement can never be an object of inference. It is an object of perception.¹⁶

Kaṇāda holds that movement is an object of visual perception when it inheres in a coloured substance.¹⁷ Sāṃkaramiśra points out that it is an object of visual and tactual perception both.¹⁸ Movement cannot be perceived through vision and touch when it inheres in an uncoloured substance.¹⁹ According to the older Vaiśeṣikas, colour or form (*rūpa*) is a condition of both visual and tactual perception. But the later Vaiśeṣikas discard this doctrine. They make manifest colour a condition of visual perception, and manifest touch a condition of tactual perception.²⁰ But both the schools hold that movement is an object of visual

¹⁴ ŚD., pp. 267-8.

¹⁵ ŚD., p. 274.

¹⁶ VSU., iv, 1, 11.

¹⁷ VSV., pp. 373-4; BhP. and SM., 54-6; see Chapter III.

¹⁸ PSPM., pp. 91-2.

¹⁹ VS., iv, 1, 11.

²⁰ VS., VSU., and VSV., iv, 1, 12.

and tactual perception under certain conditions. This doctrine finds favour also with the Western psychologists.

Śrīdhara quotes a passage from *Prakaranpañcīkā* explaining the Prābhākara doctrine of inferability of movement, and subjects it to severe criticism.²¹ His criticism is substantially the same as that of Pārthasārathimīśra. The Prābhākara argues, we do not perceive anything apart from disjunctions and conjunctions in a moving object; movement is not perceived, but inferred from disjunctions and conjunctions. This argument is unsubstantial. If movement of an object is said to be inferred from disjunctions and conjunctions, it should be inferred as subsisting both in the object and in what it moves, since disjunctions and conjunctions belong to both of them. For instance, when a monkey moves from the root of a tree to its top and again from the top to the root, we ought to infer that the tree is moving as well as the monkey, since the disjunctions and conjunctions inhere as much in the tree as in the monkey. But we never infer that the tree is moving.²² When we suddenly perceive a flash of lightning at night in the midst of dense darkness we perceive its movement, but not its conjunctions and disjunctions with points of space.²³ Hence movement is an object of perception.

²¹ PP., 79; NK., p. 194.

²² NK., p. 194.

²³ NK., p. 195.

CHAPTER IX

PERCEPTION OF TIME

1. *Introduction*

In this chapter we shall deal with perceptual time as distinguished from conceptual time, or with the time apprehended by perception as distinguished from the time of ideal construction. We shall not consider the nature of time as a reality. The Indian philosophers maintain that time is a coefficient of all consciousness including external perception and internal perception. But they do not recognize the perception of time as an independent entity. According to them, there is no sense for empty time apart from events or changes; succession and duration are the two important constituents of time. So some Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntists analyse the perception of time into the perception of succession and the perception of duration. They derive the perception of succession from the perception of changes, and the perception of duration from the perception of the 'specious present'. And they regard the perception of the 'specious present' as the nucleus of all our time-consciousness. They derive the conception of the past and the future from the perception of the 'specious present' in which there is an echo of the immediate past and a foretaste of the immediate future. In it there is a rudimentary consciousness of the past and the future which are clearly brought to consciousness by memory and expectation respectively. The Buddhists, however, do not believe in duration and the 'specious present'. They believe only in succession and the mathematical present. They recognize succession alone as the only constituent of time, and identify the perception of time with the perception of succession. And they regard the perception of succession as identical with the perception of changes. They do not believe in time apart from changes. They identify time with succession, and succession with changes. Thus they identify perception of time with the perception of changes. They do not believe in the perception of time as a qualifying adjunct of all events or changes. But the consciousness of change is not

identical with change-consciousness. The consciousness of transition is not the same as transition-consciousness. So the Buddhists try their best to derive duration from succession, and explain away the unity and continuity of time. Let us now discuss the main problems of temporal perception.

2. *Is Time an Object of Perception?*

The first question that arises in connection with temporal perception is whether time is an object of perception or not. According to the Vedāntists, time is a coefficient of all perception. The Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakas and some Naiyāyikas too hold that time is perceived by both the external and the internal sense-organs as a qualification of their objects of perception.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has discussed the possibility of the visual perception of time. Can time be an object of visual perception? According to the Vaiśeṣika, an object of visual perception must have extensity or appreciable magnitude (*mahattva*) and manifest or sensible colour (*udbhūtarūpavattva*).¹ But time is colourless. How, then, can it be an object of visual perception? The Naiyāyika asks how colour is perceived though it is colourless. Certainly an object has colour which inheres in it; but colour itself has no colour inhering in it. And if colour can be perceived, though it is colourless, then time also can be an object of visual perception, though it is colourless. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues, time is perceived through the visual organ; it is a fact of experience, and so it cannot be denied, though we may not account for it; a fact of experience cannot be argued out of existence. As a matter of fact, that is visible which can be perceived through the visual organ, be it coloured or colourless; and time can be perceived through the visual organ, though it is colourless; hence none can deny the visual perception of time.²

Rāmakṛṣṇadhvari, the author of *Sikhāmaṇi*, rightly points out that if we deny the visual perception of time because it is colourless, then we cannot account for our visual perception of an object as existing at present, e.g. 'the jar exists now'. If the present time were not an object of this perception, then there would be no certainty as to the time in which the jar is perceived

¹ Chapter III.

² NM., pp. 136-7; see also VP., p. 20.

to exist, but there would be a doubt whether the jar exists at present or not. But, in fact, the jar is definitely perceived as existing *now*; the actual perception of the jar is not vitiated by the least doubt whether the jar exists at present or not. Such an undoubted perception of an object as existing 'now' clearly shows that besides the object, an element of time also, viz. the present time, enters into the visual perception of the object. But if time is regarded as an object of visual perception, though it is colourless, because of our visual perception of an object as existing 'now', then it may equally be argued that *ākāśa* (ether) also is an object of visual perception, because of our visual perception of a row of herons in *ākāśa*. But *ākāśa* is not admitted to be an object of perception; it is regarded as a supersensible object which is inferred from sound as its substrate.³ And if, in spite of our visual perception of a row of herons in *ākāśa*, *ākāśa* is not regarded as an object of visual perception, or of any kind of perception, whatsoever, then why should time be regarded as an object of visual perception, because of our visual perception of an object as existing 'now'? It may be argued that the visual perception of a row of herons in *ākāśa* is an acquired perception like the visual perception of fragrant sandal. Just as in the visual perception of fragrant sandal the visual presentation of the sandal (i.e. its visual qualities) is blended with the representation of its fragrance perceived by the olfactory organ on a previous occasion and revived in memory by the sight of the sandal, so in the visual perception of a row of herons in *ākāśa*, the visual perception of the row of herons (*valākā*) is blended with the idea of *ākāśa* which is represented to consciousness by another cognition by association, and so *ākāśa* is not an object of visual perception. But if this argument is valid, then it may as well be argued that the element of time which enters into every perceptive process is not an object of perception, but it is represented in consciousness by another cognition, with which it is associated in experience, and thus the element of time entering into every perception is not an object of direct perception.⁴ The truth is that the visual perception of an object as existing 'now' is not an acquired perception like the acquired perception of fragrant sandal, because in this perception the element of time (now) is felt as an object

³ Śikhāmaṇi and Maṇiprabhā on VP., p. 25.

⁴ Ibid., p. 26.

of direct visual perception; nor is it like the visual perception of a row of herons in *ākāśa*, because *ākāśa* does not enter into the perception as a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) of its object. The present time is perceived as a qualification of every object of perception. Whenever an object, event, or action is perceived, it is not perceived as timeless, but as existing or occurring in time, or qualified by the present time. And time is not only an object of visual perception, but of all kinds of perception. It is perceived by all the sense-organs, external and internal, as a qualification of their objects.⁵ Here we are reminded of Kant's doctrine that time is the-form of external and internal perception.

3. *No Perception of Time as an Independent Entity*

But though time is an object of perception, it is never perceived as an independent entity. One of the essential characteristics of time is succession, and succession is never perceived apart from changes. So we can never perceive time apart from actions or changes which occur in time. The temporal marks of before and after, sooner and later, etc., are never perceived apart from actions or changes. And if there is no distinct perception of time apart from that of changes, are we to say that there is no perception of time, but only a perception of changes? Is time nothing but change or action? Some hold that time apart from action is a fiction of imagination; that time is identical with action or change; that time and action are synonymous. Hence there is no perception of time at all, but only that of actions (*kāryamātrāvalambana*).⁶

The Naiyāyika admits that there is no perception of time apart from that of actions. But from this it does not follow that there is no perception of time at all; for an element of time always enters into the perception of actions as a constituent factor; actions are never perceived without being qualified by time; actions unqualified by time or timeless actions are never perceived. The perception of time is inseparable from the perception of actions; but they are not identical with each other. Hence the legitimate conclusion is that time cannot be perceived as an independent entity, but only as a qualifying adjunct

⁵ SD., p. 554; YMD., p. 23; NKSP., ii, p. 41. HIP., Vol. II, pp. 380-1.

⁶ NM., p. 136. NKSP., p. 41.

(*viśeṣaṇa*) of events or actions; there is no perception of empty time devoid of all sensible content, but only of filled time or time filled with some sensible matter. Just as there is no perception of mere actions unqualified by time, so there is no perception of empty time devoid of all sensible content. When we perceive succession or simultaneity, sooner or later, we do not perceive mere actions, but we perceive something else which qualifies these actions, and that is time. Time, therefore, is perceived not as an independent entity, but as a qualification of the objects of perception; there is no perception of empty time.⁷ But, it may be asked, if time is an object of perception, why it is perceived not as an independent entity, but only as a qualification of perceptible objects. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that it is the very nature of time (*vastusvabhāva*) that it can be perceived only as a qualification of perceptible objects, and not as an independent entity like a jar; and that the nature of things (*vastusvabhāva*) or the law of nature can never be called in question. This is the final limit of explanation. We can never account for the ultimate nature of things.⁸ So time is an object of perception. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka also admits that time cannot be perceived by the sense-organs as an independent entity, but that it is perceived by all the sense-organs as a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) of their own objects.⁹ This psychological analysis of the perception of time is parallel to that of William James. "We have no sense," he says, "for empty time. . . . *We can no more intuit a duration than we can intuit an extension devoid of all sensible content.*"¹⁰ Kant's notion of a pure intuition of time without any sensible matter is psychologically false.

4. Perception of the Present

Some (Nāgārjuna) deny the existence of the present time and consequently of the perception of the present. When a fruit falls to the ground, it is detached from its stalk and comes gradually nearer and nearer to the ground, traversing a certain space and gradually passing from one position to another, say, from *a* to *b*, from *b* to *c*, and so on until it comes to the ground.

⁷ NM., p. 136.

⁸ NM., p. 137.

⁹ *Kālo na svāntarīyendriyairgrhyate. Atha ca viśeṣeṣu sveṣu grhyamāṇeṣu tadviśeṣanātayā sarvairapindriyairgrhyate tadvat.* ŚD., p. 554.

¹⁰ *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i, pp. 619-20.

When the fruit has passed from *a* to *b*, the space between *a* and *b* is the space traversed, and the time related to that traversed space is that which has been passed through (*patitakāla* or the past); and when the fruit will pass from *b* to *c*, the space between *b* and *c* is the space to be traversed, and the time related to this space is that which is to be passed through (*patitavyakāla* or the future); and apart from these two spaces, the traversed space and the space to be traversed, there is no third space left intervening between them which may be perceived as being traversed and give rise to the perception of the present time. So the present time does not exist. Here by the present time is meant the mathematical time-point which is the boundary line between the past and future. But such a time-point is never an object of actual perception. Hence there is no present time at all.¹¹ This argument reminds us of Zeno's dialectic against the possibility of motion.

But Vātsyāyana rightly points out that time cannot be conceived in terms of space but only in terms of action.¹² Thus Vātsyāyana anticipates Bergson in holding that there can be no spatial representation of time. According to him, time is perceived as qualifying an action; an action is perceived as occurring in time. When, for instance, the action of falling has ceased, and is no more, it is perceived as past; and when the action of falling is going to happen and not yet commenced, it is perceived as future; and when the action of falling is going on, it is perceived as present. Thus time-consciousness is found in the perception of action. When an action is *no more*, it is perceived as *past*; when it is *not yet* begun, it is perceived as *future*; and when it is *going on*, it is perceived as *present*.¹³ If an action is never perceived as going on, it cannot be perceived as no more or as not yet. For instance, if the action of falling is not perceived as going on, it cannot be perceived as having ceased, or as going to happen. As a matter of fact, what is meant by the past time or the time 'that has been fallen through' (*patitakāla*), in the present case, is that the action of falling is over or no more; and what is meant by the future time or the

¹¹ NBh., ii, 1, 37; Jha, E. T., *Indian Thought*, vol. ii, p. 245 HIP, Vol. I, pp. 401-2. HIP., Vol. II, pp. 380-1.

¹² Nādhvavyāṅgaḥ kālāḥ kimp tarhi? Kriyāvyaṅgaḥ. Ibid., ii, 1, 38.

¹³ Ibid., ii, 1, 38.

time 'to be fallen through' (*patitavyakāla*) is that the action of falling is going to happen and not yet begun, so that at both these points of time, past and future, the object is devoid of action; but when we perceive that the fruit is in the process of falling, we perceive the object *in action*. Thus time is perceived not in terms of space but in terms of actions; when they are perceived as going on or in the process of happening, they are perceived as present; when they are perceived as over or no more, they are perceived as past, and when they are perceived as going to happen and not yet begun, they are perceived as future. The consciousness of the present is the nucleus of the consciousness of the past and the future; the past and the future are built upon the present. Time is perceived only through an action; the actual happening of an action is perceived as present; and unless an action is perceived as happening or present, it can never be perceived as past or future, inasmuch as the action does not really exist in the past or in the future but only in the present. Hence the perception of the present cannot be denied as all our time-consciousness is centred in it.¹⁴

The whole controversy hinges on the meaning of the present time. Vātsyāyana takes it in the sense of the 'specious present' or felt present which is a tract of time. His opponent takes it in the sense of the mathematical time-point or indivisible instant which is never a fact of actual experience. Vātsyāyana is right in so far as he gives a psychological explanation of the *specious present* which is the basis of our conception of the past and future. He anticipates the most modern psychological analysis of our time-consciousness in western psychology. A few quotations from books on modern western psychology will not be out of place here.

"Let anyone try," says William James, "to notice or attend to, the *present* moment of time. One of the most baffling experiences occurs. Where is it, this present? It has melted in our grasp, fled ere we could touch it, gone in the instant of becoming. . . . It is only as entering into the living and moving organization of a much wider tract of time that the strict present is apprehended at all. It is, in fact, an altogether ideal abstraction, not only never realized in sense, but probably never even conceived of by those unaccustomed to philosophic meditation.

¹⁴ NBh. and NV., ii, 1, 38.

Reflection leads us to the conclusion that it *must* exist, but that it *does* exist can never be a fact of our immediate experience. The only fact of our immediate experience is what Mr. E. R. Clay has well called 'the *specious present*.'"¹⁵ Elsewhere he says, "*The original paragon and prototype of all conceived times is the specious present, the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible.*"¹⁶ J. M. Baldwin also bears out this view of James. He says, "subjectively, each individual constructs his own time-order from the standpoint of the 'specious' or felt present by means of images in which past and future, not actually present, are represented. It is only from this standpoint that the terms past and future have proper meaning. In this construction are included not only the times of the individuals' private experiences, but all times which may be dated from the present 'now'."¹⁷

Vātsyāyana's account of the perception of the time-series closely resembles that of Volkmann and Stout. "'No more' and 'not yet,'" says Volkmann, "are the proper time-feelings, and we are aware of time in no other way than through these feelings."¹⁸ This doctrine of Volkmann has been elaborated by Stout, who has beautifully expressed his view as follows: "Actual sensation is the mark or stamp of present time. The present time as distinguished from the past or future, is the time which contains the moment of actual sensation. . . . Distinction between past, present, and future can only be apprehended in a rudimentary way at the perceptual level. But there is, even at this level, what we may call a 'not yet' consciousness and a 'no more' consciousness. The 'not yet' consciousness is contained in the prospective attitude of attention, in the pre-adaptation for what is to come which it involves. This 'not yet' consciousness is emphasized when conation is delayed or obstructed, as when the dog is kept waiting for its bone. The 'no more' consciousness emerges most distinctly when conation is abruptly disappointed or frustrated. With the advent of ideal representation the 'no more' and the 'not yet' experiences become much more definite."¹⁹ Ladd says, "It is

¹⁵ *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i, pp. 608-9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 631.

¹⁷ *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, vol. ii, p. 698.

¹⁸ *Psychology*, 87, quoted by James in his *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i, p. 631.

¹⁹ *A Manual of Psychology*, second edition, 1910, pp. 405-6.

by the combination of imaging and thinking, in which every conceptual process consists, that the vague consciousness of a 'Still-there' is converted into the conception of 'the present'; the consciousness of the 'now-going' or 'just-gone', into the conception of 'the past'; and the consciousness of the 'not yet there', with its affective accompaniment of expectation or dread, into the conception of 'the future'.²⁰

5. *The Sensible Present is Instantaneous (The Buddhist View)*

Time has two essential characteristics, viz. succession and duration. But the Buddhists do not recognize the existence of duration or block of time. They identify time with mere succession of ideas. The Buddhists hold with Berkeley and Hume that there is no abstract time apart from presentations. Time is not a substantive reality, as the Naiyāyikas hold, but it is a cluster of successive presentations; an abstract time apart from momentary impressions is an artificial conceptual construction. And according to the Buddhists, there are no continuous and uniform impressions (*dhāra-vāhika-jñāna*), but only a series of detached and discrete impressions, a perpetual flux of successive presentations (*kṣaṇabhāṅgura-jñāna*). Continuity is only an illusory appearance due to our slurring over the landmarks of impressions owing to their similarity. Momentary sensations alone are real; there is no continuity among discrete sensations. The seeming continuity of impressions is nothing more than the rapid succession of impressions owing to the rapidity and uniformity of stimulations. Thus the Buddhist doctrine is quite the same as that of David Hume. Time may be viewed either as mono-dimensional or as bi-dimensional. Either it may be regarded as having only linear extension or succession, or it may be regarded as having simultaneity and succession both. The Buddhists hold that there is no synchronousness or simultaneity; that there is only succession or sequence among our presentations. So a momentary presentation can neither apprehend the past nor the future, but it apprehends only the present which has no duration. Thus, according to the Buddhists, the sensible present has no duration; it is an instant or a "time-point".²¹

²⁰ *Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory*, p. 497.

²¹ *Pratyakṣasya hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ*. NBT., p. 22.

The Vedāntists and some Naiyāyikas hold that the sensible present is not a mathematical point of time but has a certain duration; the sensible present is a tract of time extending over a few moments—it is an extended present or the ‘specious present’ (*vitata eva kālaḥ*).²² According to them the ‘specious present’ having a certain duration yields us one unitary presentation without flickering of attention. But the Buddhists hold that there is no ‘specious present’; that the present has no duration; that it is instantaneous or momentary inasmuch as our impressions are momentary. Our presentations are not somewhat prolonged processes, but instantaneous or non-enduring events. And there are no continuous and uniform impressions, as the Vedāntists and some Naiyāyikas hold.

According to Prabhākara, in the consciousness ‘I know this’ (*aham idam jñāmi*) there is a simultaneity of three presentations, viz. the presentation of the knower (*I*), the presentation of the known object (*this*), and the presentation of knowledge or the relation between the knower and the known. This is Prabhākara’s doctrine of Tripuṭī Saṁvit or triple consciousness. But the Buddhists argue, the three elements are not simultaneous; but they are discrete and detached from one another; there is no relation among them; there can be no relation between the knower and the known. They hold that at first there is a particularized presentation (*sākāra-jñāna*) of ‘I’ (*aham*), then that of ‘this’ (*idam*), and then that of ‘knowing’ (*jñāmi*). Thus these discrete and momentary impressions flow in succession. But when the first impression of ‘I’ vanishes, it leaves a residuum (*vāsanā*) which colours and modifies the second impression of ‘this’; and when the second impression vanishes, it leaves a residuum which colours and modifies the third impression. Thus though these three impressions are discrete and isolated from one another, there is a cumulative presentation of these momentary impressions owing to the transference of residua from the preceding impressions to the succeeding ones (*vāsanā-saṁkrama*),—the residua of the former colouring or modifying the latter (*upaplava*). Thus the Buddhists have invented the hypotheses of residua (*vāsanā*), transference of residua (*vāsanāsaṁkrama*), and modification of impressions by residua (*upaplava*) to explain away the fact of continuity or the consciousness of transition; a succession of presentations is

²² NM., p. 450.

certainly not the consciousness of succession. The Buddhists do not explain, but explain away the fact of unity and continuity of consciousness.²³

The Buddhists examine the perceptive process and show that perception cannot apprehend the 'specious present'. A perception is nothing but a presentation; and a presentation is the presentation of a single moment; it cannot apprehend the past and the future. If there is a series of presentations, *a*, *b*, *c*, etc., is it the antecedent presentation *b* (*uttaravijñāna*), or is it the succeeding presentation *b* that takes hold of the preceding presentation by the hind part, as it were? The Buddhists answer that *b* can neither take hold of *c*, nor can it take hold of *a*. The past as past is not present; and the future as future is not present. Hence the present presentation can neither apprehend the past nor the future presentation, and, consequently, there can be no perception of the past and future.²⁴ But the Buddhists hold that the past enters into the present at the time of passing away, and the future also enters into the present, though it is not yet come, so that the present presentation is an echo of the immediate past and a foretaste of the immediate future.²⁵ Thus the Buddhists surreptitiously introduce an element of linking or transition between the past and the present, and between the present and the future to explain our consciousness of the continuity of time. But though they admit that the past and the future enter into the present, they insist that it is only the present that is perceived and not the past or the future which enters into the present. Such is the nature of our experience that it unfolds successively—one presentation appearing and then disappearing. And in this series of presentations an antecedent state (*pūrvadaśā*) cannot come into contact with a subsequent state (*aparadaśā*), and a subsequent state cannot come into contact with an antecedent state. All sense-presentations apprehend the present alone which is instantaneous or momentary.²⁶

Some Naiyāyikas hold that sometimes the present is perceived as extended or with a certain duration, for instance, when we perceive a continuous action, e.g. cooking, reading, etc.²⁷ The

²³ VPS., p. 25.

²⁴ Vartamānānupraveśena bhūtabhāvinoḥ kālayoḥ grahaṇam. Ibid., p. 450.

²⁵ NM., p. 450.

²⁴ NM., p. 450.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 450.

sensible present is not momentary, but has a certain length of duration (*vartamānakṣaṇo dīrghaḥ*); it is not made up of a single moment, but composed of a number of moments (*nānākṣaṇag-aṇātmaka*).²⁸ The Buddhists urge that time cannot be a composite whole made up of parts; it cannot be a cluster of simultaneous presentations because there is no simultaneity among presentations. Time is not bi-dimensional, as some Naiyāyikas hold, but it is mono-dimensional. There is no simultaneity, but only succession among our presentations. It is foolish to hold that perception apprehends an extended present with a certain duration.²⁹ The Naiyāyika and the Vedāntist hold that a continuous and uniform impression bears clear testimony to the unbroken and uninterrupted existence of its object; and that consequently, it apprehends an extended present with a certain duration. The Buddhists object that there is no uniform impression (*avicchinna-dṛṣṭi*). Every impression is momentary; there cannot be a continuous impression. When there is a rapid succession of momentary impressions, they appear to be continuous, though they are not really so. And because there is no continuous impression, there can be no perception of the 'specious present' with a certain duration. Even if there were a continuous impression, it would not be able to apprehend the 'specious present', because an object must be presented to consciousness in order that we may have a presentative knowledge of the object, and the object cannot be presented to consciousness for more than one moment, since all objects are momentary.³⁰ But, as a matter of fact, there can be no continuous and uniform impression; consciousness must always apprehend itself as momentary; and not only consciousness is momentary, but also the consciousness of the momentariness of consciousness is momentary. Here the Buddhists differ from the Neo-Hegelians, Green, and others, who suppose that the consciousness of the relation of impressions must be enduring; momentary impressions are apprehended as momentary by a consciousness which must be permanent. Thus, according to the Buddhists, all presentations are momentary, and as such they can apprehend only the present which has not a

²⁸ Ibid., p. 451. "Psychologically considered, there is no such thing as a 'mathematical point of time'—no time that is not enduring time." Ladd: *Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory*, p. 311.

²⁹ NM., p. 451.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 452.

length of duration, but is constituted by a single moment; the sensible present, therefore, is instantaneous or momentary.³¹

6. *The Sensible Present has Duration (The Naiyāyika on the Vedāntist View)*

The Buddhists recognize only one aspect of time, viz. succession. They try to explain away the other aspect of time, viz. duration. But some Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntists clearly recognize the importance of duration apart from which succession has no meaning. The Buddhists have argued that a presentation cannot apprehend the past and the future as they are not presented to consciousness; that it can apprehend only the present which is constituted by a single moment. The Naiyāyika urges that even a momentary glance (*nimeṣa-dṛṣṭi*) can apprehend the continued existence of an object. Why should, then, perception be regarded as apprehending the instantaneous present?³² Even supposing that a momentary glance cannot apprehend the past and the future, but only the present, what is the span of the present time perceived by a continuous and uniform impression (*animeṣa-dṛṣṭi*)? Is it a time-point or a tract of time? Is it an instant or a length of duration? The sensible present continues as long as the continuous and uniform impression persists without an oscillation of attention, and as long as it is not interrupted by another impression; so that this single unitary presentation apprehends not an instantaneous present but a lengthened or extended present with a certain duration.³³

The Buddhists may urge that such an extended present is a tract of time made up of a number of moments; but that the present is really a single moment; that the immediately preceding moment is past and the immediately succeeding moment is future, which cannot therefore be perceived. The Naiyāyika replies that in determining the span of the sensible present we must not assume at the outset that it is momentary, but that we must determine it by an appeal to experience. A psychological investigation must not be guided by metaphysical speculation; but metaphysics must be based on psychology. Psychologically

³¹ Kṣāṇikagrāhi pratyakṣamiti siddham. Ibid., p. 452.

³² NM., p. 462.

³³ Animeṣadṛṣṭinā dṛṣṭyavicchedādavicchinnaśattāka eva dṛśyate iti na kṣāṇikagrāhi pratyakṣam. Ibid., p. 463.

considered, there is no mathematical point of time, but only a tract of time. That time must be regarded as present which is grasped by a single continuous impression without a break or interruption. And such an unbroken and uninterrupted impression apprehends the present as an unbroken and uninterrupted block or duration of time. Hence the sensible present is not an instant, but has a length of duration.

The Buddhists may argue that even according to the Naiyāyika there cannot be a stable consciousness (*sthira-jñāna*) but only a series of momentary impressions; and that he cannot hold that there can be a perception of the 'specious present'. Though all Naiyāyikas hold that a psychosis extends over three moments—the moment of production, the moment of existence, and the moment of destruction—and that there can be no simultaneity of psychoses owing to the atomic nature of the central sensory (*manas*), yet there are some Naiyāyikas who hold that a continuous and uniform impression is not destroyed at the third moment.⁵⁴ Besides, the temporal mark of a consciousness need not necessarily correspond with the temporal mark of its object. An object is apprehended by consciousness as having a continued existence. A pulse of consciousness, though existing at *present*, can apprehend the *past* as well as the *future* as past and future.⁵⁵ The feeling of the past is not a past feeling; and the feeling of the future is not a future feeling. For instance, a present recollection apprehends the past; a present flash of intuition (*prātibha-jñāna*) apprehends the future; and a present inference apprehends both the past and the future. The Buddhists may argue that the operation of the sense-organs does not exist for more than a single moment; and that in the absence of a continued peripheral action there cannot be a perception of an extended time or the 'specious present'. The Naiyāyika replies that peripheral action does not exist for a moment, but continues for some time. The perception of an object depends upon the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, and this intercourse is not momentary, but persists for some time; peripheral stimulation is not a momentary act, but a somewhat prolonged process; and consequently perception does not apprehend an instant or a 'time-point', but a tract

⁵⁴ NM., p. 463.

⁵⁵ *Jñānamtu vartamānakālamapyadūṣitānigatakalagrūhi bhavati.* NM., p. 463.

of time with a certain duration. According to Vātsyāyana, sometimes the present is perceived as unmixed with the past and the future, for instance, when we perceive that a substance exists; and sometimes the present is perceived as mixed up with the past and the future, for instance, when we perceive the continuity of an action, e.g. cooking, cutting, etc. Thus Vātsyāyana admits that the present is sometimes perceived as having a certain duration.⁶⁶

According to the Vedāntists, too, a continuous and uniform impression (*dhārāvāhikabuddhi*) is a single unitary psychosis with a certain duration; it is not a series of momentary impressions in rapid succession, as the Buddhists hold. In the continuous impression of a jar the mental mode which assumes the form of the jar is one and undivided as long as the jar is presented to consciousness without any flickering of attention, and is not interrupted by another psychosis. It is not made up of many momentary psychoses, because according to the Vedāntist, a psychosis continues in the field of consciousness as long as the mind does not assume the form of a different object. So the Vedāntist also admits that a continuous and uniform presentation does not apprehend an instantaneous present, but an extended present with a certain duration.⁶⁷ Thus the Vedāntists and some Naiyāyikas hold that the sensible present has duration, while the Buddhists hold that the sensible present is instantaneous or momentary. Certainly the former view is psychologically correct. The Buddhists deny the 'specious present' because it contradicts their fundamental doctrine of momentariness.

This psychological discussion of the 'specious present' in the medieval philosophical literature of India anticipates the same kind of discussion in the modern psychology of the West. Professor William James borrowed the word 'specious present' from E. R. Clay and gave currency to it. He expresses his view most beautifully as follows: "The practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a *duration*, with a bow and a stern, as it were, a rearward and a forward looking end."⁶⁸

⁶⁶ NBh., ii, 1, 41. HIP., i, pp. 377-86.

⁶⁷ VP., p. 26.

⁶⁸ *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i, p. 609.

CHAPTER X

PERCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSAL (JATI), INDIAN NOMINALISM AND REALISM

1. *Introduction*

The problem of the universal and the individual has been approached in the West from the psychological, logical, and metaphysical points of view. The Indian thinkers also have investigated the problem from these different standpoints, not in abstract isolation from one another, but in their synthetic unity. The psychological aspect of this question, as understood by the different schools of Indian philosophers, is incomprehensible without a metaphysical consideration of it. So we shall attempt here a psychological study of the problem with reference to its metaphysical basis.

In the Western thought, there are mainly three theories of the universal, viz. nominalism, conceptualism, and realism. According to nominalism, the individuals alone are real—there are only individual things in nature, and particular ideas in the mind; there is no universal at all in reality—only the name is general. According to conceptualism, there are only individual things in nature without any universal class-essence in them, but the mind has the power of forming a concept or abstract general idea of individual things. Thus, according to it, there is no universal in nature, but the universal exists in the mind in the form of a concept or general idea. According to realism, the universal exists both in nature and in the mind; there is a universal or class-essence in the individual things of nature, and there is a universal notion or concept in the mind corresponding to the class-essence in nature. Thus, according to nominalism, there is no universal at all either in nature or in the mind; according to conceptualism, the universal exists only in the mind; according to realism, the universal exists both in nature and in the mind. Besides these main theories there are certain intermediate positions.

Among the Indian thinkers also we find a perpetual conflict between realists and nominalists. The Buddhists are thorough-

going nominalists. The Naiyāyikas the Vaiśeṣikas, and the Mīmāṃsakas (Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara) represent different schools of realism. The Jaina is a nominalist tending towards realism. Rāmānuja also is a nominalist with a bent for realism. According to the Buddhists, specific individuals (*svlakṣaṇa*) alone are real; they are apprehended by indeterminate perception; there is no universal or class-essence at all in the specific individuals; the universal notion is an unreal abstraction of the mind; it is a conceptual construction of the mind to carry on the practical purposes of our life. The Buddhists are the most uncompromising nominalists. The Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Bhāṭṭas, and the Prābhākaras hold that there is a real universal or class-essence in the individual objects of nature. But there is a difference of opinion as to the relation of the universal to the individual. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Prābhākara regard the universal as different from the individual, and the relation between them as that of inherence, the latter being the substrate of the former. The Bhāṭṭa, on the other hand, holds that the universal is both different from, and identical with, the individual; that the relation between the two is that of identity-in-difference. The Jaina holds that there can be no universal notion in the mind, unless there is a real universal in nature. The universal notion is not an unreal fiction of the mind as the Buddhists suppose; it is real, and consequently it must be based on reality. Corresponding to a universal notion in the mind, there must be a real universal in nature. But what is the nature of the real universal? It is not a class-essence. The Jaina does not recognize its existence. There can be no one, eternal, ubiquitous class-essence in the individuals belonging to the same class, as the realists suppose. So far the Jaina agrees with the Buddhist and supports nominalism. But he differs from the Buddhist in that he recognizes the real existence of similarity among the individual members of the same class. The likeness is the objective ground of a universal notion. To this extent, the Jaina tends towards realism. Rāmānuja also holds a similar doctrine. According to him, individuals alone are real; there is no class-essence in them; but there is a close resemblance (*sausādṛśya*) among them in the shape of certain definite configurations (*saṁsthāna*) of parts among the individuals. Thus, Rāmānuja agrees with the Jaina in holding that there is a real likeness among the individual things belonging to the same

class. Rāmānuja only gives an interpretation of the likeness among the individual members of a class. Thus, both the Jaina and Rāmānuja are not out-and-out nominalists like the Buddhists, though they deny the existence of a class-essence; they are nominalists with a leaning towards realism. They are advocates of modified nominalism. All Indian realists agree in holding that the universal is an object of perception; it can be perceived through the sense-organs; it is not an ideal construction of the mind. The experience of the universal is not conceptual, but perceptual. This is seldom admitted by the Western realists. The Indian realists differ from one another only in their views as to the relation of the universal to the individuals.

2. The Buddhist doctrine of Nominalism

The universal in the form of a class-essence (*jāti*) can never be an object of perception. A perceptible object produces the perception of it in the mind. But the universal (*jāti*) is eternal; so it cannot produce its cognition. If, in spite of being eternal, the universal produces a cognition, it will never cease to do so; and, consequently, the cognition of no other object will be possible.¹ Moreover, the universal can never be perceived, for perception has for its object only the momentary specific individuals (*svalakṣaṇa*) unconnected with other individuals preceding and succeeding them. By the universal we mean that feature which is common to a whole class of objects. If such a universal character exists at all, it can be known only after collecting all the individual objects belonging to a class, and ascertaining their common character. Thus, the knowledge of the universal presupposes that of all the individuals in which it exists. How, then, can such a universal be known by indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*), which arises just after the contact of an object with a sense-organ, and is quite independent of any other cognition, preceding or succeeding it? If it is apprehended by determinate perception (*svikalpa pratyakṣa*), it is unreal for that very reason. According to the Buddhist, indeterminate perception alone is valid as it is free from all forms and categories (*vikalpa*); determinate perception is invalid as it is not free from thought-determinations. Thus, the universal can be apprehended neither by indeterminate

¹ SD., p. 381.

perception nor by determinate perception. Nor can it be proved by inference (*anumāna*) and verbal cognition (*śabda*), for these two have for their objects the unreal forms of ideal construction (*vikalpa*), and as such cannot apprehend the ontological reality.² Hence specific individuals alone are real, since they are apprehended by indeterminate perception. The universal is nothing but a mere form of determinate cognition having no real existence in the world.³

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the universal is different from the individual; it inheres in the latter which is its substratum; there is one, eternal, ubiquitous universal among the members of a class. The Buddhist criticizes this view thus: First, things which are different from one another must occupy different portions of space. But the universal is never perceived to occupy a space different from that of the individual. So the universal must not be different from the individual. Moreover, things which are different from one another can be perceived apart from one another. For instance, a cloth can be perceived apart from a jar as they are different from each other. But the universal can never be perceived apart from the individual. Hence the universal cannot be different from the individual. Secondly, it may be said that though the universal is different from the individual, it cannot be perceived apart from the individual simply because the former exists in the latter. But this is impossible. The universal can never exist in the individual. If it does so, does it exist in each individual wholly or partly? Both the alternatives are untenable. If the universal exists in its entirety in one individual, then it cannot exist in any other individual, and being one, it cannot exist entirely in many individuals. Evidently, if the universal exhausts itself in one particular, it cannot exist in another without being produced anew. But this is absurd. The universal is eternal; it cannot be produced at all. Nor can it exist partly in all the individuals, for it has no parts. Then, again, it is not possible for the same universal to exist partly in the past, present, and future individuals. Thirdly, even supposing that the universal exists in the individual, does it exist everywhere in all the individuals, or only in its proper objectives? For instance, does the universal cow (*gotva*) exist in all individuals belonging

² NM., pp. 297-8. HIP., ii, p. 400.

³ Vikalpākāramāraṇa sāmānyam, alikarṇa vā. 8D., pp. 381-2.

to different classes, e.g. cows, horses, etc. (*sarvasarvagata*)? Or, does it exist only in all the individual cows (*pinḍasarvagata*)? If a universal (e.g. the genus of cow or *gotva*) existed in all the individuals belonging to different classes (e.g. horses, cows, buffaloes, etc.), then we should perceive the genus of cow (*gotva*) in horses, that of horse (*aśvatva*) in cows, and so on, and thus there would be an utter confusion or intermixture of genera (*sāṅkaryā*). It may be said that though a universal exists in all the individuals belonging to different classes, the individuals belonging to a particular class have the power of manifesting a particular universal. For instance, only the individual cows can manifest the universal cow (*gotva*), which is ubiquitous (*sarvasarvagata*). But according to the Buddhist idealist, existence consists in its being perceived.⁴ If the universal exists everywhere, it should be perceived everywhere. Even if a universal, though all-pervading, can be manifested only by certain individuals, it does not follow that this universal must be perceived only in those individuals. If certain individuals manifest a universal which is ubiquitous, they must manifest it as it truly is. A lamp manifests certain objects. It does not follow from this that these objects are perceived in the lamp. Likewise, certain individuals manifest a universal. It does not prove that the universal must be perceived in those individuals. If, on the other hand, a universal exists only in all its proper subjects (*pinḍasarvagata* or *svavyakti-sarvagata*), how can it be perceived in a newly born individual? For instance, if the genus of cow (*gotva*) exists only in all individual cows, how can it be perceived in a newly born cow, if it did not exist in that place before the individual was born? The universal cannot be born along with the individual as it is eternal. Nor can it come from any other individual, because, first, it is without any form (*amūrta*), and consequently incapable of movement, and, secondly, it is not perceived in the individual from which it comes. Nor can it be said that the universal exists partly in the individual from which it comes, and partly in the newly born individual to which it comes, because the universal is without any parts. And thus when an individual is destroyed, the universal does not remain in that place, because it is not perceived there. Nor is it destroyed along with the individual, because it is eternal. Nor does it go to some other individual because, first, it is without any

⁴ Cf. Berkeley.

form (*amūrta*) and consequently incapable of movement, and secondly, it cannot enter into another individual in which it already exists. Fourthly, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the relation between the universal and the individual is one of inherence (*samavāya*); that the universal inheres in the individual. The Buddhist denies the relation of inherence altogether, and identifies it with identity (*tādātmya*). Inherence, according to the Vaiśeṣika, is the relation between two entities which can never be perceived apart from each other, e.g. the relation between a substance and its qualities, or that between the constituent parts and the composite whole, or that between the universal and the individual, etc. The Buddhist holds that those entities, which are not perceived apart from each other, are not different from each other. Simultaneity and inseparability of perceptions constitute a test of identity. The universal can never be perceived apart from the individual; hence they are not different from each other. Lastly, if the universal inheres in the individual, we must have such a perception as 'there is the universal cow in this individual cow' (*iha gavi gotvam*). But, as a matter of fact, every one perceives a cow as 'this is a cow' (*iyaṁ gauḥ*), and not as 'there is the class 'cow' in this particular cow' (*iha gavi gotvam*). This clearly shows that the individual is not the substratum of the universal, but identical with it. Nor can it be said that the universal is the inner essence of the individual, because the former is entirely different from the latter. One, eternal, and ubiquitous universal cannot be the essence of many, non-eternal, and discrete and isolated individuals. If even such contradictory things, as the universal and the individual, were identical with each other, then cows and horses also would be identical with each other, and thus there would be an utter confusion in the whole world. Thus, the Buddhist comes to the conclusion that the universal can never be different from the individual.⁵

The Buddhists criticize the Śrottriya view. According to the Śrottriyas, there is a *rūpa-rūpi-lakṣaṇa-sambandha* between the universal and the individual. But this also cannot be proved. If the universal is the *rūpa* of the individual which is the *rūpin* in relation to the former, what is meant by *rūpa*? Does it mean colour (*śuklādī*), or form (*ākāra*), or essential nature (*svabhāva*)? (1) If the universal were the colour of the individual, then colourless

⁵ NM., pp. 298-300; ŚD., pp. 379-380. HIP., i, pp. 596-7.

substances such as air, mind etc., qualities, and actions would have no universality in them. But, as a matter of fact, they are supposed to have universality in them. (2) If the universal were the form of the individual, then the formless qualities would have no universality in them though they are supposed to have it. (3) If the universal were the essential nature of the individual, then they would not be different from each other. An object is never perceived as different from its essential nature. Hence the universal is not different from the individual. If there is any difference between them, there is a difference in name, but not in substance.

Then, again, is the *rūpa* a different substance from the *rūpin*? Or, is it the same substance as the *rūpin*? Or, is it the property of the *rūpin*? (4) The first alternative is untenable. The universal, which is the *rūpa* of the individual (*rūpin*), is never perceived as a substance different from the individual (*vastvantaram*). (5) The second alternative contradicts the position of the opponent. If the universal is the same substance as the individual (*vastveva*), then they are identical with each other, and it is useless to speak of the *rūpa-rūpi-lakṣaṇa-sambandha* between them. (6) The third alternative also is untenable. If the universal is the property of the individual (*vastudharma*), it should be perceived as distinct from the individual. But, in fact, it is never perceived as distinct from the individual. And if the universal is inseparable from the individual, it is useless to speak of a relation called *rūpa-rūpi-lakṣaṇa-sambandha* between them, for they are not different from each other. Still, if it be insisted that there is a *rūpa-rūpi-lakṣaṇa* relation between the universal and the individual, the Śrotīyas cannot distinguish it from conjunction and inherence. Hence the Buddhists come to the conclusion that there cannot be a *rūpa-rūpi-lakṣaṇa* relation between the universal and the individual.⁶

The Buddhists criticize the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka realism. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, there is a relation of identity-in-difference between the universal and the individual. The universal is both different from the individual, and identical with it. The perception of an object involves two elements, viz. assimilation (*anugama*) and discrimination (*vyāvṛtti*). This dual character of perception must correspond to the dual character of

⁶ NM., p. 299. HIP., I, p. 597.

its object. Universality is the objective ground of assimilation, and individuality is the objective ground of discrimination. So the object of perception must be both universal and particular. The Buddhist urges that it is self-contradictory to assert that one and the same object can be both universal and particular, one and many, eternal and temporary, existent and non-existent. Such an object is never found in experience ; it is a fiction of the imagination. One and the same object can never be multiform in character. There is only one form in an object, viz. individuality that is real. The universality of an object is merely an unreal form superimposed upon the object by determinate cognition. It is the specific individuality (*svalakṣaṇa*), pure and simple, unmixed with universality, that is perceived just after the contact of the object with a sense-organ. Hence specific individuality alone is real ; and universality is unreal. It cannot be said that both the characters of an object, viz. universality and individuality, are perceived, and, therefore, both of them are real. For, in that case, the double moon also would be real because it is perceived.' According to the Buddhist, perception is always indeterminate ; and indeterminate perception can never apprehend an object with the dual character of universality and individuality. It can apprehend only the specific individuality of an object, and never its universality, because, like all things, it has a momentary existence, and, consequently, it cannot apprehend that feature of the object which it has in common with many other objects. Thus, specific individuals alone are real, since they are apprehended by indeterminate perception ; the universal is an unreal form of imagination.

The Buddhist refutes the realists' objections. First, the realist urges, just as various specific individuals are admitted to account for a variety of indeterminate perceptions, so various universals or class-essences (e.g. *gotva*, *aśvatva*, etc.) must be admitted to account for various determinate cognitions (e.g. of cows, horses, and the like). The Buddhist argues, the variety of determinate cognitions, too, can be explained by the variety of specific individuals. According to them, specific individuals are the causes of indeterminate perceptions, and indeterminate perceptions, again, are the causes of determinate cognitions ; so that a variety of specific individuals produces a variety of indeterminate cognitions, which, in its turn, produces a variety of determinate cognitions.

Thus, it is needless to suppose a variety of universals to account for a variety of determinate cognitions as the realist supposes. Secondly, the realist argues, if universals are nothing but unreal forms of imagination, they cannot serve the practical purposes of our life. According to the Buddhist, every thing is momentary, and so the specific individuals (*svalakṣaṇa*) are momentary. Hence the specific individual, which is apprehended by indeterminate perception, is destroyed at that very moment, and no action is possible with regard to that object; and that individual with regard to which there is an action is destroyed at that very moment, and so it cannot be attained. Hence one individual is perceived, while there is action on another individual, and thus practical actions are not in keeping with the real nature of things. Unreal forms of determinate cognitions cannot serve the practical purposes of our life. The Buddhist argues, even the unreal forms (*vikalpa*) of determinate cognitions can serve the practical purposes of our life; just as the cognition of a gem produced by the ray of a gem leads to the actual attainment of the gem, and thus serves a practical purpose of our life, so determinate cognitions produced by indeterminate perceptions of specific individuals and, consequently, having a semblance of specific individuals which are capable of evoking effective actions, lead those who are desirous of effective actions to the attainment of those specific individuals. Thus, determinate cognitions, though not in keeping with the real nature of specific individuals, indirectly lead to the actual attainment of them, and in this way serve the practical purposes of our life. Hence it cannot be said that determinate cognitions, having no real things for their objects, but having unreal forms (*vikalpa*) superimposed on them, cannot serve the practical purposes of our life. Thus, in spite of the non-existence of universals, practical actions can follow from unreal determinate cognitions. Thirdly, the realist may contend that discrete specific individuals can never produce a universal notion in the mind. Specific individuals, which are absolutely different from one another, cannot produce one and the same universal notion, if the universal does not really exist. If they can produce a universal notion, in spite of their absolute difference, the realist asks why certain individuals produce the universal notion of cow, while certain other individuals produce the universal notion of horse, and why all individuals do not produce all universal notions. The Buddhist retorts that the

realist cannot explain how the individuals, which are different from one another, have an identical essence in the form of the universal, and how they can be the substrata of the same universal, and how they can manifest the same universal; and how certain individuals are related to a certain universal, and not all individuals are related to all universals. If the realist argues that certain individuals, by their very nature, are related to a certain universal, and not all individuals are related to all universals, then it may equally be argued that certain individuals, by their very nature, produce the same universal notion in the form 'this is a cow', 'this is a cow', and so on, in spite of the non-existence of the universal.⁸ Thus the Buddhist does not believe in the existence of the universal. He regards the notion of the universal as a conceptual construction (*vikalpa*).

3. *The Modified Nominalism of the Jaina*

The Buddhist believes only in specific individuals which are like themselves. He does not believe in the universal. He is an uncompromising nominalist. According to him, individuals alone are real; there is no universal or class-essence in them; they are characterized by themselves; there is not even likeness among them. The Jaina agrees with the Buddhist in denying the existence of a class-essence in the individuals belonging to the same class; but he differs from the latter in recognizing the existence of common characters or resemblances among them, which he regards as the real universal. The Jaina does not go so far as to say that specific individuals alone are real, and that there is no similarity among them. According to him, there is similarity among the individuals belonging to the same class, which is the real universal; there is no universal class-essence among them. This doctrine may be compared with J. S. Mill's nominalism. According to Mill, though there is not a universal class-essence among the individuals belonging to the same class, still there are certain fundamental qualities common to them all; and in thinking of general terms, though we have concrete images before the mind, we concentrate our attention on the fundamental attributes common to them, and recognize them as common to the whole class. Thus the Jaina is neither an uncompromising nominalist

nor an uncompromising realist. The Buddhist are out-and-out nominalists. They recognize the existence of specific individuals only. They entirely deny the existence of the universal. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsaka, on the other hand, recognize the existence of one, eternal, and ubiquitous universal in the individuals. They are out-and-out realists. The Jaina holds an intermediate position. He also recognizes the reality of the universal; but, according to him, it is not one, eternal, and ubiquitous, as the realists hold, but it is multiform, non-eternal, and limited; and it is nothing but the common character or similarity among the different individuals belonging to the same class. The Jaina does not recognize the existence of any other universal than this common character which is perceived through the sense-organs like colours and the like, and is the cause of the universal notion which has no other object than this. The difference between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsaka, on the one hand, and the Jaina, on the other, is that according to the former, the universal notion has its objective counterpart in the class-essence in the individuals, which is different from them, and is one, eternal, and ubiquitous, while according to the latter, the universal notion has its objective counterpart in the common character of many individuals, which is not one, but many, existing in many individuals—not eternal, but temporary, being produced and destroyed along with the individual in which it exists—and not all-pervading, but confined only to the individual in which it exists. Thus the Jaina is neither an uncompromising nominalist like the Buddhist nor an uncompromising realist like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsaka. He is an advocate of modified nominalism.

According to the Jaina, an object of knowledge is both universal and particular (*sāmānya-viśeṣātma*). It is not merely universal like the Being or *Brahman* of Saṅkara; nor is it merely particular like the specific individuals (*svalakṣaṇa*) of the Buddhist. It is characterized both by common characters (*sāmānya*) and by distinctive characters (*viśeṣa*). Our consciousness of similarity (*anuvṛttapratyaya*) has for its object common characters (*sāmānya*), and our consciousness of difference (*vyāvṛttapratyaya*) has for its object distinctive characters (*viśeṣa*). The consciousness of an object involves assimilation and discrimination both. Assimilation is due to common characters, and discrimination is due to

uncommon characters. Hence an object of knowledge is both universal and particular, since it is characterized by common and uncommon characters both. The common characters, again, which constitute the real universal (*sāmānya*), according to the Jaina, are of two kinds, viz. *tiryak sāmānya* and *ūrdhvatā sāmānya*. By *tiryak sāmānya* he means similar modifications (*sadyśaparīṇāma-tiryak*), e.g. dewlap and the like in cows.⁹ By *ūrdhvatā sāmānya* he means the permanent substance which abides in the midst of past, present, and future modifications (*parāparavivartavyāpī-dravyamūrdhvatā*),¹⁰ e.g. earth in its various modifications. So the common characters of an object are constituted by its permanent substance which persists in the midst of all its modifications, and its modifications which are similar to those of other like objects. And these are the real universal; there is no other universal than these common characters.¹¹

Prabhācandra criticizes the Buddhist doctrine of nominalism thus: First, the Buddhist argues, the universal is not perceived apart from the individual; hence it does not exist. But the Jaina urges, the universal is as much an object of perception as the individual; it is an object of uncontradicted experience in the form of assimilative perception, just as the individual is an object of uncontradicted experience in the form of discriminative perception. Just as the exclusive perception of particularity cannot be denied, so the inclusive perception of universality also cannot be denied. Both these experiences are uncontradicted; and the verdict of uncontradicted experience can never be called in question. Hence, uncontradicted assimilative perception establishes the real existence of the universal (*sāmānya*) common to many individuals, which cannot be apprehended by discriminative perception. Secondly, the Buddhist argues that there is no universal apart from the individual, for there are not two distinct cognitions of the universal and the individual. But there is a difference between the cognition of universality and that of individuality, the Jaina urges, for all of us perceive the difference. There are two distinct cognitions of the universal and the individual. It is true that both of them are perceived at the same time and in the same object. But that does not prove that they are apprehended by one and the same cognition. For, in that case, the colour and

⁹ PMS., p. 5.

¹¹ PKM., pp. 136 ff.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 5.

the taste of a cake perceived at the same time would be apprehended by a single cognition. But, as a matter of fact, the cognitions of the colour and the taste, though simultaneous, are different from each other. Nor can it be argued that the universal is identical with the individual, since both of them are perceived at the same time through the same sense-organ. For, in that case, the wind would be identical with the sun since sometimes both of them are perceived at the same time through the tactual organ. In fact, the difference between two objects is proved by the difference in their cognitions. And there is a difference between the cognition of the universal and that of the individual: the former is inclusive, while the latter is exclusive in nature. Hence the universal is different from the individual. Moreover, sometimes we perceive only the common character (e.g. tallness) of two objects (e.g. a post and a man), but cannot perceive their distinctive characters as in doubtful perception. This conclusively proves that the cognition of the universal is different from that of the individual. And this difference in cognitions proves the real difference in their objects. Thus the universal must be different from the individual. Thirdly, the Buddhist contends that the experience of universality (*anugatapratiḥhāsa*) does not necessarily imply the real existence of the universal, for it can be produced by different individuals. But the experience of universality is never possible, the Jaina urges, without the real existence of the universal; for otherwise it would not be experienced in the same form in all times and places. Moreover, individuals are different from one another; difference constitutes the essential nature of individuals. So they cannot produce the experience of universality. Still, if the Buddhist insists that different individuals can produce the experience of universality, then for the same reason, different horses will produce the universal notion of 'cow', which is absurd. Fourthly, the Buddhist contends that though individuals are absolutely different from one another, and devoid of common characters, still the preclusion of certain individuals (e.g. cows) from those individuals which are neither their causes nor effects (e.g. horses, buffaloes, etc.) is the cause of the experience of universality (e.g. 'cow') and the consequent action. But the Jaina replies, the negation of contradictions is not at all possible in those individuals which are devoid of common characters; hence it must be the cause of the

experience of universality. Moreover, the negative conception of the 'negation of contradictories' can never lead to practical action, which always follows from positive cognitions. Besides, if the experience of universality is possible without the real existence of the universal in nature, then, for the same reason, the experience of individuality also will be possible without the real existence of the individual in nature, which is not admitted by the Buddhist. Hence, if discriminative perceptions have for their objects discrete individuals, then assimilative perceptions too must have for their objects real universals. Thus the universal has a real existence in nature. Fifthly, the Buddhist argues, though there is no real universal in the individuals, the experience of universality is due to the illusory identification of different individuals owing to the similarity of the actions produced by them; for instance, though different cows have no real identity among them, yet they seem to be identical in nature, since all of them produce similar actions, e.g. milking, carrying, etc. But the Jaina replies, different individuals produce different actions; if it is said that the identity of the actions produced by different individuals is due to the similarity of other actions, then it will lead to *regressus ad infinitum*; even the cognitions produced by different individuals are different from one another; so they cannot account for the experience of universality. Lastly, the Buddhist argues, the illusory identity of different indeterminate perceptions is due to their producing one and the same universal notion; and the illusory identity of different individuals is due to the illusory identity of the indeterminate perceptions which are produced by different individuals. Thus, according to him, an illusory identity is superimposed on the different indeterminate perceptions produced by different individuals, because of the identity of the universal notion produced by them; and an illusory identity is superimposed on the different individuals on account of the illusory identity of their effects, viz. indeterminate perceptions. Thus an identity is superimposed on indeterminate perceptions, though they are absolutely different from one another, and this superimposed identity, again, is superimposed on specific individuals which are absolutely different from one another. The Jaina replies that this theory of the superimposition of a superimposition is, indeed, a nice hypothesis, which does not appeal to reason but to blind faith! As a matter of fact, indeterminate perceptions, which are absolutely different

from one another, can never produce one and the same universal notion. Had it been so, the indeterminate perceptions of horses and other animals too would have produced the universal notion of 'cow'. So, it is wrong to argue that the illusory identity of different individuals is due to the illusory identity of the indeterminate perceptions of these individuals, and that the illusory identity of the indeterminate perceptions is due to their producing one and the same universal notion. Hence the Jaina concludes that the universal really exists in the world in the form of common characters (*sadṛśapariṇāma*), since it is an object of uncontradicted experience.¹²

The Jaina criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds there is a real universal in the individuals, and that it is one, eternal, and ubiquitous. But this doctrine is refuted by the Jaina almost by the same arguments which have been advanced by the Buddhist to prove the non-existence of the universal. The Jaina does not believe in any other universal than likeness, since likeness alone is an object of perception, and nothing beyond likeness is perceived. And this universal in the form of likeness is not one but many, since it exists in many individuals; it is not eternal but temporary, since it is produced and destroyed along with the individual in which it exists; it is not ubiquitous but limited, since it is confined to the individual in which it exists. It cannot be argued that the cognition of the universal notion itself proves the existence of one, eternal, and ubiquitous universal. For, what does it mean? Does it mean that wherever there is a universal notion, there is such a universal? Or, does it mean that wherever there is such a universal, there is a universal notion? The first meaning is not possible. It cannot be held that wherever we have a universal notion, there is a real universal corresponding to it. For, we have a universal notion of universals such as the generic character of cows (*gotva*), the general character of horses (*aśvatva*), etc.; but the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the existence of a universal of universals. Then, again, we have the universal notion of the different kinds of negation or non-existence, viz., antecedent non-existence, subsequent non-existence, mutual non-existence, and absolute non-existence. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the existence of the universal of negation. These universals of universals and

¹² PKM., pp. 136-7.

negations can be explained by the common characters in the different universals and the different kinds of negation respectively. Hence there is no other universal than common character. The second meaning also is impossible. It cannot be held that wherever there is a real universal in the world, there is a corresponding universal notion in the mind; for, though there is not a real universal in the cooks in the form of their generic character (*pācakatva*), according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, still there is the universal notion of 'cook' (*pācakaḥ*, *pācaka ityādi*). Such a universal notion is not produced by the function (*karma*) of the cooks, for functions differ with each cook; and different causes can never produce the same effect. Nor can it be produced by the community of functions (*karmasāmānya*), for, if it is possible at all, it can produce the universal notion of cooking but not of the cook.¹³

Hence the universal notion cannot have for its object one, eternal, and ubiquitous universal existing in different individuals. There is no other universal than the common character or similarity, which is not one in many individuals, but differs with each individual in which it exists. And such a universal in the form of a common character differs in each individual like its distinctive characters. Just as an individual is distinguished from other individuals by virtue of its distinctive character, so it is assimilated to other individuals by virtue of those characters which it has in common with them; and these common characters are perceived in the form 'this is similar to that', 'that is similar to this', and so on. Just as the distinctive characters of individuals lead to effective actions by producing discriminative perceptions in the mind, so the common characters of individuals lead to effective actions by producing assimilative perceptions in it.¹⁴

The Jaina refutes the Mīmāṃsaka objections. First, if the common character or similarity constitutes universality, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka asks why we perceive an individual cow as 'this is a cow', and not as 'this is *like* a cow'. The Jaina replies that we have such a perception because of the superimposition of identity or similarity (*abhedopacārāt*); that the Bhāṭṭa cannot explain such a perception as 'this is *like* that', 'the white cow is *like* the black cow'. If he argues that we have such a perception, because of their relation to the same universal, then we shall have such a

¹³ PKM., p. 139.

¹⁴ PKM., p. 140.

perception as 'these two individuals are possessed of the *same* universal'. The Jaina holds that we have such a perception as 'this is a cow', and not as 'this is *like* a cow', because of the super-imposed identity between the two individuals on account of their common characters. Secondly, if an individual is perceived to be like another individual on account of their common characters, the Bhāṭṭa asks how these common characters, again, can be perceived as *like* one another. If it is because of other common characters among these common characters, then it will lead to infinite regress. The Jaina replies that just as distinctive characters can be perceived as distinct from one another without supposing other distinctive characters among them, so the common characters among individuals can be perceived as *like* one another without supposing any other common character among them; that the hypothesis of any other universal than the common characters among individuals is unwarranted by the facts of experience.¹⁵

4. The Modified Nominalism of Rāmānuja

Rāmānuja holds almost the same view as the Jaina does, as regards the universal. According to him, there is no other universal (*jāti*) than a configuration or arrangement of parts (*samsthāna*) among the individuals; but there is a likeness in the configuration of individuals. In individual objects there are points of likeness, but not a universal class-essence (*jāti*). Rāmānuja entirely denies the existence of a class-essence, but he admits the existence of fundamental likeness or close resemblance. Fundamental likeness (*sausādṛśya*) is that property of the object, which is the unconditional and invariable condition of the use of the word 'much alike' (*susadṛśa*). If likeness is not a property of an object, it is no likeness at all. If it exists as a property in another object, then it leads to infinite regress. Therefore, there is no class-essence in individuals, but only a similarity among certain individuals. And even among these individuals not a single quality is found to belong to all the individuals of a class (e.g. cows). How, then, can we define fundamental likeness (*sausādṛśya*) among them? Rāmānuja holds that the individual members of a class are not found to possess a definite quality in common, but

¹⁵ PKM., p. 140.

that they resemble one another in the greatest number of qualities. This doctrine reminds us of Mill's doctrine of Natural Kinds, according to which the members of the same class have the greatest number of resemblances among them, and differ from the members of a different class in the largest number of points. Rāmānuja further maintains that there is not only no identity of class-essence among the different individuals of a class, but that there is not even an identity of name among them. Thus Rāmānuja goes further than Hume and Mill, when he holds that even the name is not general among the individuals of a class. When we say 'cow', we mean different cows in different times and spaces. A is like B; B is like C; C is like D. Thus there is not a *single likeness* among A, B, C, and D; but there are the different *likenesses* because the correlative terms differ in each case. Rāmānuja, thus, is an advocate of thorough-going nominalism. But he does not go the length of saying that there is no likeness at all among the specific individuals, which are absolutely different from one another. Thus the Buddhists are the most uncompromising nominalists. Rāmānuja is a bit less uncompromising, and the Jain is still less so. If the Buddhists be regarded as typical exponents of thorough-going nominalism, the Jaina and Rāmānuja both may be regarded as advocates of modified nominalism.

According to Rāmānuja, at the stage of indeterminate perception, i.e. the perception of the first individual of a class, we perceive a particular arrangement of parts (*saṁsthāna*) which is the distinctive character of the whole class, but we do not recognize it to be the common character of all the individuals belonging to the class, for at that time we have not yet perceived any other individual. Thus, even in indeterminate perception the universal character of an object is known, but not *as* universal, for, according to Rāmānuja, there is no other universal than a particular collocation of parts, which is common to all the individuals of a class, and this class-character in the form of a particular collocation of parts (*saṁsthāna-rūpajātyādi*) is as much an object of sense-perception as the individual object (*pinḍa*) itself; and, moreover, the individual which has a particular collocation of parts can never be perceived apart from the particular arrangement of parts. Hence, according to Rāmānuja, both universality and individuality are apprehended by the indeterminate perception of an object, but

the universality is not recognized to be the common character of all the individuals belonging to the class. The common character is known to be common only at the stage of determinate perception or the perception of the second, the third, and the subsequent individuals.¹⁶

5. *The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realism*

Kaṇāda defines universality and particularity as mental concepts; they are relative to the understanding (*sāmānyam viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam*).¹⁷ By universality he means a mark or quality by which the understanding assimilates a number of objects and forms a group or class. By particularity, he means a mark or quality by which the understanding differentiates one object from others. Universality and particularity are real entities. Universality (*sāmānya*) has a real existence in the form of common qualities in individual objects. Thus Kaṇāda and the later Vaiśeṣikas agree with the Naiyāyikas and advocate realism.

The Buddhist holds with Hobbes that universality lies only in name; that it is an unreal fiction of imagination (*vikalpa*). He is a nominalist. The Jaina and Rāmānuja hold that the universal is real; that it exists in the individuals in the form of common characters; and that there is no other universal besides these. They are modified nominalists. Kaṇāda holds that universality and particularity are relative to the understanding, though corresponding to them there are common qualities and individual peculiarities respectively in individual objects. The later Vaiśeṣikas, however, are realists. They lay stress on the reality of the class-essence in the individuals.

The Naiyāyikas also recognize the existence of the universal as distinct from the individual. The universal is related to the individual by the relation of inherence. There is one universal in all the individuals belonging to the same class. Though it exists in them, it is independent of them. It is not born with them; nor does it perish with them. It is unborn and imperishable. This doctrine of eternal universals resembles the realism of Plato. The universals of the Naiyāyika are eternal types like the Ideas of Plato; the individuals are born and destroyed, but the universals subsist for ever. But still the Naiyāyika does not

¹⁶ RB., i, 1, 1, and *Śrutaprakāśikā*.

¹⁷ V.S., i, 2. 3.

support the Platonic doctrine of *universalia ante rem*. Plato's Ideas exist in the transcendental world as eternal archetypes, while his individuals exist in the sensible world; his Ideas are truly real, but his individuals are mere shadows of the Ideas, and as such unreal. The Naiyāyika's individuals are as real as his universals; both of them have ontological reality. Moreover, Plato's Ideas are not immanent in the individuals so long as they exist; but the Naiyāyika's universals exist in the individuals as their formative principles; they are immanent in them so long as they exist; there is an intimate and inseparable relation between them, called inherence (*samavāya*). Thus the Naiyāyika supports the Aristotelian view of *universalia in re*. But his universal is one and eternal, while his individuals are many and non-eternal; the universal subsists before the individuals are born and after the individuals are destroyed. So far the Naiyāyika supports the Platonic doctrine of *universalia ante rem*. Thus his realism is a peculiar blend of Platonic and Aristotelian realism.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa shows that the universal is as much an object of perception as the individual is. According to the Buddhists, the specific individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) alone is an object of perception; the universal is never perceived; it is an unreal fiction of imagination (*vikalpa*). The Naiyāyika argues that the universal cannot be said to be unreal, since, like the individual, it is an object of uncontradicted and undoubted perception produced by the peripheral contact of an object with a sense-organ. The universal is as much an object of indeterminate perception as the individual is. If the individual alone were the object of indeterminate perception, the universal could not suddenly enter into distinct consciousness at the stage of determinate perception. If it is urged that the universal is simply a name, and as such only a *vikalpa* or an unreal form of imagination, then the Naiyāyika replies that the universality of an object can be apprehended, even when the name of the object is not yet known. For instance, when a man coming from the Deccan, where there are no camels, suddenly sees a number of camels, he perceives the universality of the camels, though he does not know their names. Though a man does not know the name of a number of objects belonging to the same class when he perceives them for the first time, he can perceive both their common and distinctive features. At the first sight of four fingers we perceive them both as similar

to, and different from, one another. So it cannot be argued that through perception we can apprehend only the particularity of an object, and not its universality. Moreover, if at the time of perceiving the first individual belonging to a class only its distinctive feature is perceived, then we cannot recognize the second individual perceived at some other time as belonging to the same class. The Buddhist may argue that the recollection of the first individual at the time of perceiving the second individual is the cause of recognition; the recognition of the second individual is a complex presentative-representative process involving the perception of this individual and the recollection of the first individual. But the Naiyāyika points out that the second individual, according to the Buddhist, is quite different from the first, and has no similarity with it. So the recollection of the first individual at the time of perceiving the second individual cannot help us in recognizing the second individual. If it has anything to do with the recognition of the second individual as belonging to the same class, then, at first, there must be a perception of both the common and distinctive features of the first individual. Thus at the first stage of indeterminate perception just after peripheral stimulation the universality of an object is as much perceived as its particularity, and hence universality can never be denied. Universality is as real as particularity is, since both of them are objects of indeterminate perception, which is a purely immediate and unsophisticated experience.

If it is urged that at the stage of indeterminate perception we cannot distinctly point out the common feature of an object, then it may equally be argued that at this stage we cannot also point out the distinctive feature of the object. If it is urged that community cannot be perceived at the stage of indeterminate perception, because the perception of community depends upon the perception of those objects which have common qualities, then it may equally be argued that particularity of an object too cannot be perceived at this stage, because the perception of its particularity too depends upon the perception of those objects from which it is distinguished. If the community of an object cannot be perceived, because it depends upon the assimilation of this object to other like objects, then its particularity also cannot be perceived, because it depends upon the discrimination of this object from other disparate objects. If the particularity of specific individuality

(*svalakṣaṇa*) of an object is perceived at the stage of indeterminate perception, its universality too must be perceived at the same time.

But if we apprehend an object, pure and simple, in its bare nakedness, stripped of its common and distinctive features at the stage of indeterminate perception, what is the exact nature of its object? Evidently it cannot be determined at the stage of indeterminate perception, which is purely an immediate experience. It can be determined only at the stage of determinate perception, which clearly shows that both universality and particularity are objects of indeterminate perception. In fact, indeterminate perception is the immediate experience of the common and distinctive features of an object as mere *thats*, and not as *whats*; these are apprehended as unrelated to one another. In determinate perception we apprehend these common and distinctive features as *whats* or as related to one another. Indeterminate perception is the pure immediate apprehension of objects and their qualities, both common and particular, *per se*. Determinate perception is the clear apprehension of the objects and their qualities *inter se*. It has been argued that it is self-contradictory to assert that one and the same object is characterized by contradictory qualities such as universality and particularity. But, in fact, there is no contradiction here, because we do not perceive the contradiction. Neither the perception of community contradicts that of particularity, nor does the perception of particularity contradict that of universality; hence both the perceptions are real, and none of them is illusory.¹⁸

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Buddhist doctrine thus: First, the Buddhists argue that the universal is not different from the individual, because they are not perceived to occupy different portions of space, like a jar and a cloth. But this is false. The universal is not perceived to occupy a space different from that of the individual, not because it does not exist, but because it exists only *in* the individual, which is its substratum. Secondly, the Buddhists argue that the universal cannot exist in the individual, because it cannot be conceived to exist in the individual either wholly or partly. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that the universal *does* exist in each individual wholly. It cannot be said that if the universal exists wholly in a particular individual, it cannot exist in any other individual because it has already exhausted itself in

¹⁸ NM., pp. 309-311.

the former individual ; for we do perceive the universal in each individual, and the fact of our uncontradicted experience can never be challenged ; and the universal can never exist partly in each individual, because it has no parts. Thirdly, the Buddhists argue that a universal can neither be all-pervading nor limited to certain individuals belonging to the same class ; that it can neither exist in all individuals to whatever class they may belong, nor can it exist in all its proper objectives. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that a universal exists everywhere, not only in its proper subjects, but in all the particulars. But it cannot be perceived in all the individuals, because it is not manifested by all of them ; a particular universal (e.g. genus of cow or *gotva*) is manifested by a number of particular individuals (e.g. cows) ; and in the absence of these manifesting individuals, the universal is not perceived. And an individual can manifest a universal, only when it is perceived ; unperceived individuals can never manifest a universal. Thus, though a universal exists everywhere, it cannot be perceived everywhere because the manifesting agents are not present everywhere. A universal is perceived wherever its manifesting agents or individuals are perceived, because individuals can manifest a universal only in that particular space and at that particular time, where and when those individuals are perceived. So we are not to suppose that the universal 'cow' did not exist in the particular cow just born, before its birth, but it comes into it when it is born, since the universal is incapable of movement. And there is no harm in admitting that a universal exists only in its proper subjects. Whenever a particular individual comes to exist, it comes to be related to the universal. Though the universal is eternal, its relation to a particular individual comes into existence only at that moment when the individual comes into being. Fourthly, the Buddhists argue that the universal cannot inhere in the individual, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds, since there is no relation of inherence ; that inherence (*samavāya*) is nothing but identity (*tādātmya*). The Buddhists deny the possibility of any other relation than identity between two entities which are inseparable from each other, e.g. substance and quality, universal and particular, and so on. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that inseparability of two things does not prove their identity. Though a substance and its quality are inseparable, being never perceived apart from each other, one is perceived as distinct from the other.

Likewise, though the universal is never perceived apart from the individual, they cannot be regarded as identical with each other, since they are perceived as distinct from each other. Therefore, the difference of the universal from the individual is proved by the difference in their perceptions. Fifthly, the Buddhists argue that only specific individuality is real, since it is the object of indeterminate perception; that universality is the product of conceptual construction (*vikalpa*), and consequently unreal. To this Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that universality and individuality both are real, inasmuch as both of them are objects of uncontradicted experience. The Buddhists cannot deny the reality of universality. What is his complaint against the perception of universality? He does not deny the universal notion (*anuvṛttijñāna*). What, then, is the power (*śakti*) in the individual, which produces such a universal notion? And if there is such a power in the individual, is it different from the individual, or identical with it? Is it eternal or non-eternal? Is it perceptible, or inferable? If it is different from the individual, it must be universal; if not, the individual can never produce the universal notion. If it is eternal, it is universal, since the individuals are born and destroyed; and if it is non-eternal, and as such identical with the individual, it can never produce the universal notion. If it is perceptible, the universal is real, and if it is inferable, then also the universal is real. Sixthly, the Buddhists may argue that just as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that a particular universal (e.g. the class-essence of cows or "*gotva*") can exist only in some particular individuals (e.g. cows), so it may be said that some particular individuals (e.g. cows) can produce a universal notion (e.g. of the class "cow"), though in reality there is no universality in them. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa urges that this argument is absurd. If there is a peculiarity (*atiśaya*) in a cognition, there must be a corresponding peculiarity (*atiśaya*) in its object. If you admit that a peculiarity in the effect is produced by a corresponding peculiarity in its cause, then you must admit that the universality of a notion must be produced by a corresponding peculiarity in its object, viz. universality. Hence the universal is real.¹⁹ Lastly, the Buddhists may argue that the unity in the individuals is not the unity of their universality, but it is the unity of the individuals themselves. Śrīdhara replies that this is not possible. For, if there were no

¹⁹ NM., pp. 311-14.

universality, there could be no unity among the individuals, or their causes, or their effects or actions. If the unity in the individuals were due to the unity of their causes, then there would be no unity among the individuals which are produced by different causes, e.g. fire produced by the friction of wood, fire produced by electricity, etc. So, also, if the unity among the individuals were due to the unity or sameness of their effects, then there would be a unity even among heterogeneous individuals; for instance, both cows and buffaloes give us milk; hence cows would be regarded as the same as the buffaloes.²⁰ Hence the unity in the individuals must be due to the universal in them. The universal can never be denied. It is a fact of uncontradicted experience. So the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika affirms the reality of the universal.

6. The Prābhākara Realism

The Prābhākara holds that the universal (*jāti*) is real, since we recognize an essential identity among a number of individuals which are perceived as different from one another; that the sameness in the midst of differences proves the existence of the universal in them.²¹ It exists in each individual entirely, since we recognize the same class-character in every individual. It is distinct from the individuals in which it subsists. It is eternal. It is an object of sense-perception.²² It is never perceived apart from the individual. So far the Prābhākara agrees with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But he differs from the latter in holding that the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) between the universal and the individual is not eternal. When a new individual of a class is born, a new relation of inherence is generated, by which the individual is brought into relation with the universal (*jāti*) that exists in other individuals. And when an individual is destroyed, the relation of inherence between this individual and the universal is destroyed.²³ Moreover, according to the Vaiśeṣika, there is the *summun genus* (*parā jāti*), viz. Being or existence which is supposed to be the common character of all entities. The Prābhākara does not recognize the existence of the highest genus, viz. Being (*sattā*), since we have no consciousness of it. We have to admit that there is such a *jāti* as substance, because we perceive a number of individual substances as having certain characters in

²⁰ NK., p. 318.

²¹ PP., p. 17 and p. 87.

²² PP., p. 17.

²³ PP., p. 26.

common. But we have no such consciousness of *sattā* or pure being; we do not perceive a number of things as merely 'existing'; and so we cannot admit that there can be such a *jāti* as pure being or *sattā*. When we speak of an individual object as existing (*sat*), we do not mean that it has any class-character as being (*sat*); but we mean simply that the individual has its specific existence (*svarūpasattā*) or individuality.²⁴

Prabhākara agrees with Kumārila in holding that the universal (*jāti*) is real and is an object of sense-perception. But he differs from Kumārila in his view of the relation between the universal and the individual. According to Prabhākara, the universal is different from the individual. But according to Kumārila, the universal is both different from, and identical with, the individual. According to the former, there is a relation of difference between the universal and the individual, while according to the latter, there is a relation of identity-in-difference. Prabhākara objects to the Bhāṭṭa theory of identity-in-difference between the universal and the individual for the following reason. If both the universal and the individual were perceived by one and the same act of cognition without contradicting each other, then the theory would be regarded as valid. But they cannot be perceived as such. One and the same act of cognition cannot apprehend both the difference and the identity between the universal and the individual. Just as when we perceive the difference between the universal and the individual, we also perceive both the members of the relation (i.e. the universal and the individual) as distinct, so when we perceive the identity between the two, we should perceive only one of them, either the universal or the individual because of their identity.²⁵ In such a case, a single object, viz. either the universal or the individual would give rise to two cognitions of both the universal and the individual and their identity with each other. But it is not possible either for the universal to produce a cognition of its identity with the individual, nor is it possible for the individual to produce a cognition of its identity with the universal. So it cannot be said that both difference and identity are apprehended by one and the same act of cognition. Hence the universal must be regarded as different from the individual.²⁶

²⁴ PP., pp. 29-30.

²⁵ PP., p. 20.

²⁶ SD., pp. 395-6.

7. *The Bhāṭṭa Realism*

We have already seen that Kumārila agrees with Prabhākara in holding that the universal (*jāti*) is real. Its existence can never be denied, because it is an object of sense-perception. Whenever we perceive an object, we perceive it as belonging to a particular class. The act of perception involves assimilation as well as discrimination. It is inclusive (*anuvṛtta*) as well as exclusive (*vyāvṛtta*). The element of assimilation in perception clearly shows that in the object of perception there must be a class-character or universality. The reality of the universal in the object of perception is the ground of assimilation. The reality of the universal is also proved by inference and other sources of valid knowledge which are based upon it. The ground of inference and other kinds of knowledge is universality (*jāti*). So they confirm the reality of the universal far from contradicting it. If they contradict the existence of universality on which they are based, they contradict their own existence.²⁷

Kumārila does not hold with the Buddhist that the universal is non-different from, or identical with, the individual. Nor does he hold with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Prabhākara that the universal is different from the individual. According to him, the universal is both different from, and identical with, the individual.²⁸ He does not hold with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that there is a relation of inherence between the universal and the individual. He rejects the relation of inherence altogether. A relationship, according to him, can exist only between things which are distinct entities, but inherence is regarded as a relation between things which are inseparable, and hence it is impossible.²⁹ Kumārila rejects the Jaina view of the universal as similarity, because similarity cannot exist without universality.³⁰ He rejects also the view of the universal as a particular arrangement of parts, because configurations of parts are destructible, but the class-character is indestructible.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka criticizes the Buddhist view. The Buddhists argue that if the universal is different from the individual, it must be perceived as different from it. But, as a matter of fact, the universal is never perceived as different from the

²⁷ ŚD., pp. 386-7.

²⁸ ŚD., pp. 392 and 398.

²⁹ Keith, *Karma-Mimamsa*, p. 58.

³⁰ ŚD., p. 409.

individual. And if the universal is non-different from the individual, then the individual alone is real, and there is no universal apart from the individual. The Buddhists set forth their argument in the following way: "What is real must be either different or non-different; the universal is neither different nor non-different from the individual; therefore the universal must be unreal."³¹ But there can be no inference, the Bhāṭṭa argues, if there is not an apprehension of universal concomitance between the major term and the middle term; so, in the above argument the universal concomitance between the major term and the middle term has already been apprehended; otherwise there would be no such inference. The major term here is 'the genus of reality' (*vastutva*) and the middle term is 'difference and non-difference' (*bhedābheda*). And the apprehension of uniform connection between 'the genus of reality' (*vastutva*) and 'difference and non-difference' (*bhedābheda*) establishes the existence of community (*jāti*), for *vastutva* is of the nature of *jāti*. Otherwise, the Buddhist cannot argue that the reality (*vastutva*) of the universal is not possible because of the non-apprehension of its difference and non-difference from the individual. When he argues that there is a universal concomitance between '*vastutva*' (major term) and 'difference and non-difference' (middle term), he admits the reality of *vastutva*, and consequently of community (*sāmānya*), because *vastutva* is of the nature of a universal. Thus the very act of inference by which the Buddhists prove the unreality of the universal presupposes its existence.³² But the Buddhist may urge, the term *vastu* (reality) has not for its object *vastutva* (the genus of *vastu* or reality), but it is due to a phenomenal condition (*aupādhika*); that the Bhāṭṭa cannot say that the term *vastu* (reality) has *vastutva* (the genus of reality) for its object, which is of the nature of a universal. The Bhāṭṭa replies that the above argument of the Buddhists is not admissible: that if there is no *vastutva*, call it a *jāti* or *upādhi*, it must presuppose the existence of the universal; for the inference depends upon the existence of *vastutva*, and this is called *jāti* by the realist. Otherwise, even the non-existence of *vastutva* (reality) in a *sāmānya* (universality) cannot be proved. The negation of *sāmānya* cannot be proved without assuming the *sāmānya* (community) itself. If words are only due to accidental conditions

³¹ ŚD., pp. 387-8.

³² Ibid., p. 388, and also ŚDP.

(*aupādhika*), they cannot have the power of denoting objects. According to the Buddhists, everything in the world is individual in nature; therefore, the individuals which are absolutely different from one another cannot constitute the denotation of words. The Buddhists hold that there is one condition or mark (*upāphi*) which is one and the same in different individuals, viz. apprehensibility. But that which remains identical in the midst of different individuals is nothing but the universal. Hence the reality of the universal is established by perception and inference both.³³

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka criticizes the Jaina doctrine. The Jaina holds that there is no need of assuming a separate existence of the universal; it consists in the similarity of individuals. Pārthasārathimīśra urges that the universality cannot consist in similarity (*na ca sādṛśyameva sāmānyam*).³⁴ Because, in the first place, if universality consisted merely in the similarity of individuals, then we would perceive an individual cow in the form 'this is *like* a cow', and not in the form 'this *is* a cow'. But, as a matter of fact, we never perceive a cow as 'this is *like* a cow'. Hence universality cannot be identified with similarity, as the Jaina supposes. And, in the second place, even similarity among different individuals is not possible, if there is no real universal among them, for similarity means common qualities. Similarity is not possible apart from universality. Those things are similar to one another, which possess properties in common. Thus similarity does not constitute universality (*sāmānya*), but follows from it. For instance, a cow is similar to a *gavaya* (wild ox); their parts are different from one another, so that the parts of the cow cannot exist in the parts of the *gavaya*; therefore, a certain property (*dharma*) must be supposed to exist in the different parts of the cow and the *gavaya*, so that their similarity may be perceived in spite of their difference; and that common property is called universality. Hence it cannot be held, with the Jaina, that mere similarity among things constitutes their universality or community (*sāmānya*).³⁵

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine. Is the universal different or non-different from the individual? According to the Buddhists, the universal is non-different from the individual which alone is real. The Buddhist doctrine

³³ ŚD., pp. 388-9, and also ŚDP.

³⁴ ŚD. and ŚDP., p. 409.

³⁵ ŚD. and ŚDP., p. 409.

has already been refuted. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, holds that the universal is different from the individual; but that it is not perceived apart from the individual, because it is inseparably related to it. What is the relation between the universal and the individual? It is inherence. What is inherence? It is a relation between two objects which are inseparably connected with each other, and which gives rise to such cognition as 'here it is'.³⁶

Pārthasārathimiśra offers the following criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine: (1) The universal is said to inhere in the individual; inherence is the relation between two entities inseparably connected with each other, which gives rise to such a cognition as 'here it is'. But when we perceive a cow, we have such a perception as 'this is a cow' (*iyam gauḥ*) and not as 'here is the class-essence of cow (*gotva*) in the individual cow' (*iha gavi gotvam*). This clearly shows that the universal is identical with the individual—it is not entirely different from the individual. (2) Then, again, what is meant by inseparable connection (*ayuta-siddhī*)? It is the negation or absence of separable connection (*yutasiddhī*). What, again, is separable connection (*yuttasiddhī*)? Does it mean the capacity for separate or independent movements (*prthaggatimatva*)? Or, does it mean subsistence in different substrates (*prthagāśrayāśrayitva*)? In either case, argues Pārthasārathimiśra, there would be no relation between the composite whole (*avayavi*) and its component parts (*avayava*), because there can be a movement in the parts without a movement in the whole, and because the whole and its parts inhere in different substrates—the whole inheres in its parts and the parts inhere in their component atoms. Likewise, the universal and the individual too have different substrates, because the substrate of the universal is the individual, and the substrates of the individual are the parts of the individual. Hence Pārthasārathimiśra concludes that inherence is such a relation between the container and the contained that the latter produces a corresponding cognition in the former.³⁷ The universal inheres in the individual. This means that the universal (e.g. class-essence of cow, or *gotva*) produces an apprehension of it in the individual (e.g. an individual cow or

³⁶ *Ayutasiddhānāmihapṛtyayahetuḥ sambandhaḥ*. ŚD., p. 390.

³⁷ *Yena sambandhenādheyamādhāre svānurūpān buddhirñ janayati sa sambandhaḥ samvāya iti*. ŚD., pp. 391-2.

gavyakti). But if the universal produces an apprehension of it in the individual, for instance, if an individual cow is perceived as belonging to the class 'cow', then we cannot admit a difference between the individual and the universal. We must admit a non-difference or identity between the two on the basis of perception. (3) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may urge that the universal is 'inclusive' (*anuvṛtta*), while the individual is 'exclusive' (*vyāvṛtta*). The universal is common to many individuals, but the individuals are different from one another. For instance, the class-essence of cow (*gotva*) is one and the same in all the individual cows; but the individual cows are different from one another. How, then, can the universal be identical with the individual? If the two are identical with each other, they must be of the same nature; either the universal must be 'exclusive' like the individual or the individual must be 'inclusive' like the universal. In other words, if the universal is identical with the individual, either the universal will differ in different individuals, or the individual will be common to many individuals. Pārthasārathimīśra retorts: If the universal is absolutely different from the individual, how can the individual be perceived as universal? How can an individual cow be perceived as belonging to the class 'cow' when we perceive a cow as '*this is a cow*'? This can never be explained by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, according to whom, the universal is absolutely different from the individual, though the former inheres in the latter. But the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka has no difficulty in explaining it. If the different characters of the universal and the individual, viz. 'inclusiveness' and 'exclusiveness' prove the difference between the two, the 'likeness' (*tādrūpya*) between the universal and the individual as shown by the perception of an individual as belonging to a particular class proves their identity. Thus the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka concludes that there is a relation of identity-in-difference between the universal and the individual; the universal is both different from, and identical with, the individual. (4) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may urge: How can identity and difference both subsist in one and the same object? Is it not self-contradictory to assert that the universal is both different from the individual, and identical with it? The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka argues that there is no contradiction here, for both difference and identity are perceived together by a single act of perception; that if difference and identity were perceived by two cognitions, one contradicting

the other, like the two cognitions 'this is silver' and 'this is not silver', then there would be a contradiction. But neither the perception of difference contradicts the perception of identity, nor does the perception of identity contradict the perception of difference. Hence both of them are valid. In the perception 'this is a cow', there are two cognitions, viz. the cognition of '*this*' (*iyam buddhi*) and the cognition of 'cow' (*gobuddhi*); these two cognitions have two different objects; the former has an 'individual' (an individual cow or *govyakhi*) for its object, while the latter has a universal (the class-essence of cow or *gotva*) for its object. Thus the twofold perception of an object such as 'this is a cow' proves the dual character of the object, viz. both its individuality and universality. Hence the universal cannot be different from the individual.²²

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka criticizes Prabhākara's objections. Prabhākara has argued that one and the same act of cognition cannot apprehend both the difference and the identity between the universal and the individual. His argument has already been given in detail. Pārthasārathimīśra contends that this argument is baseless. The cognition of two objects does not necessarily involve the cognition of their difference. For sometimes two objects are perceived, but not the difference between the two; for instance, when two trees are perceived from a distance, the difference between the two is not perceived. When an individual member of a class is perceived for the first time, both the individual and the universal are perceived, but not the difference between the two. When another individual belonging to the same class is perceived, it is assimilated to the first individual as belonging to the same class, and differentiated from it as being a different individual; and it is then alone that the difference between the individual and the universal is perceived. Hence it is unreasonable to hold that the cognition of two objects necessarily involves the cognition of their difference. Similarly, it is unreasonable to hold that the cognition of a single object necessarily involves the cognition of its identity. For instance, when a person is perceived from a distance, we have a doubtful cognition such as 'Is he Devadatta or Yajñadatta?' Thus a single object gives rise to two cognitions. Hence it cannot be held that the cognition of two objects necessarily involves the cognition of their

²² *śD.*, pp. 390-4.

difference, or the cognition of a single object necessarily involves the cognition of its identity. But the cognition in the form 'this is another' apprehends difference; and the cognition in the form 'this is no other' apprehends identity. A person who perceives both a white cow and a piebald cow has a cognition in such a form as 'this is a cow and this also is a cow', and so he perceives the identity between the two; and he has also a cognition in such a form as 'the white cow is different from the piebald cow' and thus apprehends their difference. Hence we conclude that the universal is both different from the individual, and identical with it.³⁹

Prabhākara may urge that the universal is eternal, while the individual is non-eternal—the universal is common to many individuals, while the individuals are different from one another. How, then, can the universal be identical with the individual? If they were identical with each other, in spite of their opposite characters, the universal would be non-eternal and different in different individuals, and the individual would be eternal and common to many individuals, and thus there would be an utter confusion in the whole world. Pārthasārathimīśra replies that there is no contradiction here. A multiform object may be eternal in some, and non-eternal in other, respects; it may be identical with other objects in some respects, and different from them in others. The universal considered as an individual is non-eternal; and the individual considered as a universal is eternal. So there is no contradiction here.⁴⁰ Thus, according to the Bhāṭṭa, the universal is not identical with the individual, as the Buddhists hold, nor is it different from the individual, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds, but it is different from the individual in some respects, and identical with it in others. The relation between the two is identity-in-difference. The Bhāṭṭa realism closely resembles the realism of Aristotle and Hegel, according to whom, the universal cannot exist apart from the individuals, and the individuals cannot exist apart from the universal; the universal is the inner essence of the individuals, and the individuals are the outer expressions of the universal; the universal and the individual are abstractions apart from each other; the universal is neither wholly identical with the individuals, nor wholly

³⁹ ŚD., pp. 395-8.

⁴⁰ ŚD., p. 399.

different from them; in fact, they together constitute the concrete reality.

Pārthasārathimīśra sets forth two reasons for the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of identity-in-difference between the universal and the individual. In the first place, in the cognition 'this is a cow' the co-inherence (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of the two elements, viz. 'this' (an individual cow) and 'cow' (the class-essence of cow) in the same object proves the identity between the individual and the universal. And the fact that the two cognitions of 'this' and 'cow' are not synonymous with each other proves the difference between the individual and the universal. Hence there is no contradiction in holding that the universal is both different from, and identical with, the individual. In the second place, the universal is different from the individual in some respects, and identical with it in others. If the universal were both different and non-different from the individual in respect of the *same* qualities, there would be a contradiction. But just as one and the same object can be both long and short in comparison with different objects, so one and the same universal can be both different and non-different from the individual in different respects. For instance, when we have such a perception as 'this piebald cow is a cow', we perceive the individual cow as identical with the universal 'cow'. But when we have such a perception as 'that white cow is not a piebald cow', the universal 'cow' is perceived as different from the individual cow. The universal 'cow' (*gotva*) differs from a white cow in respect of a black cow, but not in its essential nature. An individual cow differs from the universal 'cow' (*gotva*) in respect of certain qualities, actions, and other universals, but not in its essential nature. And one individual cow differs from another individual cow in its specific nature, but not in its generic nature. Hence there is no contradiction in holding that the universal is both different from, and identical with, the individual.⁴¹

8. *The Modified Realism of Saṃkara*

According to Saṃkara, *Brahman* alone is ultimately real, which is one, universal, eternal, and ubiquitous Being. He admits no other real universal than Being which is *Brahman*. But he admits the existence of other universals in the phenomenal world.

⁴¹ *ŚD.*, pp. 393-5.

There are the universals of cows and other substances, qualities, and actions; these universals are not born. Only individual substances, individual qualities, and individual actions are generated; but their universal essences are not born.⁴³ They are the archetypal forms, as it were, of the individual substances, qualities, and actions. But these archetypal forms or universals are not eternal in the sense in which *Brahman* is eternal. *Brahman* is beyond time, space, and causation; it is beyond all change and becoming. But the universals of individual substances, qualities, and actions have an empirical existence in the phenomenal world. They are the evolutes of nescience and as such phenomenal appearances from the standpoint of *Brahman*. Their reality is inferior to that of *Brahman* but superior to that of individual objects. They are, like the Ideas of Plato, the types which are progressively realized in individual objects of the sensible world. The individuals are born and perish, but the universals are unborn. They are the models according to which God moulds the sensible world.

The later Śaṅkarites, however, do not recognize the existence of the universal, because it can neither be perceived nor inferred.⁴³ The perception of one and the same form (e.g. 'cow') in different individuals (e.g. cows) cannot be regarded as a proof of the existence of the universal ('cow').⁴⁴ If it is regarded so, does it mean that we have the apprehension of 'cow' in one individual cow as much as in another individual cow? Or does it mean that we have the apprehension of one and the same nature of cow in all individual cows? Or does it mean that we apprehend that the different individuals possess one and the same property? The first alternative is not tenable. Just as we apprehend the same form of the moon in different pots of water in which it is reflected though there is no universal moon, so we may apprehend the same form of cow in different cows though there is no universal cow (*gotva*) in them. The second alternative also is not tenable. It is not possible for us to determine the nature that is common to all individuals of the same kind. Even if we were able to

⁴³ Na hi gavādivyaktinām utpattimattve tadākṛtīnām apyutpattimattvaṁ syāt, dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṁ hi vyaktaya evotpadyante nākṛtayaḥ. SBS., i, 3, 28.

⁴⁴ Pratyakṣādanumānād vā na jātiḥ siddhum arhati. Tattvapradīpikā, p. 303.

⁴⁵ Na tāvat gaugaurityabhinnākāragrāhi pratyakṣaṁ jātāu pramāṇam. Ibid., p. 303.

ascertain the common quality, it would be useless to postulate a *jāti* or class-essence which is different from the common quality. The third alternative also is untenable. When we perceive a man with a stick we perceive the man as possessing a stick. But when we perceive an individual cow, in which the class-essence is supposed to exist, we never perceive the cow as possessing the class-essence (*gotva*). It may be urged that we perceive at least the same configuration or arrangement of parts (e.g. dewlap, etc.) in different cows. But this resemblance in configuration of parts is not the universal or class-essence of the realist. Hence the universal can never be perceived. Nor can it be inferred. Citsukha sets forth the same arguments as the Buddhists have advanced against the existence of the universal (*jāti*).⁴⁵

⁴⁵ *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 303.

CHAPTER XI

PERCEPTION OF COGNITION

1. *Introduction*

According to Kumāṛila, an act of cognition cannot be directly perceived ; it is inferred from cognizedness (*jñātatā*) or manifestness (*prākāṣya*) produced by the cognition in the object. According to some Mīmāṃsakas, the act of cognition is inferred from the consciousness of its object ; it is not an object of perception. According to Prabhākara, a cognition is directly perceived by itself ; every cognition perceives itself, the cognizing self and cognized object. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a cognition is an object of perception ; but it is not perceived by itself but by another cognition through the internal organ or mind ; we perceive a cognition by internal perception through the mind, just as we perceive an external object by external perception through the external senses. According to the Jaina, a cognition is perceived by itself in apprehending its object ; it is not perceived by any other cognition. According to the Buddhist idealist, a cognition is self-luminous ; it apprehends itself but not an external object as there is no such object ; a cognition is not apprehended by the self because there is no self at all. According to the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala, a cognition is not perceived by another cognition but by the self because a cognition is unconscious. According to Saṃkara, a cognition is not perceived by another cognition but by itself ; it is self-luminous.

2. *The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka*

Pārthasārathimīśra gives an exposition of Kumāṛila's doctrine of inferability of cognition. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, a cognition cannot be perceived, but it is inferred from the result of cognition, viz. cognizedness (*jñātatā*) or manifestness (*prākāṣya*) in the object. For instance, when we know a jar we have an apprehension that the jar is cognized by us ; and from this cognizedness of the object we infer the existence of the cognition ; a cognition is inferred from the cognizedness of its object.¹ Pārthasārathi gives

¹ *Jñātātānumeyam jñānam.*

three arguments for the existence of cognition. In the first place, an action involves four factors, viz. an agent of action (*kartṛ*), an object of action (*karma*), an instrument of action (*karana*), and a result of action (*phala*) which inheres in the object. An act of knowledge, therefore, has an agent or subject of knowledge or knower (*jñātṛ*), an object of knowledge (*jñeya*), an instrumental cognition (*karana-jñāna*), and a result of knowledge, viz. cognizedness (*jñātatā*) in the object. Just as the act of cooking produces cookedness in the object cooked, so the act of cognition (*jñānakriyā*) produces cognizedness (*jñātatā*) in its object, and from this cognizedness as an effect we infer the existence of its cause, viz. cognition. Thus a cognition cannot be perceived either by itself or by any other cognition, but is inferred from the cognizedness in its object.² In the second place, a cognition is inferred from the relation between the knowing subject (*ātman*) and the known object (*artha*), which is apprehended by internal perception. If there is not an adventitious condition intervening between the self and the object, how is it possible for the self to be related to the object? Therefore, from the specific relation between the subject and the object involved in knowledge we infer the existence of cognition. Here, cognition or consciousness is hypostatized as a third term between the self and the not-self, which relates the two to each other.³ Even those who hold that all cognitions are self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) must admit that this relation between the self and the not-self, which is involved in knowledge, is an object of internal perception. Otherwise, it cannot be said "the jar is cognized by me". This self-appropriated cognition is not possible unless we know the relation between the cognizing self and the cognized object and the relation between the cognition and its object. No other object can be spoken of than what is manifested to consciousness. If it is urged that a cognition is self-luminous, and its object is manifested by the cognition, by what is the relation between the cognition and its object manifested? It may be urged that this relation too is manifested by the same cognition. But Pārthasārathi points out that when the cognition is produced, the relation between the cognition and its object does not yet come into existence. The relation of a cognition to its

² ŚD., pp. 201-2.

³ Jñānakriyādvārako yaḥ kartṛbhūtasātmanah karmabhūtasya cārthasya parasparam sambandho vyāptirvyāpyatvalakṣaṇaḥ sa mīnasapratyākṣāvagato vijñānaḥ kalpayati. ŚD., p. 202.

object consists in its manifesting the object; it is no other than this. So when a cognition is produced and its object is manifested, the relation that is produced between the two cannot be the object of that cognition as it has ceased to operate. It cannot be argued that at first the cognition manifests its object, and then it manifests its relation to the object, since the cognition is momentary. Nor can it be argued that the relation between the cognition and its object is self-luminous, because there is no proof of its self-luminosity. Hence, Pārthasārathi concludes that the relation between the self and the object, which is an object of internal perception, proves the existence of a cognition, and this relation cannot be denied by any one.⁴ In the third place, the existence of a cognition is inferred from the peculiarity (*atiśaya*) produced by the cognition in its object.⁵ This peculiarity must be admitted even by those who hold that the cognizer, the cognized object, and the cognition are manifested by consciousness. From this peculiarity (*atiśaya*) produced in the object by a cognition we infer the existence of the cognition itself. Hence a cognition can be perceived neither by itself nor by any other cognition.

Keśavamīśra gives an exposition of the Bhāṭṭa doctrine and criticizes it. He states the Bhāṭṭa argument in a slightly different form. When I know a jar the cognition of the jar produces in it a peculiar property, viz. cognizedness (*jñātatā*). After the cognition of the jar is produced, the cognizedness of the jar is recognized in such a form as 'the jar is cognized by me'. The peculiar property of cognizedness is produced in the jar when the cognition of the jar is already produced, and cognizedness is not produced in the jar when the cognition of the jar is not produced. So the existence of cognizedness is proved by the method of double agreement. Cognizedness is not possible without cognition; the effect cannot be produced without the cause. Thus cognizedness proves the existence of cognition as its cause by means of presumption (*arthāpatti*).⁶

Śrīdhara criticizes Kumārila's view. (1) Kumārila commits the fallacy of *hysteron proteron* when he argues that a cognition is inferred from cognizedness in its object. An object is cognized

⁴ Mānasapratyakṣagamyor'thena sahātmanah sambandho jñānaḥ kalpayati. ŚD., p. 204.

⁵ Arthagato jñānajanyo'tiśayaḥ kalpayati jñānam. ŚD., p. 205.

⁶ TBh., p. 17.

when it is related to a cognition. Its cognizedness (*jñātatā*) consists in its relationship with the cognition (*jñānasambandha*). We cannot apprehend cognizedness unless we apprehend the cognition itself. The apprehension of a relation presupposes the apprehension of the terms of the relation. In order to apprehend cognizedness, which consists in the relation of an object to a cognition, we must already apprehend the object and the cognition which are related to each other. Cognizedness presupposes cognition, and apprehension of cognizedness presupposes the apprehension of cognition. So cognition can never be inferred from cognizedness.⁷

The Bhāṭṭa may argue that we must admit a peculiar property called cognizedness (*jñātatā*) in an object in order to account for the regularity in the relations of cognitions to their objects. A particular cognition apprehends a particular object and not any other. The cognition of a jar apprehends the jar, and not a cloth. What is the reason of this? The Bhāṭṭa answers that the cognition of a jar produces cognizedness in the jar, and not in a cloth. So it apprehends a jar, and not a cloth. It is cognizedness (*jñātatā*) that relates particular cognitions to particular objects. An object is apprehended by that cognition which produces cognizedness in it. So we must admit cognizedness in an object of cognition, which relates the cognition to the object. (2) Udayana contends that even cognizedness is not possible without some regularity in the natural relation between cognitions and their objects.⁸ The Bhāṭṭa argues that a particular cognition apprehends a particular object because it produces cognizedness in it, and not in any other object. Udayana asks: Why should a particular cognition produce cognizedness in a particular object and not in any other? It may be argued that a particular cognition produces cognizedness in that object which is apprehended by it. Udayana says that the argument involves circular reasoning. A cognition apprehends a particular object because it produces cognizedness in it, and a cognition produces cognizedness in a particular object because it apprehends it. Thus the objectivity (*viśayatā*) of an object depends upon its cognizedness (*jñātatā*), and its cognizedness depends upon its objectivity. Udayana argues that it is needless to assume the existence of cognizedness. The so-called cognizedness of an object is nothing but its objectivity or the

⁷ NK., p. 96.

⁸ Svabhāvanīyamābhāvādūpakaro'hi durghaṭaḥ. NKS., p. 63.

character of being an object of cognition. There is a natural relation between a cognition and its object so that the former apprehends the latter.⁹ Vācaspatimiśra also offers a similar criticism. The Bhāṭṭa holds that an object is apprehended by that cognition which produces cognizedness in it. Vācaspatimiśra contends that there is no need of cognizedness in the object. The so-called cognizedness is held to be related to the object neither by conjunction nor by inherence but by natural relation. And if cognizedness is related to the object by natural relation, the cognition also may be related to it by natural relation, and there is no need of assuming the intervening factor of cognizedness between the cognition and its object.¹⁰ Sivāditya also holds that cognizedness is nothing but the relation between a cognition and its object,¹¹ and that there is no proof of its existence apart from this relation. Keśavamiśra also argues that cognizedness is nothing but the character of being the object of cognition. When we apprehend a jar we do not apprehend its cognizedness; but we simply apprehend that the jar is the object of cognition. There is no cognizedness apart from its objectivity.

The Bhāṭṭa may urge that the jar is said to be the object of cognition because it is the substratum of cognizedness produced by the cognition. The objectivity of the jar cannot be of the nature of identity. The jar cannot be said to be an object of cognition because there is an identity between the jar and its cognition. There can be no identity between an object and its cognition because the former is the object (*viśaya*) and the latter is the subject (*viśayin*). If by the objectivity of a thing we mean that a cognition is produced by it, then objectivity will belong to the sense-organs and other conditions which produce a cognition. This leads us to conclude that something is produced in the jar by the cognition, by virtue of which the jar alone, and nothing else, becomes the object of consciousness, and this is called cognizedness. Thus cognizedness is not only perceived through the sense-organs but is also inferred from the possibility of the objectivity (*viśayatā*) of an object. Keśavamiśra disputes this view. He argues that subjectivity and objectivity follow from the very nature of things. There is such a natural peculiarity in

⁹ Svabhāva-viśeṣa eva viśayatānīyāmakaḥ, anyathā jñātādbhāne'pi niyamānupapattiḥ iti svabhāva eva niyāmakaḥ. NKSH., p. 64.

¹⁰ KU., pp. 143-4.

¹¹ Jñātata jñānaviśayasambandha eva. SP., p. 30.

a cognition and its object that the former is the subject (*viṣayin*)¹² and the latter is the object (*viśaya*) in relation to the other.¹³ An object does not require cognizedness in it to be apprehended by a cognition. (3) Otherwise, argues Keśavamīśra, past and future objects could never be the objects of cognition, since it is not possible for any cognition to produce cognizedness in them. It is not possible for a property to be produced in an object at a time when the object does not exist; a property cannot exist without a substratum. Cognizedness is a property of the object; hence it can never be produced, in past and future objects, though they can be apprehended.¹⁴ Udayana also urges that a cognition can produce cognizedness in present objects but not in past and future ones, though they are apprehended. We have recollection of the past and expectation of the future at present. But the present recollection or expectation can never produce cognizedness in past or future objects, since they do not exist at present. This clearly shows that an object is apprehended by a cognition though it does not produce cognizedness in it. So we must admit that there is a natural relation of subject (*viṣayin*) and object (*viśaya*) between a cognition and its object.¹⁵ The Bhāṭṭa argues that the act of cognition produces in its object a peculiar condition known as cognizedness, just as the act of cooking produces in rice the condition of cookedness. "And this cognizedness being a property of the object is known along with the object itself."¹⁶ (4) But Śrīdhara urges that this is a false analogy. In the case of rice we distinctly perceive cookedness in the rice in its being changed from *tanḍula* (uncooked rice) to *odana* (cooked rice); but in the case of the object in question we do not perceive any such cognizedness. As for the direct perceptibility (*aparokṣarūpatā*) of an object and its capability of being accepted or rejected, these also consist in its relationship to cognition; they are not properties of some other property of the object, viz. cognizedness. (5) Śrīdhara further argues that just as when an object is known, there is produced in it a peculiar property called cognizedness, so

¹² In Western philosophy the self is described as the subject of knowledge. But in Indian philosophy sometimes a cognition is called the subject (*viṣayin*) in relation to its object (*viśaya*).

¹³ Svabhāvādeva viśayaviśayitopapattēh. Arthajñānāyoretādrśa eva svabhāviko viśayah yenānāyorviśayaviśayibhāvah. TBh., p. 17.

¹⁴ TBh., p. 17.

¹⁵ Svabhāva eva tatra niyāmakah. NKSH., p. 64.

¹⁶ Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, E.T. of NK., p. 21.

when this cognizedness is known, another cognizedness must be produced in that cognizedness, and so on *ad infinitum*.¹⁷ If cognizedness be regarded as self-luminous, in order to avoid this infinite regress, then we may as well admit that the cognition itself is self-luminous. It may be argued that an object has an existence extending over the past, the present, and the future; but when it is cognized it is cognized as belonging to the present. And cognizedness is nothing but the condition of the object determined by the present time; and this being an effect of the cognition is the mark for the inference of the cognition. (6) But Śrīdhara contends that by 'the condition of the object determined by the present time' (*vartamānāvacchinatā*) we mean its condition qualified by that time (*vartamānakālaviśiṣṭatā*); and this belongs to the object by its very nature; and this condition is not produced, but only known by cognition.¹⁸ The Bhāṭṭa may argue, cognition is of the nature of an action, and an action always produces a result in its object; so the act of cognition must produce a result in its object in the shape of cognizedness. (7) Udayana contends that all actions do not produce results in their objects. For instance, an arrow penetrates the ether, but its motion cannot produce a result in it. So here the reason is over-wide. Moreover, an action is always of the nature of motion (*spanda*), but cognition is not of the nature of motion. So here the reason is non-existent. If an action means the operation of an instrument, then the sense-organs, marks of inference, words, etc., do not produce a peculiar result in an object but in the self.¹⁹ Varadarāja also argues, cognition is not of the nature of an action; it is of the nature of a quality produced by the operation of the sense-organs and the like, which inheres in an all-pervading substance, the self, like pleasure.²⁰ Thus it cannot be argued that cognizedness in an object is inferred from its cognition because it is of the nature of an action. The Bhāṭṭa may argue that determinate cognition (*viśiṣṭabuddhi*) is determinate because it apprehends the relation between the qualified object (*viśeṣya*) and its qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*). So the determinate perception of a jar as cognized (*jñāto ghaṭaḥ*) apprehends the relation

¹⁷ See also TBh., p. 17.

¹⁸ Gaṅgānātha Jhā, E.T. of NK., pp. 213-14. NK., pp. 96-7.

¹⁹ NKS., iv, p. 11.

²⁰ TR., p. 52.

between the jar (*viśeṣya*) and the cognition of it (*viśeṣaṇa*); and the relation is cognizedness. Thus determinate perception proves the existence of cognizedness which constitutes the relation between a cognition and its object. (8) Udayana contends that determinate perception apprehends the natural relation between a cognition and its object, which may be called objectivity (*viśayatā*); it apprehends an object as apprehended by a cognition. It is needless to assume the existence of cognizedness to account for determinate perception. If determinate perception of a cognized object requires cognizedness in the object, then determinate perception of a finished (*kṛta*) jar or a desired (*iṣṭa*) jar will require finishedness or desiredness in the jar. If such a peculiar property is thought to be needless the peculiar property of cognizedness also is equally needless. Determinate perception of an object as cognized apprehends the natural relation between itself and its object, which is called *viśayatā* or objectivity. There is a *svarūpasambandha* between a cognition and its object by virtue of which the former is the subject (*viśayin*) and the latter is the object (*viśaya*). There is no *tertium quid* in the form of cognizedness between a cognition and its object. The natural relation between a cognition and its object by virtue of which the former apprehends the latter is called *viśayatā*. It is needless to assume cognizedness (*jñātatā*) apart from objectivity (*viśayatā*).²¹ The so-called cognizedness (*jñātatā*) is nothing but objectivity (*viśayatā*) which constitutes the *svarūpasambandha* between a cognition and its object.²²

The Jaina criticizes Kumārila's doctrine. Kumārila argues, if cognition is regarded as perceptible it will be regarded as an object (*karma*); and as an object of cognition it will require another instrumental cognition (*karaṇajñāna*) because every action on an object requires an instrument; and if that instrumental cognition is regarded as an object of perception, it will require another instrumental cognition, and so on *ad infinitum*. If this instrumental cognition through which a cognition is cognized is imperceptible, then the first cognition of an object also may be regarded as imperceptible, but yet capable of manifesting its object. One and the same act of cognition cannot be the object (*karma*) of cognition and the instrument (*karaṇa*) of cognition.

²¹ NKS., iv.

²² Tarkaprakāśa on NSM., p. 30.

Hence a cognition cannot be regarded as an object of perception ; it is imperceptible.²³

Prabhācandra, a Jaina philosopher, criticizes Kumārila's argument thus: (1) The cognizer (*pramāṭr*) and the cognition or cognitive act (*pramāṇa*), and the resultant cognition (*pramiti*) are as perceptible as the object of cognition (*prameya*), for we distinctly perceive these factors of knowledge in our experience. In the cognition 'I know the jar through myself', the cognizer 'I', the instrument 'myself', and the result 'knowing' are as much objects of perception as the cognized object, *viz.* 'the jar'. There is no hard and fast rule that whatever is perceived must be perceived as an *object* (*karma*) of perception. For, in that case, there would be no perception of the self which is never perceived as a cognized object (*karma*), but always as a cognizer (*kartr*). And if the self can be perceived as a cognizer, and not as an object of cognition, the cognition also may be perceived not as an object of perception, but as an instrument of perception. (2) It may be argued that the cognition through which an object is manifested to consciousness is simply an instrument (*karāṇa*) of the manifestation of the object, but it is not perceptible. Then it may as well be argued that the self which is manifested as the cognizer is simply the agent (*kartr*) of cognition, but it is not perceptible. But the Bhāṭṭa recognizes the perceptibility of the self. So he should as well admit the perceptibility of cognition. The self is perceived as a cognizer or the agent (*kartr*) of the act of cognition. And the cognition is perceived as the instrument (*karāṇa*) of cognizing an object. Moreover, if the self is perceptible it can cognize an external object by itself. What, then, is the use of postulating an imperceptible cognition between the cognizing self and the cognized object? It may be urged, an agent can never produce an action without an instrument, and so the self as the agent of the act of cognition requires the instrumentality of a cognition to apprehend an object. In that case, the instruments of internal and external organs would be quite adequate to bring about the consciousness of an object. So there is no use of assuming an imperceptible cognition to serve the purpose of an instrument here. (3) If no action is possible without an instrument, what is the instrument in the cognition of the self by itself? If the self itself is the instrument of self-cognition, then let it be the instrument of

²³ PKM., p. 31.

object-cognition too. There is no use of assuming an imperceptible cognition. Hence the cognition through which an object is known must be regarded as perceptible. (4) If the Bhāṭṭa admits that both the self and the resultant cognition (*phalajñāna*) of the object can be perceived, though they do not appear in consciousness as the object (*karma*) of cognition, but as the agent and the result of cognition respectively, he must also admit that the instrumental cognition or cognitive act (*karaṇajñāna*) too can be perceived, not as an object of cognition but as an instrument of cognition. (5) Again, according to the Bhāṭṭa, the instrumental cognition (*karaṇajñāna*) is not entirely different from the cognizer (*kartṛ*) and the resultant cognition (*phalajñāna*); so if the latter are perceptible the former also must be regarded as perceptible. If the instrumental cognition differs from the cognizer and the resultant cognition not as a form of cognition, but only as an instrument, then the instrumental cognition cannot be said to be imperceptible; for as cognition it does not differ from the cognizer and the resultant cognition; and so if the latter are regarded as perceptible the former also must be regarded so. (6) Moreover, the self and the cognition (*karaṇajñāna*) through which it knows an object are directly revealed in our experience. So they cannot but be regarded as objects of consciousness; for whatever is revealed in our experience is cognized, and whatever is cognized is an object of consciousness.²⁴ It is self-contradictory to suppose that the self and its cognition are not objects of perception though they are directly revealed in our experience. If the cognitive act cannot be perceived as an object (*karma*) of consciousness though it is directly revealed in our experience, it cannot be an object of consciousness through another instrumental cognition. Hence the cognitive act must be regarded as an object of perception. (7) In the cognition 'I know the jar' I am directly conscious of myself as qualified by the cognition of the jar. So my cognition of the jar is as much an object of perception as my self and the jar. Just as we cannot deny the perception of the object, so we cannot deny the perception of its cognition. If there is no perception of the cognition of the jar there can be no perception of the jar itself. An unperceived cognition can never manifest an object. (8) Then, what is the nature of cognizedness from which the cognitive act is said to be

²⁴ *Pratīyamānatvaṃ hi grāhyatvaṃ tadeva karmatvam. PKM., p. 31.*

inferred? Is it a property of the object (*arthadharmā*)? Or is it a property of the cognition (*jñānadharma*)? It cannot be a property of the object, for, in that case, it would persist in the object like its other properties (e.g. blueness) even when it is not cognized by a particular person. But, as a matter of fact, cognizedness does not persist in the object at any other time than when it is cognized. And when the object is cognized by a person, its cognizedness appears at that time as the private property of the particular person (*svāsādhāraṇaviśaya*). It is never found to exist in the object as the public property of many cognizers (*anekapramāṭṛsādhāraṇaviśaya*). Hence cognizedness cannot be a property of the object. Nor can cognizedness be a property of the cognition, since the cognitive act of which it is supposed to be a property is imperceptible according to the Bhāṭṭa, and what is imperceptible can never be the substrate of cognizedness.²⁵

(9) Is cognizedness, then, of the nature of consciousness (*jñāna-svabhāva*), or of the nature of an object (*arthasvabhāva*)? Is it subjective or objective? If the former, then as consciousness it must be imperceptible like the act of cognition; and so it cannot serve as the mark (*liṅga*) of inferring the cognitive act. Moreover, it is foolish to argue that though the act of cognition (*karaṇajñāna*) is imperceptible, cognizedness is an object of perception in spite of its being of the nature of consciousness. If the act of cognition cannot be an object of perception because it is of the nature of consciousness, cognizedness too cannot be an object of perception for the same reason. If, then, cognizedness is of the nature of an object (*arthasvabhāva*), it is nothing but the manifestness (*artha-prākāṣya*) of the object. But an object cannot be manifested if the cognition by which it is manifested is itself unmanifested. If the cognition itself is unperceived, it can never manifest its object.²⁶ Hence the Jaina concludes that a cognition must cognize itself in order to cognize an object; it manifests itself and its object (*svaparaprakāśaka*).

Veṅkaṭanātha, a follower of Rāmānuja, criticizes Kumārila's view. The Bhāṭṭa holds that cognition is inferred from cognizedness (*jñātatā*) or manifestation (*prākāṣya*) of an object. Veṅkaṭanātha urges, a cognition is nothing but the manifestation of an

²⁵ PKM., pp. 31-2.

²⁶ PKM., p. 32. See also SVM., pp. 88-90.

object²⁷; so the former cannot be inferred from the latter. It may be argued that the cognition or manifestation in the self is inferred from manifestation in the object. The former is the object of inference and the latter is the mark of inference. But, if in spite of the presence of cognition or manifestation in the self, manifestation in the object (*prākāṣya*) is thought to be necessary in order to make it an object of speech and action, then let all the conditions which are said to produce cognition be regarded as the immediate cause of manifestation in the object. What, then, is the use of cognition? It is neither necessary for the use of an object nor for its manifestation. Thus the Bhāṭṭa doctrine leads to the negation of cognition, which is absurd. So cognition is not inferred from manifestation of an object.²⁸

Śrīdhara considers another doctrine which is kindred to the Bhāṭṭa doctrine. Some hold that the act of cognition is inferred from the consciousness of objects.²⁹ We are conscious of objects; and this consciousness is not possible without an act of cognition. The cognitive act, therefore, is inferred from the consciousness of objects. Bhāskara refers to this doctrine in his commentary on the *Bhahmasūtra*. He says that this doctrine is held by some Mīmāṃsakas. According to them, the act of cognition (*jñāna-kriyā*) is the cause of the consciousness of objects (*viśayasamvedana*).³⁰ This doctrine slightly differs from the Bhāṭṭa theory. The Bhāṭṭa holds that the act of cognition is inferred from cognizedness (*jñātātā*) which is a peculiar property of the object produced by the cognition. But according to this theory, the act of cognition is inferred from the consciousness of an object (*viśayasamvedana*) which is a property of the self.

Śrīdhara criticizes this view. (1) He rightly points out that there is nothing to choose between the two doctrines. They are of a piece with each other. Where does the so-called consciousness of an object (*viśayasamvedana*) reside? It abides either in the object or in the self. It cannot inhere in the object because it is unconscious. Nor can it inhere in the self, for in that case there would be no difference between the cognitive act and the consciousness of an object both inhering in the self. Hence it

²⁷ Arthaprakāśo buddhiḥ. TMK., p. 394.

²⁸ TMK., p. 394.

²⁹ Viśayasamvedanānumeyas jñānam. NK., p. 97.

³⁰ Bhāskara's commentary on B.S., p. 6.

cannot be argued that the former is inferred from the latter. It may be urged that there is some difference between the two so that the former can be inferred from the latter. The act of cognition is the activity of the cognizing self (*jñātṛvyāpāra*) by which it apprehends an object. Cognitive activity is the cause, and consciousness of an object is the effect. The cause is inferred from the effect. (2) Śrīdhara contends that if such an activity of the cognizing self (*jñātṛvyāpāra*) exists it is either non-eternal or eternal. If it is non-eternal it must have a cause. The Mīmāṃsaka argues that the intercourse of an object with the sense-organ aided by the contact of *manas* with the self is the cause of cognitive activity (*jñānakriyā*) which, in its turn, is the cause of object-consciousness (*viśayasamvedana*). Śrīdhara urges that the sense-object-contact aided by the mind-soul-contact may as well be regarded as the cause of object-consciousness. It is needless to assume another intermediate cause in the shape of cognitive activity (*jñātṛvyāpāra*) to produce object-consciousness. If, on the other hand, the cognitive act is held to be eternal, then also it is a needless hypothesis. Consciousness of an object is not eternal. Sometimes it appears and sometimes it does not appear. So it is non-eternal. Its occasional appearance is due to certain accessory conditions, viz. the occasional contact of objects with the sense-organs and the like. And as these conditions can adequately account for the consciousness of objects it is needless to assume any eternal cognitive act as its cause. In fact, the apprehension of the object (*arthāvabodha*) and all subsequent activity (*vyavahāra*) bearing on the object can be accomplished by the consciousness of the object itself. Hence, the existence of cognitive activity which is said to be inferred from consciousness of an object is a gratuitous assumption. It may be argued that consciousness of an object cannot inhere in the self because consciousness does not constitute the essential nature of the self. Consciousness of an object is produced by the object, the sense-organs, *manas*, and the self. If the self is essentially unconscious it is on a par with the other conditions of consciousness, viz. the object, the sense-organs, and *manas*, which are unconscious. The self has no special efficacy in the production of consciousness. So there is no special reason why consciousness should inhere in the self, and not in the sense-organs, and the like. (3) Śrīdhara contends that everything cannot be proved. Reason has ultimate limits. It

cannot get over the Law of Nature (*svabhāvanīyama*). Though consciousness is produced by the self, *mañas*, the sense-organs, and the object, it is the Law of Nature that consciousness inheres in the self and not in others, even as a cloth produced by threads and the shuttle inheres in the threads and not in the shuttle. Threads are not the cloth, but still the cloth inheres in the threads. Likewise, the self is not of the nature of consciousness, but still consciousness inheres in the self. Thus it cannot be argued that consciousness cannot inhere in the self. Hence Śrīdhara concludes that cognition is not inferred from consciousness of an object.⁵¹

(4) Bhāskara also repeats substantially the same arguments against the above Mīmāṃsaka doctrine. It is needless to assume the cognitive act (*jñānakriyā*). There is nothing to prove its existence. What is the cause of the cognitive act? These Mīmāṃsakas hold that the sense-organs produce the cognitive act which, again, produces consciousness of objects (*viśayasamvedana*). Bhāskara urges that there is no use assuming the production of the cognitive act by the sense-organs. They may as well directly produce consciousness of objects. What is the use of the intermediate process of the act of cognition? When there is the action of objects on the sense-organs there is consciousness of the objects, and when there is no action of objects on the sense-organs there is no consciousness of the objects. So the method of double agreement proves that the sense-organs are the cause of consciousness of objects. If they require an intermediate process of cognitive act to produce consciousness of objects, then this cognitive act will require another cognitive act, and so on *ad infinitum*. To avoid this infinite regress we must admit that the sense-organs directly produce consciousness of objects. (5) The advocates of the doctrine hold that the act of cognition (*jñānakriyā*) is inferred from consciousness of objects (*viśayasamvedana*). Bhāskara asks: What is the mark of inference here? It cannot be consciousness, since the relation between consciousness and the act of cognition is not apprehended because the latter is imperceptible. If the act of cognition is perceived there is no need of assuming that it is inferred from consciousness of objects. Thus Bhāskara concludes that consciousness of objects is itself cognition; there is no act of cognition different from it; and that the subsequent action on objects in the form of their acceptance or rejection is the result

⁵¹ NK., p. 97.

of consciousness of objects. Hence the hypothesis of the act of cognition is entirely useless.³³

3. *Prabhākara*

Prabhākara holds that in every act of cognition three things are apprehended. Every object-cognition reveals the object, itself and the subject (*tripuṣṭipratyakṣa*). The object is apprehended when it is related to a cognition; the cognition reveals the object. And the cognition reveals itself; it is self-luminous. It not only reveals itself and its object but also the self which is its substrate. Cognition may be compared to light. Light reveals an object to which it is related. So cognition reveals an object to which it is related. Light does not require any other object to reveal it; it is self-luminous; it reveals itself. Likewise, cognition does not require any other cognition to apprehend it; it is self-luminous; it apprehends itself. Light not only reveals itself and its object but also the wick of a lamp which is its substrate. Similarly, cognition not only reveals itself and its object but also the self which is its substrate. Thus a cognition apprehends itself, its object, and its subject. Every act of cognition involves object-consciousness, subject-consciousness, and cognition-consciousness or self-conscious awareness.³³ But cognition does not cognize itself as an object of cognition but as cognition.

Śrīdhara criticizes Prabhākara's doctrine thus: Every cognition does not reveal the self and itself. For instance, in the visual perception 'this is a jar' the self and the cognition are not apprehended; there is simply the apprehension of the jar.³⁴ This is the primary cognition of an object. But sometimes this cognition is appropriated by the self and apprehended in the form 'I know the jar'. This is the secondary cognition of an object. It reveals the object, the subject, and itself. In the primary cognition of the jar only the jar is apprehended through the visual organ. But in the secondary cognition of the jar there is the mental perception of the jar as qualified by the cognition and the self.³⁵

³³ Bhāskara's Bhāṣya on B.S., pp. 6-7.

³⁴ NK., p. 91. See Chapter XII.

³⁵ Ghaṭo'yamityetasmīn pratiyamāṇe jñātrjñānāyorapratibhāsanāt. N.K., p. 91.

³⁶ Ghaṭamaharṇ jñānamīti jñāne jñātrjñānaviśiṣṭasyārthasya mānasapratyakṣatā, NK., p. 92.

In the visual perception of the jar, the self and the cognition are not apprehended. If they were apprehended along with the jar they would become objects of visual perception, which is not possible. They are perceived by the mind as qualifying the object of perception when it is appropriated by the self. A cognition is not necessarily self-cognition. Consciousness does not necessarily involve self-consciousness.³⁶

4. *The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that a cognition is not inferred from the cognizedness of its object, as the Bhāṭṭa holds. Nor is it cognized by itself, as the Buddhist idealist, the Jaina, and the Vedāntist hold. A cognition is perceived by another cognition which is called *anuvyavasāya*. A cognition is directly apprehended by internal perception. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, therefore, a cognition can never turn upon itself to make itself the object of cognition. Though a cognition manifests another object (*paraprakāśaka*), it can never manifest itself (*svaprakāśaka*); it is other-manifesting but never self-manifesting. But though a cognition is not manifested by itself, it can be manifested by another cognition.³⁷ A cognition is perceived by another cognition through the mind.

Prabhācandra criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine thus: (1) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that a cognition is perceived by another cognition, as it is an object of valid knowledge like a cloth.³⁸ Just as an external object is known by a cognition, so a cognition is known by another cognition. According to the Bhāṭṭa, the act of cognition can never turn upon itself and make it an object of apprehension; it is inferred from the result of the cognitive act in the object, viz. apprehendedness; there is a cognitive act between the self and the object of cognition, which is not perceptible. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that a cognition cannot, indeed, turn upon itself and make it an object of its own apprehension, but that it can be apprehended by another cognition. The Jaina argues that just as pleasure is not cognized by another cognition but by itself, and the divine cognition is not cognized

¹ NK., 91-2. See Pārthasārathi's criticism of Prabhākara's doctrine in Cha.

³⁷ Jñānam jñānāntaravedyam. PKM., p. 34.

³⁸ Jñānam jñānāntaravedyam prameyatvāt paśādivat. PKM., p. 34.

by another cognition but by itself, so a cognition too in the self must be regarded as self-cognized, and not cognized by any other cognition. If a cognition in us is cognized by another cognition, then this cognition must be cognized by another cognition and so on *ad infinitum*. (2) The Naiyāyika may argue that there is no infinite regress here. For in God there are two cognitions, one of which apprehends the entire universe, and the other apprehends that cognition; there is no need of postulating any other cognition in God. The Jaina asks: If there are only two cognitions in God, is the second cognition in God, which apprehends His first cognition of the entire universe, perceived or not? If it is not perceived, then how is it possible for it to perceive the first cognition? If the second cognition of God can perceive His first cognition, though it is not itself perceived, then the first cognition of God too may perceive the entire universe, though this cognition is not itself perceived. If the second cognition in God also is perceived, is it perceived by itself or by some other cognition? If it is perceived by itself, then the first cognition too may be perceived by itself? If the second cognition in God is perceived by another cognition, then this third cognition too will be perceived by another cognition and so on *ad infinitum*. If the second cognition of God is perceived by the first cognition, then there will be a circular reasoning; for, in that case, the first cognition would be perceived by the second cognition, and the second cognition would be perceived by the first cognition. Hence the divine cognition must be regarded as self-luminous or self-cognizing; it must apprehend itself in apprehending the entire universe. (3) The Naiyāyika may argue that there is a difference between the divine cognition and the human cognition, and consequently, an attribute of the former cannot be ascribed to the latter; if the divine cognition is self-luminous, and thus both manifests itself and other objects (*svaparaprakāśaka*), the human cognition cannot be regarded as self-luminous. For if you ascribe a divine attribute to a human being, then you might as well argue that because God is omniscient, man must be so. The Jaina contends that this argument is fallacious. Consciousness, by its very essential nature, both manifests itself and other objects (*svaparaprakāśaka*); this is the common and essential characteristic of all consciousness; this is not a special characteristic of the divine consciousness. If the self- and object-manifesting character

(*svaparaprakāśakatva*) is regarded as a special characteristic of the divine consciousness because it is simply found in God, then it may equally be argued that because *svaparaprakāśakatva* is found in the sun, it cannot be an attribute of a lamp. (4) It may be argued that if the human cognitions are of the nature of the divine cognition, then the former will be as omniscient as the latter. But this argument is unsound. Omniscience is not a general characteristic of all cognitions, like *svaparaprakāśakatva*, but it is the special characteristic of the divine cognition. The above argument is as unsound as that because a lamp illumines both itself and other objects like the sun, it should as well illumine the whole world like the sun. If it be argued that though both the lamp and the sun manifest themselves as well as other objects, the former manifests only a few objects owing to its limited capacity (*yogyatāvaśāt*), then it should equally be argued that though both the human consciousness and the divine consciousness manifest themselves as well as other objects, the former manifests only a few objects owing to its limited capacity. Hence the Jaina concludes that the human cognition is as self-manifesting and other-manifesting (*svaparaprakāśaka*) as the divine cognition, for both of them are of the nature of consciousness, which by its very essential nature both manifests itself and its object. (5) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the cognition of an object is cognized by another cognition (*anuvyavasāya*). But the existence of the second cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) can never be proved by valid knowledge. If it does exist, is it known by perception or by inference? It can never be known by perception. For perception always depends upon the contact of the object of perception with a sense-organ. But *anuvyavasāya* can never come in contact with the external sense-organs; nor can it come in contact with the internal organ of mind, which is supposed to be the organ of its perception. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argues: The mind is in contact with the self; and the cognition inheres in the self; hence there is a relation of *saṃyukta-samavāya* or united-inherence between the cognition and the self; and the perception of the cognition is produced by this relation. The Jaina replies that this argument is not right, for the existence of the mind cannot be proved. It may be argued that the existence of the mind can be proved by the following inference: The cognition of the cognition of a jar is produced by its contact with

the internal organ or mind, for it is a perceptible cognition, like the cognition of colour produced by its contact with the visual organ. The Jaina urges that this argument is fallacious, for the 'mark' of inference or the middle term is not proved to exist. The 'mark' of inference here is the 'perceptibility of the cognition of the cognition of a jar'. If it is proved by the existence of the mind, then there will be a circle in reasoning; the perceptibility of the cognition of the cognition of an object will be inferred from the existence of the mind, and the existence of the mind, in its turn, will be inferred from the perceptibility of that cognition. Moreover, not only the perceptibility of the cognition of the cognition of an object is unproved, but that cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) itself is not proved. We never perceive that the cognition of a jar is perceived by some other cognition; it is always perceived by itself. External objects, indeed, first come in contact with the sense-organs, and then produce their cognitions. But we do not perceive that the mental states of pleasure, etc., are first produced in the self when they are quite unknown; then they come in contact with the mind, and then they are perceived through the mind. Pleasure and pain are perceived just after the perception of their external causes, viz., desirable and undesirable objects respectively; they are not perceived by another cognition different from them; they are cognized by themselves. Likewise the cognition of an external object is not perceived by another cognition, but by itself; it cognizes itself as well as its object. (6) Even supposing that a cognition is perceived by another cognition, does the second cognition arise when the first cognition continues to exist or when it is destroyed? The first alternative is impossible, for, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, cognitions are always successive; they are never simultaneous. The second alternative also is impossible; for if the second cognition arises when the first cognition is no longer in existence, what will be cognized by the second cognition? If it cognizes the non-existent first cognition, then it is illusory like the cognition of the double moon. (7) Then, again, is the second cognition perceived or not? If it is perceived, is it perceived by itself or by some other cognition? If it is perceived by itself, the first cognition, i.e. the cognition of an external object too may be perceived by itself and there is no use of postulating the second cognition. If the second cognition is perceived by another cognition, then

that cognition also will be perceived by another and so on *ad infinitum*; thus there will be a *regressus ad infinitum*. If the second cognition is not perceived, then how can this unperceived cognition perceive the first cognition? If a cognition can be perceived by another cognition which is not perceived, then my cognition can be perceived by another's cognition unknown to me. But this is absurd. (8) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may argue that just as the sense-organs, which are not themselves perceived, can produce the apprehension of an object, so the second cognition can produce the apprehension of the first cognition, though it is not itself perceived, and that in this sense it apprehends the first cognition. But this is a childish argument. For, in that case, it may as well be argued that the first cognition of an external object apprehends its object, though it is not itself perceived. But this is not admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. This is the doctrine of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, according to whom an unperceived cognition can apprehend an object.³⁹ Hence the Jaina concludes that a cognition cognizes itself and its object. It illuminates both itself and its object (*svaparaprakāśaka*).

5. The Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala

A cognition is a psychic function or a function of the *buddhi*. The *buddhi* is unconscious, and as such it cannot be an object of its own consciousness. Just as the other sense-organs and sensible objects are unconscious and as such are manifested by the self which alone is conscious, so the unconscious *buddhi* also must be regarded as an object of the apprehension of the self; it is not manifested by itself but can only be manifested by the self. A cognition, therefore, which is nothing but an unconscious psychic function or mental mode cannot apprehend itself; nor can it apprehend an object. It is apprehended by the self.⁴⁰ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that a cognition is apprehended by another cognition. But by what is this second cognition cognized? If it is cognized by another cognition, then the third cognition will require another cognition to apprehend it, and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika hypothesis of *anuvyavasāya* leads to infinite regress. Moreover, it leads to the confusion of memory. If a

³⁹ PKM., pp. 34 ff.

⁴⁰ YS., iv, 19, and YBh., iv, 19.

cognition is cognized by another cognition, then there are as many psychic traces or residua (*samskāra*) as there are cognitions of cognitions, and there are as many reminiscences as there are residua ; thus the doctrine of *anuvyavasāya* leads to the confusion of memory.⁴¹ According to the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala, it is the self that apprehends an object, and apprehends the cognition of the object. But how can the self, which is inactive according to the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala, know a cognition? According to Vācaspati-miśra, the self is reflected on the unconscious mental mode owing to the proximity of the mind to the self and its transparency, its inertia (*tamas*) and energy (*rajas*) being completely overpowered by its essence (*sattva*), and thus some sort of relation is established between the self and the mental mode, by virtue of which the self apprehends the mental mode, though it is inactive. According to Vijñānabhikṣu, on the other hand, the self is reflected on the mental mode, and this reflection in the mental mode is reflected back on the self, so that there is a double reflection of the self on the mental mode and of the mental mode on the self, and thus some sort of direct relationship is established between the self and the mental mode. Thus, according to the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala, a cognition or mental mode is apprehended only by the self ; it cannot be apprehended by another cognition or by itself as it is unconscious.

6. The Sāṃkhya-Vedāntist

According to the Sāṃkhya-Vedānta, a mental mode (*vyṛtti*) must have an object (*viśaya*) ; but the object may be either itself or other than itself. A mental mode may either apprehend an external object, when it is modified into the object, or it may apprehend itself (*svaviśayavyṛtti*). The Sāṃkarite does not admit that there is a cognition of a cognition ; a cognition, according to him, is self-luminous ; it is not manifested by any other cognition. There is no intervening mental mode (*vyṛtti*) between a cognitive process and the cognition of this cognitive process. There is a direct and immediate consciousness of a cognition ; a cognition is directly apprehended by itself. If we represent the object as O and the cognition of the object as S, then, according to the Sāṃkarite, we do not go beyond S¹O to S²O nor do we go to SO simply ; the

⁴¹ YS., iv, 21, and YBh., iv, 21.

cognition of a mental mode may be represented as ŚO. In the apprehension of a mental mode there is a direct intellectual intuition (*kevalasākṣivedyatva*).⁴² The Śaṅkarite holds that a cognition which is itself unperceived can never apprehend an object, as the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka holds. A cognition cannot also be the object of another cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) as a cognition is not of the nature of an unconscious object; a cognition is conscious, while an object is unconscious; a cognition, therefore, cannot be regarded as an object of another cognition. Besides, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *anuvyavasāya* leads to infinite regress. A cognition is self-luminous.

The Buddhist idealist also holds that cognitions are self-luminous. But his view is not the same as that of the Śaṅkarite. According to the former, a cognition cognizes itself; it manifests itself. According to the latter, a cognition is not apprehended or manifested by any other cognition. If a cognition can make itself an object of cognition, then it can as well be an *object* of another cognition. Hence the Śaṅkarite holds that a cognition is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*), not in the sense that it is an object of its own apprehension, as the Buddhist holds, but in the sense that it is not manifested by any other cognition. The conception of self-luminosity is positive, according to the Buddhist; it is negative, according to the Śaṅkarite. The Śaṅkarite doctrine closely resembles the doctrine of Prabhākara, according to whom cognitions are self-luminous. By this Prabhākara means that a cognition is not an object of another cognition; it is not cognized as an *object* of its own cognition; a cognition is cognized, no doubt, but it is cognized as a *cognition*, not as something cognized.⁴³

Rāmānuja criticizes Śaṅkara's doctrine. (1) Śaṅkara holds that consciousness alone is ultimately real and it is self-luminous. There is no self apart from consciousness and there is no object apart from consciousness. Consciousness is above the distinction of subject and object, which have only an empirical reality. And this consciousness is self-luminous; it manifests or apprehends itself. Rāmānuja disputes this view, and urges that consciousness is not possible without the knowing self and the known object, both of which are real. There is no objectless consciousness (*nirviṣayā saṁvit*). Consciousness and its object are perceived as different

⁴² VP., pp. 79-82.

⁴³ Saṁvittaiḥ hi saṁvit saṁvedyā na saṁvedyatayā. PSPM., p. 26.

from each other ; one apprehends and the other is apprehended ; they are correlative to each other. So to annul the object altogether contradicts the clear testimony of consciousness.⁴⁴ (2) Śaṅkara holds that consciousness is self-luminous ; it apprehends itself ; it is never an object of any other consciousness. This is true under certain conditions. Consciousness manifests itself to the cognizing self when it apprehends an object. It does not manifest itself to all selves at all times. The consciousness of one person is inferred by another from his behaviour ; so it becomes an object of inferential cognition. And our own past states of consciousness too become the objects of our present recollection. So consciousness is not necessarily self-luminous.⁴⁵ Consciousness does not lose its nature simply because it becomes an object of consciousness. The essential nature of consciousness consists in its manifesting itself at the present moment through its own being to its substrate, or in being instrumental in proving its own object by its own being.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Anubhūtitadviśayaayośca viśayaviśayibhāvena bhedasya pratyakṣasiddhatvāt abādhitatvācca anubhūtireva satīryetadapi nirastam. R.B., i, 1, 1.

⁴⁵ R.B., i, 1, 1. ⁴⁶ R.B., i, 1, 1. Thibaut; É.T. of R.B. p. 48.

CHAPTER XII

PERCEPTION OF THE SELF¹

1. *Introduction*

Can the Ātman or self be perceived? This question has been answered in different ways by different schools of Indian Philosophers. The Cārvāka holds that there is no self at all, and that it can neither be perceived nor inferred. The Buddhist idealist recognizes the distinction of subject and object only within consciousness. He does not recognize any permanent self apart from the ever-changing stream of consciousness. The Naiyāyika recognizes the self as a substance endued with the qualities of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort. Some earlier Naiyāyikas hold that the self can never be an object of perception ; that it is known by an act of inference from its qualities. The Vaiśeṣika, too, is of the same opinion. But he admits that the self can be object of *yogic* intuition. The Sāṃkhya holds that the self is an object of inference ; that it is inferred as an original (*bimba*) from its reflection (*pratibimba*) in *buddhi*. The Pātañjala holds that the self can be an object of higher intuition (*prātibhājñāna*). The Neo-Naiyāyika holds that the self is an object of internal perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*) ; that it can be perceived only through the mind in relation to its distinctive qualities. The Bhāṭṭya Mīmāṃsaka also holds that the self is an object of internal perception or self-consciousness (*ahampratyaya*). The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka holds that the self is revealed in every act of knowledge as the knowing subject or ego ; that it is known as the *subject* of perception and not as the object of perception ; and that it is known not as the subject of internal perception or self-consciousness, but of external perception, since there can be no self-consciousness apart from object-consciousness. The Jaina holds that the self is an object of internal perception ; that it is perceived as the subject which has pleasure, pain, and the like. In external perception also the self knows itself through itself as having the

¹ This chapter is an elaboration of an article published in *Meerut College Magazine*, January, 1924.

cognition of an object. The Upaniṣads regard the self as an object of higher intuition. Śaṅkara holds that the self is pure consciousness above the distinction of ego and non-ego, and that it is known by an immediate, intuitive consciousness. Rāmānuja holds that the self is nothing but the knower or ego, and that it is known as such by perception. He rejects Śaṅkara's concept of the self as pure consciousness.

2. *The Cārvākas and the Buddhist Idealists*

The Cārvākas do not recognize the existence of the self as an independent entity. Sadānanda speaks of four schools of Cārvākas. Some Cārvākas identify the self with the gross body. Some Cārvākas identify it with the external sense-organs. Some Cārvākas identify it with the vital force. And other Cārvākas identify it with the mind. Thus the Cārvākas do not regard the self as an independent entity.² Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says that the Cārvākas regard consciousness as a by-product of unconscious elements, e.g. earth, water, fire, and air. Just as intoxicating liquor is produced by unintoxicating rice, molasses, etc., so consciousness is produced by unconscious, material elements. There is no self endowed with consciousness, since there is no proof of its existence. It cannot be perceived through the external sense-organs, like jars, etc.; nor can it be perceived through the mind. And inference is not recognized by the Cārvākas as a means of valid knowledge. Moreover, there is no mark of inference. Hence the self can neither be perceived nor inferred.³

The Buddhist idealists (*Yogācāras*) regard the self as a series of cognitions or ideas. Cognitions alone are ultimately real. They are polarized into subject and object, which are not ultimately real. There is no self apart from cognitions; and there are no objects apart from cognitions; cognitions apprehend themselves as their own objects. Cognitions are self-luminous or self-aware. They reveal neither the self nor the not-self apart from them. There is no self apart from the ever-changing stream of cognitions. And there are no extra-mental objects apart from cognitions. The distinction between subject and object is a creation of individual consciousness within itself; it is not a relation between two

² *Vedāntasāra*, p. 26.

³ *NM.*, p. 429.

independent entities.⁴ Hence, the problem of perception of the self as a permanent intelligent principle does not puzzle the Buddhist idealists, though they cannot explain, as Śaṅkara points out, how momentary cognitions can become subjects and objects of each other.⁵

3. *The Naiyāyikas*

According to the Naiyāyikas, the self is a permanent substance in which cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition inhere. It is not a series of cognitions, but a permanent principle in which they exist. It is not a stream of consciousness, but an abiding substance which becomes conscious at times. All Naiyāyikas admit that the self is an object of inference. But some of the earlier Naiyāyikas hold that the self is an object of perception as well, while others deny it. Gautama makes the self an object of inference. It is inferred from its qualities such as pleasure, pain, cognition, desire, aversion, and volition.⁶ Gautama nowhere mentions in the *sūtras* whether the self is an object of perception or not. Vātsyāyana makes apparently conflicting statements about this question. In one place he says, "The self is not apprehended by perception." In another place he says, "The self is perceived by the *yogin* through a particular kind of conjunction between the self and *manas* owing to the ecstasy of meditation. The self is an object of *yogic* perception."⁷ These two statements apparently conflict with each other. But they can be easily harmonized. The self is not an object of normal perception. It cannot be perceived by ordinary persons through the internal organ. But it can be perceived only by the *yogin* in a state of ecstasy. So the self is not an object of normal internal perception but of supernormal perception. Here by the self Vātsyāyana means the pure self free from its connection with the organism. Udayana has made it clear in *Nyāyavārtikātātparyapariśuddhi*. He raises the question why Vātsyāyana should deny the normal perception of the self when, as a matter of fact, it is always an object of mental perception, being always perceived as 'I' along with every cognition; and

⁴ *Jñānameva grāhyagrāhakasamvittibhedavadiva lakṣyate*. Ibid., p. 540.

⁵ S.B., ii, 2, 28.

⁶ NS., i, 1, 10.

⁷ *Ātmā tāvat pratyakṣato na grhyate*. NBh., i, 1, 9.

⁸ *Pratyakṣam yujjānasya yogasamādhiyamātmamanasoh tathayogaviśeṣād ātmā pratyakṣa iti*. NBh., i, 1, 3.

answers that we have indeed the notion of 'I' along with every cognition through mental perception ; but that it may be taken as referring to the body. The empirical self or the self as connected with the organism is the object of mental perception. The pure self apart from the body cannot be apprehended by mental perception. Mental perception is not a sufficient proof of the existence of the pure self apart from the body, so long as it is not strengthened by other means of knowledge, inference, etc. This is the answer from the standpoint of those Naiyāyikas who do not regard the self as an object of normal perception. But some Naiyāyikas hold that one's own self is always an object of mental perception. From their standpoint the self of any other person is not an object of perception.⁹ Uddyotakara, however, holds that the self is an object of perception. It is directly perceived through the internal organ. This direct knowledge of the self is perceptual in character inasmuch as it is independent of the recollection of the relation between a major term and a minor term, and it varies with the variations in the character of its object. Inferential knowledge depends on the recollection of the invariable concomitance of the major and the minor terms. The internal perception of the self is independent of any such recollection. Besides, the perception of an object varies with the variation in the character of its object. The perception of a blue object will vary if the object becomes yellow. Likewise, the internal perception of the self varies according as the character of the self varies. The perception of the self as 'I am happy' is different from the perception of the self as 'I am unhappy'. So the self is an object of self-consciousness (*aham-pratyaya*) which is of the nature of direct perception.¹⁰ Uddyotakara does not draw a distinction between the self apart from the body and the self connected with the body, between the pure self and the empirical self. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says that according to some Naiyāyikas and the Aupavarṣas, the self is an object of internal perception or self-consciousness (*ahampratyaya*).¹¹ But Jayanta himself holds that the self cannot be established by perception. It is not an object of self-consciousness. Our self-consciousness has the body for its object. The self is established

⁹ Gaṅgānātha Jha, E.T. of NBh., i, 1, 10. *Indian Thought*, vol. II, pp. 188-9.

¹⁰ NV., iii, p. 344. *Tadevamahampratyaya viṣayatvādātma tāvat pratyakṣah*. Ibid., p. 345. Also NVTT., pp. 350-1.

¹¹ NM., p. 429.

by inference.¹² Thus Jayanta's view is opposed to that of Uddyotakara. Udayana, however, agrees with Uddyotakara, and holds that the self is perceived through *manas* just as colour is perceived through the visual organ, both of them being of the nature of direct and immediate knowledge.¹³ The later Naiyāyikas also hold that the self is an object of mental perception. Laugākṣi Bhāskara holds that the self is perceived as 'I' owing to its ordinary conjunction with *manas*.¹⁴ Keśavamiśra also holds the same view. But in case of diversity of opinion as to the perceptibility of the self, the self is inferred from its qualities.¹⁵ Viśvanātha also makes the self an object of mental perception.¹⁶ But he lays down a condition. The self apart from its specific qualities cannot be perceived through *manas*. It is perceived through *manas* only as endowed with its specific qualities such as pleasure, pain, and the like.¹⁷ The self is always perceived as 'I know', 'I will', etc. It is never perceived apart from its qualities. The self is the object of self-consciousness. The body is not the object of self-consciousness.¹⁸ Thus Viśvanātha's view is opposed to that of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭācārya holds the same view as Viśvanātha. He also holds that the self is perceived through the *manas* as 'I am happy' and the like.¹⁹

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and some earlier Naiyāyikas, the self is not an object of perception but an object of inference. The self is the substance in which cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort inhere; it is the substratum of these qualities. We cannot perceive the self. But we can infer it from its qualities. The qualities of the self are the marks of inference. Jayanta offers the following criticism of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka doctrine that the self is an object of internal perception: Firstly, how can the self be the subject as well as the object of one and the same act of cognition? If one and the same act of cognition cannot be polarized into the subject and the object, as the Buddhist idealist holds, then, for the same reason, one and the same self also cannot be bifurcated into the subject and the object of the same act of knowledge.

¹² *Ātmā pratyakṣo nāvadhāryate, asmadādīnāmahaṃpratyayasya śarīrāvalambanāt. Anumānāt tu pratipattavyaḥ.* NKL., p. 5.

¹³ LV., p. 8.

¹⁴ TK., p. 8.

¹⁵ TBh., p. 18.

¹⁶ SM., 62.

¹⁷ BhP. and SM., 49.

¹⁸ *Ahaṃkārohamitipratyayaḥ tasyāśrayo viṣaya ātmā na śarīrādīriti.* SM., p. 233.

¹⁹ TA., p. 6.

Secondly, the Bhāṭṭa urges that the same self is the subject in one condition and the object in a different condition. The self is the subject, in so far as it is conscious; and it is the object, in so far as it is a substance. The self is a conscious substance; as conscious it is the subject or cognizer; as a substance it is the object cognized.²⁰ But this is unreasonable. If substantiality constitutes the object of consciousness, then the self can never be the subject or knower; for the self is as much a substance as a jar is, and if the jar as a substance is simply the object of consciousness, but never its subject, then, on the same ground, the self also as a substance is simply the object of consciousness, but it can never be the subject or knower. Thirdly, it may be urged by Kumārila that the pure form of transcendental consciousness in the subject or knower, and that when it is empirically modified, qualified, or determined in various ways, it becomes the object of consciousness. The pure transcendental consciousness is the subject, and its empirical modification is the object. Elsewhere, there is simply the consciousness of an object apart from the subject. Thus we may distinguish three factors: (i) a pure subject (*śuddhā jñātṛtā*), (ii) a pure object (*śuddha-viṣayagrahaṇam*), and (iii) the subject as modified by the object, which is a mixed mode (*ghaṭāvaccinnā jñātṛtā*).²¹ But this argument also is unsubstantial. In the consciousness 'this is a jar' there is simply a consciousness of an object. Then, when this consciousness is appropriated by the self, there arises a consciousness 'I know the jar'. Here, there is merely a self-appropriation of the consciousness of the jar, or there is simply a consciousness of the consciousness of the jar; it does not refer to the noumenal substrate or the self. (4) Fourthly, Kumārila may urge that in the consciousness 'I know the jar' there are three elements: (i) the consciousness of the 'jar'; (ii) the consciousness of 'knowing the jar', and (iii) the consciousness of 'I' or the 'self'. In one and the same unitary act of consciousness, one part cannot be valid, and the other invalid. In the same consciousness 'I know the jar', the consciousness of 'jar', and the consciousness of 'knowing the jar' cannot be said to be valid, and the consciousness of 'I' or the self to be invalid. If the first and second parts are valid, the third part also must be regarded as valid. In other words, we must

²⁰ Dravyādisvarūpamātmano grāhyaṁ jñātṛrūpaṁ ca grāhakam. NM., p. 430.

²¹ Ghaṭāvaccinnā hi jñātṛtā grāhyā śuddhaiva tu jñātṛtā grāhikā. NM., p. 430.

admit that there is a consciousness of the self as an object of T'-consciousness or self-consciousness (*ahamvitti*). The Naiyāyika contends that the self can never be both subject and object of one and the same act of consciousness. In the consciousness 'I know the jar' there are three parts: (i) 'I', (ii) 'know', and (iii) 'the jar'. The second and third parts evidently refer to the object (*viṣaya-niṣṭhameva*); if the first part viz. 'I' refers to the self, then the self remains in its pure, indeterminate form both as subject and object in the same condition. Hence it cannot be maintained that the self becomes the subject in one condition and the object in a different condition. If there is no difference in the essential nature of the self, how can it be both subject and object? If it is insisted that the pure, unmodalized self assumes the forms of subject and object under different conditions, then this doctrine does not differ from Buddhist idealism, according to which one and the same cognition is its subject as well as its object. Hence, the Naiyāyika holds that the self can never be known as an object of self-consciousness; that it is known only by inference; the subject can never enter into the object-stream; it always stands apart. This reminds us of the doctrine of Kant, according to whom the category of substantiality cannot be applied to the self. But the Naiyāyika himself regards the self as a substance endowed with qualities, though he does not admit that it is an object of perception.²²

According to Śaṅkara, the self is essentially conscious; it is one, eternal, ubiquitous, undifferentiated consciousness. It is not manifested by fleeting states of consciousness, as a jar is manifested by some transient state of consciousness. But it manifests itself; or, it is self-luminous. Consciousness constitutes the essential nature of the self; it is natural or essential to the self, and not an adventitious or accidental property of it. The self is not conscious owing to its connection with consciousness produced by the internal organ or the external organs; it is not inert in itself like matter, which is endued with consciousness, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds. If the self were conscious owing to its connection with the consciousness produced by the sense-organs, then an external object, too, e.g. a jar, would be conscious owing to its connection with the consciousness produced by it. The self is the light of consciousness; it lights up everything; but it does not depend upon any-

²² NM., pp. 430-1.

thing to manifest itself. Other objects depend upon many factors for their manifestation, but the self is self-luminous or self-manifesting; it is not caused or conditioned by anything else; it is unconditioned, uncaused, and independent. The self can never be an *object* of consciousness; it is the pure, unmodalized, or transcendental consciousness above the phenomenal distinction of subject and object. Consciousness is here hypostatized as a third term existing independently of subject and object. Consciousness alone is ultimately real in its pure, unmodalized, or transcendental form; the distinction of subject and object within this ultimate reality has only empirical reality.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes it as follows: Firstly, the Śāṅkarite holds that the self is of the nature of unconditioned consciousness. But has anybody ever experienced unconditioned or transcendental consciousness? Our consciousness is produced by an external organ or by the internal organ. Hence we can never conceive of a self whose essence is transcendental consciousness. Secondly, the Śāṅkarite holds that the self, the essence of which is transcendental consciousness, is self-luminous. But if the self is self-luminous, why is it that I am conscious only of my own self, and not of other selves? What is the reason for it? Then, again, if I am conscious of my own self, it is apprehended by me, and if it is apprehended, it must be apprehended as the *object* of apprehension (*anubhava-karma*). Thirdly, the Śāṅkarite may urge that the self is not the object of perception; that it cannot be presented to consciousness as an object, but it can be known by immediate intuitive consciousness (*aparokṣajñāna*). But this is self-contradictory. Perception means the same thing as direct and immediate consciousness. If it is said that the self cannot be the object of perceptual or presentative consciousness, then it cannot be an object of immediate and intuitive consciousness for the same reason. It is self-contradictory to say that the self is not an object of perception, but that it is an object of immediate intuition.²³ Fourthly, the Śāṅkarite may urge that the self is luminous, and hence it is known by an immediate intuition. If so, then a luminous lamp too would manifest itself to a blind man, though unperceived by him. If the lamp manifests itself only to him by whom it is apprehended, then the self too must be regarded as manifesting itself, only when it is apprehended. If the self manifests itself, it must also be

²³ Pratyakṣaśca na bhavati aparokṣaśca bhavātīti citram. NM., p. 432.

apprehended ; and as apprehended it must be regarded as an *object* of apprehension. Thus, the self becomes both subject and object of consciousness, and cannot be regarded as pure, unmodalized or transcendental consciousness above the distinction of subject and object. Fifthly, the Śaṅkarite holds that the self is of the nature of consciousness which is self-luminous ; that it manifests itself and is not manifested by any other thing. Thus both the self and consciousness, which constitutes its essence, are self-luminous. But if it were self-luminous, it would become both subject and object of consciousness, which is impossible. And, in fact, no body is ever conscious of two self-luminous entities, *viz.* the self-luminous self and the self-luminous consciousness. Lastly, the Śaṅkarite holds that consciousness constitutes the essence of the self ; that it is natural or essential to the self, not accidental to it. But this does not stand to reason. That is to be regarded as conscious (*cetana*), which has consciousness of an object (*citā yogāt*), and that is to be regarded as unconscious (*jaḍa*), which has no consciousness of an object. And there is no other consciousness than the consciousness of an object. If an object, too, were held to be self-luminous, then every object in the world would manifest itself to every one, and thus every one would be omniscient. Hence, we must admit that consciousness is not essential to the self, but its adventitious property ; that the self is not conscious in itself, but it is endued with consciousness which is produced by various causes and inheres in it. But why should consciousness inhere in the self, and not in the object which produces it? Jayanta replies that this is the nature of consciousness that it inheres in the self and not in the object. There are certain acts which inhere only in their agents or subjects and never in their objects, *e.g.* the act of going. So the act of consciousness, by its very nature, inheres in its subject, *viz.* the self, and not in its object. And the inexorable law of nature (*vastusvabhāva*) cannot be called in question.²⁴ Jayanta, therefore, concludes that consciousness does not constitute the essential nature of the self ; that the self is not an object of internal perception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*) or immediate intuition (*aparokṣa-jñāna*) ; that the self is an object of inference, and that the qualities of the self, *e.g.* cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are the mark of inference.

²⁴ NM., pp. 431-2.

4. *The Vaiśeṣika*

Kaṇāda holds that the self is not an object of normal perception, but of supernormal perception. It cannot be perceived through the internal organ (*manas*) owing to its ordinary conjunction with the self.²⁶ My own self is as imperceptible as any other self.²⁶ But Kaṇāda admits that the self can be perceived by the *yogis* through a particular kind of conjunction between the self and *manas*. This conjunction is due to a peculiar power (*dharma*) born of meditation.²⁷ Thus, the self is an object of higher intuition. Śaṅkara Miśra holds that the self in its essential nature is an object of higher intuition; but that the self as modified by its own specific qualities is an object of internal perception. I directly perceive through *manas* 'I am sorry', 'I am happy', 'I know', 'I will', 'I desire'. I cannot perceive the self as modified by these specific qualities through the external senses; I perceive it through the internal organ when the external organs do not operate. So there is a direct perception of the self as modified by its specific qualities through the internal organ. This knowledge of the self is perceptual in character, since it is directly produced by the internal organ. It is neither inferential nor verbal. It is not inferential knowledge, since it is not produced by a mark of inference. It is not verbal knowledge, since it is not produced by any verbal authority. It is in the nature of direct internal perception derived through the internal organ.²⁸ But Śaṅkara Miśra does not make the pure self an object of normal internal perception. He also, like Kaṇāda, makes it an object of *yogic* perception. But he admits that sometimes ordinary men like us also have flashes of intuition of the pure self; but that it is so much obscured by nescience (*avidyā*) that it is as good as non-existent. It is especially to be found in *yogis* who have a direct perception of the pure self owing to a particular conjunction of the self with the internal organ brought about by a peculiar power born of meditation.²⁹ Śrīdhara also holds that the pure self free from all attributes is not an object of normal internal perception. His conception of the self approaches that of Śaṅkara. The self is

²⁶ *Tatrātmā manaścāpratyakṣe*. VS., viii, 1, 2.

²⁷ VSU., viii, 1, 2.

²⁸ *Ātmanyātmamanasoḥ samyogaviśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam*. V.S., ix, 1, 11, and VSU., ix, 1, 11.

²⁹ VSU., iii, 2, 14.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, ix, 1, 11.

known to us as 'I' and 'mine', as the doer and the possessor. But these are not the essential attributes of the self; they are rather accidents of the self due to its connection with the limitations of the body. The notions of 'I' and 'mine', subject and ego are false conceptions of the self. The self in itself is not an ego. The ego or subject is the empirical self or the self limited by the organism. The empirical self is an object of normal internal perception. But the pure self is not an object of normal perception. It is perceived by the *yogis* alone. It is an object of higher intuition. The real nature of the self free from all impositions of 'I' and 'mine' is perceived by a *yogin*, when he withdraws his mind from the external organs, concentrates it on an aspect of the self, and constantly meditates upon the self with undivided attention.³⁰

5. The Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala

According to the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala, consciousness is the essence of the self which is self-luminous. But the self cannot know its essential nature, so long as it illusorily identifies itself with the unconscious *buddhi* on which it casts its reflection and gives it an appearance of a conscious self. The self knows an external object in the following manner. The transparent *buddhi* goes out to the object through the channel of a sense-organ, and assumes its form, but it cannot manifest the object as it is unconscious; it manifests the object to the self only when a reflection of the self is cast upon the function of the unconscious *buddhi* modified into the form of the object. Thus the self knows an external object only through the mental modification on which it casts its reflection. This is the view of Vācaspatiśrī.³¹ Vijnānabhikṣu maintains, that the self casts its reflection on the unconscious *buddhi* functioning in a particular way; that the mental function which takes in the reflection of the self and assumes its form is reflected back on the self; and that it is through this reflection that the self knows an external object.³²

Now, the question is: Can the self know itself? Though the self is self-luminous, it cannot know itself directly so long as it is connected with the organism. Ordinarily, the self infers its existence through its reflection in *buddhi*. Just as I cannot see my

³⁰ NK., p. 196.

³¹ TV., i, 7; ii, 17; ii, 20; iv, 22.

³² YV., i, 4, pp. 12-13; SPB., i, 87, i, 99; DHIP., I, p. 260; YP., p. 165.

own face but infer its existence from its reflection in a mirror, so I cannot perceive my self but infer its existence from its reflection in *buddhi*, inasmuch as a reflection (*pratibimba*) must have an original (*bimba*).⁵³ But Patañjali asserts, that when we develop the power of concentration, we may have supernormal intuition (*prātibha jñāna*) of the self through its reflection in *buddhi*. But how can the self know itself through an unconscious mental modification though it takes in the reflection of the self? Vācaspati holds that the self can know itself only when attention is entirely withdrawn from the mental mode in which the self is reflected, and is wholly concentrated on the reflection, of the self in the pure essence (*sattva*) of *buddhi*, its inertia (*tamas*) and energy (*rajas*) being completely overpowered. Thus, the self knows itself only through its reflection in the pure essence of *buddhi*, viewed apart from the unconscious mental mode which takes in the reflection of the self.⁵⁴ The self is always the knower, the witness (*sākṣin*), the seer or spectator (*draṣṭṛ*); so it can never turn back upon itself and make itself an *object* of knowledge (*dṛśya*). Then, what is the knowing subject and what is the known object in the supernormal intuition of the self? Vyāsa asserts, that the self cannot be manifested or known by the essence (*sattva*) of *buddhi* as *buddhi* is unconscious; but that it is the self which knows itself through its reflection in the pure essence of *buddhi*.⁵⁵ If we call the self in its pure essence the pure or transcendental self, and the mental mode in which the self is reflected the empirical self, then the pure self can know the empirical self, but the empirical self can never know the pure self. Vācaspatimiśra asserts, that the self is reflected in the unconscious essence of *buddhi*, so that the mental mode may be said to have the self for its object in the sense in which a mirror in which a face is reflected is said to have the face for its object; that the mental mode cannot be said to have the self for its object in the sense that it manifests or apprehends the self, inasmuch as the unconscious mental mode can never manifest the conscious self. Vācaspati says, "The notion of self-knowledge consists in making the object of knowledge, the reflection of the Puruṣa into the

⁵³ VPS., p. 54. Na ca puruṣapratyayena buddhisattvātmanā puruṣo drśyate puruṣa eva pratyayaṁ svātmāvalambanaṁ paśyati. YBh., iii, 35.

⁵⁴ TV., p. 245. See also Mañiprabhā, p. 64 and Bhojavṛtti, p. 55. (Calcutta, 1903). 3 Y.Bh. iii, 35.

buddhi.”³⁶ Again, he says, “In the trance cognition the object of knowledge is the Self reflected into the *buddhi*. It is different from the real Self, because it becomes the support of that Self (*ātmā*).”³⁶ The self, in its pure essence, is the subject of self-apprehension, and the pure essence of *buddhi* which takes in the reflection of the self and is modified into its form is the object of self-apprehension, so that the subject and the object of self-apprehension are not the same.³⁷ In other words, the transcendental self is the subject of self-apprehension, and the empirical self is the object of self-apprehension. Thus, Vācaspati avoids self-contradiction in the view that the self can be both subject and object of knowledge. Nāgeśa also corroborates the view of Vācaspatimiśra. He asks: In the apprehension of the self is it *buddhi* which knows the self, or, is it the self which knows itself? In the first alternative, *buddhi* would be conscious, which is not admitted by the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala. In the second alternative, the self would be both subject and object of knowledge which is self-contradictory. Nāgeśa says that the second alternative does not involve self-contradiction. The self cannot be known by the mental mode in which the self is reflected because it is unconscious. But it is the self itself which knows the mental mode which is modified into the form of the self and is reflected in the self. Thus the self has knowledge of itself in the form of the reflection in itself, of the mental mode which takes in the reflection of the self and which is modified into the form of the self. Here, in the apprehension of the self by the self there is no self-contradiction, for there is a difference between the self as the subject and the self as the object. The self as it is determined by the empirical mental mode modified into its form, or the empirical self is the object, and the self as it is in itself undetermined by any mental mode, or the transcendental self is the subject. The self in itself can never be an object of knowledge. The transcendental self is always a knower; it can never be an object known. Thus Nāgeśa substantially agrees with Vācaspatimiśra's view that the pure self is the subject of self-apprehension, and the empirical self is the object of self-apprehension. But he differs from the latter in holding that the mental mode in which the self

³⁶ Rama Prasad, E. T. TV., pp. 229-230.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 293.

³⁷ TV., iii. 35, p. 245.

is reflected is reflected back in the self. On this point he agrees with Vijñānabhikṣu.³⁸

According to Vācaspatimiśra, the self is reflected in the essence of *buddhi* which is modified into the form of the self. But, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, the self is reflected in the essence of *buddhi* functioning in a particular manner, and the mental function too, in which the self is reflected, is reflected back in the self. Thus, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, the self knows itself through the reflection, in itself, of the mental mode, which takes in the reflection of the self and is modified into its form, just as it knows an external object (e.g. a jar) through the reflection, in itself, of the mental mode which assumes the form of the object.³⁹ He says, "We must admit that just as there is a reflection of *buddhi* in the self, so there is a reflection of the self in *buddhi* also; otherwise, the self's experience would not be possible."⁴⁰ But how does he avoid self-contradiction, if the self knows itself through the reflection, in itself, of the mental mode which assumes the form of the self? He says that there is no contradiction in the cognition of the self by the self, inasmuch as the self is essentially self-luminous, and hence it can be both the illuminating agent and the illumined object, the knowing subject as well as the known object. There is no inconsistency in the relation between the self as a knowing subject and the self as a known object, because the self is essentially self-luminous, and that which is of the nature of illumination (*prakāśa*) is itself illumined; there is no contradiction in it. But a relation always implies two terms; how can there be relation of the self to itself—of the self as the subject to the self as the known object? Vijñānabhikṣu holds that though there is no real difference in the nature of the self, yet we may distinguish the self in its pure essence, as the original (*bimba*), from the reflection of the mental mode in the self, as an image of the self (*prati-bimba*). Of these two aspects of the self, which is the knowing subject and which is the known object? Vijñānabhikṣu holds that the self as determined by the mental mode which is modified into the form of the self is the knowing subject, and the self, in its pure essence, free from all determinations, is the known object.⁴¹ Thus Vijñānabhikṣu goes against the views of Vyāsa,

³⁸ Chyāyā on YS. (Benares, 1907), p. 174.

³⁹ YV., pp. 231-2.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 13.

⁴¹ Atmakāraṇyatyavacchinnaśya jñātṛtvāt kevalasya jñeyatvāt. Ibid, p. 232.

Vācaspati, and Nāgeśa who regard the pure self as the subject of self-apprehension, and the empirical self as the object of self-apprehension. He says that the self is self-luminous, because it illumines itself, or knows itself as an object of knowledge. The self is not, indeed, an object of an ordinary mental function, but it is an object of supernormal *yogic* intuition. But still Vijñāna-bhikṣu's interpretation does not seem to be in keeping with the spirit of the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala distinction between the knower (*draṣṭṛ*) and the known (*dṛśya*), the self (*puruṣa*) and the not-self (*prakṛti*).

6. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka

There seems to be a difference between Kumārila and his followers on this question. Kumārila maintains, that the self is of the nature of pure consciousness and is illumined by itself; that it is self-luminous or manifested by itself. But Pārthasārathimīśra, a follower of Kumārila, holds that the self is an object of mental perception. This distinction is not recognized by all. Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, and Dr. S. N. Das Gupta represent Kumārila as holding that the self is an object of mental perception. "Kumārila holds," says Dr. G. N. Jha, "that the Soul is not self-luminous, but known by mental perception (*śāstraḍīpikā*, p. 101)."⁴² Dr. S. N. Das Gupta says, "Kumārila thinks that the soul which is distinct from the body is perceived by a mental perception (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*), . . . Kumārila agrees with Prabhākara in holding that soul is not self-illuminating (*svayamprakāśa*)."⁴³ But Dr. P. Sastri rightly points out that according to Kumārila, the self is self-illumined. Kumārila clearly says, "The self is a light which illumines itself. When it is said to be *imperceptible* (*agrāhya*) the epithet apparently means that the self is imperceptible to all; but as the Śruti says that it is self-illumined (*atmajyoti*), we conclude that it is imperceptible only to others and not to itself."⁴⁴ Again he says, "The notion of 'I' (which is all the notion that we have of the soul) always points to the mere existence of the Soul, which is of the nature of pure consciousness."⁴⁵ Kumārila seems

⁴² PSPM., p. 80.

⁴³ DHIP., I, p. 400 and p. 401. See also YP., p. 143.

⁴⁴ *Ātmanaiva prakāśyo'yamātmā jyotiritīritam*. ŚV., Ātmavāda, 142. Quoted by P. Sastri in IPM., p. 91.

⁴⁵ Jha, E. T. of Tantravārtika, p. 516, referred to by Keith in KM., p. 71 n.

to accept the doctrine of self-illumination of the self from *Śavara-bhāṣya*. Śavara says, "The Atman is known by itself (*svasamvedya*); it is incapable of being seen or shown by others."⁴⁶

But Pārthasārathi says, "The self or the knower, which is distinct from the body, is an object of self-consciousness in the form of mental perception."⁴⁷ This distinction between Kumārila's view and that of his followers is not generally recognized. The author of *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* credits Kumārila with the view that the self is an object of mental perception.⁴⁸ So we shall take Pārthasārathi as the typical exponent of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka view. According to the Bhāṭṭa, the self is not an object of inference as some Naiyāyikas hold; nor is it an object of immediate intuition as Śaṅkara holds; nor is it perceived as the subject of object-cognitions as Prabhākara holds. According to him, the self is an object of mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*) or self-consciousness (*ahampratrayaya*).

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka criticizes the Naiyāyika doctrine thus: Firstly, some Naiyāyikas hold that the self cannot be an object of perception, because it cannot be the subject and the object of the same act of knowledge. The Bhāṭṭa asks: How, then, can the self be an object of inference? Here, the self knows itself by inference through itself. The self is the subject of inference, the object of inference, and the instrument of inference. Thus, it cannot be held that the self is always the subject and never the object of knowledge. If in inference the self can be both the subject (*anumātr*) and the object of inference (*anumeya*) at the same time, it may also be regarded as an object of perception, when it is both the knower and the known. If the self can be known by inference, it may as well be known by perception. Secondly, if it be argued that the self cannot be perceived because it has no form (*rūpa*), then it may equally be argued that pleasure and the like cannot be perceived because they are without any form. And if the latter can be perceived, though without any form, then the former also can be perceived, though devoid of any form. And as a matter of fact, pleasure, etc., are never perceived apart from the self to which they belong. Pleasure is perceived as pleasure of the self; we have no

⁴⁶ Quoted by P. Sastri in IMP., p. 97.

⁴⁷ Śarīrātirikto mānasapratyakṣarūpāhampratrayayagamyo jānāi. SD., p. 479.

⁴⁸ Manahkaraṇakenātmā pratyakṣeṇāvasīyate. viii, 37. See KM., p. 71.

consciousness of *mere* pleasure such as 'this is pleasure'; but we have a consciousness of pleasure always in such a form as 'I have pleasure'. Thus pleasure and the like are not perceived apart from the self, but they are perceived as belonging to it, and thus manifest themselves as well as the self to which they belong. Thirdly, sometimes an external object is known together with its knowledge; the consciousness of the object is appropriated by the self. In this self-appropriation of the consciousness of the object, there is not only a consciousness of the object, but also a consciousness of the self which has consciousness. In this act of cognition there is the apprehension of an object as qualified by the consciousness of the self (*jñātr-jñānaviśiṣṭārtha-grahana*). There cannot be a consciousness of a qualified object, without apprehending the qualifications which qualify the object. In the cognition 'I know the object' the qualified object cannot be known unless its qualifications viz. the consciousness and the self are already known. Thus the self must be regarded as an object of consciousness. Fourthly, if the self is not perceived already, it can never be remembered afterwards; and if it cannot be remembered it cannot be an object of inference. Thus the self must be regarded as an object of perception.⁴⁹

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka criticizes Prabhākara's doctrine thus: According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, the self is the object of internal perception or 'I'-consciousness. But Prabhākara argues that the self cannot be the subject as well as the object of consciousness; that it is self-contradictory to suppose that the self is the object of perception, inasmuch as the self cannot be both the percipient and the perceived. Prabhākara holds that there is no 'I'-consciousness (*ahamvitti*) apart from the consciousness of objects (*ghaṭādivitti*). So the self cannot be regarded as the object of 'I'-consciousness, which is different from object-consciousness. According to him, in every act of consciousness there are three factors: (i) the consciousness of an object or object-consciousness (*viśayavitti*), (ii) the consciousness of the subject or the self (*ahamvitti*), and (iii) the self-conscious awareness or consciousness of consciousness (*svasamvitti*). There is a triple consciousness (*tripuṣi-samvit*) in every act of consciousness. There is no consciousness of an object, pure and simple, apart from the consciousness of the self. There can be no consciousness of an

⁴⁹ NM., pp. 433-4.

object which is not appropriated by the self. There is no consciousness of an object which does not reveal the self. In every act of cognition the self is revealed not as the object of knowledge, but as the subject of knowledge or the knower (*jñātr*). It is self-contradictory to suppose that the self can be perceived as an object of consciousness; the self is always the knower; so it can never be a known object.

Pārthasārathimīśra, a Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, asks what Prabhākara means by self-contradiction in the self, if it is both subject and object of perception. Prabhākara evidently means, that the self is simply the agent (*kartr*) of the act of cognition; that it is not the object (*karma*) of the act of cognition; or that the act of cognition cannot produce its result (*svaphala*) in the self. Pārthasārathi asks: What is the result of the act of cognition? It is manifestation or illumination (*bhāsana*). And it exists in the self which is the agent of the act of cognition. The self is manifested by the act of cognition. And since it is manifested by the act of cognition, it is the object of consciousness. If it is not manifested by the act of cognition, it cannot be said to be revealed by it. Thus, if the self is revealed by an act of consciousness, as Prabhākara holds, then it is both subject and object of consciousness, and so Prabhākara also cannot avoid self-contradiction.⁵⁰ According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, the self is not manifested in every consciousness of an object; the object-consciousness (*viśayavitti*) is not always appropriated by the self. For instance, sometimes I know that 'this is a jar', but I do not know that 'I know the jar'. So, the Bhāṭṭa holds that though the self is manifested when an object is known, it is not manifested either as the subject (*kartr*) or as the object (*karma*) of this object-consciousness (*viśayavitti*), but along with this object-consciousness there is sometimes another distinct consciousness, viz. self-consciousness (*mānasāhampratyaya*) of which the self is the object.⁵¹

Prabhākara is right in so far as the self is always implicitly involved in the consciousness of the not-self or object; and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka is right in so far as the self is not always explicitly manifested in the consciousness of the not-self, but it is *explicitly* manifested only in self-consciousness or T—consciousness which cannot be identified with mere object-consciousness.

⁵⁰ *ŚD.*, pp. 479-482.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 482, and *ŚDP.*

Self-consciousness is certainly a higher degree of conscious life than the mere consciousness of an object; it involves an additional factor of self-appropriation. Hence, the self may be regarded as the object of the self-consciousness, as the Bhāṭṭa holds, rather than the subject of object-consciousness, as Prabhākara holds.

Prabhākara tries to avoid self-contradiction in the nature of the self by supposing that the self cannot be both subject and object of knowledge, but it is only the subject of knowledge. If so, then there can be neither recollection nor recognition of the self. Both in recollection and in recognition it is the object of recollection and recognition that appears in consciousness, and not their subject. In these representative processes it is the object presented to consciousness in our past experience that is represented to consciousness. Hence, in the recollection and recognition of the self it is the self apprehended as an object of previous perception that is represented to consciousness as the object of present recollection and recognition. If, in the recognition of the self, the self were not known as the object of recognition, then the act of recognition would be objectless. But there can be no consciousness without an object. Hence, the Bhāṭṭa concludes that the self must be regarded as an object of self-consciousness. But how can the self be subject and object at the same time? Is it not self-contradictory? According to the Bhāṭṭa, the self as a conscious entity is the subject, and as a substance it is the object. Thus he tries to avoid self-contradiction.⁵² This view may be contrasted with that of Kant, according to whom the self is the subject or knower, but not an object or substance.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka criticizes Śaṅkara's doctrine. Śaṅkara maintains, that consciousness constitutes the essence of the self which is self-luminous or self-manifesting; that it does not depend for its manifestation on any other condition. How, then, can it be the object of consciousness? How can the self which is self-luminous be manifested by consciousness? The Bhāṭṭa retorts: If the self is self-luminous because it is of the nature of consciousness, then why should pleasure and the like be not regarded as self-luminous? Besides, if the self were self-luminous by its very nature, then it would never cease to be so, and it would manifest itself even in dreamless sleep. But, in fact, the self is not manifested in deep sleep. How, then, can it be regarded as

⁵² ŚD., p. 487, and ŚDP.

self-luminous? It may be urged that the self is manifested even in dreamless sleep, with its natural bliss. Otherwise, on waking from sleep we cannot have the recollection that we slept well. What, then, is the difference between dreamless sleep and waking consciousness? The Vedāntist urges that in dreamless sleep the self alone is manifested, neither the organism, nor the sense-organs, nor external objects, but in waking consciousness all these are manifested, while in dream-consciousness only the self and the mind are manifested. But the Bhāṭṭa points out that this is contradicted by our experience. On waking from sleep we have a consciousness that we apprehended nothing during deep sleep. So it cannot be held that the self is manifested in dreamless sleep. On waking from sleep we have a consciousness that we slept well, not because the self is manifested with its essential bliss in dreamless sleep, but because of the absence of pain at the time. Hence, the self cannot be regarded as self-luminous, as Śaṅkara holds, but it must be regarded as the object of internal perception or self-consciousness (*mānasapratyakṣagamya evāyam*).⁵³

7. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka

According to the Prābhākara, consciousness is self-luminous, or, it manifests itself; and in manifesting itself it manifests both its knowing self and known object. Neither the self nor external objects are self-luminous; both of them are manifested by consciousness which is self-luminous. The self is directly manifested by every act of cognition, presentative or representative. There can be no consciousness of an object apart from the consciousness of the self; every act of cognition is appropriated by the self; all experience is the self's experience. In every act of cognition there is a triple consciousness, a consciousness of the self (*ahamvitti*), a consciousness of an object (*viśayavitti*), and self-conscious awareness (*svasamvitti*). Thus, in every act of cognition there is a direct and immediate knowledge of the self, not as an object of knowledge, but as the knowing subject; the self can never be known as an object of knowledge. But though there is always a direct and immediate knowledge of the self in every act of cognition, there is not always a direct and immediate knowledge of an external object. An object is not directly presented to consciousness in recollection and inference. But

⁵³ ŚD., pp. 487-90.

though an object is indirectly revealed to consciousness in representative and inferential cognitions, all experience, be it presentative or representative, perceptual or inferential, is directly and immediately presented to consciousness. In other words, though in indirect knowledge its object is not directly presented to consciousness, yet the indirect knowledge itself is directly presented to consciousness. And because there is a direct and immediate knowledge of every act of cognition, be it immediate or mediate, there is also a direct and immediate knowledge of the self in every act of cognition, immediate or mediate. Thus, every act of cognition directly reveals the self in directly revealing itself. But we must not suppose that this cognition requires another cognition for its direct and immediate presentation to consciousness. It is self-luminous ; it directly reveals itself. There is no *regressus ad infinitum* in the consciousness of experience. According to Prabhākara, consciousness is self-luminous ; there is no consciousness of consciousness as the Naiyāyika supposes ; consciousness is self-aware or self-manifesting ; consciousness itself is self-consciousness. If there were a consciousness of consciousness, there would be a consciousness of that consciousness and so on *ad infinitum*.

Thus there is a difference between the apprehension of the self and that of an object. There is always a direct and immediate knowledge of the self in every act of cognition, presentative, representative, or inferential ; but there is not always a direct and immediate knowledge of an object, e.g. in recollection and inference. But both the self and an object are non-luminous, and are manifested by consciousness. Thus, Prabhākara regards consciousness as an external relation between the self and the not-self. There is also a difference between the apprehension of an object and that of a cognition ; an object is sometimes directly presented to consciousness, and sometimes indirectly revealed to consciousness ; but a cognition is always directly and immediately presented to consciousness. And there is also a difference between the apprehension of the self and that of a cognition. There is a direct and immediate knowledge of the self and the cognition both. But the self is apprehended by a cognition as its knowing subject, but the cognition is not apprehended by any other cognition ; it apprehends itself. Thus, both the self and an object are non-luminous as they are manifested by consciousness. But consciousness itself is self-luminous as it manifests itself. Without consciousness

neither the object nor the self can be manifested. In dreamless sleep there is no consciousness ; so neither the self nor any object is manifested in deep sleep. It cannot be said that the self does not exist in deep sleep, for, in that case, there would be no recognition of personal identity on waking from sleep. If the self were self-luminous, as the Vedāntist holds, then it would be manifested in deep sleep. But since it is not manifested in deep sleep, it must be regarded as non-luminous. But consciousness is self-luminous ; it is not manifested in deep sleep because it does not exist at that time.⁵⁴

The Prābhākara rejects the Vedāntist doctrine of the self-luminous self for the following reasons: Firstly, the self is not manifested in deep sleep, though it exists as pure *esse* at that time. Secondly, all the phenomena of our experience can be explained by the theory of self-luminous consciousness and, therefore, it is needless to assume the self-luminosity of the self. Thirdly, the self is not of the nature of consciousness, as the Vedāntist holds, but it is the substratē of consciousness.⁵⁵

The Prābhākara criticizes Kumārila's view. According to Kumārila, the self is as much an object of perception as an external object. An external object is perceived by external perception ; but the self is perceived by internal perception. There is no contradiction in the self being both the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge ; for the self is a conscious substance, and as conscious it is the subject of consciousness, and as a substance it is the object of consciousness ; the element of substance in the self is the known object and the element of consciousness in the self is the knowing subject. The Prābhākara urges that this view is untenable. What Kumārila calls the substantial element in the self is unconscious, and so cannot be a self at all. Thus, there remains only the conscious element ; and if this conscious element be the object of knowledge, then the self becomes the knowing subject and the known object at the same time, and thus Kumārila cannot avoid self-contradiction. Nor can it be said that the conscious element in the self is capable of undergoing a change so as to have simultaneously the character of the knowing subject and the known object, because the self is not made up of parts and so cannot undergo any change.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ PP., pp. 56-8.

⁵⁵ PSPM., p. 80.

⁵⁶ Thibaut, E. T. of VPS., *Indian Thought*, vol. I, p. 357.

Therefore, it must be held that the self is immediately known not as the object of consciousness as Kumārila holds, but as the knowing subject or substrate of consciousness. The Prābhākara rejects Kumārila's theory on the following grounds: Firstly, the self is always the knower; it can never be an object of knowledge. It is self-contradictory to suppose that the self can be both subject and object of the same act of knowledge.⁵⁷ Secondly, as the self is directly revealed in every cognition of an object as its cognizer, it is needless to assume another cognition, viz. internal perception which should directly reveal the self as its object.⁵⁸ The Prābhākara's view may briefly be compared with that of the Buddhist idealist. According to both of them, consciousness is self-luminous. But according to the Buddhist idealist, consciousness alone is real, which is polarized into subject and object, which are unreal. But according to the Prābhākara, both subject and object are real and manifested by consciousness which is self-luminous.

8. *The Jaina*

The Jaina maintains, with the Prābhākara, that a cognition is always appropriated by the self, and it reveals itself, the self, and its object; that every act of cognition cognizes itself, the cognizing subject and the cognized object. But he differs from the Prābhākara's view that consciousness alone is self-luminous, which reveals the cognizing subject and the cognized object, which are equally non-luminous. The Jaina does not regard the self as non-luminous. According to him, in the cognition 'I know the jar through my self' it is not the cognition of the jar that reveals the self and the jar, as the Prābhākara holds, but it is the self which reveals itself through itself, the jar, and the cognition of the jar. In this cognition the cognizer, 'I' or the self, the instrument 'myself' and the result 'knowing' are as much objects of perception as the cognized object, e.g. the jar. In this cognition I am directly conscious of myself as qualified by the cognition of the jar; so my self is as much an object of perception as the jar and the cognition of the jar. Just as we cannot deny the perception of the cognition and the object, so we cannot deny the perception of the cognizing subject. The cognition and the cognizing self are directly revealed in our experience. Hence, they

⁵⁷ PP., p. 151.

⁵⁸ PP., p. 151, and VPS., p. 54.

cannot but be regarded as objects of consciousness. For whatever is revealed in our experience is cognized, and whatever is cognized is an object of consciousness. It is self-contradictory to suppose that the self and its cognition are not objects of perception, though they are directly revealed in our experience.

The Jaina holds that the self is an object of internal perception. When I feel that 'I am happy', or 'I am unhappy', I have a distinct and immediate apprehension of the self as an object of internal perception. But how can it be an object of direct and immediate apprehension or perception, though it has no form at all? The Jaina replies that just as pleasure can be perceived though it is without any form, so the self also can be perceived though it is without any form. When pleasure is perceived it is not perceived apart from the self. It is perceived always as belonging to the self. Pleasure is never perceived as 'this is pleasure' as a jar is perceived as 'this is a jar'. Pleasure is always perceived as 'I am pleased', or 'I have pleasure'. Hence the perception of pleasure in the form 'I am pleased' not only reveals pleasure but also the self. Thus, the self is an object of internal perception. This is another point of difference between the Jaina and the Prābhākara. The Prābhākara holds that the self is always perceived as the subject of external perception or object-cognition; that it can never be perceived as an object of internal perception. The Jaina holds that the self is manifested both by external perception and by internal perception.⁵⁹

9. *The Upaniṣads*

The Upaniṣads identify the self with the Absolute, the Ātman with Brahman. The Ātman is not an object of knowledge. In the Upaniṣads we do not find clear-cut arguments for this doctrine. But we find certain passages in them, which may be regarded as symbolical expressions of the following arguments. Firstly, the Ātman is absolutely unconditioned. It has no attributes. It is devoid of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell.⁶⁰ It is devoid of all sensible qualities. So it cannot be perceived through the external sense-organs. It is devoid of pleasure, pain, and the like. So it cannot be perceived through the internal organ (*manas*).⁶¹ It is undefinable by speech, and unattainable by the outer or

⁵⁹ PKM., pp. 31-3.

⁶⁰ Kath. Up., III, 15.

⁶¹ Kena Up., i, 5.

inner senses.⁶² Secondly, the Ātman is beyond the categories of space, time, and causality. It contains space but is not spatial; it contains time but is not temporal; it contains causality, but is not subject to the law of causality. It is spaceless, timeless, and causeless. It is the ultimate reality. It is the noumenon. It is beyond the categories of the phenomenal world. So it cannot be comprehended by the intellect which can know only phenomena bound by space, time, and causality. The intellect can give only categorized knowledge. The Ātman is beyond all categories. So it is beyond the grasp of the intellect. Thirdly, the Ātman is the knower of all things and as such cannot be known by anything. How can the knower be known?⁶³ How can you see the seer of seeing? How can you hear the hearer of hearing? How can you know him through the mind, which impels the mind to know? How can you comprehend him through the intellect, which makes the intellect comprehend?⁶⁴ The Ātman is the seer but is not seen; it is the hearer but is not heard; it is the comprehender but is not comprehended; it is the thinker but is not thought.⁶⁵ The Ātman is the witness (*sākṣin*),⁶⁶ the seer (*paridraṣṭr*),⁶⁷ the knower (*viññātr*).⁶⁸ And the knower can never be known. The subject can never be an object of knowledge. Deussen says: "The Ātman as the knowing subject can never become an object for us, and is therefore itself unknowable."⁶⁹ Ranade says: "The Ātman is unknowable because He is the Eternal Subject who knows. How could the Eternal Knower be an object of knowledge?"⁷⁰ Fourthly, the Ātman is all-comprehending. It comprehends all relations. It can never be a term of any relation. It embraces the distinction of subject and object, knower and known. How, then, can it be an object of knowledge? The distinction of subject and object is within it; it is not subject to the distinction. It is non-dual. It is one. It is infinite (*bhūmā*). In it one cannot see any other thing, one cannot hear any other thing, one cannot comprehend any other thing.⁷¹ Where there is duality in appearance, there one smells the other, one sees the other, one hears

⁶² Kath. Up., iii, 12; Tait. Up., ii, 4, 1.

⁶³ Viññātāram are kena vijāniyāt. Br. Up., ii, 4, 14.

⁶⁴ Ibid., iii, 4, 2.

⁶⁵ Ibid., iii, 8, 11.

⁶⁶ Svet. Up., vi, 14.

⁶⁷ Pras. Up., vi, 5.

⁶⁸ Br. Up., ii, 4, 14.

⁶⁹ The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 403.

⁷⁰ A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, p. 272.

⁷¹ Chānd. Up., vii, 24, 1.

the other, one addresses the other, one comprehends the other, and one knows the other. But where there is no duality, where everything is realized as the Ātman, how should one smell, see, hear, address, comprehend, and know the other?"⁷³ The Ātman is the one, infinite reality. It is beyond duality. It is beyond distinction. So it cannot be an object of knowledge.⁷⁴ "The supreme ātman," says Deussen, "is unknowable, because it is the all-comprehending unity, whereas all knowledge presupposes a duality of subject and object."⁷⁵ This conception of the Ātman as beyond the distinction of subject and object is higher than the conception of the Ātman as the Eternal Knower or Subject. Śaṅkara advocates this conception. Lastly, though the Upaniṣads make the Ātman absolutely unknowable as the unconditional Brahman, they do not make it so as the inner self (*pratyagātman*) of man. The Ātman which is hidden in the heart of man (*guhvaṛeṣṭha*) as the inner self is apprehended by ecstatic intuition (*adhyātmayoga*).⁷⁶ God created the sense-organs in such a way that they always turn outwards to external objects: they can never turn inwards to apprehend the inner self. So we cannot perceive the inner self through the sense-organs. But some men can perceive it by withdrawing their senses from the external objects and concentrating their minds on the inner self (*pratyagātman*).⁷⁷ The inner self hidden in all creatures cannot be comprehended by the gross or unrefined intellect. It can be perceived only by *yogis* or subtle seers through their subtle one-pointed intellect or intuition.⁷⁸ The Ātman can be realized by one in meditation through the pure, enlightened heart, where there is the illumination of spiritual vision.⁷⁹ The Ātman can be realized only by supra-intellectual intuition (*prajñāna*).⁸⁰ Thus, the inner self of man is inaccessible to the outer and inner senses, *manas* and *buddhi*. It is only an object of higher intuition which is above intellect.

10. The Śaṅkara-Vedāntist: The Self and Consciousness

Śaṅkara develops the Upaniṣadic conception of the Ātman and regards it as the universal light of consciousness. According

⁷³ Br. Up., ii, 4, 14.

⁷⁴ H. N. Dutt, *Brahmatattva* (Bengali), ch. iii.

⁷⁵ *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 79.

⁷⁶ Kath. Up., ii, 12.

⁷⁷ Ibid., iii, 12.

⁷⁸ Kath. Up., ii, 24.

⁷⁹ Ibid., iv, 1.

⁸⁰ Muṇḍ. Up., iii, 1, 8.

to Rāmānuja, consciousness is a substance (*dravya*), and still it is a property of the self, even as a ray of light, though a substance, is a property of the lamp.⁸⁰ The Naiyāyika, the Vaiśeṣika, and Prabhākara hold that consciousness is a quality (*guṇa*) of the self.⁸¹ Kumārila holds that consciousness is an action (*karma*) of the self, because it is the result of its cognitive activity (*jñānakarma*), and because the cognitive activity and its result, viz. consciousness, should be regarded as one.⁸² The Sāṃkhya, on the other hand, holds that consciousness constitutes the very essence (*svarūpa*) of the self and is not its quality or action.⁸³ Śaṅkara also holds with the Sāṃkhya that consciousness is neither a substance, nor a quality, nor an action of the self. The self is mere consciousness. It is not a substance to which consciousness belongs either as a quality or an action. Though there is no difference between the self and consciousness, yet we draw a distinction between the two, and speak of 'consciousness' when we wish to emphasize the relation of the self to objects, and we speak of the 'self' simply when we do not want to emphasize that relation.⁸⁴ In fact, the self and consciousness are one. The self is of the nature of eternal consciousness.⁸⁵

Let us compare Śaṅkara's doctrine with Prabhākara's views. Prabhākara holds that consciousness is self-luminous, but that the self which is the substrate of consciousness is not self-luminous. Śaṅkara, on the other hand, holds that the self is nothing but consciousness, and as such it is self-luminous. Prabhākara holds that the self is always known as an ego or a knower; that it is identical with the ego. But Śaṅkara holds that the self is the eternal light of consciousness beyond the distinction of ego and non-ego. The self cannot be identical with the ego. If it were so, it would be known as an ego even in dreamless sleep. But, as a matter of fact, there is no such consciousness in dreamless sleep, though all admit that the self persists at that time. Prabhākara argues that there is no 'I'-consciousness in dreamless sleep, because, at that time, there is no consciousness of objects, and there can be no 'I'-consciousness apart from object-consciousness. But the Śaṅkarite asks: In dreamless sleep is there the absence of pure consciousness? Or, is there the absence of empirical

⁸⁰ TMK., pp. 399-400.

⁸¹ VPS., p. 57.

⁸² S.B., ii, 3, 18.

⁸³ VPS., p. 58.

⁸⁴ 'Jñāṇaḥ nityacaitanyo' yamātmā. S.B., ii, 3, 18.

consciousness which depends on the affection of the self by objects? The first alternative is impossible, since pure consciousness is eternal and so can never be suspended. The second alternative also is excluded, since the consciousness of the self does not depend on the affection of the self by objects. So the Śaṅkarite maintains, that the self is not identical with the ego, and that it is not manifested as an ego in dreamless sleep because it remains in that state as pure self-luminous consciousness above the distinction of ego and non-ego. "When a man, on waking from dreamless sleep, reflects 'I slept well', he transfers the *I*-character which belongs to all waking cognition to the state of deep sleep in which the self, freed for the time from all shackles of egoity was abiding in its own blissful nature and associated only with general non-particularized nescience, not with any of its special modifications."²² In dreamless sleep egoism (*ahamkāra*) is resolved into general nescience (*avidyā*); at the time of waking it is formed again out of nescience. So in waking life there is ego-consciousness, but in dreamless sleep there is none.

Thus Śaṅkara differs from Prabhākara in his conception of the self. According to Prabhākara, the self is identical with the ego; egoism constitutes the essence of the self; *I*-consciousness is a permanent characteristic of the self; in all cognitions of objects the self is revealed as the subject of knowledge or ego. According to Śaṅkara, on the other hand, the self is consciousness, pure and simple; it is neither the substrate of consciousness nor the subject of consciousness; it is neither a conscious substance nor a conscious subject or ego. The self is the pure light of consciousness which is self-luminous; it is above the distinction of ego and non-ego, subject and object. But though the self is pure self-luminous consciousness, it appears as an ego when it is determined by the limiting condition of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) modified into egoism (*ahamkāra*), and cannot distinguish its pure essence from its phenomenal appearance as an ego. Egoism does not constitute the essence of the self, as Prabhākara holds, but it is a modification of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which is an evolute of nescience. It is an adventitious mark of the self, which is superimposed on it by nescience. The self which is one, eternal, changeless consciousness can neither be a knower (*jñātṛ*), nor an agent (*kartṛ*), nor an enjoyer (*bhokṛ*),

²² *Indian Thought*, vol. I, p. 368.

since these imply agency, activity, and change which cannot belong to the changeless and eternal self. These are phenomenal appearances of the self superimposed on it by nescience.

Śaṅkara draws a distinction between the *jīva* and the *Ātman*. The *Ātman* is the eternal light of consciousness. The *jīva* is the eternal consciousness as limited by the organism, sense-organs, *manas*, and *ahamkāra*. The *Ātman* is the pure consciousness which is the presupposition of all experience; it is presupposed by experience of all objects, and as such is entirely non-objective. But the *jīva* is both subject and object, knower and known, ego and non-ego. It is both *I* and *me*. The *Ātman* is never an object of consciousness. The *jīva* is an object of self-consciousness (*asmātpratyaya*). The *Ātman* becomes an object of self-consciousness, when it loses its purity and is determined by the limiting conditions of body, sense-organ and the like. When it is freed from all these fetters, it is not an object of self-consciousness. The *Ātman* as the inner self (*pratyagātman*) is apprehended by immediate intuition.⁸⁸

Śaṅkara says that even as fire cannot burn itself so the *Ātman* cannot know itself. The *Ātman* is not of the nature of an object; so it can never be an object of knowledge.⁸⁹ It cannot be perceived through the sense-organs, since it is the witness of all perceptible objects.⁹⁰ It is not an object of mental perception or intellectual comprehension.⁹¹ The *Ātman* cannot be an object of its own apprehension, since being without parts it cannot be split up into the knowing subject (*jñātṛ*) and the known object (*jñeya*) at the same time.⁹² But though it can never be an object of empirical knowledge, it can be apprehended by higher intuition. The *yogis* have a vision of the *Ātman*, which is undefinable and beyond all phenomenal appearances by meditation (*saṁrādhana*). Meditation consists in devotion, concentration of mind and ecstatic intuition.⁹³ Govindānanda says, "The *Ātman* can be realized by intuition."⁹⁴

⁸⁸ Na tāvadayamekāntenāviśayaḥ, asmātpratyaya viśayatvāt, aparokṣat-vācca pratyagātmāsiddheḥ. S.B., Introduction.

⁸⁹ Na cāgneriva ātmā ātmano viśayo na cāviśaye jñāturjñānamutpadyate. S.B., Br. Up., ii, 4, 14.

⁹⁰ S.B., iii, 2, 23.

⁹¹ S.B., Br. Up., iii, 8, 11.

⁹² Na hi niravayavasya yugapat jñeya-jñātṛtvopapattiḥ. S.B., Tait. Up., ii, 1.

⁹³ Enamātmānaṁ nirastasaṁstaprapaṇcam avyaktāṁ saṁrādhana-kāle paśyanti yoginaḥ. S.B., iii, 2, 24.

⁹⁴ Yogalabhya ātmā yogātmā. Ratnaprabhā on S.B., iii, 2, 24.

Vācaspati discusses this question in *Bhāmātī*. According to him, the inner self (*pratyagātman*) is an object of higher intuition, but the *jīva* or individual soul, which is its phenomenal appearance, is an object of self-consciousness (*ahampratyaya*). The inner self (*pratyagātman*) is self-luminous, non-objective, and partless; still when it is determined by the gross body, subtle body, sense-organs, *manas*, and *buddhi*, which are the products of beginningless undefinable, *avidyā*, though unlimited, it appears as limited, though single, it appears as multiple, though inactive, it appears as active, though not an enjoyer, it appears as an enjoyer, though not an object of consciousness, it appears as an object of self-consciousness, and is manifested to us in the condition of a *jīva*⁸³ The Ātman is unlimited. But when it is limited by *buddhi* and other conditions, and cannot distinguish itself from these limiting conditions, it appears as a *jīva*. And the *jīva* is a knower (*jñātṛ*), a doer (*kartṛ*), and an enjoyer (*bhokṛ*). It is of a composite character. It is self and not-self, subject and object, knower and known. As pure consciousness (*cidātmā*) it is self-luminous, and not an object of self-consciousness. But as conditioned by the limiting adjuncts of *buddhi* and the like, it is an object of self-consciousness.⁸⁴ Though the *jīva* is non-different from the Ātman, it is entangled in empirical life as limited by certain conditions. The active agent, which is the object of self-consciousness, is the *jīvātman*, which is determined by the aggregate of limiting conditions. The *paramātman*, which is the witness of this empirical self, is not an object of self-consciousness.⁸⁵ Self-consciousness (*ahampratyaya*) is a mental mode which is unconscious. And this unconscious mental mode can never manifest the Ātman. It is the Ātman that manifests the mental mode of self-consciousness.⁸⁶ It is the presupposition of all experience, and so can never be an object of experience. It is the presupposition of self-consciousness, and so can never be an object of self-consciousness. According to Vācaspati, the inner self is of the nature of pure consciousness and manifests all things, but it is

⁸³ *Bhāmātī*, i, 1, 1. P., 38.

⁸⁴ *Jīvo hi cidātmatayā svayamprakāśatayā aṣṭayo'pyaupādhikena rūpeṇ aṣṭaya iti bhāvaḥ. Bhāmātī*, i, 1, 1 (Bombay. 1917), p. 39.

⁸⁵ *Ahampratyayaṣṭayo yaḥ kartā kāryakāraṇasaṃghātopahito jīvātmā, tatsākṣitvena paramātmāno'hampratyayaṣṭayatvasya pratyuktatvāt. Bhāmātī*, i, 1, 4, p. 134.

⁸⁶ *Na hyātmā'nyārthaḥ, anyat tu sarvamātmārtham. Ibid.*, p. 134.

not manifested by any other thing. Still we must admit that it is apprehended by immediate intuition. Otherwise, all things would be unmanifested to us, since they are manifested by the inner self, and this would lead to utter ignorance of the whole universe.⁹⁷

Anandagiri regards the Ātman as self-luminous, and the not-self (*anātman*) as the object of its consciousness. The Ātman, which is of the nature of consciousness, is manifested as the witness (*sākṣin*). It cannot be said that the Ātman is not at all an object of consciousness like the void. Though it is not an object of self-consciousness (*asmatpratyaya*), it is apprehended by immediate intuition.⁹⁸

Govindānanda holds that the *jīva* is apprehended by self-consciousness.⁹⁹ But how can the *jīva* be the knowing subject and the known object at the same time? Apyayadīkṣita holds that the *jīva* as determined by the mental modes of pleasure, pain, and the like is the object of self-consciousness, and as determined by *antaḥkāraṇa* is the knowing subject. So there is no contradiction here.¹⁰⁰

Padmapāda raises the question of contradiction in the apprehension of the Ātman by itself. The Ātman is the self (*viśayin*); the object is the not-self (*viśaya*). There is an essential difference between the two. The Ātman is of the nature of consciousness. The object is unconscious. The Ātman is internal (*pratyak*) but the object is external (*parāk*). Consciousness is directed inward to the self; but it is directed outward to the object. The object is of the nature of *this* (*idam*); but the Ātman is of the nature of *not-this* (*anidam*). The object is the common property of everybody's experience. The Ātman is not a property of anyone's experience. How can the single, partless Ātman break up into two such contradictory parts as the knowing subject and the known object? Padmapāda answers that the Ātman is not an object of self-consciousness; that egoism (*ahamkāra*) which is of a dual character of subject and object is the object of self-

⁹⁷ *Avāśyam cidātmā'parokṣo'bhyupetaveyaḥ, tadaprathāyām sarvasyāprathanena jagadāndhyaprasaṅgāt. Ibid. i, 1, 1, p. 39.*

⁹⁸ *Asmatpratyayāviśayatve'pyaparokṣatvāt ekāntenāviśayatvābhāvāt. Nyāyanirnaya, i, 1, 1.*

⁹⁹ *Yo'hamdhigamyah sa kartā sa eva jīvaḥ. Ratnaprabhā, ii, 3, 38.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ahamśukhityādanubhavāt sukhādiviśiṣṭarūpeṇa karmatvam, antaḥkāraṇaviśiṣṭarūpeṇa kartṛtvam. Kalpataruparimāla, i, 1, 1, p. 39.*

consciousness.¹⁰¹ Prakāśātman elaborates the view of Padmapāda. He says that the Ātman cannot be the knowing subject and the known object because they are of contradictory characters. The light of the sun is self-luminous; it illumines all things, but is not illumined by any other thing. But its reflection in the mirror is illumined by the light of the sun. Likewise, the Ātman is the universal light of consciousness. It is self-luminous. It manifests all objects, but is not manifested by any other object. But its reflection in *ahamkāra* is manifested by the Ātman through the mental mode of self-consciousness. So the Ātman is not the object of self-consciousness. It is *ahamkāra* (egoism) or the *antaḥkaraṇa* superimposed on the Ātman that is the object of self-consciousness.¹⁰² According to Vidyāraṇya also, the Ātman cannot be apprehended by itself because it does not possess the dual character of subject and object. But *ahamkāra* is of a dual character; even as a piece of iron modified by contact with fire appears to have the dual character of iron and fire, so the *antaḥkaraṇa* being superimposed on the Ātman which is reflected in it in the form of *ahamkāra* appears to have the dual character of subject and object. It is of a composite character. It is, as it were, a mixture of self and not-self. It is the *antaḥkaraṇa* superimposed on the Ātman, or the Ātman as reflected in, and determined by, the *antaḥkaraṇa*. The Ātman which is the presupposition of all experience of objects is the conscious and non-objective element, and the *antaḥkaraṇa* which is superimposed on the self and is impregnated with the reflection of the self is the unconscious and objective element in *ahamkāra*. So *ahamkāra* is the object of self-consciousness.¹⁰³ Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstri gives a similar account of the Śaṅkarite view of Ātma-pratyakṣa in his lucid and elaborate introduction to *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. In the cognition 'I am conscious', 'I' does not stand for the Ātman but for egoism (*ahamkāra*) with which it is erroneously identified. In self-consciousness (*ahampratyaya*) the Ātman as reflected in egoism (*ahamkāra*) is manifested.¹⁰⁴ Rāmānuja objects that if the Ātman is not the ego (*aham*) or 'I', it cannot be the inner

¹⁰¹ *Asmatpratyayatvābhimato'hamkārah. Sa cedamanidāmrūpavastugarbhah sarvalokasākṣikaḥ. Pañcapādikā, p. 17.*

¹⁰² *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa, p. 49.*

¹⁰³ *VPS., p. 53.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ahampratyaye hi ahamkārasamvalitam caitanyamavabhāṣate. Introduction, VP., (Calcutta University edition, 1930), p. 29.*

self or the seer. The Sāṃkarite urges that the object of self-consciousness is the Ātman as determined by egoism, and that the subject of self-consciousness is the universal consciousness as conditioned by egoism. Egoism enters as a constituent element into the object-self, but not into the subject-self, of which it is only a limiting adjunct.¹⁰⁵ Universal consciousness is the ultimate reality. It is subject-object-less. It is beyond the distinction of subject and object. It has really neither subject (*nirāśraya*) nor object (*nirviśaya*). The pure light of universal consciousness appears as the knowing subject owing to nescience when it is determined by egoism (*ahamkāra*). *Ahamkāra* is material; it can never be the knower, since it is unconscious. The *jīva* is the knower; and the *jīva* is the Ātman as conditioned by *ahamkāra*. Though *ahamkāra* is material and unconscious, it can be the knower when the Ātman is reflected in it owing to its proximity to the Ātman. The universal consciousness as reflected in *ahamkāra* is the *jīva* which is the knower and the doer. Neither *ahamkāra* in itself nor the Ātman in itself is the knower. But the Ātman as reflected in *ahamkāra* and conditioned by it is the knower. Owing to the reflection of the Ātman in *ahamkāra* there is an erroneous identification of it with *ahamkāra*. The Ātman which is above the distinction of ego and non-ego appears as the ego. In itself it is not the ego. In deep sleep the Ātman persists as the seer or witness, not as the knower because *ahamkāra* is resolved at that time.¹⁰⁶

The author of *Pañcadaśī* holds that the Ātman is neither perceptible nor imperceptible. It is the subject (*viśayin*); so it can never be the object of perception (*viśaya*). But though it is not an object of sense-perception, it is apprehended by immediate intuition.¹⁰⁷ Rāmakaṣṇa holds that the Ātman is self-luminous without being an object of cognition like cognition, since it is realized by higher intuition.¹⁰⁸ It cannot be subject and object at the same time. So it can never be an object (*karma*) of cognition. If it is argued that the Ātman, in its pure essence, is the subject (*kartr*), and as determined by a mental mode is the object (*karma*), it may as well be argued that a person in his

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, p. 30.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 31-32.

¹⁰⁷ *Pañcadaśī*, *pañcakośavivekaprakaraṇam*, 27-8.

¹⁰⁸ *Ātmā svaprakāśaḥ sarvītkarmatāmāntareṇāparokṣatvāt samvedanaavat.* Rāmakaṣṇa's commentary on *Pañcadaśī*, iii, 28, p. 68 (Bombay, 1912).

essential nature is the subject of going, and as determined by the act of going is the object of going, which is absurd.¹⁰⁹ So Rāmakṛṣṇa concludes that the Ātman can never be an object (*karma*) of cognition.¹¹⁰ Citsukha also holds a similar view. The Ātman cannot be an object of cognition. If it were so, it would be subject and object of the same act of cognition, which is self-contradictory. It cannot be argued that the Ātman in itself is the subject and as determined by the mental modes of pleasure, pain, and the like is the object. In that case, the same person would be the subject as well as the object of going, which is absurd.¹¹¹ So Citsukha holds that the Ātman is self-luminous without being an object of cognition.¹¹²

The Śaṅkarite position may be thus briefly summed up. The self cannot be an object of introspection (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*) or self-consciousness (*aham-pratyaya*), as Kumārila holds, for, in that case, it would become a not-self as unconscious as an external object; nor can it be perceived as the ego as opposed to the non-ego, or the subject of all knowledge of objects, as Prabhākara holds, because the ego is the phenomenal appearance of the self, being really a modification of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which is an evolute of nescience. The self which is the one, undifferentiated, eternal light of consciousness, above the distinction of ego and non-ego—subject and object—can be known only by an immediate and intuitive consciousness. Though the knower (*draṣṭṛ*), the known (*dṛśya*), and knowledge or consciousness (*dṛśi*) are apprehended by all as undoubted, still the subject of consciousness or the knower (*draṣṭṛ*), and the object of consciousness or the known (*dṛśya*) depend upon consciousness (*dṛśi*) for their reality. Hence, consciousness alone has ultimate reality, and the knower and the known, the ego and the non-ego, have empirical reality only.¹¹³ Consciousness, again, is of two kinds: unconditional (*nirupādhika*) and conditional (*sopādhika*). Unconditional consciousness is both subjectless (*nirāśraya*) and objectless (*nirviśaya*): it is identical with Being (*sonmātrārūpa*): it does not depend upon anything else to realize its existence. It is called Brahman.

¹⁰⁹ 'To go' is a transitive verb in Sanskrit. The subject of going is an agent, and the object of going is the place to which he goes.

¹¹⁰ Rāmakṛṣṇa's commentary on Pañcadaśī, ch. iii, 28, p. 68.

¹¹¹ Citsukhi, p. 25.

¹¹² Akarmatvāccātmanah svaprakāśatvam. Ibid, p. 25.

¹¹³ R.B., i, 1, 1.

Conditional consciousness, on the other hand, has a subject (*sāśraya*) as well as an object (*saviśaya*), and depends on perception, inference, and the like. As it depends upon subject and object it has only an empirical reality. It is manifested by the *antaḥkaraṇa* (internal organ). It consists in the function (*vr̥tti*) of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Hence, subjecthood or egoity (*jñātr̥tva*) must belong to the *antaḥkaraṇa*, or the empirical self (*jīva*) which is conditioned by the *antaḥkaraṇa*. It cannot belong to the pure self (*ātman*), which is pure consciousness. It cannot be the knower, subject, or ego. Egoity belongs to *ahamkāra*, which is a modification of *avidyā*. Selfhood (*ātmavā*) is falsely attributed to *ahamkāra*, which is entirely different from the self. So, unconditional consciousness, which is above the distinction of ego and non-ego, constitutes the essence of the self. It can be known only by an immediate intuition.

11. *The Rāmānuja-Vedāntist*

Rāmānuja holds with Śaṅkara that consciousness constitutes the essence of the self. But he differs from Śaṅkara in holding that the self is not mere consciousness but also the subject of consciousness: even as a lamp itself is of the nature of light, and still light is its property, so the self itself is of the nature of consciousness, and still consciousness is a property of the self. According to Rāmānuja, there can be no consciousness without a self, just as there can be no light without a lamp; just as the lamp is nothing but light, but still light is referred to the lamp, so the self is nothing but consciousness, but still consciousness is referred to the unity of the self.¹¹⁴ Thus, the self, according to Rāmānuja, is not mere consciousness, but the ego or subject of consciousness; the ego is not a phenomenal appearance of the self when it is determined by the limiting condition of *ahamkāra* (egoism), a modification of *antaḥkaraṇa* (internal organ) which is a particular form of nescience (*avidyā*); but it is identical with the self and constitutes its very essence.¹¹⁵

Śaṅkara holds that just as the idea of silver is illusorily superimposed upon a nacre, so egoity is illusorily superimposed upon the self which is really beyond the distinction of ego and

¹¹⁴ R.B., i, 1, 1.

¹¹⁵ Tattvatraya, pp. 17-18.

non-ego. But if egoity were nothing but an illusory superimposition of nescience upon the self, then there would be a non-discrimination of the ego from pure consciousness or the self, and there would be such a consciousness as 'I am *consciousness*', and not as 'I am conscious'. But, as a matter of fact, we always have such an experience as 'I am conscious'; this undeniable fact of experience clearly shows that the self is the subject of consciousness. We cannot divide this single indivisible consciousness into two parts and hold that the element of 'I' is illusory and the element of consciousness is real—'I'-ness or egoity is an illusory superimposition of nescience, and consciousness alone is a real ontological verity.¹¹⁶ Śaṅkara argues, that by the ego we mean the agent (*kartr*) of cognition (*jñāna*), and that this agency of knowledge cannot be regarded as an attribute of the self which is changeless and eternal. Hence, egoity or the character of a knower which involves an action and consequently change, is not a property of the unchanging and eternal self, but of the unconscious *antaḥkaraṇa* (internal organ) which is modified into egoism (*ahamkāra*). Rāmānuja contends that egoity or the character of a knower cannot be the property of an unconscious object, viz. the *antaḥkaraṇa* (internal organ), but that it is the distinctive character of a conscious being, viz. the self. Moreover, the ego or knower does not involve any change; it is the subject of knowledge; a knower is not necessarily an active, energizing, and changing principle. According to Rāmānuja, the self is eternal, and the natural consciousness of the self is eternal; but though the consciousness of the self is eternal, it is subject to contraction and expansion, which are not natural properties of the self, but its mere accidents due to the *karma* of the person in the cycle of his mundane existence.¹¹⁷ The self, in its pure essence, is unchanging. But though changeless, it is a knower or ego. The agency of knowledge cannot belong to the unconscious organ of egoity (*ahamkāra*). How can the unconscious *ahamkāra*, which is a modification of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, become a conscious knower? It may be argued that the unconscious organ of egoity (*ahamkāra*) may appear as a conscious knower (*jñātr*) because of the reflection of consciousness in it owing to its proximity to consciousness or the self.¹¹⁸ But this argument is quite unsound. What is the

¹¹⁶ R.B., i, 1, 1.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Śaṅkhya.

¹¹⁸ R.B., i, 1, 1.

meaning of the 'reflection of consciousness'? Does it mean the reflection of *ahamkāra* on consciousness? Or, does it mean the reflection of consciousness on the unconscious *ahamkāra*? The first alternative is impossible, since Śaṅkara does not admit at all that consciousness in itself, or the self, is a knower. Nor can consciousness be reflected upon the unconscious *ahamkāra*, since that which is unconscious can never be a knower.

Śaṅkara holds that the self exists in deep sleep as the witness (*Sākṣin*) of the general non-particularized nescience (*avidyā*), when the organ of egoity (*ahamkāra*) is dissolved. But Rāmānuja asks: What is the meaning of a *Sākṣin*? By a *Sākṣin* we mean that which directly and immediately knows an object; and hence that which does not know an object cannot be called a *Sākṣin*; mere consciousness is never regarded as a *Sākṣin*; a *Sākṣin* is nothing but a knower or an ego.¹¹⁹ Egoity is not an adventitious property of the self, so that when this property is destroyed, the self may remain in its own essential condition as the pure light of consciousness which is above the distinction of ego and non-ego; but egoity constitutes the essence of the self; the ego is identical with the self and the self is identical with the ego. And this egoity of the self persists even in dreamless sleep, but there is no clear and distinct consciousness of the egoity at that time, since it is overpowered by *tamas* (ignorance), and there is no consciousness of external objects at that time. If it did not persist in deep sleep, we could never remember that we slept well on waking from sleep. And even when the self is released from the fetters of mundane existence, it does not realize itself as pure consciousness but as an ego. The self is always manifested as an ego, and never as mere consciousness above the distinction of ego and non-ego.¹²⁰ Rāmānuja's conception of the self as an ego agrees, to a great extent, with Prabhākara's view of the self, the only difference being that according to the latter, consciousness does not constitute the essence of the self, as Rāmānuja holds with Śaṅkara, but it is a quality of the self which is its substrate. Veṅkaṭanātha holds that the self is an object of self-consciousness, but that the self, in its pure essence, is clearly apprehended by *yogic* intuition.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ R.B., i, 1, 1, and NSA., p. 59.

¹²⁰ R.B., i, 1, 1.

¹²¹ NSA. pp. 60-1.

12. *Comparison of the Different Views*

The Cārvāka identifies the self either with the gross body, or with the sense-organs, or with the life-force, or with the mind (*manas*). His conception of the self is that of 'the material self' of James, since even mind is material, and thought is a function of matter. He cannot rise above 'the sensitive and appetitive self' of Ward. Sadānanda speaks of some Cārvāka philosophers who identify the self with the sons, i.e. near and dear ones. Their conception of the self is that of 'the social self' of James. The Buddhist idealist, like James, identifies the self with the stream of consciousness without any core of substantiality. He regards the self as a psychic continuum. He cannot rise above the psychological *Me*. His conception of the self is purely empirical. Like James, he does not recognize the transcendental or pure self. The Naiyāyika, however, recognizes the self as a permanent substance endued with the qualities of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort. Some older Naiyāyikas hold that the self is an object of inference. It is inferred from its qualities as their substratum. It cannot be perceived because it cannot be subject and object of the same act of knowledge. It cannot be the percipient and the perceived at the same time. The Naiyāyika rises above the psychological *Me* or the empirical self to the conception of the pure self or *I*. He conceives the pure self as the substratum of the empirical self or the stream of cognitions, affections, and conations. These psychoses are the qualities of the pure self, which inhere in it. They have no existence apart from it. There is an inseparable relation between the two. But they cannot be identified with each other. A substance cannot be identified with its qualities. "To identify *I* and *Me*," says Dr. Ward, "is logically impossible, for, *ex vi terminorum*, it is to identify subject and object."¹²² Again he says, "the *I* cannot be the *Me* nor the *Me* the *I*. At the same time the objective *Me* is impossible without the subjective *I*."¹²³ Some earlier Naiyāyikas hold that the self cannot be perceived because the subject can never become the object. But this position is not satisfactory. We cannot be deprived all together of the perception of the self, which thinks, feels, and wills. Hence, the Vaiśeṣika holds that

¹²² *Psychological Principles*, p. 379 (1920).

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 379 n. (1920).

the self is not an object of ordinary perception, but it is an object of *yogic* perception or higher intuition. The Sāṃkhya also holds with some Naiyāyikas that the self is an object of inference. But, according to him, the self can be inferred from its reflection (*pratibimba*) in *buddhi* as its original (*bimba*). The Sāṃkhya dualism of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, Draṣṭṛ (the seer) and Dṛśya (seen), self and not-self makes the perception of the self impossible. The self is only the seer; it can never be seen; it can never turn back upon itself and perceive it. If it is ever perceived as the object, it will cease to be the subject. But the Pātañjala, like the Vaiśeṣika, holds that the self can be perceived by higher intuition (*prātibha jñāna*). But how can the same self be subject and object at the same time? The Pātañjala holds that the self in its essence, or the pure self, is the subject, and that the self as reflected in *buddhi*, or the empirical self, is the object. The pure self intuitively through its reflection in *buddhi*, or the empirical self; it cannot make itself an *object* of direct intuition. Thus, the Pātañjala agrees with the Vaiśeṣika's view that the self can be perceived only by the *yogis*. But there is a difference between them. The Pātañjala holds that even in *yogic* intuition the pure self is the subject, while the empirical self, or the self as reflected in *buddhi*, is the object. The Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, holds that the self in itself, or the pure self, apart from its cognitions, feelings, and conations, which constitute the empirical self, is the object of *yogic* intuition. For, unlike the Pātañjala, the Vaiśeṣika does not set up an antagonism between the pure self and the empirical self and consider the former as a conscious subject and the latter as an unconscious object. But if the self can be an object of *yogic* perception, why should it not be an object of ordinary perception? Can we not distinguish between the *minimal* perception of the self and the *maximal* perception of the self, and hold that we have the former in ordinary perception, and the latter in *yogic* perception? Can we not have even a glimpse of the self in ordinary perception? The Neo-Naiyāyika holds that the self is an object of ordinary perception. It is perceived only through the mind in relation to its qualities. The older Naiyāyika holds that the self is inferred from its qualities, while the Neo-Naiyāyika holds that the self is perceived together with its qualities. The Bhāṭṭa agrees with the Neo-Naiyāyika that the self is an object of introspection or internal perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*). He does not hold, with Prabhākara, that every act of cognition is

appropriated by the self and that all consciousness involves self-consciousness. There is a distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness. The Bhāṭṭa holds that only when an object is known and appropriated by the self, it is known as an object of internal perception or self-consciousness. Prabhākara, on the other hand, holds that every act of cognition apprehends itself, the cognizing subject and the cognized object. Self-consciousness is not a higher degree of consciousness. All consciousness is self-consciousness. Object-consciousness and self-consciousness always go together. There is no self-consciousness apart from object-consciousness. The self is always perceived as the subject of object-consciousness. Psychologically it is more reasonable to hold that the self is an object of self-consciousness than to hold that it is always the subject of object-consciousness. The Jaina agrees with Prabhākara in holding, that in every cognition of an object there is the cognition of the self, the object, and itself; that every cognition is appropriated by the self. But he differs from Prabhākara in holding that it is the self that perceives itself through itself together with the object and the cognition of the object, and also that the self is an object of internal perception such as 'I am happy', 'I am unhappy', etc. But how can the subject be perceived as an *object*? The Jaina replies that whatever is directly and immediately experienced is the object of perception. But still the difficulty remains. How can the subject become an object? How can the knower become the known? "The whole difficulty," says Kant, "lies in this, how a subject can internally intuit itself." Dr. Ward holds that the pure self is always immanent in experience in the sense that experience without an experient is unintelligible. But it is transcendent in the sense that it can never be a direct object of its own experience.¹²⁴ So there is no difficulty in maintaining that the pure subject is immanent in experience and yet it is never a direct object of experience. In this sense, Prabhākara's view is right. Sāṃkhya avoids all these difficulties by conceiving the self as pure consciousness above the distinction of subject and object. He puts pure consciousness *above* the distinction of subject and object, while the Buddhist idealist (*Yogācāra*) puts the distinction of subject and object *within* consciousness. Hence, both of them have not to face the difficulty how the subject can become an object. But

¹²⁴ *Psychological Principles*, p. 380 (1920).

at least from the psychological point of view, this is cutting the Gordian knot. The pure self or Ātman of Śaṅkara is the Brahman or Absolute. The individual self (*jīva*) of Śaṅkara is the knower, the doer, and the enjoyer. Thus it is the subject from the individual point of view. The *jīva* is an object of self-consciousness (*ahampratyaya*), but the Ātman is apprehended by immediate intuition. According to the Upaniṣads, the Ātman is beyond the grasp of the senses, the mind, and the intellect; it is known only by higher intuition (*adhyātmayoga*). According to Rāmānuja, the self is essentially an ego or subject; egoity is not an accidental quality of the self; it constitutes its very essence, and the self is always perceived as an ego or subject. It is an object of self-consciousness and is clearly apprehended by higher intuition.

BOOK VI

CHAPTER XIII

INDEFINITE PERCEPTIONS

1. *Different Kinds of Indefinite Perceptions*

We have dealt with the nature and conditions of various kinds of perception. But our treatment of Indian Psychology of Perception would be inadequate without reference to the analysis of the various kinds of erroneous perceptions. Praśastapāda divides knowledge into two kinds: (1) True knowledge (*vidyā*) and (2) erroneous knowledge (*avidyā*). He subdivides the former into four kinds: (1) Perception, (2) inference, (3) recollection, and (4) higher intuition of an ascetic. He subdivides the latter also into four kinds: (1) Doubt (*saṁśaya*), error (*viparyaya*), (3) indefinite and indeterminate perception due to lapse of memory (*anadhyavasāya*), and (4) dream (*svapna*).¹ Śivāditya recognizes another kind of indefinite perception called Ūha. In this chapter we shall discuss the nature of doubtful and indefinite perceptions. In subsequent chapters of this Book we shall deal with illusory perceptions, dreams, and abnormal perceptions. Three kinds of indefinite perceptions have been analysed in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature: (1) Saṁśaya or doubtful perception; (2) Ūha or conjecture; and (3) Anadhyavasāya or indefinite and indeterminate perception due to lapse of memory. Let us consider the psychological nature of these indefinite perceptions apart from their epistemological value.

2. (a) *Saṁśaya (Doubtful Perception)*

We may have doubt with regard to perceptible objects or with regard to inferable objects. But here we are concerned only with doubtful perception. Bhāsarvajña defines doubt as uncertain knowledge (*anavadhāraṇa-jñāna*).² But this definition is too wide. It includes two other kinds of indefinite perception, e.g. Ūha and Anadhyavasāya. Praśastapāda defines doubt as uncertain knowledge

¹ PBh., p. 172.

² NSār., p. 1.

of the mind wavering between two alternatives, which arises from the perception of the common qualities of two objects, the peculiar qualities of which were perceived in the past, the recollection of the peculiar qualities of both the objects, and demerit (*adharma*).³ Śrīdhara explains it in the following manner. When we perceive a tall object from a distance but do not perceive the peculiar qualities of the object, we have a doubtful perception such as 'Is it a post or a man?' Here, we perceive the tallness of the object, which is common to a post and a man, but we do not perceive their distinctive features such as crookedness and cavities which are the peculiar characteristics of a post, and hands and feet which are the peculiar features of a man; but the perception of the common quality (e.g. tallness) simultaneously revives in memory the subconscious impressions of the peculiar characters of both the objects (e.g. a post and a man) left by previous perceptions; and our minds oscillate between these two objects revived in memory, and cannot come to a definite decision whether the object of perception is a post or man, because when we are inclined to think that the object is a post we are met by the opposite characters of a man revived in memory by the perception of the common quality; and thus our minds are drawn from the one to the other by conflicting trains of ideas, and consequently come to have a doubtful perception such as 'Is it a post or a man?' Thus, the perception of the common quality of two objects in the same substance is the cause of a doubtful perception. But how can it be so? Is it not destroyed when there is a reproduction of the peculiar qualities of the two objects? Śrīdhara contends, that the perception of the common quality simultaneously revives the subconscious impressions of the peculiar qualities of both objects with which it was associated in our past experience, but that it does not vanish after reinstating the ideas of the peculiar features of both objects; that it lingers in the mind, and together with the conflicting trains of ideas constitutes a complex psychosis called doubtful perception.⁴ Udayana points out that a doubtful perception arises from the perception of an object, endued with the common qualities of two objects along with the non-perception of their peculiar qualities, which brings about the recollection of their peculiar qualities.⁵ Thus, a doubtful

³ PBh., p. 174.

⁵ Kir., p. 261.

⁴ NK., p. 175-6.

perception is a complex presentative-representative process in which there is the perception of the common quality of two objects in the same substance together with two conflicting trains of ideas revived by the perceptions. But these conflicting trains of ideas are not integrated with the percept, but hover round it; sometimes the one train of ideas suggested by the percept gives rise to the apprehension of the one object, and sometimes the other train of ideas suggested by the percept gives rise to the apprehension of the other object. Thus, the mind oscillates between two alternatives in a doubtful perception. Udayana points out that the state of doubt has always an unpleasant feeling tone, and we always try to avoid it. Otherwise, it would never bring about the desire to know the object of doubtful cognition more definitely.⁶ Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says that a doubtful cognition arrests all activity for the time being.⁷

Śaṅkara Miśra defines a doubtful cognition as the knowledge of many contrary qualities in one and the same object. Annam Bhaṭṭa also defines it in the same way.⁸ Thus doubt has three characteristics: (1) There must be knowledge of several qualities; (2) the qualities must be contrary to one another; and (3) they must be apprehended in one and the same object. The definition, however, is not quite satisfactory, since it is difficult to define what is meant by contrary (*viruddha*) qualities. "There is no certain test," says Mr. Athalye, "to determine what properties are contrary to one another and what not. Roughly we may say that those which are never observed together as existing in one object are irreconcilable."⁹ Laugākṣi Bhāskara defines a doubtful cognition more precisely as knowledge consisting in an alternation between various contrary qualities with regard to one and the same object.¹⁰ Śrī Vādi Devasūri also defines it as uncertain knowledge consisting in an alternation between various extremes owing to the absence of proof or disproof.¹¹ According to all these definitions, in the state of doubt the mind oscillates between more than two alternatives, while according to Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara, Udayana, and others, the mind oscillates between two alternatives only in the state of doubt. Viśvānātha distinguishes between definite knowledge and doubtful knowledge.

⁶ Kir., p. 261.

⁷ NM., p. 166.

⁸ KR., p. 121; TS., p. 56.

⁹ Ibid., p. 361.

¹⁰ TK., p. 6.

¹¹ PNT., i, 11.

Definite knowledge (*niscaya*) consists in knowledge of the presence of an attribute in an object, which it possesses, and of the absence of an attribute in an object, which it does not possess. Doubtful knowledge (*samśaya*) consists in knowledge which has for its characteristic the presence or absence of contrary qualities in one and the same object. When we have a doubtful perception such as 'Is this a post or a man?' we have four alternatives (*koṭi*): (1) 'This is a post'; (2) 'This is not a post'; (3) 'This is a man'; and (4) 'This is not a man'. Thus the doubtful perception has four alternatives.¹²

In the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika literature the various kinds of doubt and the various causes of doubt have been discussed elaborately. But these are not so much concerned with the psychological nature of doubtful perception. So we cannot consider them here.¹³

3. (b) *Ūha* (Conjecture)

Generally in a doubtful perception (*samśaya*) we have a distinct consciousness of two alternatives reproduced in memory by the perception of the common quality of two objects. But sometimes one of these alternatives is suppressed and the other is manifest, and sometimes both the alternatives are indistinct and unmanifested. So we have two other kinds of indefinite perceptions: *Ūha* and *Anadhyavasāya*. *Ūha* or conjecture is an indefinite perception in which the mind does not oscillate between two equally distinct alternatives as in doubtful perception (*samśaya*) described above. In it the mind is conscious of one of the alternatives, the other being suppressed. Śivāditya defines *Ūha* as a doubtful or indefinite perception in which only one of the suggested alternatives is manifest to consciousness (the other being suppressed).¹⁴ When we perceive a tall object from a distance, in a field of corn in which posts are not generally found, but only men, we have an indefinite perception such as 'That may be a tall man in the field'.¹⁵ Here, we perceive only the tallness of an object, but do not perceive its peculiar features; the perception of tallness which is common to a post and a man tends

¹² SM., Ślokaś 129-130, pp. 440-1. ¹³ HIP., i, pp. 550-3.

¹⁴ *Utkaṭaika-kotikah samśaya ūhaḥ*. SP., p. 69.

¹⁵ MB., p. 25; NSār., p. 2; NTD., p. 65.

to reinstate in memory the two conflicting trains of ideas, e.g. those of the peculiar qualities of a post and a man. But one of these conflicting trains of ideas is suppressed by the other owing to the greater strength of its associative connection. Generally we do not find posts in fields of corn, but very often meet with men working in fields. So when we perceive a tall object in a field from a distance, though the perception of tallness tends to revive the ideas of a post and a man both, it actually revives the idea of a man owing to the greater strength of its associative connection which suppresses the idea of a post suggested by the perception of tallness. One alternative is suppressed by the strength of the other. But though the idea of a post is suppressed by the idea of a man, it tends to come to the margin of consciousness, and colours the whole mental process and invests it with indefiniteness. Herein lies the difference between conjecture (*ūha*) and definite perception. Thus the suppressed alternative also has a function in such an indefinite perception. Venkaṭanātha gives a similar account of *Ūha*. It is a kind of perception in which only one alternative is distinctly present to consciousness owing to repeated perception of this object in the past, the other being suppressed. In it the mind does not oscillate between two alternatives because they are not equally distinct to consciousness. Only one of them is manifest to consciousness and the other is unmanifest so that the mind tentatively accepts the former alternative.¹⁶ Śrīnivāsa urges that *Ūha* should not be regarded as having only one alternative. It has two alternatives, one of which comes up to the level of consciousness, and the other still remains below the threshold of consciousness so that one is manifest and the other is unmanifested.¹⁷ *Ūha* is not quite an indefinite cognition. It is almost definite.¹⁸

Samśaya may be compared with *Ūha*. In *Samśaya* both the alternatives suggested by the perception of their common quality are manifest to consciousness; both of them are above the threshold of consciousness; but the mind oscillates between these two alternatives, since it cannot perceive the peculiar qualities of the object present to a sense-organ. But in *Ūha* only one alternative

¹⁶ NP., p. 68.

¹⁷ *Utkaṭānutkaṭakoṭidvaya viśaya eva na tveka koṭikaḥ*. *Nyāyasāra* on NP., p. 68.

¹⁸ *Adhyavasāyātmaka eva sa ūhaḥ*. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

suggested by the perception of the common quality is manifest to consciousness, which is above the threshold of consciousness, being revived by the perception of the common quality owing to its stronger association with the object and suppressing the other alternative. This alternative was very often perceived together with the object in the past; so a strong bond of association has been established between their subconscious impressions; hence, this alternative is revived in memory, which suppresses the other alternative, because it was seldom perceived together with the object in the past. Thus, in *Samśaya* both the alternatives are manifest to consciousness, while in *Ūha* only one alternative is manifest to consciousness, and the other is suppressed. This distinction is brought out by *Veṅkaṭanātha*.¹⁹ Thus, though *Ūha* is an indefinite perception like *Samśaya*, it is more definite than the latter as here the mind tentatively accepts one alternative which is manifest to consciousness, the other being suppressed, while in *Samśaya* the mind wavers between two alternatives equally manifest to consciousness and cannot accept one and reject the other.

4. (c) *Anadhyavasāya* (Indefinite and Indeterminate Perception)

Sometimes an indefinite perception takes the form of *Anadhyavasāya*, which is defined by *Śivāditya* as an indefinite perception of an object in which both the alternatives are unmanifested to consciousness.²⁰ It is an indefinite and indeterminate perception due to lapse of memory. For example, when we perceive a tree but do not remember its name, we have an indefinite perception of the tree in the form: 'What may be the name of the tree?'²¹ According to *Śivāditya*, in this perception also there are two conflicting trains of ideas suggested by the perception of a common quality, but these trains of ideas are not distinct and manifest to consciousness, as in the doubtful perception: 'Is it a post or a man?'²² but they are indistinct or unmanifested (*anālīṅgita*, *aśpaṣṭa*), occupying only the margin of consciousness, or the level of the subconscious; and when these marginal or subconscious ideas are brought back to the field of distinct consciousness by an effort of the mind afterwards, the mind oscillates between the

¹⁹ NP., p. 68.

²⁰ *Anālīṅgitobhayakotyanavadhāraṇajñānamanadhyavasāyah*. SP., p. 69.

²¹ MB., p. 25; NTD., p. 66.

²² MB., p. 26.

two distinct trains of ideas and comes to have a doubtful perception: 'Is it a mango-tree or a jack-fruit tree?'²³ But when the conflicting trains of ideas suggested by the perception of a common quality occupy the margin of consciousness or the sub-conscious region, the mind is in an aching void, groping in the dark, as it were, for one of these marginal or subconscious ideas. This kind of indefinite perception is different from a doubtful perception in which both the alternatives are manifested to consciousness.

But Praśastapāda and his exponents, Śrīdhara and Udayana, give us a slightly different account of the nature of Anadhyavasāya. Praśastapāda defines Anadhyavasāya as an indefinite perception of an object, either familiar or unfamiliar, due to absent-mindedness or desire for further knowledge.²³ For instance, when a well-known king has passed by a road, one who has not been able to observe him through inattention or absent-mindedness, has only an indefinite perception that 'somebody has passed by the road' without definitely recognizing the object of perception.²⁴ As regards unfamiliar objects an indefinite perception appears on account of ignorance. For instance, a Bāhika, an inhabitant of the Dakṣa country, has an indefinite perception of a jack-fruit tree, which is unfamiliar to him. Śrīdhara explains it in the following manner. When a Bāhika perceives a jack-fruit tree, he has many definite perceptions with regard to it, such as (1) 'this exists', (2) 'this is a substance', (3) 'this is a modification of earth', (4) 'this is a tree', (5) 'this has a colour', and (6) 'this has branches'. He has also an indistinct perception of the generic character of the jack-fruit tree, which is common to all jack-fruit trees, and which distinguishes these from other kinds of trees. What he does not know is the only fact that this tree bears the particular name, viz. 'jack-fruit tree', since he has not yet heard this name from any other person; but he has an idea that it must have a name. And such an indefinite perception devoid of the definite idea of the particular name is called Anadhyavasāya.²⁵ Veṅkaṭa-nātha's account of Anadhyavasāya is similar to those of Praśastapāda and Śrīdhara. He holds that it is the apprehension of an object, the name of which is forgotten. In it the mind has a definite perception of an object but has no definite recollection

²³ PBh., p. 182.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 182-3; E.T., p. 385.

²⁵ NK., p. 182.

of its name, though it feels that it must have a name. After definitely perceiving a tree, for instance, we are in doubt whether its name is 'mango-tree', or 'jack-fruit tree', and want to know its name definitely. So in *Anadhyavasāya* there is a doubt as to the name of an object due to lapse of memory.²⁶

Udayana differs from *Praśastapāda* and *Śrīdhara* in his conception of *Anadhyavasāya*. According to him, *Anadhyavasāya* is an indefinite perception due to the perception of a common quality of two alternatives both of which are not distinctly apprehended. There is a distinct apprehension of one alternative, but no apprehension of the other. So *Anadhyavasāya* is different from *Samśaya*. *Samśaya* or doubt arises from the perception of the common quality of two alternatives, both of which are distinctly apprehended. In it the mind oscillates between two alternatives, both of which are distinctly present to consciousness. But in *Anadhyavasāya* there is no oscillation of the mind, since the two alternatives are not distinctly present to consciousness.²⁷ Udayana's conception of *Anadhyavasāya* resembles *Śivāditya's* conception of *Oha*.

Śaṅkara Miśra defines *anadhyavasāya* as the apprehension of an object as *something*.²⁸ When a person who has never seen a camel sees it suddenly for the first time he apprehends it as something. He perceives the distinctive qualities of the camel, e.g. a long neck, wide lips, etc., and so distinguishes it from a horse or an elephant. But he cannot refer it to the class of camels nor does he know its name. So *anadhyavasāya* is different from *samśaya*. In *samśaya* the mind wavers between two conflicting alternatives such as 'Is it a post or a man?' But in *anadhyavasāya* the mind does not waver between two alternatives, since they are not present to consciousness. It does not arise from the perception of the common quality of two objects, and the recollection of their distinctive qualities. It apprehends the distinctive qualities of an object. *Samśaya* and *anadhyavasāya* both are indefinite knowledge. They give rise to a desire for further knowledge. In *samśaya* the alternatives are distinct, while in *anadhyavasāya* they are unmanifested. Thus, *anadhyavasāya* differs from *samśaya* for three reasons. First, they are different kinds of indefinite knowledge. Secondly, they

²⁶ NP., pp. 67-8.

²⁷ *Anupalabdhasapākṣavipakṣasamśasparśasya dharmasya darśanāt viśeṣata upalabdhanupalabdhakotikam jñānamanadhyavasāyah.* Kir., p. 269.

²⁸ *Anadhyavasāyo'pi kiṁ svid idamiti jñānam.* KR., p. 121.

apprehend different objects. Thirdly, they are produced by different causes.²⁹

Vallabhācārya gives us a slightly different account of *Anadhyavasāya*. According to him, *Anadhyavasāya* is the indefinite perception of an object as something in a general way, the particular features of which are not perceived. In it there is a bare apprehension of an object as something, but no apprehension of its distinctive character. Still there is a desire to know its nature.³⁰ Śrī Vādi Devasūri, a Jaina philosopher, gives us a similar account of *anadhyavasāya*. He defines it as an indefinite perception of an object in the form 'What is it?' He gives an example. When a passer-by treads on grass with an inattentive mind he has an indefinite perception of something in the form of *anadhyavasāya*.³¹ Ratnaprabhācārya further explains the nature of *anadhyavasāya* as defined by Śrī Vādi Devasūri. He defines *anadhyavasāya* as the bare apprehension of an object in the form 'What is it?' In it the particular features of the object are not distinctly presented to consciousness. For instance, when a person with his mind engrossed in some other thing treads on grass he has an indefinite perception that he has touched something, but owing to inattention he cannot recognize what class it belongs to and what its name is. Such a bare apprehension of an object with no knowledge of its particular features is called *Anadhyavasāya*.³² Thus, it is an indistinct impression in the field of inattention surrounding the focal point of clear and distinct consciousness.

Samśaya may be compared with *Anadhyavasāya*. Śrīdhara points out that *anadhyavasāya* must not be identified with *samśaya*, because it differs from the latter both in its origin and nature. Firstly, *samśaya* arises from the recollection of the peculiar features of two objects; while in *anadhyavasāya* there is no such recollection of the peculiar features of two objects, which often arises from mere absence of a distinct cognition of peculiarities. Secondly, in *samśaya* the mind wavers between two distinct alternatives, sometimes touching the one and sometimes touching the other, while in *anadhyavasāya* the mind does not oscillate between two alternatives.³³ Udayana distinguishes

²⁹ KR., pp. 121-2.

Nyāyalilāvatī (Bombay), p. 46.

³⁰ PNT., i, 13-14.

³¹ Ratnākārāvatārika (on above), i, 13-14.

³² NK., p. 183; E.T., pp. 385-6.

samśaya from *anadhyavasāya* in the following manner: *Samśaya* arises from the perception of the common quality of two extremes which are revived in memory ; in it the mind oscillates between two alternatives which are distinctly present to consciousness. *Anadhyavasāya*, on the other hand, arises from the perception of the common quality of two extremes both of which are not distinctly revived in memory ; it is indefinite knowledge consisting in an alternation between two extremes one of which is distinctly present to consciousness, while the other is suppressed. Here, evidently, Udayana means by *Anadhyavasāya* what has already been explained as *Ūha*.³⁴

³⁴ Kir., p. 269.

CHAPTER XIV

ILLUSIONS

1. *Introduction*

In this chapter we shall confine our attention to illusory perceptions. The treatment of Indian philosophers is more psychological than physiological. And their psychological analysis of illusory perception is closely allied with the determination of its epistemological value and ontological basis. Indian philosophers treat psychology always as the basis of epistemology and ontology; and their psychological analysis is sometimes coloured by their metaphysical presuppositions. They do not give an exhaustive classification of the different kinds of illusions with reference to all the sense-organs. But still they give a psychological classification of the principal types of illusions. Their enumeration of the different sources of illusions is almost complete. The different schools of Indian philosophers have tackled the problem of illusion in different ways. They give us slightly different accounts about its psychological nature. There is a hot controversy among them about its ontological basis. Different schools of Indian philosophers have advanced different theories of illusion, and their polemics against one another exhibit their wonderful power of psychological analysis and rare metaphysical acumen. Western psychologists are more concerned with the physiological conditions of illusions than with their psychological nature. Their treatment is more physiological than psychological, and their treatment of illusions from the epistemological and ontological points of view is extremely meagre in comparison with the Indian treatment.

2. *Different kinds of Illusions*

- (i) *Anubhūyamānāroṇa viparyaya and smaryamānāroṇa viparyaya.*

Śaṅkara Miśra divides illusions into two kinds: (1) those which consist in false ascription of an actually perceived object to another object present to a sense-organ (*anubhūyamānāroṇa*); and

(2) those which consist in false ascription of an object revived in memory to another object present to a sense-organ (*smārya-māṇāroṇa*).¹ The illusory perceptions of bitter molasses and a yellow conch-shell are examples of the first kind. And the illusory perception of silver in a nacre is an example of the second kind. In the illusory perceptions of bitter molasses and a yellow conch-shell, bitterness of the bile in the gustatory organ and yellowness of the bile in the visual organ, which are actually perceived, are falsely ascribed to molasses and conch-shell respectively. These illusions are not due to subconscious impressions. In them both the object which is superimposed and the object on which the former is superimposed are actually perceived. The illusions of the second kind are produced by the sense-organs in co-operation with subconscious impressions, like recognition. They cannot be produced by the sense-organs alone; nor can they be produced by subconscious impressions alone; but they are produced by both taken together. For instance, the illusory perception of silver in a nacre is produced by the visual organ in contact with the nacre, in co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver revived by the perception of brightness of the nacre, which it has in common with silver.² Jayasimhasūri also divides illusions into the above two kinds.³ He illustrates the first kind of illusion by the illusory perception of the double moon. He explains it in the following manner. When we press the eye-ball with a finger, the moon appears to be double; but before the eye-ball was pressed the moon appeared to be single, and after the pressing has ceased the moon appears to be single. And sometimes the illusion of the double moon is due to the excess of darkness (*timira*) within the eye-ball, which bifurcates the ray of light issuing out of the eye-ball. In this illusion an object revived in memory is not falsely ascribed to an object present to a sense-organ. He illustrates the second kind of illusion by the illusory perception of elephants, etc., during sleep. In dreams the objects which were perceived in the past are revived in memory and appear to be actually perceived here and now. Thus centrally initiated illusions or hallucinations fall within the second category.⁴

¹ *Kaṇādarahasya*, pp. 119-120.

² *Ibid.*, p. 120.

³ *NTD.*, p. 66.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-7.

(ii) *Indriyajā bhrānti* (Illusion) and *Mānaśi bhrānti* (Hallucination)

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa divides illusory perceptions into two kinds: (1) those which are produced by the peripheral organs (*indriyaja*), and (2) those which are produced by the central organ or mind (*mānasa*). The former are peripherally excited, while the latter are centrally excited. The former are produced by some defects in the external stimuli, or by some defects in the peripheral organs. The latter are produced by some defects in the central organ or mind. The former are never without objective substrates; they are always produced by external stimuli (*sālabhāna*). But the latter are always without objective substrates; they are never produced by external stimuli (*nirālabhāna*).⁵ The former are called illusions and the latter hallucinations in Western psychology. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa illustrates these different kinds of illusory perceptions. The illusory perceptions of silver in a nacre, and of a sheet of water in the rays of the sun reflected on sands in a desert are illusions due to defects in the external stimuli (*viśaya-doṣa*). The illusory perceptions of bitter sugar, double moon, and a mass of hair are illusions due to defects in the peripheral organs (*indriya-doṣa*). All these are illusions. Hallucinations have no external stimuli, and are independent of the peripheral organ; they are solely of mental origin, and due to some defects in the mind (*manodoṣa*, *antaḥkaraṇa-doṣa*).⁶ For example, when a lover is overpowered by stormy passion awakened by pangs of separation, he perceives the semblance of his beloved lady near him, though she is far away. Hallucinations are due to the recollection of objects distant in time and space owing to the revival of their subconscious impressions. Dreams also are hallucinations due to revival of subconscious impressions left by previous perceptions; they are excited by the mind overcome by drowsiness. Thus, in hallucinations the forms which appear in consciousness are mostly memory-images owing to the revival of their subconscious impressions. But what is the cause of the resuscitation of these subconscious impressions? Sometimes they are awakened by similar cognitions (*sadṛśa vijñāna*), sometimes by strong passions, e.g. lust, grief, etc. (*kāmaśokādi*), sometimes by the habitual perception of these objects (*taddarśanābhīyāsa*), sometimes by drowsiness (*nidrā*), sometimes by constant thinking (*cintā*), sometimes

⁵ NM., pp. 89, 185, and 545.⁶ Ibid., pp. 185 and 545.

by perversion of the bodily humours (*dhātūnām vikṛti*), and sometimes by *adṛṣṭa* (i.e. merit or demerit) where there are no other causes.⁷

Śrīdhara also divides illusory perceptions into peripherally excited illusions and centrally excited illusions or hallucinations. He divides the former again into indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) illusions and determinate (*savikalpaka*) illusions. Indeterminate illusions contain only presentative elements; they are due to pathological disorders of the peripheral organs alone. For example, when we perceive a white conch-shell as yellow, the illusion is purely presentative in character, and is produced by the visual organ perverted by preponderance of the bilious humour. Determinate illusions contain both presentative and representative elements; they are produced by the peripheral organs in co-operation with subconscious impressions. For example, when we mistake a nacre for a piece of silver, the illusion is produced by the perverted visual organ in contact with the nacre in co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver. Here, the illusory perception contains both presentative and representative elements; the presentative element (*idam*) is produced by the perverted visual organ, and the representative element (*rajatām*), by the subconscious impression. But the illusion is *perceptual* in character, though it contains presentative and representative elements; hence it is produced by the perverted visual organ in co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver. These illusions are produced by external stimuli which have certain features in common with those objects which are manifested in illusory perceptions; this similarity between the real objects or external stimuli (e.g. nacre) and the illusory objects (e.g. silver) appearing in consciousness is the cause of these illusions. But hallucinations are not peripherally excited; they arise solely from some derangement of the mind. Hallucinations never arise out of the perception of similarity which is not possible in these cases, since there are no external stimuli to excite them. For instance, when a man is infatuated with love for a woman, he perceives the semblance of his beloved, here, there, and everywhere, though there is no objective stimulus. Hallucinations are illusory perceptions because in them absent objects appear in consciousness as present.⁸

⁷ Ibid., p. 89.

⁸ NK., pp. 178 ff.

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also, in the illusory perception of silver in a nacre we perceive only the common feature of the nacre (e.g. brightness); the perception of this similarity between the nacre and silver reminds us of the peculiar features of silver, and so we have an illusory perception of silver in a nacre.* But this is possible only in peripherally excited illusions. In centrally excited illusions or hallucinations there are no external stimuli; so they cannot be produced by the perception of the common features of two objects and the recollection of the peculiar features of one of them. In hallucinations there is no perception of external objects, but only a perception of those objects which are reproduced in memory and projected into the external world. Recollection alone is the cause of hallucinations, while perception and recollection both are the causes of those peripherally excited illusions which contain representative elements. Thus, both these kinds of illusions consist in false ascription of memory-images (*smāyamāṇāropa*). The former consist in the projection of memory-images into the external world, while the latter consist in the superimposition of memory-images on external objects actually perceived. Thus, the two divisions of illusions are not mutually exclusive. But they are based on two different principles.

3. Different Causes of Illusions

Illusory perceptions are due to some defects (*doṣa*) in the conditions of perception, or to wrong operation of the sense-organs with regard to their objects (*asamprayoga*), or to subconscious impressions (*saṁskāra*).

In the first place, illusory perceptions are produced by defects in any condition of perception. Ordinarily, sense-perception is produced by several conditions taken together. It requires an external object of perception and sometimes an external medium of perception, e.g. light in the case of visual perception. Then it requires an external sense-organ through which the object is perceived, and also the central organ or mind without the help of which the peripheral organs cannot operate on their objects. And in internal perception the mind alone is the channel of perception. Besides these, the self is involved in every act of perception; it is the self which perceives an object through the

* NM., p. 181.

senses. These are the conditions of sense-perception. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa holds that if any of these conditions is vitiated by defects it gives rise to illusory perceptions.¹⁰ (i) Some illusions are due to defects in the external stimuli or objects (*viśaya-doṣa*), e.g. similarity, movement, distance, etc. For instance, we perceive a nacre as a piece of silver, a rope as a snake, a cow as a horse, and clouds coloured by fading light as a town of ethereal beings owing to similarity between the two in each case. Again, the rapid movement of a fire-brand in a circle produces the illusion of a circle. But when it is moved slowly it cannot produce the illusion of a circle. Then, again, the moon appears to be small because it is at a great distance from us.¹¹ (ii) Some illusions are due to the movement of the conveyance (*bāhyāśraya-doṣa*) in which we travel. For instance, when we sail in a boat, it moves and we also move along with it, but the trees and other objects around us appear to be moving. This illusion is known as "parallax" in Western psychology.¹² (iii) Some illusions are due to defects in the external medium of perception. For instance, when the light is dim or dirty, we sometimes mistake one object for another.¹³ (iv) Some illusions are due to pathological disorders of the peripheral organs (*bāhyendriya-doṣa*). For instance, when the visual organ is affected by jaundice or preponderance of bile, we perceive a white conch-shell as yellow. When the gustatory organ is affected by provocation of bile, we taste molasses or sugar as bitter. When the rays of light issuing out of the visual organ are bifurcated by darkness (*timira*), we perceive the moon as double.¹⁴ Or, when the eye-ball is pressed with a finger, the moon appears to be double. The illusion of a mass of hair also is due to some defect in the visual organ. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa explains it in the following manner. There are particles of darkness within the cavities of the eye-ball here and there; the rays of light issuing out of the visual organ are intercepted by these particles of darkness so that they become thinly distributed; these thinly distributed fine rays of light issuing out of the eye-ball are obstructed by the rays of the sun and appear as a mass of hair. Before sunrise or after sunset we do not get this illusory perception.¹⁵ All these illusions are due to some defects in the peripheral

¹⁰ NM., p. 173.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 185; NBT., p. 16.

¹² NBT., p. 16.

¹³ NM., p. 173.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 180.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 185 and 545.

organs. Thus when they are overpowered by predominance of flatulent, bilious, and phlegmatic humours, we have illusory perceptions. (v) Some illusions are due to pathological disorders of the bodily humours (*adhyātmagatadoṣa*), e.g. the flatulent humour, the bilious humour, and the phlegmatic humour. For instance, pillars of fire are seen owing to provocation of the bodily humours. (vi) Some illusions are due to defects in the mind (*antaḥkaraṇadoṣa*, *mano-doṣa*). For instance, when it is overpowered by the predominance of *rajas* or *tamas*, we have illusory perceptions. When it is overpowered by strong emotions or passions we have illusory perceptions. A man infatuated with love for a woman, sees the semblance of his beloved here, there, and everywhere. When the mind is overpowered by drowsiness, we have illusory perceptions in the form of dreams. All these illusions which are due to some disorder of the mind only are called hallucinations.¹⁶ (vii) Some illusions are due to defects in the self (*pramāṭṛ-doṣa*). For instance, when the self is affected by strong desire, aversion, hunger, rage etc., it has illusory perceptions.¹⁷ Dharmottara describes four sources of illusions, e.g. disorders of the peripheral organs, disturbances in the external stimuli, movement of the conveyance in which we travel, and disorders of the bodily humours. According to him, all these different causes of illusions must involve a derangement of the sense-organs. There can be no 'sense-illusions' unless there are 'sense-disorders'.¹⁸ Thus, some illusions are due to defects in the various conditions of perception. This condition of illusions is emphasized by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

In the second place, illusory perceptions are produced by a wrong function of the sense-organs with regard to their objects (*asamprayoga*). This condition of illusions is mentioned by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas. Right perception depends upon the right intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects (*satsamprayoga*). It requires a real object (*sat*), and the right intercourse between the object and the proper sense-organ (*samprayoga*). If there is no real object and still we have perceptual experience, the perception is illusory. In dreams there are no real objects or external stimuli, but still we have illusory perceptions of various objects. So dreams should be regarded as hallucinations. If, in

¹⁶ NM., p. 545.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 173.

¹⁸ NBT., pp. 16-17.

spite of the presence of a real object, there is a wrong intercourse between it and the proper sense-organ, we have illusory perception. For instance, when we mistake a nacre for a piece of silver, there is a wrong intercourse between the visual organ and the nacre. Right perception depends upon the intercourse of that object with the proper sense-organ, which is manifested in consciousness. When one object is in contact with a sense-organ, but another object appears in consciousness, the perception is illusory. For instance, when a nacre is in contact with a visual organ, but a piece of silver appears in consciousness, the perception is illusory. Thus, right perception depends upon the right operation of the sense-organs with regard to their objects, and illusory perception depends upon a wrong operation of the sense-organs with regard to their objects. This condition of illusions, viz. *asamprayoga*, emphasized by the Mīmāṃsakas, is included in *viśaya-doṣa* and *indriya-doṣa* mentioned by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.¹⁹

In the third place, illusory perceptions are produced by subconscious impressions (*saṃskāra*). We have already found that subconscious impressions are the causes of those peripherally excited illusions which contain representative elements. For example, when a nacre is in contact with the visual organ, we sometimes perceive only its brightness which is common to both nacre and silver, and the perception of this brightness revives the subconscious impression of silver, and the visual organ in co-operation with this subconscious impression produces the illusory perception of silver. Thus, subconscious impressions in co-operation with the peripheral organs produce those peripherally excited illusions which contain representative elements.²⁰ We have also found that centrally excited illusions or hallucinations are due to subconscious impressions alone. For example, a lover infatuated with love for a woman sees his beloved near him, though she is far away. Here, the subconscious impression of the woman is revived by the strong passion of love and invades the field of consciousness; the memory-image of the woman distant in time and space appears like a woman actually perceived here and now. Thus subconscious impressions alone are the causes of hallucinations.²¹

¹⁹ ŚV. and Nyāyaratnākara, Sūtra 4, 15 ff.

²⁰ KR., p. 120.

²¹ NK., p. 179; NM., p. 545.

Praśastapāda asserts, that an illusory perception consists in the misapprehension of one object as another, both of which were perceived in the past with their peculiar characters, and that it is due to three causes: (1) wrong apprehension by a peripheral organ perverted by provocation of the bilious, phlegmatic, and flatulent humours; (2) the mind-soul-contact depending upon the subconscious impression left by the previous cognition of an absent object; and (3) demerit (*adharma*); e.g. the illusory perception of a horse in a cow. Here Praśastapāda refers to peripherally excited illusions which contain representative elements.²² Śrīdhara explains the functions of the peripheral organs and subconscious impressions in producing these kinds of illusions. When we mistake a cow for a horse, what is the cause of the non-apprehension of the distinctive character of a cow; and what is the cause of the apprehension of the distinctive character of a horse which is not present to the visual organ? The visual organ, he argues, cannot apprehend the distinctive character of a cow, though it is in contact with a cow, because it is perverted by the disorders of the bilious, phlegmatic, and flatulent humours. But how can the perverted sense-organ produce the apprehension of the distinctive character of a horse which is not present to the visual organ? Can it produce the apprehension of absent objects? If so, then it can produce the apprehension of any absent object whatsoever at any time, and thus there will be nothing to determine the appearance of particular objects in consciousness in illusory perceptions. Śrīdhara points out that the perverted sense-organ brings about the apprehension of an absent object only in co-operation with the mind-soul-contact, which depends upon the subconscious impression of an absent object. Though the visual organ is in contact with a cow, it cannot apprehend the object as a cow because it is perverted by disorders of the bodily humours. But still it apprehends the individual as endowed with those features which are common to cows and horses. The perception of similarity revives the subconscious impression of a horse; and this subconscious impression being revived brings about the recollection of a horse; and this recollection of a horse, owing to some perversion of the mind, produces the *perceptual* experience of a horse, in contact with the visual organ because of the similarity between a cow and a horse. Thus, any absent object

²² PBh., p. 177.

*cannot appear in consciousness at any time in the presence of any object in contact with a perverted sense-organ. Similarity between a present object and an absent object, and the sub-conscious impression of the latter revived by the perception of similarity determine the appearance of a particular absent object in an illusory perception. Hence, the perverted sense-organs in co-operation with subconscious impressions produce certain illusory perceptions.*²³

4. Psychological Analysis of an Illusion

A centrally excited illusion or hallucination is solely due to revival of subconscious impressions. A peripherally excited illusion which contains only presentative elements is due to pathological disorders of the peripheral organs. So these two kinds of illusions are simple psychoses. But a peripherally excited illusion which contains both presentative and representative elements is complex in character. It is due to the peripheral organs and subconscious impressions. This kind of illusion has been analysed by different schools of Indian thinkers in slightly different ways. Let us consider the illusory perception of silver in a nacre. Is it a single psychosis? Or, is it a combination of two psychoses? If it is a single psychosis, what is its nature? Prabhākara holds that an illusion is a complex psychosis, made up of a presentative element or perception (*anubhava*) and a representative element or recollection (*smaraṇa*), and as long as the illusion lasts we do not discriminate these two factors from each other. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Vedāntist hold that an illusion is a single psychosis of a presentative or perceptual character.

According to Prabhākara, in an illusion there are two elements, an element of perception or presentation and an element of recollection or representation. When we perceive a nacre as silver, we perceive only the common qualities of nacre and silver, viz. brightness and the like, which revive the idea of silver in memory by association. Thus, in the illusion of silver in a nacre there are the perception of brightness and the like, and the recollection of silver. But so long as the illusion lasts we do not distinguish the presentative element from the representative element. Thus, an illusion is made up of a presentative element and a representative

²³ NK, pp. 178-9.

element, in which there is no discrimination of the two factors from each other. This non-discrimination (*vivekākhyāti*) of the presentative element from the representative element is the cause of exertion for the appropriation or avoidance of the object of illusion. A sublating cognition (*bādhaka-jñāna*) does not contradict an illusion, but simply recognizes the distinction between the presentative element and the representative element. But why are not the two elements discriminated from each other before the so-called sublative cognition? Prabhākara holds that we cannot discriminate the representative element from the presentative element, because the former does not appear in consciousness *as* representation or memory owing to obscuration of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*).²⁴

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, an illusion is a single psychosis of a presentative or perceptual character. In the illusion of silver in a nacre at first we perceive those qualities of the nacre which are common to both silver and nacre, e.g. brightness, etc., but we do not perceive the peculiar qualities of the nacre owing to the perversion of the visual organ; then the perception of these common qualities reminds us of the peculiar qualities of silver by association. So far the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika agrees with Prabhākara. But according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the recollection of silver, owing to some perversion of the mind, produces the *perception* of silver, in contact with the visual organ; the illusion of silver is perceptual in character; it is experienced as a direct perception, and not as a recollection. If we regard an illusion as a mere reproduction of past experience, then we miss its distinctive psychological character.²⁵

According to the Neo-Naiyāyika, the visual perception of silver in a nacre depends upon the extraordinary intercourse through the idea of silver revived in memory by association as we have already seen.²⁶ Here there is no contact of the visual organ with actual silver; there is no ordinary intercourse (*laukika sannikarṣa*) between the sense-organ and its object. But there is an extraordinary intercourse (*alaukika sannikarṣa*), by means of which the idea of silver reproduced in memory by association produces the visual *perception* of silver. This is called the

²⁴ PP., p. 43; also NM., pp. 179-180.

²⁵ NM., pp. 180-1, and NK., p. 178.

²⁶ Chapter IV.

extraordinary intercourse whose character is knowledge (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*).

According to the Advaitā Vedāntist, an illusion is a presentative process. He explains the illusion of silver in a nacre in the following manner. At first, the visual organ perverted by certain pathological disorders comes into contact with the nacre which is present to the sense-organ, and brings about a mental mode in the form of 'this' or 'brightness'. Then the object-consciousness determined by 'this' is reflected in the mental mode, so that the mental mode streaming out of the sense-orifice, the object-consciousness (*viśaya-caitanya*) determined by 'this' the mental consciousness or consciousness determined by the mental mode in the form of 'this' (*ṛtti-caitanya*), and the logical subject-consciousness (*pramāṇi-caitanya*) are identified with one another. Then nescience (*avidyā*) in the form of nacre is produced, this *avidyā* exists in the object-consciousness which has been identified with the subject-consciousness. In co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver revived by the perception of the common features, (e.g. brightness) and the peripheral disorders, it is transformed into illusory silver (*prātibhāsika rajata*), on the one hand, and the illusory perception of silver (*rajata-jñānābhāsa*), on the other.²⁷ Stripped of all epistemological and metaphysical implications, the Sāṃkarite's analysis of an illusion is exactly the same as that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika from the psychological point of view. According to both, an illusion is a simple psychosis of a presentative character; it is produced by a sense-organ vitiated by a certain derangement in co-operation with a subconscious impression revived by the perception of similarity. They do not differ in their psychological analysis of an illusion, though they differ in their epistemological and metaphysical doctrines of illusion, which we shall consider later on.

An illusion may be compared with a doubtful perception. According to Udayana, both an illusion (*viparyaya*) and a doubtful perception (*samsāya*) are not produced by the corresponding objects (*anarthaja*); but the former is definite (*niscayātmaka*), while the latter is indefinite (*aniscayātmaka*). An illusion is a false perception of a definite character in the waking condition.²⁸ According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, an illusion differs from a doubtful perception both

²⁷ VP., pp. 136-7.

²⁸ Kir., p. 263.

in its nature and in its origin. First, in an illusion one object is definitely perceived as another, e.g. a post as a man, or a man as a post; while in a doubtful perception the mind wavers between two alternatives, sometimes touching the one, and sometimes touching the other. Thus, an illusion is a definite, false perception, while a doubtful perception is an indefinite or uncertain false perception. Secondly, an illusion springs from the recollection of the peculiar qualities of one object (e.g. silver, or water) which is suggested by the perception of the common quality in another object (e.g. nacre, or the rays of the sun); while a doubtful perception springs from the recollection of the peculiar qualities of two objects (e.g. a post and a man) which are suggested by the perception of their common quality (e.g. tallness).²⁹

5. *Different Theories of Illusions*

Different schools of Indian philosophers have advanced different theories of illusions. These theories are not only based on the purely psychological analysis of illusions, but also on their epistemological significance and ontological basis. Prabhācandra refers to seven different theories of illusions viz. Akhyāti (non-apprehension), Asatkhyāti (apprehension of a non-existent object), Prasiddhārthakhyāti (apprehension of a real object established by knowledge), Ātmakhyāti (apprehension of a subjective cognition projected into the external world), Anirvacanīyārthakhyāti (apprehension of an undefinable object), Anyathākhyāti (apprehension of an object as otherwise, i.e. as a different object), and Smṛtipramoṣa (obscuration of memory) or Vivekākhyāti (non-apprehension of discrimination or non-discrimination). It is not known who is the advocate of the first doctrine. The second doctrine is held by the Mādhyamika. It is not known who is the advocate of the third doctrine. The fourth doctrine is held by the Yogācāra; the fifth, by the Advaita Vedāntists; the sixth, by the Naiyāyika, the Vaiśeṣika, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, Patañjali, and the Jaina; and the seventh, by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka. Jayasīmaśūri mentions eight different theories of illusions, adding to the above list Alaukikakhyāti (apprehension of an extraordinary object, different from the ordinary objects of experience). Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also discusses the theory of Alaukikakhyāti and attributes it to a certain

²⁹ NM., p. 181.

Mīmāṃsaka. The Sāṃkhya advocates the doctrine of Sadasat-khyāti. Rāmānuja advocates the doctrine of Satkhyāti (apprehension of a real object).

(i) THE DOCTRINE OF AKHYĀTI.—According to this doctrine, an illusion has no objective substratum; it is objectless (*nirālabana*); it does not apprehend any object at all; it is a pure hallucination. Let us consider the illusion of a mirage, or the illusory perception of water in the rays of the sun. What is the object of this illusion? Is it water, absence of water, or the rays of the sun, or something else? Water cannot be the object of the illusory cognition, for, in that case, the cognition would be valid and not illusory. The absence of water cannot be the object of the illusion, because it is the cognition of water that induces the person under illusion to exert himself to get water. The rays of the sun, too, cannot be the object of the illusion, for, in that case, the cognition would not be illusory but valid, representing the real nature of the external stimulus. It cannot be argued that the rays of the sun are perceived as water, inasmuch as one thing (e.g., a cloth) cannot be perceived as something different (e.g. a jar). Hence, an illusion is objectless or without any objective substratum.³⁰ Prabhācandra, a Jaina philosopher, gives this account of the doctrine of Akhyāti.

Prabhācandra criticizes the doctrine of Akhyāti. If illusions have no objective substrates (*ālambana*), and are not excited by external stimuli, we cannot distinguish one illusion from another. For instance, we cannot distinguish the illusory cognition of water (in the rays of the sun) from the illusory cognition of silver (in a nacre). If, again, illusions are not produced by external objects, there can be no difference between an illusion and dreamless sleep. It may be urged, there is no difference between the two, except that in an illusion there is consciousness, while in dreamless sleep there is no consciousness at all; they agree in having no external stimulus. But Prabhācandra contends that, at least the object that appears in consciousness in an illusion must be regarded as the object of that illusion. Thus, an illusion can never be held to be a non-apprehension of an object.³¹

(ii) THE DOCTRINE OF ASATKHYĀTI.—The Mādhyamika holds that in the illusory cognition of silver, there is a cognition of

³⁰ *Nirālabanam viprayaya-jñānam*, PKM., p. 13.

³¹ PKM., p. 13.

silver as real, though really there is no silver at all. Hence, he concludes that in an illusion something non-existent is cognized as existent. This is the doctrine of *Asatkhyāti*.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes *Asatkhyāti* on behalf of *Prabhākara*. What is the meaning of *Asatkhyāti* or apprehension of a non-existent object? What is the object of an illusion according to this doctrine? Is it an absolutely non-existent object like a sky-flower? Or, is it an object existing in some other time and place? If it is the latter, then *Asatkhyāti* is nothing but *Viparītakhyāti*, according to which, silver existing in some other time and place appears in the illusory cognition of silver, but not existing in that time and place. If it is the former, then there will be a cognition of a sky-flower also; but because such an absolutely non-existent object never appears in consciousness, it cannot be the object of an illusion. It may be argued that a non-existent thing appears in consciousness through the intensity of a subconscious impression. But it is not possible without a real object; it is nothing but a vestige left by the previous perception of an object. Why should such a residuum be the cause of the cognition of an absolutely non-existent object? If we admit that some other kind of impression (*vāsanā*) produces the cognition of a non-existent object, why should it produce the cognition of silver and not that of a sky-flower? What regulates the operation of such an impression? An absolutely non-existent object can never appear in consciousness, nor can it induce a person to exert himself to get hold of it.³² So the doctrine of *Asatkhyāti* is untenable.

Prabhācandra criticizes it thus: According to the *Mādhyamika*, there is neither an external reality, nor a subjective cognition; so there is neither any variety in external objects nor any variety in cognitions. Hence, there cannot be a variety of illusions.³³ Thus the doctrine of *Asatkhyāti* cannot be maintained.

(iii) THE DOCTRINE OF *ĀTMAKHYĀTI*.—*Vidyāraṇya* Muni, a *Śaṅkarite*, gives the following exposition of the doctrine of *Ātmakhyāti* held by the *Yogācāra*. According to the Buddhists, mind (*citta*) and mental states (*caitta*) are produced by four different causes: (1) co-operating cause (*sahakāri-pratyaya*), (2) dominant cause (*adhipati-pratyaya*), (3) immediate cause (*samanantara-pratyaya*), and (4) objective datum or external cause

³² NM., pp. 177-8.

³³ PKM., p. 13.

(*ālambana-pratyaya*). Now, in the first place, the illusion of silver cannot be produced by the co-operating cause which, in the present case, is light; for light is the cause of the distinctness of the perception. In the second place, it cannot be produced by the dominant cause which, in the present case, is the visual organ, for it is the cause only of the visual character of the perception, but it cannot account for the particular nature of the visual perception, viz. that of silver. In the third place, it cannot be produced by the immediate cause which is the immediately preceding cognition; for the illusory cognition of silver may arise immediately after a cognition of an entirely different kind, e.g. that of a jar. In the fourth place, it cannot be produced by an external cause, for according to the Buddhist idealist there is no external reality at all. How, then, can he account for the illusory cognition of silver? The Yogācāra holds that it is produced by a subconscious impression (*vāsanā*) of silver which, at some time or other, arose in the beginningless series of nescience (*avidyā*), which, again, had been produced by a yet earlier idea of silver, and so on. Thus the idea of silver is the result of a beginningless series of subconscious impressions, and owing to error this subjective idea appears to consciousness as something external. An illusion, therefore, is not produced by an external object in contact with a sense-organ; but it is simply an eccentric projection of a subjective idea into the external world; it is a purely subjective hallucination.³⁴

Prabhācandra gives the following gist of the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti. In the illusory perception of silver, the object of consciousness (e.g. silver) is a subjective form of consciousness itself; it appears as an extra-mental object owing to the potency of erroneous cognitions arising out of beginningless nescience. The beginningless series of various subconscious impressions are gradually awakened in persons; on account of this, various cognitions (e.g. pots, cloths, etc.) arise, which cognize their own forms. There are no external objects corresponding to these cognitions. This is the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti.³⁵

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes Ātmakhyāti, on behalf of Prabhākara. According to this doctrine, a mere idea appears as the cognizer, the cognized object, and the cognition; there is neither a subject

³⁴ VPS., p. 34.

³⁵ PKM., p. 13.

nor an object apart from ideas ; there is simply a series of ideas. Thus, if in an illusion a mere idea were manifested in consciousness, and not an external object, then we should have such a cognition as 'I am silver', and not as '*this* is silver'. Moreover, this doctrine implies Viparītakhyāti, inasmuch as, according to this view, a subjective idea is cognized as something different, viz. an objective reality. And this doctrine implies Asatkhyāti too, since the cognition of externality has no real objective basis, there being no extra-mental reality according to the Yogācāra.³⁶

Prabhācandra criticizes the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti. If all cognitions apprehended only their own forms, and not those of external objects, as the Yogācāra holds, there would be no distinction between an illusory cognition and a valid cognition, and consequently, there would be neither any sublating cognition nor any sublated cognition. If, again, the forms of illusory cognitions such as silver and the like were not those of external objects, but mere forms of consciousness, then they would be apprehended as such, like the forms of pleasure and pain, and not as something external ; and, also, a person under illusion would exert himself to get the object of illusion, as if it were a subjective momentary cognition, and not an extra-mental reality. If it be urged that an internal momentary cognition is mistaken for an external permanent object owing to the potency of nescience (*avidyā*), then the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti leads to Viparītakhyāti, since the internal form of a momentary cognition appears as an external permanent object. Thus the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti is untenable.³⁷

Vidyāraṇya, a Śaṅkara-Vedāntist, criticizes the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti. In the illusion of silver, the illusory silver is either devoid of origination, on account of its extraordinary nature ; or it originates like an ordinary silver. On the first alternative, it will not be of the nature of an emergent cognition as it really is ; it comes into being, and so it cannot be without an origin. On the second alternative, it must be produced either by a cognition or by an object. It cannot be produced by an object, as the Yogācāra does not admit the existence of an extra-mental object. If it is produced by a cognition, it is produced by a pure cognition or a cognition which is due to a vitiated cause. It cannot be produced by a pure (*viśuddha*) cognition, as a pure cognition

³⁶ NM., p. 178.

³⁷ PKM., p. 13.

constitutes liberation. If it is produced by a cognition which is due to a vitiated cause, it is the same originating cognition which apprehends the silver, or it is some other cognition. The first alternative is not possible, because the originating cognition and the originated cognition both being momentary, and hence occupying different points of time, there will be no presentation of silver at all. The second alternative also is impossible. If it is another cognition that apprehends the silver, it cannot be a cognition produced by a non-vitiated cause, for in that case there will be no reason why such a cognition should specially apprehend silver. If, on the other hand, the cognition apprehending the illusory silver is produced by a vitiated cause, then that cause is either silver or it is not silver. It cannot be silver, for, in that case, silver will have causal efficiency, and, consequently, a real existence, which is not admitted by the Yogācāra. If silver is not the cause, then it cannot be manifested in the illusory cognition. Thus, on the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti, the illusory cognition of silver will never come into being.³⁸

(iv) THE DOCTRINE OF ALAUKIKAKHYĀTI.—Jayanta Bhaṭṭa gives the following exposition of the doctrine of Alaukikakhyāti and ascribes it to a certain Mīmāṃśaka. According to this doctrine, in the illusory cognition of silver it is not a nacre that is the object of the illusion, but it is silver; but this silver is different from ordinary (*laukika*) silver; it is extraordinary (*alaukika*) silver. Just as the valid cognition of silver has for its object ordinary (*laukika*) silver, so the illusory cognition of silver has for its object extraordinary (*alaukika*) silver. What is the difference between *laukika* silver and *alaukika* silver? Whatever is manifested to consciousness as silver must be regarded as silver; but some silver known as an object of consciousness serves our practical purposes (*vyavahāra-pravartaka*), while some other silver does not; the former is called ordinary (*laukika*) silver, while the latter is called extraordinary (*alaukika*) silver. In the illusory cognition of silver it is an extraordinary (*alaukika*) silver that is the object of the illusion; it is silver because there is a cognition of silver; and it is extraordinary (*alaukika*) silver because it does not serve any practical purpose.³⁹

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the doctrine of Alaukikakhyāti. We

³⁸ VPS., pp. 34-5; E.T., *Indian Thought*, vol. i, p. 273.

³⁹ NM., p. 187.

cannot know that there is extraordinary (*alaukika*) silver corresponding to the illusory cognition of silver. It is an absolutely new and unperceived object. The contradicting perception 'this is not silver' clearly establishes the extraordinariness (*alaukikatva*) of the silver which existed at the time of the illusory cognition. Hence there is neither silver corresponding to the illusion of silver, nor is it extraordinary (*alaukika*). So it is not right to hold that whatever is manifested to consciousness as silver must be silver; silver is manifested to consciousness in the illusory cognition of silver, though really there is no silver at all at that time and place. Real silver can be known only through the cognition of silver which is not contradicted by any other cognition. Moreover, what differentiates an ordinary (*laukika*) object from an extraordinary (*alaukika*) object? On what does the distinction depend? Does it depend upon the distinction of our cognitions (*pratibhāsa-nibandhana*). Or, does it depend upon the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of our practical purposes (*vyavahāra-sadasadbhāva-nibandhana*)? The first alternative is not tenable; for sometimes we are conscious of the existence of silver, and sometimes of the non-existence of silver; but we are never conscious of the ordinariness (*laukikatva*) and extraordinariness (*alaukikatva*) of silver. The second alternative also cannot be maintained, for what is the meaning of practical use (*vyavahāra*)? Does it mean the capacity of being an object of thought and speech (*jñānābhidhāna-svabhāva*)? Or, does it mean the capacity of producing an effect or action (*arthakriyā-nirvartana*)? The first view is untenable, because there is no consciousness of ordinariness (*laukikatva*) or extraordinariness (*alaukikatva*) of an object. The second view also is not tenable, for, in that case, a woman embraced in a dream will be ordinary, and a jar which is destroyed as soon as it produced, and as such cannot serve any practical purpose, will be extraordinary. Further, he who does not make an effort to pick up silver at the sight of a nacre does so, not because he recognizes the extraordinariness of the existing silver, but because he understands that there is no silver in reality. If there is *alaukika* silver as the object of the illusion of silver, why should a person under illusion make an effort to pick it up? If it is urged that he perceived the *alaukika* silver as *laukika*, then at last the advocate of the doctrine of *Alaukikakhyāti* comes to adopt the view of

Anyathākhyāti, according to which, one object appears as a different one in an illusion.⁴⁰

(v) THE DOCTRINE OF ANIRVACANĪYAKHYĀTI.—The Advaita Vedāntist holds that the object of an illusion is neither real, nor unreal, nor both, but undefinable (*anirvacanīya*). This is called the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti. According to this doctrine, whatever is manifested in a cognition is the object of that cognition. In the illusory perception of silver, it is silver that appears in consciousness; so silver must be the object of this illusion. If something else is regarded as the object of this illusion, as the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti holds, then we cannot call this illusion an illusion of silver, but of something else. So it is silver that is the object of the illusion of silver. But this silver is neither real (*sat*), nor unreal (*asat*), nor both real and unreal (*sadasat*), but is undefinable (*anirvacanīya*). It cannot be real, for, then, the cognition of silver will be valid, and not illusory, and as such will not be contradicted by any sublatting cognition. Nor can it be unreal, for then, it will not produce the cognition of silver, and, consequently, it will not lead the person under illusion to exert himself to get hold of silver. Nor can it be both real and unreal, as this supposition will involve both the above difficulties, and further, two contradictory qualities like reality and unreality cannot inhere in one and the same object. Hence, the silver which is the object of the illusory cognition of silver must be regarded as undefinable (*anirvacanīya*).⁴¹ The Sāṃkarite, therefore, holds that undefinable silver is produced at that time and place and continues as long as the illusion of silver persists. This kind of existence is called by him apparent existence (*prātibhāsika-sattā*), which is different from empirical existence (*vyāvahārika-sattā*).

But what is the use of admitting an undefinable reality to account for an illusion? An illusory cognition may very well be explained by the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti, according to which, an illusion is the misapprehension of one thing as a different thing; for example, the illusion of silver is the misapprehension of a nacre as silver which exists in some other time and place. The Sāṃkarite urges that silver existing in some other time and place cannot be an object of perception, since it is not present to the sense-organ and there can be no presentation without a present object.

⁴⁰ NM., pp. 187-8.

⁴¹ The Jaina account of the Sāṃkarite doctrine. PKM., pp. 13-14.

The Neo-Naiyāyika argues that the silver existing in some other time and place is brought to consciousness by association, and produces the perception of silver by means of an extraordinary intercourse whose character is knowledge (*jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*). The Sāṃkarite urges that in that case, in the inference of fire from smoke, fire which is not present to the sense-organ may be brought to consciousness by association, and produce the perception of fire by means of an extraordinary intercourse whose character is knowledge (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*), and thus there will be no inference at all. Besides, what is the meaning of *Anyathākhyāti*? If it means a cognition of one thing as otherwise, to what does the otherwiseness actually belong? Does it belong to the cognitive activity, or to the resulting cognition, or to the object of cognition? The first alternative is impossible. If the act of cognizing the shell is in the form of silver, then the shell cannot be called the objective substrate of the illusory cognition of silver; because an object can impart its own form to that cognition by which it is apprehended, and hence the shell cannot impart its own form to a cognition which apprehends silver. The second alternative also is not tenable. The otherwiseness (*anyathātvā*) cannot belong to the result of cognitive activity or the cognition itself, for the cognition does not essentially differ, whether it is true or illusory; the cognition does not appear as something different or otherwise. Nor can the third alternative be maintained. In what sense, can the otherwiseness belong to the object, viz. the shell? Does it mean that the shell identifies itself with silver? Or, does it mean that the shell transforms itself into the form of silver? In the first alternative, is the shell absolutely different from silver? Or, are they different and non-different at the same time? The first view is untenable, since things absolutely different from each other can never identify themselves with each other. The second view also is untenable, for, in that case, such judgments as 'the cow is short-horned' will be illusory. In the second alternative, if the shell actually transforms itself into the form of silver, then the cognition of silver cannot be sublated as it is the cognition of a real change. If it be urged that the shell actually transforms itself into silver so long as the illusion lasts, then silver will be perceived in the shell also by those who do not suffer from any defect of the sense-organs and the like. Hence, the doctrine of *Anyathākhyāti* cannot be stated in an intelligible

form. It does not offer a better explanation of an illusion than the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyaṭi, according to which an undefinable object is produced at the time of an illusory cognition.⁴² But it may be urged that the object of the illusory cognition of silver (e.g. its different parts) is absent at the time. The Śaṅkarite replies that it is produced by *avidyā* in co-operation with the sub-conscious impression of silver perceived in the past, and revived by the perception of its similarity with a nacre which is in contact with the visual organ impaired by a certain derangement. So it cannot be said that illusory silver (*prātibhāsika rajata*) cannot be produced at the time, which is the object of the illusory cognition of silver.⁴³

According to the Śaṅkarite, an illusion is a presentative cognition, and as such it must be produced by a present object; and the object of a cognition must be that which appears in consciousness; it cannot be some other object which does not appear in consciousness. In the illusory cognition of silver, it is silver that is the object of the cognition as it appears in consciousness; and that silver must be present at that time and place, when and where the illusion is produced; otherwise the illusion would not be a presentative cognition. So the illusion of silver has silver for its object which is produced then and there and continues as long as the illusion lasts. But this silver cannot be real, for, in that case, the cognition of silver will not be illusory. It cannot be unreal, for, in that case, there will be no cognition of silver and consequently no activity for the appropriation of silver. Nor can it be real and unreal both, as it involves self-contradiction. Hence it must be undefinable.

Rāmānuja contends that even the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyaṭi cannot avoid Anyathākhyāṭi, which it seeks to refute. The very assumption of an undefinable existence to account for an illusion implies that one thing appears as another, since an undefinable object appears to consciousness as real. If an undefinable object were apprehended as undefinable at the time of the illusory cognition, then the cognition would not be illusory, and hence it would not be contradicted by a subsequent cognition. If it be urged that the undefinable object of an illusion does not appear as undefinable so long as the illusion lasts, but subsequently it is known to be undefinable by rational reflection, then also the

⁴² VPS., pp. 33-4.

⁴³ VP., pp. 136-7. HIP., ii, pp. 560-4.

doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti leads to Anyathākhyāti, since an undefinable object appears to consciousness as real. Moreover, the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti can adequately explain all the facts connected with an illusion, viz. illusory cognition, activity consequent upon an illusion, and the subsequent sublating cognition. Hence, it is needless to assume an undefinable object, which is absolutely unperceived and groundless. Even if we admit that an undefinable object is produced at the time of the corresponding illusion, what is its cause? In the illusory cognition of silver what is the cause of the undefinable silver which is the object of the illusion? The cognition of silver cannot originate the undefinable silver, for there cannot be the cognition of silver before origination of the silver. It is absurd to argue that at first a cognition arises without any object, and then this objectless cognition produces the undefinable silver and makes it an object of apprehension. Nor can it be argued that a certain defect in the sense-organs is the cause of the illusory silver; for a defect abiding in the knowing person cannot produce an effect in an outward object. Nor can the sense-organs unvitiated by defects, give rise to the illusory silver, for the sense-organs are the causes of cognitions only, and not of their objects. Nor can the sense-organs deranged by a certain defect originate the illusory silver; for they also can produce peculiar modifications only in the cognitions produced by them, but not in their objects. Nor can a beginningless nescience (*avidyā*) be the cause of the illusory silver, for the doctrine of nescience does not stand to reason. Rāmānuja has brought seven charges against the Śaṅkarite doctrine of nescience (*avidyā*).⁴⁴

(vi) THE DOCTRINE OF SATKHYĀTI.—Rāmānuja holds that an illusory perception has a real object (*sat*) for its objective substrate. In the illusory perception of silver in a nacre the silver that is manifested to consciousness is a real object, for an unreal object can never be apprehended. Otherwise, why is it that only silver is apprehended in a nacre, and not a jar, or a cloth, or some other thing? It cannot be argued that silver is apprehended owing to its similarity with the nacre, inasmuch as the similarity of the nacre with silver will revive the subconscious impression of silver, and thus produce the recollection of silver, but will never produce the *perception* of silver. It is real silver that is the object

⁴⁴ R.B., i, 1, 1. HIP., ii, pp. 680-7.

of the illusory perception of silver. But how is it real? All objects of the world are produced by triplication or quintuplication (*pañcīkaraṇa*) of the five elements of earth, water, fire, air, and ether, so that everything exists everywhere in the form of its elements. Hence, silver in which the element of fire predominates exists in part in the nacre in which the element of earth predominates. Moreover, there is a law that an object is similar to that object which contains the parts of the latter. According to this law, a nacre which is similar to silver must contain the parts of silver. Thus, in the illusory perception of silver in a nacre, silver must exist in part in the nacre. But, then, why is the perception of silver in a nacre called illusory? It is called illusory, not because silver does not exist even in part in the nacre, but because in the nacre the parts of silver are much less than those of the nacre, and they do not serve our practical purposes. Hence, every illusory perception has a real object for its objective substrate. This is the doctrine of Satkhyāti.⁴⁵

A Śaṅkarite offers the following criticism of the doctrine of Satkhyāti in *Advaitāmōḍa*. According to Rāmānuja, all cognitions are real; even an illusory cognition has a real object for its objective substrate. So the illusory perception of silver has real silver for its object. The Śaṅkarite also holds that the illusory perception of silver has real silver for its object. But, according to the Śaṅkarite, the silver which is the object of the illusory cognition of silver has only apparent or illusory existence (*prātibhāsika-sattā*), while according to Rāmānuja, it has real or ontological existence (*pāramārthika-sattā*). But if the object of an illusion has real existence, how can we perceive water in a desert? It is true that a part of water does exist in earth on account of triplication or quintuplication of the subtle elements. But the distinctive character of water does not exist in a particular earthy substance produced by triplication or quintuplication of the elements. Even if the distinctive character of water exists in the part of water which constitutes a part of that substance, it is not capable of being perceived. Triplication or quintuplication is such a combination of the elements that they cannot be separated. Before triplication or quintuplication the elements are subtle and imperceptible; after combination also the part of water alone cannot be perceived in the earthy substance. Moreover, it does not stand to reason that

⁴⁵ NP., p. 37; YMD., pp. 4-5.

the elements of water in the earthy substance, though subtle, are perceived from a distance, but they cannot be perceived by those who are near it. Rāmānuja asserts, that fire and earth are not perceived owing to a certain defect of the peripheral organ, and that water is perceived owing to demerit (*adr̥ṣṭa*). But this is no argument. For the same reason it is wrong to hold that we have an illusory perception of silver in a nacre because silver really exists in the nacre in the form of the elements of fire, which enter into three-fold or five-fold combination to constitute the nacre. Moreover, why are the elements of fire in the nacre perceived as silver alone? They may as well be perceived as lightning, the sun, and other fiery objects, because the elements of fire are common to all these objects before combination. It cannot be said that certain particles of the fire (*tejas*) which, by triplication or quintuplication, are transformed into silver, are combined and are perceived in the nacre, for there is no proof of their existence. It cannot be said that the cognition of silver is the proof of their existence, for it will involve a vicious circle. The existence of silver in the nacre will depend upon the cognition of silver being an apprehension of a real object; and the cognition of silver being an apprehension of a real object will depend upon the existence of a part of silver in the nacre. It cannot be said that the existence of a part of silver in the nacre is proved by the perception of similarity of the nacre with silver. The nacre is similar to silver because it is endowed with those qualities which are common to itself and silver, viz. brightness and the like, and not because it contains a part of silver; there is no law of nature that an object must contain a part of another object with which it has similarity. If the clothes and ornaments of Caitra are similar to those of Devadatta, Devadatta may mistake the clothes and ornaments of Caitra for his own. But the parts of the clothes and ornaments of Devadatta do not interpenetrate into those of Caitra. Hence the doctrine of Satkhyāti is groundless.

(vii) THE DOCTRINE OF SADASATKHYĀTI.—This doctrine is held by the Sāṃkhya. Kapila criticizes all the rival doctrines of illusion and establishes his own doctrine.⁴⁶ And Aniruddha explains his arguments. The Mādhyamika holds that something non-existent, e.g. the identity of a nacre with a piece of silver, appears in consciousness in the illusory perception 'this is silver'. This is wrong,

⁴⁶ *Sadasatkyātirbādhābhāṭa*. SS., v, 56.

for a non-existent object (e.g. the horns of a man)⁴⁷ can neither lead to action nor produce a cognition. Prabhākara maintains, that in the illusory perception 'this is silver' there are two cognitions: (1) the perception of 'this' present to the visual organ, and (2) the recollection of 'silver'; and that non-discrimination of these two cognitions from each other leads to action. This also is wrong, for apprehension of non-difference or identity is found to lead to action, and the illusory perception 'this is silver' is contradicted by the sublating cognition 'this is not silver', while a valid cognition can never be contradicted.⁴⁸ According to the Sāṃkarite, the objective substrate of the illusory perception 'this is silver' is neither real nor unreal nor both; if it were unreal, there would be no immediate or presentative cognition; if it were real, there would be no sublating cognition; and it cannot be both, because it is self-contradictory; hence the object of the illusion is neither real nor unreal nor both, but it is undefinable. This also is wrong, for the illusory perception, in the present case, is defined as 'this is silver'.⁴⁹ The Naiyāyika holds that in the illusory perception 'this is silver' it is a nacre that appears in consciousness as a piece of silver. This also is wrong, because it is against experience that one object should appear in consciousness as another object.⁵⁰

Hence, the Sāṃkhya concludes that in the illusory perception 'this is silver' the cognition of 'this' is real (*sat*) and the cognition of 'silver' is unreal (*asat*). The cognition of 'this' has for its object an object present to the visual organ; so it is real. The cognition of 'silver' has for its object 'silver' which is not present to the visual organ; and it is contradicted by a sublating cognition; so it is unreal. So an illusion apprehends both a real object (*sat*) and an unreal object (*asat*).⁵¹ This is Aniruddha's interpretation of the doctrine of Sadasatkhyāti. Vijñānabhikṣu asserts, that in the illusory perception 'this is silver' the silver that appears in consciousness is real (*sat*), since it exists in the shop of a silver-merchant, and that it is unreal (*asat*), since it is falsely ascribed to a nacre.⁵²

(viii) THE DOCTRINE OF PRASIDDHĀRTHAKHYĀTI.—According to this doctrine, a non-existent thing is not the object of an illusory cognition, but a really existent object established by knowledge; for example, water is the object of the illusion of water, and when

⁴⁷ SSV., v, 52.

⁴⁸ SSV., v, 53.

⁴⁹ Ibid, v, 54.

⁵⁰ Ibid, v, 55.

⁵¹ Ibid, v, 56.

⁵² SPB., v, 56. HIP., ii, pp. 71-2.

the illusory cognition is contradicted by the cognition of the rays of the sun, the latter cognition has for its object the rays of the sun.

This theory, too, is untenable. If all cognitions were true representations of their objects, then there would be no difference between a valid cognition and an illusion, and all cognitions would be equally valid; and a person having an illusory cognition of water and acting upon it would feel the wetness of the ground, etc., which are the effects of water though water itself may be absent, because the effect of water is not momentary like the flash of lightning. And if all cognitions are equally valid, no cognition can be contradicted by another cognition. But it is a fact of experience that some cognitions are contradicted by other cognitions. Hence the doctrine of *Prasiddhārthakhyāti* is untenable.⁵³

(ix) THE DOCTRINE OF *VIVEKĀKHYĀTI* OR *SMRITIPRAMOṢA*.—Prabhākara's doctrine of *Vivekākhyāti* (non-discrimination) is sometimes called *Akhyāti* (non-apprehension). But in order to distinguish this doctrine from that of *Akhyāti* described above we prefer to call it by the name of *Vivekākhyāti*. According to Prabhākara, whatever is manifested to consciousness must be the object of that consciousness; and hence there can be no apprehension of an object as a different thing; there can be no *Anyathākhyāti* or misapprehension. What is the object of the illusion of silver, according to the doctrine of *Anyathākhyāti*? Is it silver existing in some other time and place? Or, is it a nacre which conceals its own form and assumes the form of silver? Or, is it the nacre itself in its own true form? The first alternative implies *Asatkhyāti*. If silver existing in some other time and place is the object of the illusion of silver, then silver which does not exist at present becomes the object of the illusory cognition, and thus something non-existent is apprehended as existent. Hence *Anyathākhyāti* implies *Asatkhyāti*. The second alternative is unintelligible. If a nacre, which conceals its own form and assumes the form of silver, is the objective substrate of the illusion of silver, then is there an apprehension of a nacre or an apprehension of silver? If the former, then there is no illusion, as a nacre is perceived as a nacre. If the latter, then there is no proof for the existence of the nacre there, which is manifested as silver in consciousness. It cannot be said that the nacre is known by the sublating cognition 'this is not silver'; because the object of

⁵³ PKM., p. 13.

the illusion of silver cannot be established by some other cognition. A sublating cognition merely establishes the non-existence of the object of the sublated illusion ; it does not ascertain the object of the illusory cognition. The third alternative also cannot be maintained. It cannot be held that a nacre is the object of the illusion of silver. For, in that case, everything present at the time of the cognition, e.g. the proximate piece of land, etc., would be regarded as the object of the illusory cognition.⁵⁴ Hence Prabhākara concludes that whatever is manifested in a cognition must be regarded as its object. In the illusory cognition of silver, it is silver that is manifested in consciousness ; so silver must be regarded as its object. It is foolish to regard a nacre as the object of the illusion of silver.

We have already found that, according to Prabhākara, there are two elements in an illusory cognition. It is made up of a presentative element and a representative element which are not discriminated from each other as long as the illusion lasts. This lack of discrimination between the two elements is the cause of exertion for the appropriation or avoidance of the object of illusion. A sublating cognition does not contradict an illusion, but simply recognizes the distinction between the presentative element and the representative element involved in an illusion. In the illusory cognition 'this is silver', 'this' is not identical with 'silver', as the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti holds ; 'this' is nothing but 'this' which is perceived, and 'silver' is nothing but 'silver' which is remembered ; 'this' is one thing (e.g. brightness, etc.), and 'silver' is quite a different thing. The distinction between these two is recognized when there is the so-called sublative cognition 'this is not silver'. But why are not the two elements discriminated from each other before the so-called sublative cognition? Prabhākara holds that the representative element does not appear in consciousness as representation owing to obscuration of memory (smṛtipramoṣa).

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa offers the following criticism of the doctrine of Vivekākhyāti: Prabhākara holds that an illusion is a complex psychosis made up of presentative and representative elements which cannot be discriminated from each other owing to obscuration of memory. But when the illusion is contradicted by a sublative cognition, the presentative element is discriminated

⁵⁴ NM., pp. 176-7. HIP., i, pp. 805-9.

from the representative element. In the illusory perception of silver in a nacre in the form 'this is silver', there is a presentation of 'this' and there is a representation of silver in memory, which are not distinguished from each other. But the Naiyāyika urges that in the illusion of silver there is an actual perception or presentation of silver, in which we do actually feel that we are perceiving silver. But Prabhākara tries to explain away this fact of experience. He cannot account for the fact that as long as the illusion of silver lasts, there is an actual presentation or perception of silver, and not a mere representation of silver. He cannot give a satisfactory account of the so-called non-discrimination of the presentative element from the representative element in an illusion. He cannot also explain the nature of the so-called obscuration of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*).

Let us consider these in detail. In the first place, according to Prabhākara, when we have the illusion of silver in a nacre the sense-organ does not come into contact with real silver; so there is no presentation of silver, but only a representation of silver. In the illusion 'this is silver' there are two elements, a presentation of 'this' and a representation of 'silver', which are not discriminated from each other at the time. But the Naiyāyika and the Advaita Vedāntist contend that we are conscious of silver as something presented to consciousness 'here and now', and not as something perceived in the past and remembered now.⁵⁵ Nor can it be said that there is only a presentation of 'this' and not of 'silver', for we have a direct and immediate knowledge of both 'this' and 'silver' at the same time; so both of them are directly presented to consciousness or perceived at present. Gaṅgeśa and his followers hold that in the illusion 'this is silver' both the elements 'this' and 'silver' are perceived, the first through the ordinary intercourse between the visual organ and its object and the second through the extraordinary intercourse whose character is knowledge (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*). In the second place, what does Prabhākara mean by non-discrimination? So long as an illusion lasts there is no apprehension of non-discrimination of its presentative factor from its representative factor. It is apprehended, if at all, when it is sublated. But, as a matter of fact, the subsequent sublative cognition testifies to the immediate consciousness of 'this is silver' at the time of the illusory

⁵⁵ *Indian Thought*, vol. i, p. 177.

perception, rather than non-discrimination of the presentative element from the representative element. Moreover, non-discrimination at the time of an illusion cannot induce exertion in the person under illusion to appropriate or avoid the illusory object. In the illusion 'this is silver' what moves a person to action? Is it the actual perception and the recollection together or either of the two? If the former, then do the two psychoses operate together or in succession? The first of these latter alternatives is inadmissible, since presentation and representation being distinct psychoses cannot occur at the same time. If the two cognitions are successive, the former can have no casual efficiency with regard to the person's action, since the latter intervenes between the two. Nor can either psychosis by itself move the person to action; for the particular action follows neither from the perception of 'this' nor from the recollection of 'silver', but from the direct and immediate apprehension of 'this is silver'. Thus mere non-discrimination cannot account for exertion induced by an illusion. In the third place, what is the meaning of obscuration of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*)? If it means the absence of memory, then there cannot be a reproduction of silver perceived in the past, and it cannot differ from swoon in which there is no memory. If it means the consciousness of memory not as memory, but as something opposed to it, viz., perception, then the doctrine of *smṛtipramoṣa* implies *Anyathākhyāti*. If it means the apprehension of a past object as present, then also it implies *Anyathākhyāti*. If it means the blending of perception with recollection in such a way that the two psychoses cannot be distinguished from each other, then what is the meaning of blending? Does it mean the apprehension of the two different psychoses as non-different or identical? Or, does it mean the actual blending of the two different psychoses? The first alternative leads to *Anythākhyāti*. The second alternative is impossible, for two physical things can blend with each other as milk and water, but two psychoses cannot blend with each other. Hence the doctrine of *smṛtipramoṣa* is unintelligible.

(X) THE DOCTRINE OF ANYATHĀKHYĀTI.—According to the doctrine of *Anyathākhyāti*, an object is apprehended as a different object in an illusion which is not a sum of two psychical processes—perception and recollection—but a single psychosis of a perceptual character. When we perceive silver in a nacre, we perceive

in the nacre only the common qualities of nacre and silver, and not the peculiar qualities of the nacre; the perception of similarity revives the idea of the peculiar qualities of silver in memory; and the reproduction of silver in memory produces the *perception* of silver, and so we have an illusory perception 'this is silver'.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refutes Prabhākara's objections to the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti in the following manner: First, Prabhākara has asked: What is the objective substrate of the illusion of silver? Is it silver existing in some other time and place? Or, is it a nacre that conceals its own form and assumes the form of silver? Or, is it a nacre in itself? He has urged that the first alternative implies Asatkhyāti or apprehension of a non-existent object as existent. The Naiyāyika replies that silver is not non-existent; but that it does exist in some other time and place. There is a difference between an absolutely non-existent thing (e.g. a sky-flower, etc.) and an object not existing here and now, but in some other time and place. The former is never an object of consciousness, while the latter is an object of consciousness. Secondly, Prabhākara has urged that the second alternative is absurd and unintelligible. The Naiyāyika replies that the nacre is said to conceal its own form, since we do not perceive its peculiar features (e.g. triangularity, etc.), and that it is said to assume the form of silver, since we remember the distinctive features of silver. Thirdly, Prabhākara has urged that the third alternative also is unreasonable. One object can never be apprehended as a different one; for, in that case, whatever is present to the sense-organ at the time of the illusory perception of silver would be regarded as the substrate of that illusion. The Naiyāyika replies that he does not mean that whatever is present to the sense-organ is the object of consciousness, so that the piece of land before the eyes may be regarded as the object of consciousness. What he means is that the nacre is the cause of the illusion of silver; that it is not an *object* of the illusory perception of silver. So all the charges of Prabhākara against Anyathākhyāti are groundless.⁵⁸

6. Different Theories of Illusions compared

According to the doctrine of Akhyāti, an illusion consists in non-apprehension of an object (*akhyāti*). An illusion has no

⁵⁸ NM., pp. 184-5. HIP., i, pp. 478-83; ii, pp. 134-5.

external stimulus at all; it is objectless (*nirālabhāna*). This doctrine is right in so far as the object that is manifested in consciousness in an illusory cognition does not exist at that time and place. For example, silver does not exist at that time and place when and where there is the illusory cognition of silver. But it is wrong for two reasons. In the first place, an illusory perception is not mere non-apprehension of an object; it is apprehension of something; in the illusory perception of silver there is apprehension of silver, though the object does not exist at that time and place; there is not mere non-apprehension of a nacre. In the second place, an illusory perception is not always objectless; in most cases it has an external stimulus (*ālabhāna*). But sometimes an illusion is not produced by an external stimulus; it is produced directly by the mind affected by a certain derangement. It is called a hallucination. But all illusions are not hallucinations. The Mādhyamika holds that an illusion consists in the apprehension of a non-existent object (*asatkhyāti*). He agrees with the view that an illusion has no external stimulus at all. But, according to the former, an illusory cognition consists in non-apprehension of an object (*akhyāti*), while, according to the latter, it consists in apprehension of a non-existent object (*asatkhyāti*). The doctrine of Asatkhyāti is right in so far as the object of an illusion does not exist then and there. But it is wrong in so far as the object of an illusion is not absolutely non-existent, but exists in some other time and place. But this doctrine is in keeping with the spirit of nihilism of the Mādhyamika. According to him, the ultimate reality is Void (*śūnyam*); neither the external world nor the inner world of ideas is real. The Yogācāra holds that an illusion consists in apprehension of a subjective cognition (*ātmakhyāti*). He agrees with the two views mentioned above that an illusion has no external stimulus at all: it is absolutely objectless. But, according to him, an illusory cognition consists neither in non-apprehension of an object nor in apprehension of a non-existent object, but in apprehension of a purely subjective cognition as an external object; an illusion consists in projection of an idea into the external world. But only hallucinations are illusions of this kind. Other illusions are produced by external stimuli, which are not pure creations of fancy. They cannot be explained by the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti. But this doctrine is in keeping with the spirit of subjective idealism of the Yogācāra.

According to him, there is no external world at all ; there is only the inner world of ideas which appear to us as external objects. The Śaṅkarite holds that an illusion consists in apprehension of an undefinable object (*anirvacanīyakhyāti*). According to him, an illusion has an objective basis ; it has an external stimulus ; it has an illusory object corresponding to it. The Śaṅkarite believes in three degrees of reality : (1) ontological reality (*pāramārthikasattā*) ; (2) empirical reality (*vyāvahārikasatta*) ; and (3) illusory reality (*prātibhāsikasattā*). Brahman has ontological reality ; the world of external objects conditioned by space, time, and causality has empirical reality ; and objects falsely ascribed to empirical objects, like silver ascribed to a nacre, have illusory reality : these also have an extra-mental existence. The illusory perception of silver has for its object extra-mental illusory silver which is neither real, nor unreal, nor both, but undefinable. The doctrine of Alaukikakhyāti is substantially the same as that of Anirvacanīyakhyāti. According to the Alaukikakhyāti, the illusory perception of silver has extraordinary silver for its object, which has no practical efficiency. These doctrines go beyond the province of psychology and seek to define the ontological nature of the object of an illusion. They recognize the distinctive character of an illusory cognition. According to them, it is presentative or perceptual in character. But a presentative cognition always requires a present object which is an illusory reality (*prātibhāsika*) according to Anirvacanīyakhyāti, and an extraordinary (*alaukika*) reality, according to Alaukikakhyāti. Rāmānuja holds that an illusion consists in apprehension of a real object (*satkhyāti*). The illusory perception of silver in a nacre has real silver for its object. The Śaṅkarite believes in the illusory existence (*prātibhāsika-sattā*) of silver at the time of the illusory perception. But Rāmānuja believes in its ontological existence (*pāramārthika-sattā*) at the time of the illusory perception. According to him, silver really exists in the nacre in the form of its elements ; and the nacre is similar to silver only because silver does exist in part in the nacre. But this is going too far. Similarity means similarity in qualities. It does not necessarily mean partial co-existence of two things in each other. The doctrine of Satkhyāti is based on the cosmological doctrine of triplication or quintuplication of the elements. The Sāṅkhya holds that an illusion consists in apprehension of a real object and an unreal

object both (*sadasatkhyāti*). In the illusory cognition of silver in the form 'this is silver' the cognition of 'this' is the apprehension of an object present to the sense-organ, and the cognition of 'silver' is the apprehension of silver which is not present to the sense-organ. Prabhākara makes it more clear. According to him, an illusory cognition is a complex psychosis made up of a presentative element and a representative element. The illusory cognition in the form 'this is silver' is made up of the perception of 'this' and the recollection of 'silver,' which are not discriminated from each other until the illusion is contradicted. But Prabhākara misses the distinctive psychological character of an illusory cognition; it is a perceptual process, though it depends upon perception and recollection both. Prabhākara contends that the representative process in an illusory cognition appears to be a presentative process owing to lapse of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*). But he should not explain away a fact of experience by an unintelligible theory. An illusory cognition is experienced as a direct and immediate perception. The Naiyāyika holds that an illusion consists in misapprehension of one object as another or apprehension of an object in that in which it does not exist. According to him, an illusory cognition is a single psychosis of a perceptual character which is produced by a sense-organ impaired by a certain defect in contact with an external object in co-operation with the subconscious impression of another object with which it has similarity. In the illusory perception of silver in a nacre, the nacre is wrongly perceived as silver owing to the perversion of the sense-organ and the subconscious impression of another object awakened by the perception of similarity. This theory is not based on metaphysical grounds. It is based on the evidence of our experience. There is an extraordinary intercourse (*alaukika sannikarṣa*) whose character is knowledge (*jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣa*), according to Gaṅgeśa, in an illusion. There is *visual perception* of silver, though its idea (*jñāna*) is revived in memory, on account of this extraordinary intercourse through knowledge. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is more faithful to our experience than the other views.

CHAPTER XV

DREAMS

1. *The Psychological Character of Dream-consciousness*

(i) *The Presentative Theory of Dreams*

Kaṇāda defines a dream-cognition as the consciousness produced by a particular conjunction of the self with the mind (*manas*) in co-operation with the subconscious impressions of past experience, like recollection.¹ Praśastapāda defines it as an internal perception through the mind, when all the functions of the external sense-organs have ceased and the mind has retired within a trans-organic region of the organism.² When the internal organ (*manas*) retires within itself, the peripheral organs cease to operate and consequently cannot apprehend their objects as they are no longer guided by the mind. During this retired state of the mind, when the automatic vital functions of in-breathings and out-breathings profusely go on in the organism, dream-cognitions arise through the mind from such causes as sleep, which is the name of a particular conjunction of the self with the mind, and subconscious impressions of past experience; these dreams are internal perceptions of unreal objects.³ Udayana asserts, that in the dream-state, though the external sense-organs cease to operate, we distinctly feel that we see objects with our very eyes, hear sounds with our very ears, and so on.⁴ Śaṅkara Miśra also holds that though a dream-cognition is produced by the mind when it has retired, and the external sense-organs have ceased to operate, it is apprehended as if it were produced by the external sense-organs.⁵ Śrīdhara also regards dreams as presentative in character. Dream-cognitions are independent of previous cognitions, and as such are not mere reproductions of past experience; they are produced through the retired central sensory or mind when the functions of all the peripheral organs have ceased; they are direct and immediate presentations of a definite and determinate

¹ VS., ix, 2, 6-7.

² PBh., p. 183.

³ Ibid., p. 183.

⁴ Kir., p. 273.

⁵ VSU., ix, 2, 7.

character.⁶ These dream-cognitions arising from sleep and sub-conscious impressions are direct and immediate presentations (*aparokṣasamvedana*) of objects which have no real existence at that time and place.⁷ They are presentative in character, and not mere reproductions of past experience.⁸ But dream-perceptions are not produced by the external organs which cease to function at that time, but they are produced entirely by the mind (*manomātraprabhava*). And these dream-perceptions are not indefinite and indeterminate in nature; but they are definite and determinate in character (*paricchedasvābhāva*). They are not valid but illusory, since they do not represent real objects present to the sense-organs. Śivāditya defines a dream as a cognition produced by the mind perverted by sleep.⁹ Mādhava Sarasvatī mentions the following distinctive marks of dream-cognitions as defined by Śivāditya. First, they are produced by the mind, and as such are different from the waking perceptions of jars and the like, which are produced by the external sense-organs. Secondly, they are produced by the perverted mind, and as such are different from the waking perceptions of pleasure and the like, which are produced by the unperverted mind. Thirdly, they are produced by the mind perverted by sleep, and as such are different from waking hallucinations which are produced by the perverted mind in the waking condition.¹⁰

Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara, Saṁkara Miśra, Śivāditya and others recognize the central origin of dreams. Though they hold that certain dreams are produced by organic disorders within the body, they do not recognize the origin of dreams from the external sense-organs. But Udayana admits that in the dream-state the peripheral organs—at least the tactual organ which pervades the organism—do not altogether cease to operate; external stimuli, if not sufficiently intense to awaken the person, may act upon the peripheral organs and produce dream-cognitions.¹¹ Thus Udayana recognizes both peripherally excited and centrally excited dreams, or in the language of Sully, dream-illusions and dream hallucinations. Udayana also holds that though dream-cognitions are generally perceptual in character being produced by the mind, sometimes, though very rarely, they assume the form of inference,

⁶ *Purvādhigamānapekṣam paricchedasvābhāvaṁ mānasam manomātraprabhavaṁ tat svapnajñānam.* NK., p. 184.

⁷ NK., p. 185.

⁸ Sp., p. 68.

⁹ MB., p. 68.

¹⁰ NKS., iii, p. 9.

when, for instance, a person dreams that he sees smoke in a particular place and from the sight of the smoke infers that there must be fire behind it.¹¹ Thus the Vaiśeṣikas generally advocate the presentative theory of dreams.

The ancient Naiyāyikas also consider dreams as presentative in character. Gautama does not include dream-cognition in recollection. Vātsyāyana regards dream as distinct from recollection. Uddyotakara and Vācaspati also agree with Gautama and Vātsyāyana.¹² Thus the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas generally recognize the perceptual character of dreams. But there are some Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers who regard dreams as recollections of past experience due to the revival of subconscious impressions. We may designate this doctrine as the representative theory of dreams as contrasted with the presentative theory.

(ii) *The Representative Theory of Dreams*

Among the Naiyāyikas Bhāsarvajña started the view that dream-consciousness is a kind of false recollection (*smṛti*).¹³ We have already seen that Jayasimhasūri distinguishes between *anubhūyamanāroṇa* illusions and *smāyamāṇāroṇa* illusions. The former consist in the false ascription of a percept to another percept. The latter consist in the false ascription of an idea of memory to a percept. Jayasimhasūri includes dreams in the latter. So he regards them as representative in character.¹⁴ Jayanta Bhaṭṭa seems to regard dream-cognitions as recollections of past experience.¹⁵ Keśavamisra regards all dream-cognitions as false recollections.¹⁶ Jagadīśa holds that dream-cognitions are produced by recollections of objects perceived in the past, merit and demerit, and intra-organic disorders.¹⁷ Thus the ancient Naiyāyikas regard dreams as presentative in character, while the majority of medieval and modern Naiyāyikas regard them as representative in character.¹⁸

The Mīmāṃsakas also recognize the representative character of dreams. According to Kumārila, dreams have an objective

¹¹ Kir., p. 273.

¹² Umesha Mishra: "Dream theory in Indian Thought". *The Allahabad University Studies*, vol. v, pp. 274, 275.

¹³ *Princess of Wales Sarasvatībhavan Studies, Benares*, vol. iii, p. 82 n.

¹⁴ NTD., p. 67.

¹⁵ NM., pp. 182-3, 545.

¹⁶ TBh., p. 30.

¹⁷ TA., p. 11.

¹⁸ *The Allahabad University Studies*, vol. v, p. 278.

basis; they are produced by external objects which are not present to the sense-organs but were perceived elsewhere in the past and are now revived through their subconscious impressions.¹⁹ Pārthasārathimiśra says, "It is definitely known that dream-cognitions are of the nature of recollection."²⁰ External objects perceived in some other time and place are remembered owing to the revival of their impressions through the agency of merit or demerit; but they appear to consciousness as objects existing here and now owing to the perversion of the mind by sleep.²¹ Prabhākara also regards dream-cognitions as recollections of past experience. But he slightly modifies the doctrine of Kumārila. He advances his theory of obscuration of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*) to account for the apparently presentative character of dreams. His theory will be considered in the next section.

Śaṅkara also is an advocate of the representative theory of dreams. He says, "Dream-consciousness is of the nature of recollection (*smṛti*)."²² "Dreams are reproductions of past waking perceptions owing to the revival of their subconscious impressions; so they have the semblance of waking perceptions."²³ Though Śaṅkara advocates the representative theory of dreams, his follower, Dharmarājādharīndra, advocates the presentative theory.²⁴

According to Prabhākara, dream-cognitions are really reproductions of past waking experience; but they appear to consciousness as direct and immediate sense-presentations owing to lapse of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*). In dream-consciousness memory-images of past experience appear to consciousness as percepts. It is due to lapse of memory which makes the distinctive character of the memory-images, viz., their representative character, drop out of consciousness; and thus the memory-images of past experience deprived of their representative character appear to consciousness as percepts in dream. The process may be represented as follows: Memory-image—memory = percept; or, representation—memory = presentation. Recollection is the apprehension of the previously apprehended; and if the element of 'the apprehended' sinks below the threshold of consciousness,

¹⁹ SV., p. 242.

²¹ SD., pp. 211-12.

²³ S.B., iii, 2, 6. Cf. Sully: "Dreams are to a large extent the semblance of external perceptions", *Illusions*, pp. 130-1.

²⁴ VP., pp. 159 ff.

²⁰ NR., p. 243.

²² S.B., ii, 2, 29.

then recollection appears as a direct apprehension or perception, or, the *re*-presentation appears as a direct and immediate presentation. Thus, according to Prabhākara, dream-cognitions are representative in character, but they appear to consciousness as direct presentations owing to lapse of memory. Prabhākara explains both waking illusions and dream-illusions by the same theory of obscuration of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*).²⁵

Udayana discusses the nature of dream-cognitions and criticizes Prabhākara's theory of dreams. In the dream-state, though the external sense-organs cease to function, yet we have direct and immediate presentations of objects not present at that time and place. This dream-consciousness cannot be of the nature of memory, inasmuch as during the state of dream we do not recognize dream-cognitions as reproductions of our past experience in such a form as 'I remember this'; nor, on waking from sleep, do we remember our dream cognitions in such a form as 'I remembered this'. But, on the contrary, during the state of dream we apprehend our dream-cognitions as actual perceptions, and not as mere echoes of our past experience; and on waking from sleep we remember our dream-cognitions as actual perceptions in the dream-state. So dream-cognitions are not representative, but perceptual in character.

But how can they be perceptual in nature, since the things that are presented to consciousness in dream are not present at that time and place, and the peripheral organs are not quite operative at that time, which are the channels of all perceptions, and the mind (*manas*) too cannot apprehend external objects without the help of the peripheral organs? Are dream-cognitions, then, illusions of memory (*smṛti-viparyāsa*)? Do dream-cognitions appear as percepts, though, as a matter of fact, they are nothing but memory-images? Do memory-images appear to consciousness as percepts in dream-cognitions? Are dream-cognitions the illusions of memory, as Prabhākara holds? If by illusions of memory he means the illusory cognitions of the objects of memory, Udayana has no objection. But if by these he means the illusory appearance of memory as perception, then it cannot be maintained that dream-cognitions are the illusions of memory. For if dream-cognitions were nothing but illusory appearances of memory-images as percepts, the perceptual character of dream-

cognitions would be contradicted at some time or other recognized as representative. But, in fact, in the dream-state we never recognize dream-cognitions as reproductions of our past experience. Besides, in the dream-state we have cognitions of many things which have never been perceived before, e.g. the lopping off of our own heads. Moreover, it is not possible for one form of consciousness to appear as another, though an *object* may appear to consciousness as quite a different thing. If in dream-consciousness memory-images were illusorily cognized as percepts, we should never have a direct presentative consciousness in the form 'I perceive *this* pot', but we should have a presentative consciousness in the form 'I perceive *that* pot' (i.e. perceived in the past and reproduced in memory). As a matter of fact, in dream-cognitions we have a direct and immediate presentation in the form 'I perceive *this* pot'. *Thisness* is the special characteristic of perception alone, while *thatness* is, of memory. Hence, dream-cognitions must be admitted to be presentative or perceptual in character.²⁴

Dharmarājādhvarīndra criticizes Prabhākara's theory of dream. According to the Śaṅkarite, in an illusory perception of waking life we do not perceive an object as another, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds, but we perceive an illusory reality which is produced at that time and place; this reality is illusory (*prātibhāsika*) and undefinable (*anirvacanīya*) as distinguished from the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) reality which is the object of right perception. Likewise, according to him, dream-cognitions too are illusory perceptions, during sleep, of illusory realities produced at that time and place, like the illusory perceptions of our waking life. But Prabhākara contends that dream-cognitions cannot be direct and immediate sense-presentations, because the peripheral organs cease to function during sleep and the mind (*manas*) cannot apprehend external objects without the help of the peripheral organs; and because dream-cognitions are not presentations at all, it is quite useless to assume that they apprehend illusory realities produced at that time and place. In fact, Prabhākara urges that dream-cognitions are nothing but representations of our previous waking perceptions; and that because we cannot discriminate the dream-representations from their originals in waking perceptions we mistake them for actual sense-presentations. To this the

²⁴ NKS., v, pp. 146-7.

Śaṅkarite replies that dream-cognitions cannot be representative in character because in dream we are conscious that 'we see a chariot', and on waking from dream we are conscious that 'we saw a chariot in dream'. This introspection clearly shows that dreams are *perceptual* in character, and this fact of experience cannot be explained away by a dogmatic assumption. Moreover, dream-cognitions cannot be mere recollections of our previous waking perceptions, for the objects of dream-cognitions (e.g. chariots, elephants, etc.) were never perceived in our waking life exactly in that place; hence dream-cognitions must be regarded as immediate presentations or perceptions.²⁷

Dharmarājādhvarīndra criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of dream. Though the Śaṅkarite agrees with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in regarding dream-cognitions as presentative in character, and in refuting Prabhākara's doctrine of the representative character of dreams, yet he differs from the latter in bringing out the metaphysical implication of dreams. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in an illusory perception we erroneously ascribe unreal silver to a nacre which is real in the illusory perception of the nacre as silver. But, according to the Śaṅkarite, illusory silver is produced at that time and place and continue as long as dream-cognitions last. The objects of dream-cognitions (e.g. chariots, elephants, etc.) cannot be erroneously ascribed to any real object (e.g. ground) present to the sense-organs, since the ground is not in contact with the peripheral organs. Nor can they be erroneously ascribed to an object such as ground reproduced in memory, since the ground is not reproduced in memory in dream but is an object of actual perception. Moreover, the objects of dream-cognitions cannot be perceived through the peripheral organs, since they do not really exist in that place, and consequently cannot come into contact with the sense-organs. Nor can these objects of dream-cognitions be brought to consciousness in dream through association (*jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣa*) with the ideas of other objects which are not present to the sense-organs at that time. Nor can they be perceived by the mind, since it cannot apprehend external objects which are not in contact with the external organs. Nor can they be cognized by inference, since they are distinctly felt as objects of direct perception. Moreover, the objects of dream-cognitions are perceived in the absence of recollection of any

²⁷ VP. and Śikhāmaṇi, pp. 159-161.

mark of inference. According to the Śaṅkarite, therefore, the illusory objects of dream-cognitions are produced at that time and place and continue as long as dream-cognitions last. Herein lies the difference between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Advaita Vedānta in their explanation of dream-cognitions.²⁸

2. *Dreams, Illusions, Indefinite Perceptions and Hallucinations*

Udayana distinguishes dream-cognitions from illusory perceptions of waking life and doubtful and indefinite perceptions. Though dream-cognitions are illusory perceptions, since they apprehend objects which are not present at that time and place, and as such resemble illusory perceptions of waking life, they differ from the latter in that they are produced when the peripheral organs are not quite operative, while the latter are produced by the peripheral organs. Then, again, dream-cognitions are not to be identified with doubtful and indefinite perceptions. For dream-cognitions are definite and determinate in character, in which the mind does not oscillate between alternate possibilities, while doubtful and indefinite perceptions are uncertain, because in them the mind is not fixed on a definite object but wavers between two objects without any definite decision.²⁹ Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra also describes a dream-cognition as an illusory, definite perception (*niyatakoṭika*) which does not waver between alternate possibilities and which is produced when all the peripheral organs cease to operate. Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja also regards dreams as determinate cognitions.³⁰ Śrīdhara also regards dream-cognitions as definite and determinate perceptions as distinguished from indefinite and indeterminate perceptions. Dream-cognitions, arising either from the intensity of subconscious traces, or from intra-organic disorders, or from unseen agencies, are purely illusory, since they consist in the false imposition of an external form upon something that is wholly internal, and as such are not essentially different from the illusions of our waking life, the only difference lying in the fact that the former are illusory perceptions in the condition of sleep, while the latter are illusory perceptions

²⁸ VP. with Śikhāmaṇi and Maṇiprabhā, p. 162.

²⁹ Kir., p. 271.

³⁰ Rasasāra, pp. 101-2. PR., p. 28.

in the waking condition.³¹ According to Jayasimhasūri also, dreams are illusions in the condition of sleep. They are illusions because in them things which were perceived in the past and in some other place are perceived here and now.³² Thus, in the language of James Sully, "Dreams are clearly illusory, and, unlike the illusions of waking life, are complete and persistent."³³

Hallucinations are pure creations of the mind (*manas*). And some dreams also are pure creations of the mind (*manomātra-prabhava*). Both are centrally initiated presentations. Both are definite and determinate in character. And both are invalid. So there is a great resemblance between dreams and hallucinations. The only difference between them lies in the fact that the former are hallucinations in sleep, while the latter are hallucinations in the waking condition. This distinction has been pointed out by Mādhava Sarasvatī.³⁴

Frank Padmore says: "A dream is a hallucination in sleep, and a hallucination is only a waking dream; though it is probable that the waking impression, seeing that it can contend on equal terms with the impressions derived from external objects, is more vivid than the common run of dream."³⁵ Wundt also regards dreams as hallucinations. They are as vivid as sensory experience and are projected into the external world as are sensations.

3. Classification of Dreams: Kinds of Dreams: Their Physiological Basis

We find a crude classification of dreams in *Caraka-saṃhitā*. Caraka says that a person sees various dreams through the mind which is the guide of the external sense-organs when he is not in profound sleep. Some of these dreams are significant; others are not. These dreams are of seven kinds, viz. dreams of those objects which have been seen, heard, and felt, dreams of those objects which are desired, dreams awakened by imagination, dreams that are premonitions of future events, and pathological or morbid dreams.³⁶ Caraka seems to suggest here the following psychological facts. Some dreams are mere reproductions of past experience (*anubhūta*), though they are apprehended as immediate

³¹ NK., p. 185.

³² NTD., p. 67.

³³ Illusions, p. 137.

³⁴ MB., p. 68.

³⁵ Apparitions and Thought Transference, p. 186.

³⁶ Caraka Saṃhitā, Indriyasthāna, ch. v.

perceptions. Some dreams involve constructive imagination (*kalpita*), though the material is supplied by memory. Some dreams are fulfilment of desires (*prārthita*). Some dreams are stimulated by pathological disorders within the organism (*doṣaja*). And some dreams are prophetic in character (*bhāvika*), and foreshadow future events. This fact is called dream-coincidence in modern western psychology. According to Caraka, dreams are experienced only in light sleep; they are produced by the mind.³⁷

The Vaiśeṣikas, Praśastapāda, Śrīdharā, Udayana, Śaṅkara Miśra and others, describe four kinds of dreams: (1) dreams due to intra-organic pathological disorders (*dhātudoṣa*); (2) dreams due to the intensity of subconscious impressions (*samskārapāṭava*); (3) dreams due to the unseen agency (*adṛṣṭa*), i.e. merit and demerit (*dharmādharmā*); and (4) "dream-end cognitions" or dreams-within-dreams (*svapnāntika jñāna*).³⁸

Dreams are due to phlegm, bile and flatulence, the influence of a god, the influence of a person's own habits, and his power of prognostication according to Nāgasena. Ariyavansa-Ādiccaransi attempted a systematic explanation of dream-phenomena from the Buddhist standpoint. He recognized four kinds of dreams: (1) dreams due to organic and muscular disturbances, e.g. the flatulent, phlegmatic, and bilious humours; (2) recurrent dreams consisting in recurrence of the previous dreams, due to previous experiences; (3) telepathic dreams due to suggestions from spiritualistic agents; and (4) prophetic dreams due to the force of character of clairvoyant dreamers. "The first category includes the dreams of a fall over a precipice, flying into the sky, etc., and what is called 'nightmare'; the second consists of the 'echoes of past waking experiences'; the third may include dream coincidences; and the fourth is of a clairvoyant character."³⁹ Thus the Buddhists add to the Vaiśeṣika list dreams due to spirit-influence, or telepathic dreams. In addition to these various kinds of dreams, Caraka recognizes dreams which are wish-fulfillments. Madhusūdana and Śaṅkara also recognize the

³⁷ Caraka Saṁhitā, Indriyasthāna, ch. v. Nāgasena also holds that dreams are dreamt when the mind is active in light sleep, in which a person still guards his scattered thoughts. In deep sleep the mind enters into the life stream and becomes inactive. *The Questions of King Milinda*, Vol. II, pp. 159-61, S.B.E.

³⁸ PBh., p. 184.

³⁹ CP., p. 48. *The Questions of King Milinda*, Vol. II, p. 157.

influence of desires on dreams. These different kinds of dreams will be considered in the next section.

We have seen that, according to most Indian thinkers, dream-cognitions are presentative in character. They are felt as perceptions, and are aroused by external and internal stimuli. They are sometimes produced by extra-organic stimuli, and sometimes by intra-organic stimuli in the shape of peripheral disturbances and other organic disorders. These dreams may be called dream-illusions. And there are some dream-cognitions which are produced by the strength of sub-conscious impressions of a recent experience coloured by an intense emotion. These dreams are centrally excited and hence may be called dream-hallucinations. Among the Western psychologists, Spitta, first of all, drew a distinction between these two kinds of dreams, and called the former *Nervenreizträume*, and the latter *psychische Träume*. Miss Calkins calls the former *presentation-dreams*, and the latter *representation-dreams*.⁴⁰ Jastrow calls the former *presentative dreams* and the latter *representative dreams*.⁴¹ Sully calls the former *dream-illusions* and the latter *dream-hallucinations*.⁴² And besides these two kinds of dreams, the Indian thinkers recognize prophetic or veridical dreams and telepathic dreams. The former are due to the merit and demerit of the dreamer, forecasting the future and so on; and the latter are due to the suggestive force of spiritualistic agents. In addition to these, there are dreams-within-dreams or 'dream-end' cognitions. Let us consider the nature of these different kinds of dreams.

Dream-illusions are those dreams which are excited by peripheral stimulation either internal or external. Udayana has discussed the question of the extra-organic and intra-organic origin of dreams. How can dream-cognitions arise in sleep? What is the origin of dreams? Dream-illusions are produced by the reproduction of those objects, the subconscious traces of which are resuscitated owing to certain causes. But how can the subconscious traces be revived without the suggestive force of similar experience? What is the suggestive force here that revives the subconscious traces of past experience? According to Udayana,

⁴⁰ Edmund Parish, *Hallucinations and Illusions*, p. 50; Marie De Menaceine, *Sleep*, p. 255.

⁴¹ Joseph Jastrow, *The Subconscious*, p. 188.

⁴² Sully, *Illusions*, p. 139.

peripheral stimulation is not altogether absent from dream-cognitions. Dreams are not altogether without external stimuli; they are excited by certain external stimuli in the environment, and certain intra-organic stimuli. In the state of dream we do not altogether cease to perceive external objects, since the external sense-organs are not entirely inoperative. For instance, we perceive external sounds in dream, when they are not sufficiently loud to rouse us from sleep; and the faint external sounds perceived through the ears even during light sleep easily incorporate themselves into dreams. Even if all other external sense-organs cease to function in dream, at least the organ of touch is not inoperative, as the mind (*manas*) does not lose its connection with the tactual organ even in dream, which is not confined to the external skin but pervades the whole organism according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. This is the peculiar doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In dream we can perceive at least the heat of our organism which serves to revive the subconscious traces of past experience. Hence certain extra-organic or intra-organic stimuli serve as the exciting cause of the revival of subconscious traces in dream.⁴³ Udayana does not recognize the purely hallucinatory character of dreams. According to him, all dreams are of the nature of illusions because they are initiated by extra-organic or intro-organic stimuli. Thus he anticipates the more recent account of dreams in Western psychology.

"Dream-appearances," says Mr. A. E. Taylor, "which Volkmann classes as hallucinations are more accurately regarded by Wundt as generally, if not always, based on illusion; i.e. they are misinterpretations of actual minimal sense-impressions such as those due to slight noises, to the positions of the sleeper's limbs, to trifling pains, slight difficulties in breathing, palpitations, and the like."⁴⁴ Sully says, "Dreams are commonly classified with hallucinations, and this rightly, since, as their common appellation of 'vision' suggests, they are for the most part the semblance of percepts in the absence of external impressions. At the same time, recent research goes to show that in many dreams something answering to the 'external impression' in waking perception is starting point".⁴⁵ Bergson says, "When we are sleeping naturally,

⁴³ Udbodha eva kathamiticit. Mandataratamādinyāyena bāhyānāmeva śabdādīnāmupalambhāt, antataḥ śarīrasyaivoṣṇmādeḥ pratīpatteḥ. NKS., ch. iii, p. 9.

⁴⁴ E.R.E., vol. v, p. 29.

⁴⁵ *Illusions*, p. 139.

it is not necessary to believe, as has often been supposed, that our senses are closed to external sensations. Our senses continue to be active." "Our senses continue to act during sleep—they provide us with the outline, or at least the point of departure, of most of our dreams."⁴⁶

Praśastapāda also describes the intra-organic stimulation of dream-illusions, which has been explained and illustrated by Udayana, Śrīdhara, Śaṅkara Miśra, Jayanārāyaṇa Tarka-Pañcānana and others. There are some dreams which are due to intra-organic disturbances such as the disorders of the flatulent, bilious, and phlegmatic humours of the organism, which are thought by the Hindu medical science to be the causes of all organic diseases (*dhātudoṣa*).⁴⁷ Those who suffer from disorder of flatulency dream, that they are flying in the sky, wandering about on the earth, fleeing with fear from tigers, etc. These are kinesthetic dreams of levitation.⁴⁸ And those who suffer from an inordinate secretion of bile dream, that they are entering into fire, embracing flames of fire, seeing golden mountains, flashes of lightning, meteor-falls, a huge conflagration, the scorching rays of the mid-day sun, etc. And those who suffer from phlegmatic disorder dream, that they are crossing the sea, bathing in rivers, being sprinkled with showers of rain, and seeing mountains of silver and the like.⁴⁹

There are many dreams which are not excited by peripheral nerve-stimulation but by the intensity of the subconscious impressions left by a recent experience (*samskārapāṭava*).⁵⁰ On the physical side, these dreams are due to central stimulation, and hence may be called dream-hallucinations. These dreams are generally excited by intense passions. For instance, when a man, infatuated with love for a woman, or highly enraged at his enemy, constantly thinks of his beloved or enemy, and while thus thinking falls asleep, the series of thoughts produces a series of memory-images, which are manifested in consciousness as immediate sense-presentations owing to the strength of subconscious impressions.⁵¹ These dreams are purely hallucinatory in character.

We find a similar Buddhist account of dreams in Mr. Aung's *Introduction to Compendium of Philosophy* in which he has

⁴⁶ *Dreams*, p. 31, and p. 48.

⁴⁷ PBh., p. 184.

⁴⁸ Cf. Conklin, *Principles of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 342.

⁴⁹ VSU., ix, 2, 7.

⁵⁰ PBh., p. 184.

⁵¹ NK., p. 185.

summarized Ariyavansa-Adiccaranā's explanation of dreams. "When scenes are reproduced automatically in a dream with our eyes closed the obvious inference is that we see them by way of the door of the mind. Even in the case of peripheral stimulations, as when a light, brought near a sleeping man's eye, is mistaken for a bonfire, it is this exaggerated light that is perceived in a dream by the mind-door. If these presentations do not come from without, they must come from within, from the 'inner' activities of mind. That is to say, if peripheral stimulations are absent, we must look to the automatic activity of mind itself for the source of these presentations; or, to speak in terms of physiology, we must look to the central activity of the cerebrum, which is now generally admitted to be the physical counterpart of the mind-door, the sensory nerves being the physical counterpart of the five-doors in an 'organized sentient existence.'"⁵²

But even these centrally excited dreams due to the revival of subconscious traces are suggested by extra-organic or intra-organic stimuli according to Udayana.⁵³

Caraka says that some dreams are about those objects which are desired (*prārthita*).⁵⁴ Madhusūdana defines dream as the perception of objects due to the desires (*vāsanā*) in the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) when the external sense-organs are inoperative.⁵⁵ Saṃkara also recognizes the influence of desires (*vāsanā*) on dreams.⁵⁶ Dr. M. N. Sircar truly observes: "Here the word 'desire' is significant, it introduces a volitional element in dream. It seems to hold that desires get freedom, in a state of passivity and acquire strength, finally appearing in the form of dream construction."⁵⁷ This reminds us of the Freudian theory according to which, dreams arise out of the repressed, unconscious desires. These dreams also should be regarded as dream-hallucinations, because they are not excited by peripheral stimulation; they are centrally initiated presentations or hallucinations.

But all dreams cannot be explained by peripheral stimulation, due to the action either of external stimuli or internal stimuli, and by central stimulation. There are certain dreams which are

⁵² Pp. 46-7.

⁵³ NKS., ch. iii, p. 9.

⁵⁴ Caraka Saṃhitā, Indriyasthāna, ch. v.

⁵⁵ Siddhāntabindu, p. 189.

⁵⁶ S.B., iii, 2, 6.

⁵⁷ *Vedantic Thought and Culture*, p. 172.

prophetic in character; they are either auspicious or inauspicious. Auspicious dreams betoken good and inauspicious dreams forebode evil. The former are due to a certain merit (*dharma*) of the person, and the latter, to a certain demerit (*adharma*). Some of these prophetic dreams are echoes of our past waking experiences, while others apprehend entirely novel objects never perceived before. The former are brought about by the subconscious traces of our past experience, in co-operation with merit or demerit, according as they augur good or evil, while the latter, by merit or demerit alone, since there are no subconscious traces of such absolutely unknown objects. But merit and demerit are supernatural agents; so this explanation of prophetic dreams seems to be unscientific. But we may interpret the agency of merit and demerit as "the force of character of clairvoyant dreamers" after Mr. Aung.

Prāśastapāda and his followers recognized only three causes of dreams: (1) intensity of subconscious impressions, (2) intra-organic disorders, and (3) merit and demerit of the dreamer (*adr̥ṣṭa*).⁵⁸

And besides the peripherally excited dreams, centrally excited dreams, and prophetic dreams, Ariyavansa-Ādiccaransī, a Buddhist writer, has recognized another class of dreams which are due to spirit-influence, or "due to suggestions from spiritualistic agents" in the language of Mr. Aung; these may include "dream-coincidences". They may be called telepathic dreams.⁵⁹

Besides these dream-cognitions which we do not recognize as dreams during the dream-state, sometimes we have another kind of dream-cognitions which are recognized as dreams. Sometimes in the dream-state we dream, that we have been dreaming of some thing; this dream-within-dream is called *svapnāntika-jñāna*, which has been rendered by Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā as a 'dream-end cognition';⁶⁰ in this 'dream-end cognition' a dream is the object of another dream.⁶¹ Such a 'dream-end cognition' arises in the mind of a person whose sense-organs have ceased their operations; so it is apt to be confounded with a mere dream-

⁵⁸ Saṃskārapāṭavāt dhātudoṣāt adr̥ṣṭacca. PBh., p. 184.

⁵⁹ CP., Introduction, p. 48.

⁶⁰ E.T. of NK., p. 388.

⁶¹ Cf. Sully: "There is sometimes an undertone of critical reflection, which is sufficient to produce a feeling of uncertainty and bewilderment, and in very rare cases to amount to a vague consciousness that the mental experience is a dream." *Illusions*, p. 137 n.

cognition. But Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara and Śaṁkara Miśra rightly point out that our 'dream-end cognitions' essentially differ from mere dream-cognitions, since the former are representative, while the latter are presentative in character. The 'dream-end cognitions' are recollections of dream-cognitions, while dream-cognitions resemble direct sense-perceptions. Dream-cognitions are presentative in character, though they arise out of the subconscious traces left in the mind by the previous perceptions in the waking condition; and these presentative dream-cognitions again leave traces in the mind which give rise to 'dream-end cognitions'. Thus dreams-within-dreams are representative in character.⁶²

Caraka and Suśruta describe various kinds of dreams which are the prognostics of impending diseases and death. Caraka suggests a physiological explanation of the morbid dreams which precede death. These horrible dreams are due to the currents in the *manovahā nāḍi* being filled with very strong flatulent, bilious, and phlegmatic humours before death.⁶³ From this we may infer, that dreams are due to the excitation of the *manovahā nāḍi* which, in the language of Dr. B. N. Seal, is "a generic name for the channels along which centrally initiated presentations (as in dreaming or hallucination) come to the sixth lobe of the *Manaschakra*".⁶⁴ According to Śaṁkara Miśra, dreams are produced by the mind when it is in the *svapnavahā nāḍi* and disconnected with the external sense-organs except the tactual organ; when the mind loses its connection even with the tactual organ and retires into the *purītat*, there is deep dreamless sleep.⁶⁵ Thus, according to Caraka, the *manovahā nāḍi* is the seat of dreams; and according to Śaṁkara Miśra, the *svapnavahā nāḍi* is the seat of dreams. What is the relation between the *manovahā nāḍi* and the *svapnavahā nāḍi*? Dr. B. N. Seal says that according to the writers on Yoga and Tantras, "the *Manovahā Nāḍi* is the channel of the communication of the *Jīva* (soul) with the *Manaschakra* (sensorium) at the base of the brain. It has been stated that the sensory currents are brought to the sensory ganglia along different nerves of the special senses. But this is not sufficient for them to rise to the level of discriminative consciousness (*savikalpaka*

⁶² PBh., p. 184; NK., 185-6; Upaskāra, ix, 2, 8.

⁶³ Caraka Saṁhitā, Indriyasthāna, ch. v.

⁶⁴ PSAH., p. 221.

⁶⁵ Yādā svapnavahanāḍīmadhyavartī manah tadā vahirindriyasambandhavaribhāt svapnajñānānyeva jāyante. KR., p. 120.

jñāna). A communication must now be established between the *Jīva* (in the *Sahasrāra Chakra*, upper cerebrum) and the sensory currents received at the sensorium, and this is done by means of the *Manovahā Nāḍī*. When sensations are centrally initiated, as in dreams and hallucinations, a special *Nāḍī* (*Svapnavahā Nāḍī*), which appears to be only a branch of the *Manovahā Nāḍī*, serves as the channel of communication from the *Jīva* (soul) to the sensorium."⁶⁶

4. Theories of Dreams

Mr. Aung gives a lucid account of the four Buddhist theories of dreams: "The first of these is clearly the physiological theory, which recognizes a source of dreams in the pathological conditions of the body. . . . The theory of the induction of dreams by peripheral nerve-stimulation, due either to the action of external objects on sense-organs, or to disturbances in the peripheral regions of the nerves, is but a branch of the physiological theory. The second may be called the psychological theory. It recognizes the induction of dreams by central stimulation due to the automatic activities of the mind."⁶⁷ The theory of the induction of dreams by the agency of spirits may be stigmatized in the West as "the superstitious theory". "But as the *devas*, or mythical beings as they would be termed in the West, are, according to Buddhism, but different grades of sentient beings in the thirty-one stages of existence, the theory in question, merely recognizes the suggestive action of mind upon mind, and may therefore be aptly called the telepathic or telepsychic theory."⁶⁸ The theory of the induction of prophetic dreams by the agency of merit and demerit may be called 'the clairvoyant theory'. The theory which explains dreams as the fulfilment of desires may also be called the psychological theory. The different kinds of dreams described by Indian thinkers may be explained by these four theories.

"What is this that men call a dream and who is it who dreams it? It is a suggestion coming across the path of the mind which is what is called a dream. And there are six kinds of people who see dreams—the man who is of a windy humour,

⁶⁶ PSAH., p. 223.

⁶⁷ CP., pp. 48-9.

⁶⁸ CP., pp. 48-99.

or of a bilious one, or of a phlegmatic one, the man who dreams dreams by the influence of a god, the man who does so by the influence of his own habits, and the man who does so in the way of prognostication. And of these, only the last kind of dreams is true; all the rest are false.”⁶⁶ This is the view of Nāgasena, a Buddhist philosopher. The Buddhists ascribe dreams to extra-organic stimuli, intra-organic disorders, subconscious impressions of past experiences, old habits, clairvoyant character, and the suggestive action of a superior mind. There is always an element of suggestion in dream.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ *The Questions of King Milinda*, Part II, pp. 157-8. (S.B.E.).

CHAPTER XVI

ABNORMAL PERCEPTIONS

1. *The Sāṃkhya and the Ancient Medical Science*

Íśvarakṛṣṇa mentions eleven kinds of anæsthesia of the sense-organs (*indriya-badha*) corresponding to the eleven kinds of sense-organs—five sensory organs, five motor organs, and one central sensory as distinguished from the peripheral organs. And besides these eleven kinds of sense-disorders and their effects on the intellect, he mentions seventeen other kinds of the disorders of the intellect (*buddhibadha*).¹ Māthara says that *indriyabadha* means the incapacity of the sense-organs for apprehending their objects; the sense-disorders cannot produce right apprehension.²

Vācaspatimiśra explains the disorders of the five sense-organs as deafness (*bādhīrya*) or anæsthesia of the auditory organ, cutaneous insensibility (*kuṣṭhitā*) or anæsthesia of the tactual organ, blindness (*andhatva*) or anæsthesia of the visual organ, numbness of the tongue and loss of the sense of taste (*jaḍatā*) or anæsthesia of the gustatory organ, and insensibility to smell (*ajighratā*) or anæsthesia of the olfactory organ. He describes the abnormalities of the motor organs as dumbness (*mūkatā*) or paralysis of the vocal organ, paralysis of the hands or prehensory organ (*kaunya*), paralysis of the legs or the locomotive organ (*pañgutva*), paralysis of the excretive organ (*udāvarta*), and impotence or paralysis of the generative organ (*klaibya*). And he explains the anæsthesia of the mind as utter insensibility to pleasure, pain and the like (*mandatā*). Gauḍapāda regards insanity (*unmāda*) as the anæsthesia of the mind.³

Corresponding to these eleven kinds of sense-disorders there are eleven kinds of intellectual disorders (*buddhibadha*) which consist in the non-production of psychoses corresponding to peripheral and central stimulations, or in the production of psychoses which are not in keeping with peripheral and central stimulations. And besides these eleven kinds of disorders of the

¹ SK., 49.

² SK., 49; STK., 49.

³ Mātharavṛtti, 49.

intellect corresponding to the eleven kinds of sense-disorders, there are seventeen kinds of abnormalities which are purely intellectual due to some defects of the intellect, and do not owe their origin to the stimulation of the peripheral organs or the central sensory affected by pathological disorders. These intellectual disorders consist in the production of such psychoses as are contradictory to the nine kinds of *tuṣṭi* or intellectual complacency and eight kinds of *siddhi* or fruition of the peripheral organs or the central sensory affected by pathological disorders. These intellectual disorders consist in the production of such psychoses as are contradictory to the nine kinds of *tuṣṭi* or intellectual complacency and eight kinds of *siddhi* or fruition of intellectual operations. Thus altogether there are twenty-eight kinds of disorders of the intellect.⁴

In the medical works of the ancient Hindus we find a description and explanation of various kinds of sense-disorders and consequent abnormalities in sense-perception. Our account of abnormal perceptions would be incomplete without a reference to this account in the medical works. First we shall give an account of the abnormalities of visual perception as described by Susruta. But his account of the disorders of visual perception cannot be fully understood unless we understand his view of the mechanism of the visual organ. So we briefly refer to the mechanism of the eye described by him.

The eye-ball (*nayana-budbuda*) is almost round in shape and about an inch in diameter. It is made up of five elements. The muscles of the eye-ball are formed by the solid elements of earth (*bhū*); the blood in the veins and arteries of the eye-ball is formed by the element of heat (*tejas*); the black part of the eye-ball (iris, etc.) in which the pupil is situated is formed by the gaseous element (*vāyu*); the white part of the eye-ball (vitreous body) is made up of the fluid element (*jala*); and the lachrymal or other ducts or sacs (*aśrumārga*) through which the secretions are discharged, are made up of the ethereal element (*ākāśa*). There are five *maṇḍalas*, or circles, and six *paṭālas*, or layers in the eye. The five *maṇḍalas* are the following, viz. (1) the *drṣṭimaṇḍala* (the pupil), (2) the *kṛṣṇa-maṇḍala* (the choroid), (3) the *śveta-maṇḍala* (the sclerotic and cornea), (4) the *vartma-maṇḍala* (the eye-lid),

⁴ STK., 49, and Gauḍapādabhāṣya, 49.

and (5) the *pakṣma-maṇḍala* (the circle of the eye-lashes).⁵ "The different parts of the eye-ball are held together by the blood-vessels, the muscles, the vitreous body, and the choroid. Beyond the choroid, the eye-ball is held (in the orbit) by a mass of *Sleşmā* (viscid substance—capsule of Tenon) supported by a number of vessels. The deranged *Doṣas* which pass upward to the region of the eyes through the channels of the up-coursing veins and nerves give rise to a good many dreadful diseases in that region."⁶

2. *Abnormal Perceptions*

According to the Hindu medical science, all diseases are due to the provocation of three humours of the body, flatulent, bilious, and phlegmatic. So the disorders of visual perception are brought about by the bodily humours (*doṣas*) attacking the different layers of the eye. (1) "All external objects appear dim and hazy to the sight when the deranged *Doṣas* of the locality passing through the veins (*Śirā*) of the eye, get into and are incarcerated within the first *Paṭala* (innermost coat) of the pupil (*Driṣṭi*)." (2) "False images of gnats, flies, hairs, nets or cobwebs, rings (circular patches), flags, ear-rings appear to the sight, and the external objects seem to be enveloped in mist or haze or as if laid under a sheet of water or as viewed in rain and on cloudy days, and meteors of different colours seem to be falling constantly in all directions in the event of the deranged *Doṣas* being similarly confined in the second *Paṭala* (coat) of the *Driṣṭi*. In such cases the near appearance of an actually remote object and the contrary (*Miopia* and *Biopia*) also should be ascribed to some deficiency in the range of vision (error of refraction in the crystalline lens) which incapacitates the patient from looking through the eye and hence from threading a needle." (3) "Objects situate high above are seen and these placed below remain unobserved when the deranged *Doṣas* are infiltrated in the third *Paṭala* (coat) of the *Driṣṭi*. The *Doṣas* affecting the *Driṣṭi* (crystalline lens), if highly enraged, impart their specific colours to the objects of vision. The deranged *Doṣas* situated at and obstructing the lower, upper, and lateral parts of the *Driṣṭi* (crystalline lens) respectively shut out the view of near, distant and laterally situate

⁵ *Suśrutasaṃhitā*, Uttaratāntra, E.T. by Kuṇḍalāl Bhiṣagratna, Ch. I.

⁶ *Ibid*, vol. iii, p. 4.

objects. A dim and confused view of the external world is all that can be had when the deranged Doṣas spread over and affect the whole of the Driṣṭi (crystalline lens). A thing appears to the sight as if cut into two (bifurcated) when the deranged Doṣas affect the middle part of the lens, and as triply divided and severed when the Doṣas are scattered in two parts; while a multifarious image of the same object is the result of the manifold distributions of movability of the Doṣas over the Driṣṭi." (4) When the fourth *paṭala* of the eye is attacked by the deranged humours, we have a loss of vision (*timira*). When the vision is completely obstructed by the deranged humours, it is called *līṅganāśa* (blindness). When *līṅganāśa* is not deep-seated but superficial, we have only a faint perception of the images of the sun, the moon and the stars, the heaven, a flash of lightning, and such other highly brilliant objects. The *līṅganāśa* (blindness) is also called *nīlikā* and *kāca*.⁸

There are various kinds of *timira* or loss of vision. In the type of *timira* due to the derangement of the flatulent humour (*vātaja*), external objects appear to the sight as cloudy, moving, crooked, and red. In the type of *timira* due to the derangement of the bilious humour (*pittaja*), external objects appear to be invested with the different colours of the spectrum, of the glow-worm, of the flash of lightning, of the feathers of a peacock, or coloured with a dark blue tint. In the type of *timira* due to the derangement of the phlegmatic humour (*kaphaja*), all objects appear to the sight as covered with a thick white coat like that of a patch of white cloud, and look white, oily, and dull, and appear hazy and cloudy on a fine day, or as if laid under a sheet of water. In the type of *timira* due to deranged blood (*raktaja*), all objects appear red or enveloped in gloom, and they assume a greyish, blackish or variegated colour. In another type of *timira* (*sānnipātika*), external objects appear to the vision as doubled or trebled, variegated and confused, and abnormal images of stars and planets float about in the vision. In the type of *timira* due to deranged bile in concert with deranged blood, which is called *parimlāyi*, the quarters of the heaven look yellow and appear to the sight as if brilliant with the light of the rising

⁷ *Suśruta Saṁhitā*. Uttara Tantra, vol. iii, E.T., chapter vii, pp. 25-6.

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. iii, ch. vii.

sun, and trees appear as if sparkling with the flashes of glow-worms.

Besides these six types of *liṅganāśa*, there are six other kinds peculiar to the *dṛṣṭi* (pupil), which are called *pitta-vidagdha-dṛṣṭi*, *sleṣma-vidagdha-dṛṣṭi*, *dhūma-dṛṣṭi*, *hrasva-jātya*, *nakulāndhya* and *gambhīrika*. (1) In *pitta-vidagdha-dṛṣṭi*, all external objects appear yellow to the sight, and nothing can be seen in the day, but things can be seen only at night. It is due to an accumulation of the deranged bile in the third *paṭala* or coat of the eye. (2) In *sleṣma-vidagdha-dṛṣṭi* all external objects appear white to the sight, and they can be seen only in the day, but not at night; this is called nocturnal blindness. It is due to an accumulation of the deranged phlegm in all the three *paṭalas* or coats of the eye. (3) In *dhūma-dṛṣṭi* the external objects appear smoky. It is due to grief, high fever, excessive physical exercise, or injury to head, etc. (4) In *hrasva-jātya* small objects can be seen with the greatest difficulty even in the day-time, but they can be seen easily and distinctly at night. (5) In *nakulāndhya* the external objects appear multi-coloured in the day-time, and nothing can be seen at night. (6) In *gambhīrika* the pupil is contracted and deformed and sinks into the socket, attended with an extreme pain in the affected parts.*

Caraka says that when the cerebrum is injured the eye-sight is affected and we have disorders in visual perception.¹⁰ And he attributes blindness (*timira*) to the excessive provocation of the flatulent humour.¹¹

Suśruta describes three kinds of disorders in sound-perception, viz. *praṇāda* or *kārṇa-nāda*, *kārṇa-kṣveḍa*, and *bādhīrya*. In *praṇāda* or *kārṇa-nāda*, ringing and various other sounds are heard in the ear. In *kārṇa-kṣveḍa*, only a peculiar type of sound is heard in the ear. It differs from *kārṇa-nāda* in that in this disease only a sound of a special kind, viz. that of a wind-pipe, is heard in the ear, while in the latter various kinds of sounds are produced in the ear. In deafness (*bādhīrya*) there is a complete loss of hearing.¹² According to Caraka complete deafness (*bādhīrya*) is due to the provocation of the flatulent humour. He mentions two other kinds of disorders in auditory perception,

* Suśruta Samhitā, Uttara Tantra, E.T., vol. iii, chapter vii, pp. 25-30.

¹⁰ Caraka-Samhitā, Siddhiśāhanam, ch. ix, 9.

¹¹ Ibid., Sūtra śāhanam, chapter xx, 12.

¹² Suśruta Samhitā, Uttara Tantra, ch. xx.

viz. *asabda-śravaṇa* and *uccaiḥśruti*, which also are due to the provocation of the flatulent humour. The former is that kind of deafness in which a person can hear words uttered very softly or in whispers only. The latter is that form of deafness in which a person hears only such words as are uttered very loudly.¹³

Suśruta describes many disorders of the olfactory organ, of which one may be regarded as a cause of the loss of the sense of smell. In *apināśa* (obstruction in the nostrils) there is a choking and burning sensation in the nostrils with a deposit of filthy slimy mucus in their passages, which deaden the sense of smell and taste for the time being. In a malignant type of catarrh (*pratisyāya*), too, there is an insensibility to smell.¹⁴

Caraka also refers to *ghrāṇa-nāśa* which consists in the loss of the sensation of smell, and is due to the provocation of the flatulent humour.¹⁵

Caraka mentions *arasajñatā* as a disease of the tongue in which there is a complete loss of the sensation of taste ; it is due to the provocation of the flatulent humour. He also describes the different kinds of tastes owing to the provocation of different kinds of humours. Owing to the provocation of the flatulent humour a person has an astringent taste in the mouth, and sometimes does not feel any taste at all. Owing to the provocation of the bilious humour a person feels in his tongue the presence of an acrid or sour taste. Owing to the provocation of the phlegmatic humour a person feels in his mouth the presence of a sweet taste. And owing to the simultaneous provocation of all the three humours, a person feels the presence of many tastes in his mouth. Caraka also refers to the disease of *tiktāsyatā* or a constant bitter taste in the mouth owing to the provocation of bilious humour. He also refers to *mukhamādhurya* or a constant sweet taste in the mouth, and *kaṣāyāsyatā* or a constant astringent taste in the mouth.¹⁶

Caraka and Suśruta describe cutaneous affections as *kuṣṭhas*, which are of various kinds and which give rise to various kinds of disordered cutaneous sensations. According to Suśruta, when the cutaneous affection is confined only to the serous fluid of the

¹³ Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, lesson xx, 12.

¹⁴ Suśruta Saṁhitā, Uttara Tantra, ch. xxii.

¹⁵ Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, lesson xx, 12.

¹⁶ Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, lesson x.

skin, there are the following symptoms, viz. loss of the perception of touch, itching sensation, etc.; when it is confined to the blood, it brings about complete anæsthesia; when it affects only the flesh, there are various symptoms such as excruciating pricking pain in the affected part and its numbness; and when it affects the fat, the body seems to be covered with a plaster.¹⁷ In the various kinds of cutaneous affections described by Caraka and Suśruta there is partial or complete anæsthesia together with various kinds of disorders in cutaneous, organic, and muscular sensations.¹⁸

Caraka also mentions various other abnormalities in tactile sensations (including organic and muscular sensations) such as *ekāṅgaroga* (partial or local paralysis), *pakṣabadha* (side paralysis), *sarvāṅgaroga* (complete paralysis), *daṇḍaka* (stiffness of the whole body like a log of wood), *oṣa* (the disease in which the patient feels the sensation of fire being always placed very near his body), *ploṣa* (the disease in which the patient has the sensation of his body being slightly scorched by fire), *dāha* (a sensation of burning experienced in every part of the body), *davathu* (a sensation of every part of the body having been subject to painful inflammation), *antardāha* (a burning sensation within the body, generally within the thorax), *amsadāha* (a burning sensation in the shoulders), *uṣmādhikya* (excess of internal heat in the body), *māmsadāha* (a sensation of burning in the flesh), etc.¹⁹

Caraka refers to the abnormalities of the vocal organ such as *vāksaṅga* (temporary dumbness or difficulty in speaking, e.g. stammering), *gadgadatva* (slowness of speech), and *mūkatva* (complete dumbness). When the cerebrum is injured, there are slowness of speech, loss of voice, and complete dumbness.²⁰ Temporary dumbness (*vāksaṅga*) and complete dumbness (*mūkatva*) are due to the provocation of the flatulent humour.²¹

Caraka asserts that when the cerebrum is injured there is a loss of motor effort (*ceṣṭānāśa*).²² According to him, the heart is the seat of the mind, the intellect, and consciousness. But the cerebrum is the seat of sensory and motor centres. Just as the rays of the sun have their seat in the sun, so the sensory and

¹⁷ Suśruta Saṁhitā, Nidāna-sthāna, ch. v.

¹⁸ Ibid., ch. v; Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, ch. xx.

¹⁹ Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, lesson x.

²⁰ Caraka Saṁhitā, Siddhisthāna, ix, 9.

²¹ Ibid., Sūtra-sthāna, xx, 12.

²² Ibid., Siddhisthāna, ch. ix, 9.

motor organs and the vital currents of the sense-organs have their seat in the cerebrum.²³

According to Caraka, the heart is the seat of consciousness. So when the heart is injured, we have epilepsy (*apasmāra*), insanity (*unmāda*), delirium (*pralāpa*), and loss of the mind (*cittanāśa*). This paralysis of the mind (*cittanāśa*) may be called 'mental blindness' in the language of William James. "When mental blindness is more complete," says James, "neither sight, touch, nor sound avails to steer the patient, and a sort of dementia which has been called *asymbolia* or *apraxia* is the result."²⁴

According to Caraka, the *prāṇa* and the *udāna*, which are biomorphic forces, the mind (*manas*), the intellect (*buddhi*), and consciousness (*cetanā*) have their seat in the heart.²⁵ So when the heart is overpowered by the provocation of the phlegmatic humour, consciousness is benumbed, and lapses into semi-unconsciousness (*tandrā*).²⁶ And when the heart is overpowered by the provocation of the flatulent humour, consciousness is suspended and lapses into torpor or unconsciousness (*moha*).

3. Causes of Sense-disorders and Mental Disorders

According to Caraka, there are four kinds of correlation or contact of the sense-organs with their objects, viz. *atiyoga*, or excess of contact, *ayoga* or total absence of contact, *hīnayoga* or sparing or partial contact, and *mithyāyoga* or contact of sense-organs with disagreeable objects. *Atiyoga* corresponds to over-use of a sense-organ, *ayoga*, to its non-use, *hīnayoga*, to its under-use, and *mithyāyoga*, to its misuse. This account of Caraka has a strangely modern ring. There is no doubt that sense-disorders are, to a great extent, due to the abnormal functioning of the sense-organs. So Caraka's explanation is very significant. He accounts for the disorders of the sense-organs and consequent abnormalities of sense-perceptions by the excess of correlation, absence of correlation, insufficient correlation, and injudicious correlation of the sense-organs with their respective objects. *Yathāyoga* or judicious correlation of a sense-organ with its objects preserves the normal condition of the organ, and also keeps the

²³ Ibid., Siddhisthāna, ch. ix, 5.

²⁴ *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i, p. 52.

²⁵ Caraka Saṁhitā, Siddhisthāna, ix, 4.

²⁶ Ibid., ix, 28.

perceptions produced by that organ unimpaired. But excessive exercise, absence of judicious exercise, insufficient exercise, and injudicious exercise impair the sense-organs, and consequently impair the perceptions produced by them. Caraka gives us some examples to illustrate the different kinds of correlation of the sense-organs with their objects. A continuous gaze at very bright objects is an example of excessive correlation of the visual organ. Total abstention from exercising the eye is the absence of correlation. The sight of objects that are very minute or very distant, or that are hateful, terrible, amazing, repulsive, or extremely ugly is an example of injudicious correlation. All these impair the sense of vision. Excessive correlation of the auditory organ arises from constantly exposing the ear to the stunning report of thunder or beat of a drum or loud cries. Total abstention from hearing by closing the ears is the absence of correlation. Injudicious correlation arises from hearing sounds that are rough, harsh, dreadful, uncongenial, disagreeable, and indicative of danger. These impair the sense of hearing. Excessive correlation of the olfactory organ arises from constantly smelling very keen and powerful scents which call forth tears, excite nausea, produce stupefaction, etc. Total abstention from all scents is the absence of correlation. Injudicious correlation arises from smelling odours emitted by putrid objects, or objects that are poisonous, disagreeable, or repulsive. These impair the sense of smell. Excessive correlation of the gustatory organ arises when the objects producing any of the six kinds of taste are taken in an excessive degree. Total abstention from tasting is the absence of correlation. Injudicious correlation arises from tasting things which are made up of incompatible ingredients, or which are not suitable to the organism. These impair the sense of taste. Excessive correlation of the tactual organ arises from exposure to excessive heat and cold, excessive indulgence in bathing and rubbing the skin with oil, etc., and indulgence in sudden change of temperature. Total abstention from enjoying the sense of touch, or from allowing the body to be touched, is the absence of correlation. Contact of the body with poisonous objects, or with untimely heat and cold is injudicious correlation. These impair the sense of touch.²⁷

²⁷ Caraka Saṃhitā, Sūtrasthāna, ch. xi, 27-32. E.T. (Abinash Chandra Kaviratna).

BOOK VII

CHAPTER XVII

SUPER-NORMAL PERCEPTIONS

1. *Introduction*

In the last Book we have dealt with indefinite perceptions, illusions and hallucinations, dreams, and abnormal perceptions. In this Book we shall deal with super-normal perceptions, divine perception, the perception of the individual witness (Jīva-Sākṣin), and the perception of the divine witness (Īśvara-Sākṣin).

The Indian treatment of super-normal perceptions is more descriptive than explanatory. The Indian philosophers have distinguished between abnormal perceptions and super-normal perceptions, inasmuch as the former are disorders and aberrations of perception, while the latter are the higher grades of perception. Super-normal perceptions are above the general laws and conditions of normal perceptions. They transcend the categories of time, space, and causality, and apprehend the real nature of things divested of all their accidental associations of names, concepts, and so forth. So we cannot understand their nature by appealing to the facts of our ordinary perceptions. We must have a conception of these higher grades of super-normal perception on the basis of speculation, unless we ourselves attain the stage of higher intuitions. And Indian philosophers have tried to arrive at a conception of these super-normal perceptions by using speculative arguments and appealing to their own higher intuitions. Almost all schools of Indian philosophers believe in supernormal perceptions. Only the materialist Cārvāka does not believe in any other source of knowledge than sense-perception. And the Mīmāṃsaka also denies the possibility of super-normal perceptions, because, according to him, the past, the future, the distant, and the subtle can be known only through the injunctions of the Vedas. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala, the Vedāntist, the Buddhist, and the Jaina believe in super-normal perceptions, though they give different accounts of them.

The modern science of hypnotism and other occult and esoteric sciences will find sufficient material for research and investigation in the Indian account of super-normal perceptions. They will find in it evidences of auto-suggestion, clairvoyance, clairaudience, hyperæsthesia of vision, hearing, touch, etc., hypermnesia, thought-reading, thought-transference or telepathy, and different kinds of trance or ecstasy.

2. *The Mīmāṃsaka Denial of Yogi-Pratyakṣa*

Yāmunācārya gives us a lucid account of the Mīmāṃsaka argument against the possibility of yogic or ecstatic intuition. Is yogic perception sensuous or non-sensuous? Is it produced by the sense-organs or not? If it is sensuous, is it produced by the external sense-organs or by the internal organ or mind? The external sense-organs produce cognitions of their appropriate objects only when they come in contact with their objects. But as the external sense-organs can never come in contact with distant, past, and future objects, they can never produce cognitions of these objects. Hence yogic perception can never be produced by the external sense-organs. Nor can it be produced by the mind. For the mind can produce the perception of only mental states, independently of the external sense-organs. But it cannot produce the perception of external objects independently of the external sense-organs. If the mind did not depend upon the external sense-organs to produce the perception of external objects, then there would be no need of the external organs at all in the perception of external objects, and no one would be blind or deaf. Hence the Mīmāṃsaka concludes that external objects cannot be perceived through the mind independently of the peripheral organs. Nor can it be said that the external organs can apprehend objects even without coming in contact with them, when they attain the highest degree of excellence through the powers of occult medicines, incantations, and the practice of austerities and intense meditation; for all that these can do is to bring about a manifestation of only the natural capacities of the sense-organs, which are not unlimited, but strictly limited within their proper sphere. The ear can never produce the perception of colour or taste, even if it is extremely refined by the application of medicines. A sense-organ can never transcend its

natural limitations, even when it attains the highest degree of perfection by intense meditation; the function of a sense-organ is always restricted within a limited sphere; so a sense-organ, even in its highest degree of excellence, cannot transcend its natural limits. Hence sensuous knowledge can never apprehend past, distant, and future objects.

The perception of the Yogin is said to be the result of intense meditation. But though the cognition produced by constant meditation is manifested as a distinct presentation, does it cognize a thing as apprehended in the past or more than that? If it apprehends exactly the same thing as was apprehended in the past, then the cognition produced by intense meditation is nothing but memory or reproduction of the past experience. And if it apprehends more than what was perceived in the past, then it is illusory as it apprehends something which has no real existence. Therefore, either the intuition of the Yogin is not of the nature of perception, or, if it is perceptual, it is illusory. If it is regarded as perceptual in character, then it cannot transgress the general condition of perception, that it must be produced by the contact of a sense-organ with its proper object. Hence the Mīmāṃsaka concludes that there can be no yogic perception of past, distant, and future objects and that these can be known only through the injunction of the Vedas.¹

3. *The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika View of Yogi-pratyakṣa*

Śrīdhara proves the possibility of yogic perception by the following arguments: In the first place, just as by constant practice we learn new things in different sciences and arts, so by the collective force of constant meditation upon the self, *ākāśa*, and other super-sensible objects we acquire true knowledge of these objects. In the second place, the varying grades of the intellect must reach the highest limit beyond which it cannot go, because they are varying grades, like the varying grades of magnitude.² Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also offers the same argument. Just as there are various degrees of whiteness and other qualities, so there are various degrees of the faculty of perception; and the highest degree of perfection is reached by man in yogic perception

¹ Siddhitraya, pp. 70-2. HIP., I, p. 805.

² NK., p. 196; Gaṅgānātha Jha, E.T., p. 413.

which apprehends all objects, subtle, hidden, remote, past, future, and the like; and there is nothing improbable in this. We see only proximate objects with the help of light. But cats can see objects even in utter darkness, and vultures can see objects from a very great distance. So we can legitimately suppose, that we can acquire super-sensuous vision by constant practice in meditation.^a

But it has been objected that the mere presence of the varying degrees of an object does not necessarily imply that it should reach the highest limit. For instance, there are varying degrees of heat when water is heated; but we never find it reaching the highest limit of heat and turning into fire itself; nor do we ever perceive the highest limit of jumping as there is no man who can jump over all the three worlds. Śrīdhara replies that this objection does not apply to yogic practices. That property which has a permanent substratum, and which produces a peculiarity in it gradually reaches the highest limit of excellence through constant practice. For instance, when gold is repeatedly heated and treated by the method of '*puṣṭapāka*' its purity gradually reaches the highest limit and acquires the character of the *raktasāra*. As for the heating of water, it has no permanent substratum; so repetition cannot bring it up to the highest limit of perfection. That water has no permanent substratum is proved by the fact that it entirely disappears on the application of intense heat. Then as for the practice of jumping it does not produce any peculiarity in its substratum; because the first act of jumping is totally destroyed and leaves no such trace behind, so that the second and subsequent acts of jumping may be helped by the effect of the first act of jumping; all these acts of jumping are effects of different forces and efforts, and hence any subsequent excellence of jumping may not be due to the previous jumping. It is for this reason that when a man is tired by three or four jumps his limit of jumping begins to decline, owing to the decrease of strength. As for the intellect (*buddhi*), on the other hand, it has a permanent substratum and produces a peculiarity in it; since we find that though something is quite unintelligible to us at first, it becomes thoroughly intelligible when we repeatedly apply intelligence to it. Thus the more we practise meditation upon an object, the greater peculiarity is produced in it at

^a NM., p. 103.

each step of the practice, and when the practice is kept up continuously for a long time, the intellect acquires a fresh force due to the peculiar powers or merit (*dharma*) born of yoga and must reach its highest limit of excellence. And there is nothing unreasonable in this.⁴

Then, again, it has been objected that Yogis cannot perceive super-sensuous objects because they are living beings like ourselves. Śrīdhara criticizes this argument. The Yogis are, no doubt, living beings but they may be omniscient, too. The character of living beings is not inconsistent with omniscience; they are not mutually exclusive of each other. No inconsistency has ever been found between omniscience and the character of living beings. But since we cannot definitely ascertain whether our want of omniscience is due to our character of living beings, or due to the absence of the peculiar power of *dharma* born of yoga which is regarded as the cause of omniscience, there is a doubtful concomitance of omniscience with the character of living beings. And because there is a doubtful concomitance between the character of living beings and omniscience, the former can never prove the inference that Yogis cannot have super-sensuous knowledge because they are living beings. But the fact that the *dharma*, or a peculiar power born of yoga, is the cause of super-sensuous knowledge is well-known to us. So Śrīdhara concludes that our want of omniscience is due to the absence of the peculiar power of *dharma* produced by constant meditation.⁵

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa describes the nature of yogic perception. The Yogis can perceive all objects past, distant, and future, hidden, subtle, and remote, and even *dharma* which is absolutely super-sensible to us. But do the Yogis perceive all objects by one cognition or by many cognitions? Not by one cognition, since contradictory qualities like heat and cold cannot be apprehended by a single cognition. Nor by many cognitions, since they cannot arise simultaneously owing to the atomic nature of *manas*; and if they are produced successively, then Yogis will require infinite time to perceive all the objects of the world. Hence Yogis cannot be omniscient. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refutes this objection. Yogis perceive all objects of the world simultaneously by one cognition,

⁴ NK., pp. 196-7; E.T., pp. 413-14.

⁵ NK., pp. 197-8; E.T., pp. 415-16. Cf. NTD., p. 82, and NM., p. 105.

and there is nothing unreasonable in it. It is found in actual experience that contradictory qualities like blue, yellow, etc., do appear in a single psychosis (*citrapratyaya*), and heat and cold are perceived simultaneously by a person with the lower part of his body plunged in water and the upper part of his body in the scorching rays of the sun. Thus Jayanta Bhaṭṭa concludes that Yogis perceive all objects of the world simultaneously by a single intuition.*

Bhāsarvajña divides perception into two kinds, yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*), and non-yogic perception (*ayogipratyakṣa*). He defines ordinary or non-yogic perception as direct and immediate apprehension of gross objects, produced by a particular relation between sense-organs and their objects with the help of light, time ('now'), space ('here'), merit or demerit of the person. And he defines yogic perception as direct and immediate apprehension of distant, past, future, and subtle objects.⁷

If Yogis can perceive all objects of the world, past, present, future, hidden, subtle, and remote, and supersensible objects like *dharma*, etc., how do they differ from omniscient God? How does the perception of Yogis differ from divine perception? Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that the difference lies in that the omniscience of Yogis is produced by constant meditation, while divine omniscience is eternal. Moreover, the divine perception of *dharma* (Moral Law) is natural to God; *dharma* constitutes the essential nature of God, which is the cause of the Vedic injunctions of *dharma*. But Yogis at first learn the real nature of *dharma* from the Vedic injunctions and then by unceasing practice in meditation they come to perceive it; and when they acquire an intuition of it, the conception that the Vedic injunction is the ultimate standard of duty or moral obligation loses its hold upon their minds.⁸

Prāsaṣṭapāda divides yogic perception into two kinds, viz. (i) *yuktapratyakṣa* or the perception of those who are in ecstasy, and (ii) *viyuktapratyakṣa* or the perception of those who have fallen off from ecstasy. Those who are in a state of ecstasy can perceive their own selves, the selves of others, *ākāśa*, space, time,

* *Yugapad ekayaiva buddhyā sarvatra sarvān arthān drakṣyanti yogināḥ*. NM., pp. 107-8.

⁷ NSr., p. 3, and NTD., p. 82.

⁸ *Īśvarasya nityam eva jñānārṇ yogināṁ tu yogabhāvanābhyāsa-prabhavam*. NM., p. 108. NP., p. 72.

atoms, air, *manas*, and the qualities, actions generalities, and particularities inhering in these, and inherence itself through the *manas* aided by the peculiar powers (*dharma*) produced by meditation. And those who have fallen off from ecstasy perceive subtle, hidden, and remote things, owing to the fourfold contact of the self, *manas*, sense-organs and objects, and by virtue of the peculiar powers produced by meditation.⁹

Bhāsarvajña also follows Praśastapāda in dividing yogic perception into two kinds: (1) ecstatic intuition or intuition in the state of ecstasy, and (2) non-ecstatic intuition or intuition out of the state of ecstasy. In the ecstatic condition there is no peripheral stimulation or intercourse of the external sense-organs with outward objects; but the perception of all the objects follows from the conjunction of the self with the internal organ (*manas*), aided by a certain *dharma* brought about by intense meditation and the grace of God. Thus in the state of ecstasy the internal organ alone is operative, the external organs being entirely inoperative at the time. But in the non-ecstatic condition the yogic perception of supersensible objects follows from the four-fold, three-fold or two-fold contact as required in different cases.¹⁰ When objects are perceived through the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the visual organ, or the tactual organ, perception is brought about by the four-fold contact of the self with the *manas*, of the *manas* with the external sense-organs, and of these external sense-organs with their proper objects. In the perception of sound there is the three-fold contact of the self with the *manas*; and of the *manas* with the auditory organ. And in the perception of pleasure, pain, etc., there is the two-fold contact of the self with the *manas*.¹¹

Similarly the Neo-Naiyāyikas divide yogic perception into two kinds: (1) the perception of a Yogin who has attained union with the supreme Being (*yukta*), and (2) the perception of a yogin who is endeavouring to attain such a union (*yuñjāna*). The first yogin enjoys a constant perception of all the objects of the world, ether, atoms, etc., through his mind aided by a certain *dharma* born of meditation, while the second Yogin can acquire perception of all the objects with a little effort of attention or meditation.¹²

⁹ PBh., p. 187; NP., pp. 72-75.

¹⁰ NSār., p. 3.

¹¹ NTD., p. 83.

¹² BhP., 65; SM., pp. 284-5. HIP., I, pp. 472-3.

Is yogic perception determinate (*savikalpa*) or indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*)? Jayasimhasūri holds that the yogic perception in the state of ecstasy is indeterminate, since the complete focussing of attention in ecstasy cannot be brought about by a determinate perception. There is no element of discrimination in the yogic intuition in the state of ecstasy. But it must not be supposed, that the yogic intuition in ecstasy is the same as our indeterminate perception which apprehends the mere forms of objects, and not their mutual relations. Our indeterminate perception marks the lowest stage of immediacy, while the yogic intuition in ecstasy marks the highest limit of immediacy. Our indeterminate perception is below determinate perception, while the indeterminate perception of the Yogin in a state of ecstasy is above determinate perception and, indeed, above all determinate cognitions, presentative and representative, perceptual and conceptual. Our indeterminate perception is immediate 'sense-perception', while that of the Yogin in ecstasy is immediate 'intellectual intuition'. Our indeterminate perception apprehends the mere form of an object through an external sense-organ, while that of the Yogin in ecstasy apprehends all objects of the world simultaneously. Therein lies the speciality of the indeterminate perception of the Yogin in a state of ecstasy. But the perception of a Yogin out of the condition of ecstasy can be both indeterminate and determinate.¹³ Dharmottara also holds that the perception of a Yogin in the highest stage is indeterminate.

Śrīdhara explains the meaning of yoga as ecstasy (*samādhi*), which is of two kinds, conscious (*samprajñāta*) and supra-conscious (*asamprajñāta*). The word *asamprajñāta* has been translated by Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jha as unconscious. And it has been translated by Professor Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya as supra-conscious, and by Dr. S. N. Das Gupta as ultra-cognitive. The latter seems to be the better version. In the highest stage of ecstasy there is the most clear, most distinct, most vivid, and most concentrated consciousness of the self. It is supra-conscious rather than unconscious. The conscious ecstasy consists in the union of the *manas*, which has been controlled and concentrated on an aspect of the self, with the self in which there is a desire for true knowledge. And the supra-conscious ecstasy consists in the union of the controlled *manas* with an aspect of the self in which there

¹³ NTD., p. 86.

is no desire owing to its unruffled condition. The supra-conscious ecstasy is fully developed in the highest stage of the spiritual life of a person who has thoroughly conquered all desires and cravings and seeks only deliverance; it does not produce any merit (*dharma*) as there is no desire in the self to acquire merit and avoid demerit; nor does it tend towards any external object as the *manas* is concentrated on the self alone. The conscious ecstasy, on the other hand, is always aided by a certain desire, and as such brings about a true knowledge of the object for which there is a desire in the self.¹⁴

Prāśastapāda describes the nature of sagic intuition (*ārṣa-jñāna*) which is kindred to yogic perception. The sages who are the authors of the śāstras have a true intuitive cognition of all objects, past, present, and future, and also of Dharma (Moral Law) and other supersensible objects, owing to the contact of the *manas* with the self and a peculiar *dharma* or power born of austerities; such an intuitive cognition is called *ārṣa-jñāna*. This cognition is perceptual in character, since it is not produced by inferential marks and so forth; but it differs from ordinary perception in that it is not produced by the external organs, but by the *manas* with the help of certain powers acquired by learning, austerities, and meditation. This intuition is also called *prātibha-jñāna*, since it is a distinct and vivid perception which is not produced by the sense-organs, inferential marks, and so forth. It is a valid cognition as it is free from doubts and illusions. It is not a doubtful cognition because it does not oscillate between two alternatives. It is not an illusion as it is actually found to agree with facts.¹⁵

Jayasrinhasūri asserts that essentially there is no difference between sagic intuition (*ārṣajñāna*) and yogic intuition (*yogipratyakṣa*), since both of them are produced by a peculiar *dharma* or merit. The only difference between them lies in the fact, that the former is produced by the practice of austerities (*tapojanita*), while the latter is produced by meditation (*yogaja*). Both of them are non-sensuous. The organ of both these kinds of higher intuition is the *manas*. Veṅkaṭanātha includes sagic intuition in yogic intuition.¹⁶

¹⁴ NK., pp. 195-6; E.T., pp. 411-12.

¹⁵ PBh. and NK., p. 258. HIP., I, pp. 289, 805.

¹⁶ NTD., p. 84; NP., pp. 75-6.

Besides the intuitions of Yogis and sages *Prāśastapāda* describes the perceptions of occultists who cannot perceive supersensible objects like Yogis and sages, but can perceive only those sensible things which are too subtle or too remote for our gross sense-organs, and as such are hidden from our view. They can perceive these subtle, remote, and hidden objects not through the *manas* by meditation or austerities like yogis and sages, but through the external sense-organs refined by the application of certain unguents and the like which produce certain occult powers. And such an occult perception is purely sensuous, since it is produced by the external sense-organs with the help of certain occult medicines.¹⁷ Thus the difference between ordinary perception and occult perception lies in that the former is produced by the sense-organs unaided by any external applications, while the latter is produced by the sense-organs strengthened and refined by the application of occult medicines. But both of them are sensuous. *Prāśastapāda* and his commentators, *Śrīdhara*, *Udayana* and others, do not explain how occult powers are generated in the sense-organs by the application of occult medicines. They have simply recorded occult perception as a fact of experience.

According to *Prāśastapāda*, higher intuition (*prātibhajñāna*) generally belongs to sages; but on rare occasions it belongs to ordinary persons also, as when a girl has a flash of intuitive perception that her brother will come to-morrow.¹⁸ *Jayanta Bhaṭṭa* also asserts that though Yogis can perceive all objects, past, present, and future, ordinary persons like us are not entirely devoid of the power of perceiving the future. On rare occasions we also have a flash of intuition; for instance, when a girl perceives in her heart of hearts that her brother will come to-morrow.

This flash of intuition must be regarded as a kind of valid perception on the following grounds: (1) It is produced by an object; (2) it is not doubtful; (3) it is not contradicted; (4) its causes are not vitiated by any defect. (1) It may be objected that the cognition is not produced by an object, since the object of the cognition does not exist at that time. *Jayanta Bhaṭṭa* replies that this objection would be valid, if such a cognition were held to apprehend an object existing at that time; that, in fact, this intuitive cognition apprehends its object not as existing at that

¹⁷ PBh. and NK., pp. 258-9.

¹⁸ PBh., p. 258. H.P., i, p. 289.

time but as existing in the future. So it cannot be said that the cognition is not produced by an object. (2) But how can there be a perception of the future? Futurity is nothing but prior non-existence which will be destroyed; but how can there be a relation between this prior non-existence and the existent object (e.g. brother)? It is self-contradictory to say that existence is related to non-existence. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that this objection is not sound. The object of the intuition (e.g. brother) is not non-existent, but its relation to that place is non-existent. There is a prior non-existence not of the object itself, but of its relation to that place. The brother does exist, though not in that place. The girl is reminded of her brother for some reason or other, and when the 'brother' flashes in her memory he is perceived as coming to-morrow. Thus the object of intuitive perception is reproduced in memory owing to a certain cause, and the reproduction of the object in memory is the cause of its presentation to consciousness. The intuition of the object, therefore, is the effect of its reproduction in memory. Thus it is a valid cognition, since it is produced by an object that has a real existence. (3) But how can it be regarded as perception, since it is not produced by peripheral stimulation? Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that it is not of the nature of sensuous perception, but of the nature of 'intuition' produced by the internal organ (*manas*). It is not an inference, since it is not produced by the knowledge of a mark of inference (*liṅga*). It is not an analogy, since it is not produced by the knowledge of similarity. It is not a verbal cognition, since it is not produced by a word. It is a perceptual cognition produced directly by the *manas*, independently of the peripheral organs; it is an intuitive perception of a future object brought to consciousness by memory owing to a certain cause.¹⁹

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa discusses the question of the yogic perception of *Dharma* or moral law. Can the Yogis perceive *Dharma* which is regarded by all as supersensuous? Kumārila denies it on certain grounds which are criticized by Jayanta. Kumārila argues, a sense-organ can never apprehend anything but its proper object; the eye can see only visible objects; it can never see odour or taste when it attains the highest degree of excellence by constant meditation; it can at best see subtle and remote objects, but it can never see *Dharma* which is absolutely supersensible. Jayanta

¹⁹ NM., pp. 106-7.

Bhaṭṭa contends that it is not impossible for the Yogis to acquire a vision of *Dharma* which is supersensible to us. If those things which are too remote for our vision, and which are hidden from our view by other things or concealed by utter darkness can be seen by other animals like vultures, cats, flies, etc., it is quite reasonable to suppose that *Dharma* which is not an object of our vision can be an object of the vision of Yogis. Secondly, Kumārila argues, if *Dharma* which is supersensible could be an object of the vision of Yogis, then their eyes would perceive smell, taste, etc., which are not their proper objects. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that this is an unwarrantable assumption, since the other sense-organs of the Yogis, too, attain perfection and apprehend their proper objects. But similarly it cannot be argued that *Dharma* cannot be an object of yogic vision, since it is not the proper object of vision like smell, taste, etc. For we cannot know that *Dharma* is not a proper object of the vision of the Yogis. We know that an object is not the proper object of a sense-organ, if we cannot perceive it in the presence of that sense-organ. For instance, we cannot perceive sound even in the presence of the eyes; so we conclude that sound is not the proper object of the eyes. But we cannot know that a Yogin cannot perceive *Dharma* even in the presence of his visual organ. Thirdly, Kumārila argues, *Dharma* is above all temporal limits; it is not determined by the past, the present, or the future; so it is absurd to suppose that it is an object of sense-perception. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that certainly it is absurd in the case of ordinary human beings whose perception is confined to 'here and now', but not in the case of Yogis who have transcended the limitations of time and space. Fourthly, if the Mīmāṃsaka insists that *Dharma* can never be an object of external sense-perception, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues that it may be an object of internal perception. The Yogis can perceive even supersensible *dharma* through their minds by constant practice in meditation. The mind can apprehend all objects; there is nothing which is not an object of mental apprehension. Even those objects which are beyond the range of external sense-organs are found to be clearly perceived by the mind by constant practice in meditation. For instance, the lover mad in love for a woman perceives his beloved as present before his eyes, though not really present. But is it not a false analogy? Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, asserts though the perception of the lover is

illusory and that of the Yogin is perfectly valid, they agree in being clear and distinct presentations. Hence even super-sensible objects like *Dharma* can be perceived by Yogis through the mind, if not through the peripheral organs. Lastly, just as we have flashes of intuition of future objects in *prātibhajñāna*, so Yogis can perceive all objects past, distant, future, hidden, subtle, and remote, and even *Dharma* which is absolutely supersensible to us. The divine perception of the Moral Law is natural, which is the cause of the Vedas.²⁰

4. The Sāṃkhya

According to Sāṃkhya, everything exists at the present moment; nothing goes out of existence and nothing comes into existence. The various qualities of things are only modes of energy acting in different collocations of the original *guṇas* or reals, mass (*tamas*) energy (*rajas*) and essence (*sattva*). "And these various Energies are sometimes actual (kinetic), sometimes potential, rising to actuality, and sometimes sublatent, subsiding from actuality into sub-latency."²¹ Thus the so-called future objects are present as latent or potential, and the so-called past objects are present as sublatent; and only those things which are supposed to be present are actual. So the mind of the Yogin can come in contact with past and future objects which are not non-existent at present, but exist only as sublatent and potential respectively by virtue of certain peculiar powers produced by meditation. Certainly the Sāṃkhya explanation of the yogic perception of past and future objects is more convincing than that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. If the past and the future exist at present in some form or other, it is easier to conceive that the mind of the Yogin can come in contact with them and produce a perception of the past and the future.

Vijñānabhikṣu points out that the mind of the Yogin can come into contact with distant and hidden objects by virtue of the peculiar power (*atiśaya*) acquired by meditation, which consists in its all-pervasiveness, or its power of acting on all objects, owing to the complete suppression of the inertia (*tamas*) of the mind which prevents it from acting on them. The inertia

²⁰ *Īśvarajñānaṁ sāmśiddhikam eva dharmaviṣayaṁ vedasya kāraṇa-bhūtam.* NM., p. 108. Ibid., pp. 102-3.

²¹ PSAH., p. 17.

(*tamas*) of the mind is removed sometimes by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects as in ordinary sense-perception, and sometimes by the *dharma* born of meditation as in yogic perception.²² According to Aniruddha, the perception of a Yogin is produced by the mind and not by the external organs, and, consequently, it is not like the perception of an ordinary person. The Yogin alone, who has acquired peculiar powers through the favourable influence of the *dharma* born of yoga, can perceive objects in all times and places through the connection of his mind with Prakṛti, the ultimate ground of all existence.²³

5. The Yoga

Patañjali holds that ordinarily the mind is a continuous stream of mental functions. Vyāsa describes its five stages: wandering (*kṣipta*), forgetful (*mūḍha*), occasionally steady (*vikṣipta*), one-pointed (*ekāgra*), and restrained (*niruddha*).²⁴ In the first stage, the mind being overpowered by energy (*rajas*), becomes extremely unsteady and constantly flits from one object to another. In the second stage, the mind is overpowered by inertia (*tamas*) and sinks into listlessness, drowsiness, and deep sleep. In the third stage, the mind, though unsteady for the most part, becomes occasionally steady when it avoids painful things and is temporarily absorbed in pleasurable objects. In the fourth stage, the mind is withdrawn from all other objects and concentrated on one object, either material or mental, and assumes an unflickering and unwavering attitude with regard to that object owing to the predominance of essence or purity (*satva*). In the last stage, all the mental functions are arrested and the mind retains only the potencies of its functions. In the fourth stage, the mind falls into conscious ecstasy (*samprajñāta samādhi*). In the last stage, the mind reaches the highest stage of supra-conscious ecstasy (*asamprajñāta samādhi*).

The mental functions can be arrested by constant practice of abstraction and concentration and extirpation of passion for objects of enjoyment. Trance (*samādhi*) is the ultimate result of the long and arduous processes of the inhibition of the bodily


²² SPB., i, 91.

²³ SSV., i, 90.

²⁴ YBh., i, 1; YPR., p. 95; HIP., ii, pp. 146-7.

activities or perfect posture of the body (*āsana*), regulation of breathing (*prāṇāyāma*), withdrawal of the mind from distracting influences (*pratyāhāra*), fixation of the mind on certain parts of body (*dhāraṇā*), and constant meditation on the same object (*dhyaṇa*). When the mind by deep concentration on an object is transformed into it and feels at one with it, that condition of the mind is called trance or ecstasy (*samādhi*).

Patañjali recognizes two kinds of ecstasy: (i) conscious ecstasy (*samprajñāta samādhi*), and (ii) supra-conscious ecstasy (*asamprajñāta samādhi*). Rāmānanda Yati and Vācaspatimiśra divide conscious ecstasy (*samprajñāta samādhi*) into eight kinds, which may be represented as follows:—



Just as an archer at first tries to pierce a 'arge object and then points his arrow at a small object, so a Yogin at first concentrates his mind on gross (*sthūla*) objects and then on subtle (*sūkṣma*) objects. Thus he rises to higher and higher stages of ecstasy according as he identifies his mind with subtler and subtler objects and at last reaches the highest stage of purely objectless and supra-conscious ecstasy. Let us explain the nature of the different kinds of conscious ecstasy in their ascending order. (1) *Savitarka samādhi* is the condition of the mind when by deep concentration it becomes one with a gross (*sthūla*) object (*artha*) together with its name (*śabda*) and concept (*jñāna*). This is the lowest stage of *samādhi*. In this stage, the object of contemplation does not appear to consciousness in its pure form but associated and identified with its name and concept, though, as a matter of fact, the object, the name, and the concept are quite distinct from one another. Thus *savitarka samādhi* cannot give us true knowledge of the real nature of an object; it erroneously identifies the object of contemplation with its name and concept.²²

²² YPR., p. 150; *The Study of Patañjali*, p. 156.

(2) *Nirvitarka samādhi* is the condition of the mind when by deep concentration it becomes identified with a gross (*sthūla*) object divested of all associations of name and concept. This is a higher stage than *savitarka samādhi*, because it gives us true knowledge of the real nature of its object free from all kinds of association, which serve to conceal its real nature. "The thing in this state does not appear to be an object of my consciousness, but my consciousness becoming divested of all 'I' or 'mine', becomes one with the object itself; so that there is no notion here as 'I know this', but the mind becomes one with the thing, so that the notion of subject and object drops off and the result is the one steady transformation of the mind into the object of its contemplation."²⁶ The objects of the above two kinds of *samādhi* are gross material objects according to Rāmānanda Yati and Vācaspatimiśra. But according to Bhojarāja, Nāgeśa, and Vijñānabhikṣu, gross material objects (*sthūlabhūta*) and gross sense-organs (*sthūla indriya*) are the objects of contemplation in *savitarka samādhi* and *nirvitarka samādhi* which are comprehended under one name as *vitarkānugata*. But Rāmānanda Yati and Vācaspatimiśra regard the sense-organs as the objects of contemplation in *sānanda samādhi*. (3) *Savicāra samādhi* is the condition of the mind when by deep contemplation it becomes one with subtle objects such as atoms, *tanmātras*, etc., associated with the notions of time, space, and causality, qualified by many other qualifications and erroneously identified with their names and concepts. (4) *Nirvicāra samādhi* is the condition of the mind when by deep concentration it becomes identified with subtle objects such as atoms, *tanmātras*, etc., in their pure state, divested of all the notions of time, space, and causality, and devoid of all qualifications and associations. *Savicāra samādhi* and *nirvicāra samādhi* may have for their objects, atoms, *tanmātras*, Ahaṁkāra, Buddhi, and Prakṛti. They are comprehended under one name as *vicārānugata*. (5) *Sānanda samādhi* is the determinate state of mind when by deep concentration it becomes identified with the gross sense-organs, the essence of which is *sattva* owing to their power of manifesting objects. This is the view of Rāmānanda Yati and Vācaspatimiśra. But Bhojarāja, Nāgeśa, and Vijñānabhikṣu hold that the sense-organs are the objects of *savitarka samādhi*. According to them, the object of *sānanda samādhi*

²⁶ YPR., p. 151.

is extreme bliss arising from the predominance of *sattva* (essence), though *rajas* (energy) and *tamas* (inertia) are not entirely suppressed. (6) *Nirānanda samādhi* is the indeterminate state of the mind when by deep concentration it becomes identified with gross sense-organs. But *Vijñānabhikṣu* holds that *ānanda samādhi* does not admit of two forms, viz., *sānanda* and *nirānanda*. (7) *Sāsmīta samādhi* is the determinate state of the mind when by deep concentration it becomes one with *Buddhi* (the cause of the sense-organs) which is identified with the self. This is the view of *Rāmānanda Yati* and *Vācaspatimiśra*. According to *Vijñānabhikṣu*, the object of *asmitā* is the consciousness transformed into the form of the pure self. This kind of *samādhi* may have for its object either the finite self (*jīvātman*) or the infinite self (*paramātman*). According to *Bhojarāja*, in this stage *Buddhi* which is endowed with pure *sattva*,—*rajas* and *tamas* being entirely suppressed, becomes the object of contemplation. (8) *Nirānanda samādhi* is the indeterminate state of the mind when it becomes one with *Buddhi* which is identified with the pure self.

Rāmānanda Yati and *Vācaspatimiśra* recognize these eight kinds of *samprajñāta samādhi*. But *Vijñānabhikṣu* does not recognize two forms of *samādhi* each under *ānandānugata* and *asmitānugata*. He recognizes only six kinds of *samādhi*. *Vācaspatimiśra* comprehends all the different kinds of *samprajñāta samādhi* under three classes: (1) *grāhya-samādhi* or concentration on external objects, (2) *grahaṇa-samādhi* or concentration on the sense-organs, and (3) *grahītṛ-samādhi* or concentration on the ego. In the different stages of *samprajñāta samādhi* the *Yogin* attains certain miraculous powers (*siddhi*) which strengthen his faith in the process of yoga. Different miraculous powers are achieved as the result of concentration on different objects. No reason is given why these powers are attained and why particular powers are attained as the result of concentration on particular objects. These are the facts of actual experience of the *Yogin*, and they have been recorded as such. Some of these miraculous powers are clairvoyance, clairaudience, thought-reading, interpretation of veridical dreams, understanding the language of animals, memory of past lives, knowledge of the past and the future, the distant and the subtle, and knowledge of the self (*puruṣa*).

The different kinds of *samprajñāta samādhi* (conscious ecstasy) are called *sabīja samādhi* because they contain the seed of bondage inasmuch as they do not bring about true knowledge of the distinction between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. *Asamprajñāta samādhi* (supra-conscious ecstasy) is produced by constant practice of extreme passionlessness which is the cause of the complete cessation of the mental functions. In this stage all the mental functions are arrested, leaving behind only their potencies in the mind. Extreme passionlessness destroys even its own traces, and thus brings about the highest stage of *asamprajñāta samādhi*, which is called *nirbīja samādhi* because it is absolutely objectless and does not contain the seed of bondage.²⁷

6. The *Śaṅkara-Vedāntist*

Sadānanda Yati has accepted Patañjali's classification of *samādhi* in its entirety. He divides *samādhi* mainly into two kinds, viz. *samprajñāta samādhi* and *asamprajñāta samādhi*. And like *Vijñānabhikṣu* he divides the former, again, into six kinds: (1) *śavitarka samādhi*, (2) *nirvitarka samādhi*, (3) *śavicāra samādhi*, (4) *nirvicāra samādhi*, (5) *sānanda samādhi*, and (6) *sāsmīta samādhi*. From another standpoint, he divides *samprajñāta samādhi* into three kinds: (1) *grāhyasamādhi*, (2) *grahaṇa-samādhi*, and (3) *grahītṛsamādhi*. Here he agrees with *Vācaspati-miśra*. Thus Sadānanda Yati has incorporated the Pātañjala system of yoga-practice into the Vedāntic culture.

But Vedāntists generally recognize only two kinds of *samādhi*, viz. *samaprajñāta samādhi* or *śavikalpa samādhi* and *asamprajñāta samādhi* or *nirvikalpa samādhi*. Mahādeva Sarasvatī Muni divides *samādhi* into these two kinds. He defines *samprajñāta samādhi* as an unbroken stream of mental functions having for their object the pure consciousness (*Brahman*) without the distinction of subject and object. In this stage the mental modes are not entirely destroyed; they have for their object *Brahman* or pure consciousness and are transformed into it. In it the consciousness of subject and object drops off altogether, but the mental modes remain concentrated on and transformed into pure consciousness; it is the result of the utmost perfection of the practice of concentration. Mahādeva Sarasvatī Muni defines

²⁷ HIP., ii, pp. 161-6; YPR., ch. xiii.

asamprajñāta samādhi as the complete suppression of all mental functions (*sarvadhīnirodha*) on the suppression of the effects of *samprajñāta samādhi*. He explains it as the transformation of the mind into the form of Brahman or pure consciousness without the medium of mental modes which are entirely destroyed.²²

Sadānanda recognizes two kinds of *samādhi*, viz. *savikalpa samādhi* and *nirvikalpa samādhi*. He defines the former as the mental mode which has for its object Brahman or pure consciousness into which it is transformed, and in which the distinction of the knower, the known, and the knowledge is not destroyed. In this stage there is the consciousness of Identity (the pure self) through the medium of mental modes in spite of the consciousness of duality of subject and object. He defines the latter as the mental mode which has for its object Brahman or pure consciousness into which it is transformed, and with which it is more completely identified; in this stage, though there is a mental mode which is transformed into Brahman or pure consciousness, there is no consciousness of the mental mode, but only the consciousness of pure Brahman. But, then, what is the difference between *nirvikalpa samādhi* and dreamless sleep? According to Sadānanda, though in both the states there is no consciousness of any mental mode, yet in the former there is a mental mode (*vṛtti*) which is transformed into the form of Brahman, while in the latter there is no mental mode at all because the mind is dissolved into *avidyā* in deep sleep.²³

Nṛsiṃha Sarasvatī describes two stages of *savikalpa samādhi*. In the first stage, there is the consciousness of Brahman through the medium of a mental mode (*vṛtti*) which is interpenetrated by the authoritative knowledge that 'I am Brahman'. So, in this stage, there is a mental mode; its object is Brahman; there is the consciousness of Brahman through the mental mode; and there is the consciousness of the injunction of the *śāstras*, 'Thou art that.' In the second stage, there is the continuous consciousness of Brahman through the medium of a mental mode which is not interpenetrated by the authoritative knowledge that 'I am Brahman'. So, in this stage, there is a mental mode; its object is Brahman: there is continuous consciousness of Brahman through the mental mode; but there is no authoritative knowledge that 'I am Brahman'. In both there is the consciousness

²² ACK., pp. 398-9.

²³ VSR., pp. 457.

of the distinction between the knower, the known, and the knowledge. But though there is this consciousness of distinction or duality, yet there is a consciousness of Identity. In both these stages there is a consciousness of Identity *with* the consciousness of duality. The only difference between them lies in that in the first stage there is the consciousness of the authoritative injunction 'Thou art that', while in the second stage there is no such consciousness.³⁰

Nṛsiṃha Sarasvatī describes two stages of *nirvikalpa samādhi* also. In the first stage, there is the consciousness of Brahman through the medium of a mental mode (*vr̥tti*) which is transformed into and identified with Brahman with the aid of the subconscious impressions of the mental modes in the state of determinate ecstasy (*savikalpa samādhi*) devoid of the consciousness of the knower, the known, and the knowledge. In this stage, therefore, there are the following factors: (1) there is a mental mode having for its object Brahman; (2) there are subconscious impressions of the mental modes in the state of determinate ecstasy, which colour and modify the present mode in the state of indeterminate ecstasy; (3) there is no consciousness of the knower, the known, and the knowledge. In the second stage, there is the existence of Brahman (pure consciousness and bliss) without the medium of any mental mode modified into the form of Brahman and thus manifesting it, in which there is no consciousness of the distinction among the knower, the known, and the knowledge, and in which there is no trace of subconscious impressions of mental modes, which are being completely destroyed by the constant practice of indeterminate ecstasy. In this state, therefore, there are neither any mental modes (*vr̥tti*) nor any subconscious impressions (*samskāra*) of past psychoses, nor any consciousness of duality of subject and object; there is the existence of pure absolute consciousness and bliss (Brahman). This is the highest stage of *samādhi*.³¹

According to Sadānanda, there are mental modes in both determinate and indeterminate ecstasy. But in indeterminate ecstasy though there are mental modes, there is no consciousness of them. According to him, in determinate ecstasy there is the consciousness of Identity (Brahman) together with the consciousness of duality of subject and object, while in indeterminate

³⁰ Subodhinī on VSR., p. 45 (Jacob's edition).

³¹ Ibid, pp. 46-7.

ecstasy there is the pure consciousness of Identity (Brahman) without the consciousness of duality of subject and object. According to Nṛsiṃha Sarasvatī also, in determinate ecstasy there is the consciousness of Identity together with the consciousness of duality, while in indeterminate ecstasy there is the pure consciousness of Identity (Brahman) divested of all consciousness of relativity of subject and object. But, according to him, in the highest stage of indeterminate ecstasy all mental modes and their subconscious impressions are destroyed and there remain only the pure absolute consciousness and bliss. It is the pure, absolute, transcendental consciousness free from all empirical modes and determinations and devoid of all consciousness of relativity. This state of ecstasy alone should properly be called indeterminate ecstasy. All the other kinds of ecstasy in which there is empirical consciousness revealed through mental modes should be called *savikalpa samādhi*. Mahādeva Sarasvatī also holds that in the highest stage of ecstasy (*asamprajñāta samādhi*) all mental modes and their subconscious impressions are totally destroyed and the mind is transformed into Brahman or pure consciousness and bliss, though devoid of all mental modes. But, according to him, in *samprajñāta samādhi* only there are mental modes which are transformed into Brahman or pure consciousness, but there is no consciousness of relativity of subject and object. But this is *nirvikalpa samādhi*, according to Sadānanda. The author of *Ratnāvalī* also describes *asamprajñāta samādhi* as the condition of the mind in which all mental functions are completely arrested. Rāmā-tīrtha Yati identifies conscious ecstasy (*samprajñāta samādhi*) with determinate ecstasy (*savikalpa samādhi*) and supra-conscious ecstasy (*asamprajñāta samādhi*) with indeterminate ecstasy (*nirvikalpa samādhi*).²²

7. The Buddhist

According to Dharmakīrti, the intuitive perception of a Yogin is produced by constant contemplation of the ultimate truths when it reaches the highest limit of perfection. Dharmottara clearly explains the nature of yogic intuition. There are four ultimate truths according to the Buddhists: (1) all is momentary, (2) all is void, (3) all is pain, and (4) everything is like itself. By

²² Vidvanmanorajījanī on VSR., p. 129 (Jacob's edition).

constant contemplation of these four truths the Yogin gradually attains a more and more distinct vision of them; and when he attains the highest stage of contemplation, he acquires the most distinct vision or intuition of the ultimate truths. Until he reaches the highest limit of distinct vision born of constant contemplation, he perceives the objects of contemplation as slightly indistinct, as if hidden behind mica. But when he reaches the highest limit of distinct vision by constant contemplation of the ultimate truths, he perceives the objects of contemplation most distinctly, as if they were within his own grasp. And because he has the most distinct vision of the ultimate truths at the highest stage of contemplation, his intuitive perception is indeterminate. According to the Buddhists, indeterminate perception alone is distinct and vivid; and the so-called determinate perception is not in itself distinct and vivid, but it acquires distinctness and vividness from its contact with indeterminate perception which is its immediate antecedent.³³

Anuruddha describes the different levels of consciousness. He divides consciousness into two orders, viz. subliminal consciousness or subconsciousness below the threshold of consciousness (*manodvāra*), and supra-liminal consciousness or consciousness above the threshold of consciousness. He divides supra-liminal consciousness, again, into two orders, viz. normal consciousness and super-normal consciousness. Normal consciousness is called *kāma-citta* as it is generally confined to the *kāma-loka* or the plane of existence in which desire prevails. Super-normal consciousness is called *Mahaggata-citta* or sublime or exalted consciousness. And this super-normal consciousness, again, is subdivided into *Rūpa-citta*, which is generally found in the *Rūpa-loka* or the sphere of visible forms which are not altogether immaterial, and *Arūpa-citta*, which is concerned with *Arūpa-loka* or the sphere of the invisible or formless, and *Lokuttara-citta* or transcendental consciousness which is above the three worlds, viz. *Kāma-loka*, *Rūpa-loka*, and *Arūpa-loka*.³⁴

In order to pass from the *Kāma-citta* or normal consciousness to the *Rūpa-citta* or the lowest order of super-normal consciousness a severe discipline and concentration of the mind are

³³ *Bhūtiārthabbhāvanāprakaraṇaparyantaṃ yogijñānaṃ ceti.* NB., p. 20. NBT., pp. 20-1.

³⁴ CP., introduction, pp. 10 and 12.

necessary. A monk must inhibit all physical and mental activity and concentrate his mind on a single selected object or sensation without changing the object of thought. After some time the sensuous mark or symbol is replaced by the corresponding image. This concentration of the mind on a bare sensation or its image is called 'preliminary concentration' (*parikamma-samādhi*). Then by more intense concentration of the mind the image is divested of its concrete, sensuous, or imaginal form, and is converted into an abstract conceptualized image, though not completely de-individualized. The concentration of the mind on this conceptualized image during the period of transition from normal consciousness to super-normal consciousness is still known as 'access concentration' (*upacāra-samādhi*).³⁵ At this stage there intervenes the lowest order of super-normal consciousness known as the first Rūpa-jhāna.

The Pali word *jhāna* corresponds to the Sanskrit word *dhyāna*, which means 'concentrative meditation', or 'ecstatic musing'. There are five Rūpa-jhānas, which consist in the gradual elimination of the factors of consciousness and attainment of an 'intensified inward vision' and an absolute equanimity or hedonic indifference. (1) The first jhānic consciousness of the Rūpa-loka has five factors: (i) Vitakka or initial attention by which sloth-and-torpor (*thina-middha*) is inhibited; (ii) Vicāra or sustained attention by which doubt (*vicikicchā*) is inhibited; (iii) Pīti or pleasurable interest or zest by which aversion (*byāpāda*) is inhibited; (iv) Sukha or pleasure or happiness by which distraction and worry (*uddhacca-kukkucca*) are inhibited; (v) Ekaggatā or one-pointedness of consciousness or individualization which develops into ecstatic concentration (*appanā-samādhi*) and inhibits all sensuous desire (*kāma-chanda*).³⁶ (2) In the second Rūpa-jhāna, initial attention (*vitakka*) is eliminated; and it occurs together with sustained attention (*vicāra*), pleasurable interest or zest (*pīti*), pleasure (*sukha*), and individualization (*ekaggatā*). (3) In the third Rūpa-jhāna, both initial attention (*vitakka*) and sustained attention (*vicāra*) are got rid of; and it occurs together with pleasurable interest or zest (*pīti*), pleasure (*sukha*), and individualization (*ekaggatā*). (4) In the fourth Rūpa-jhāna, pleasurable interest (*pīti*) also is eliminated; and it occurs together with

³⁵ BP., p. 109.

³⁶ CP., Introduction, p. 56.

pleasure (*sukha*) and individualization (*ekaggatā*). (5) In the fifth Rūpa-jhāna, pleasure or happiness (*sukha*) is eliminated; and it occurs together with neutral feeling or hedonic indifference (*upekkhā*) and individualization (*ekaggatā*). Sometimes the fourth Jhāna and the fifth Jhāna are combined into one and only four Rūpa-jhānas are spoken of.²⁷

The higher stages of *samādhi* in the Yoga system are attained by concentrating the mind on subtler and subtler objects. But the higher stages of Jhāna in the Buddhist system are attained by eliminating the factors of consciousness gradually. "Here we have," says Mrs. Rhys Davids, "a gradual composure and collectedness of consciousness gradually brought about by the deliberate elimination of: (1) the restless, discursive work of intellect, seeking likenesses and differences, establishing relations, forming conclusions; (2) the expansive suffusion of zest, keen interest, creative joy; (3) all hedonistic consciousness. The residual content of consciousness is admitted to be (a) a sort of sublimated or clarified *sati*, an intensified inward vision or intuition, such as a god or spirit might conceivably be capable of; (b) indifference or equanimity, also god-like."²⁸ Above the level of the Rūpa-citta there is the Arūpa-citta which is concerned with Arūpa-loka or the world of the invisible or formless. The Arūpa-loka is entirely non-spatial. And the experience of this world can never be sensuous. In the highest stage of the Rūpa-citta, which is attained by the gradual elimination of the factors of consciousness, there is the abnormal clarity of inward vision or intuition together with hedonic indifference or equanimity. Above this stage there is no longer any elimination of factors of consciousness, but of all consciousness of distinctions or limitations. Just as there are four stages of Rūpa-jhāna, so there are four stages of Arūpa-jhāna. (1) At the first stage of Arūpa-jhāna, the mind transcends the consciousness of matter and form, distinctions and limitations, and being concentrated on the concept of infinite space, acquires "the blissful consciousness, subtle yet actual, of an infinite sensation of space."²⁹ This may be compared to Kant's pure intuition of space as distinguished from his empirical intuition of space. (2) At the second stage of Arūpa-jhāna, the mind

²⁷ Ibid, Introduction, pp. 57-8. *The Questions of King Milinda*, Part II, p. 222, 1894, S.B.E.

²⁸ BPs., p. 111.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 117-8.

transcends the sensation of infinite space, and being concentrated on the concept of infinite consciousness "becomes conscious only of a concept subtle yet actual, of consciousness as infinite"⁴⁰

(3) At the third stage of Arūpa-jhāna, the mind wholly transcends the conceptual sphere of consciousness as infinite, and being concentrated on the concept of nothingness "becomes conscious only of a concept, subtle yet actual, of infinite nothingness".⁴¹

(4) At the fourth stage of Arūpa-jhāna, the mind wholly transcends the sphere of nothingness and attains the stage of an all but complete hypnosis or quasi-unconsciousness which may be described as "neither percipience or non-percipience".⁴² When the mind transcends all these different stages of super-normal consciousness concerned with the Rūpa-loka and the Arūpa-loka, it attains the highest stage of super-normal consciousness which is called transcendental or supra-mundane consciousness (Lokuttara-citta).

Jhāna-consciousness is mystic consciousness. It is brought about by auto-suggestion. It consists in concentrating consciousness on a single object. The object is first of all a percept, then an image, then a concept. So far the mind is in the preparatory stage. Then gradually the contents of consciousness are eliminated in the different stages of Rūpa-jhāna till the mind at last acquires super-normal clarity of vision and hedonic indifference. So long the mind is in the plane of visible forms (Rūpa-loka). It is conscious of the ethereal but not of the immaterial or non-spatial. Then the mind comes in touch with the entirely immaterial world of the invisible or formless by gradually eliminating all consciousness of distinctions and limitations. The mind is, at first, concentrated on infinite space, then on infinite consciousness, then on infinite nothingness, and last of all attains the stage of complete trance or quasi-unconsciousness which may be described as neither consciousness nor unconsciousness. This is the highest stage of Jhāna-consciousness, but not the highest plane of consciousness. When the mind completely transcends even the plane of the invisible or formless (Arūpa-loka), it attains the stage of transcendental or supramundane consciousness (Lokuttara-citta).

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 118.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 118.

⁴² Ibid., p. 118.

According to William James, ineffability, noetic quality, transiency, and passivity are the characteristics of mystical consciousness. As to transiency and ineffability, Mrs. Rhys Davids says, "the former is markedly true concerning the momentary ecstasy of attainment or *appanā*, as also concerning the realization of great spiritual elevation generally. Touching the 'Fruit' of each 'Path' of spiritual progress appears to have been a momentary flash of insight. As to the latter, ineffability, it is also true that we find no attempts by brethren who were expert at Jhāna to enter in detail into their abnormal experiences. . . . Language is everywhere too much the creature and product of our five-fold world of sense, with a varying coefficient of motor consciousness, to be of much use in describing consciousness that has apparently got beyond the range of sense and local movement."⁴³ As to the noetic quality, Jhāna-consciousness is strongly characterized by it. It gives us insight into depths of truth unfathomed by the discursive intellect; it brings the mind into touch with higher and higher planes of existence. The chief intellectual result of the different stages of Jhāna-consciousness is a super-normal clarity of inward vision or intuition "untroubled by either discursive intellection or hedonistic affection". The Jhāna-process gives us the following powers: (1) Hyperæsthesia of vision or clairvoyance, e.g. the super-normal vision of the past and the future history of a particular individual; (2) hyperæsthesia of hearing or clair-audience, e.g. super-normal hearing of sounds and voices, both human and celestial,—the distant becoming near; (3) thought-reading and thought-transference or telepathy; (4) hypermnnesia, or reminiscence of the past history of former lives.⁴⁴ According to William James, mystical consciousness has got another characteristic, viz. passivity. "When mystical consciousness has once set in," says James, "the mystic feels as if his own will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and held by a superior power."⁴⁵ This characteristic of passivity, however, is lacking in Jhāna-consciousness and differentiates it from other kinds of mystical consciousness. It differentiates it from the eucharistic consciousness or the mystic sense of union with the divine one, and also from the Vedāntic sense of identity of the

⁴³ BPs., pp. 115-16.

⁴⁴ CP., Introduction, pp. 63-4.

⁴⁵ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 381.

individual soul with the world-soul. "There was, of course, this deep cleavage," says Mrs. Rhys Davids, "between it and the eucharistic consciousness, that the self was banished, and no sense of union with the divine One, or any One, aimed at or felt. Herein, too, the Buddhist differs from the Vedāntist, who sought to realize identity with Ātman, that is, the identity of the world-soul and his own self or *ātman*—'Tat tvam asi' (That art thou)."⁴⁶ But why is Jhāna-consciousness wanting in passivity? Mrs. Rhys Davids offers a reason for it. She says, "it has the essential *noëtic quality* too strongly to permit of passivity as a constant. Intellect and volition, for Buddhist thought, are hardly distinguishable, and the *jhāyin* seems to be always master of himself and self-possessed, even in ecstasy, even to the deliberate falling into and emerging from trance. There is a *synergy* about this Jhāna, combined with an absence of any reference whatever to a merging or melting into something greater, that for many may reveal defect, but which is certainly a most interesting and significant difference."⁴⁷

8. The Jaina

The Jaina divides perception into two kinds: (1) empirical perception (*sāṃvryavahārika pratyakṣa*), and (2) transcendental perception (*pāramārthika pratyakṣa*). Empirical perception is what we have in everyday life. It is of two kinds: (1) sensuous perception (*indriya-nibandhana*) or perception derived from the sense-organs (i.e. external sense-organs) and (2) non-sensuous perception (*anindriya-nibandhana*) or perception derived from the mind which is not a sense-organ according to the Jaina. Transcendental perception owes its origin to the self alone; it is neither derived from the sense-organs nor from the mind. It is directly derived from the self owing to the destruction of the impediments to perfect knowledge. It is of two kinds, viz. imperfect or deficient (*vikala*) and perfect or complete (*sakala*). The former, again, is of two kinds, viz. clairvoyant perception of objects at a distance of time and space (*avadhi*) and direct perception of the thoughts of others, as in telepathic knowledge of the thoughts of other minds (*manahparyaya*). The latter is omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) or the perfect knowledge of all the objects of the universe due to

⁴⁶ BPs., p. 114.

⁴⁷ BPs., pp. 114-15.

the complete destruction of the *karma*-matter which is an obstacle to knowledge. Thus the highest stage of transcendental perception, according to the Jaina, is omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*). The Jaina does not believe in the existence of God and consequently in divine omniscience. But he holds that the Jīva or the individual self can attain perfection and omniscience by completely destroying the *karma*-matter which is an obstacle to perfect knowledge. The knowledge of all objects exists in the self. But it is veiled by *karma*-matter. When the veil of *karma*-matter encrusting the self is completely destroyed, the self realizes its omniscience.⁴⁸ This perfect intuition of the whole universe is not produced by the external sense-organs, or by the internal organ of mind, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds. So before we discuss the nature of omniscience, let us briefly refer to the Jaina criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of yogic intuition.

According to some, the external sense-organs aided by the merit born of meditation can apprehend past, future, distant, and subtle objects. But the sense-organs can never be freed from their inherent imperfections, Prabhācandra argues, and so even the sense-organs of Yogis can never enter into direct relation with supersensible objects (e.g. atoms), like ours because they are, after all, sense-organs. What is the nature of the aid rendered by the peculiar power (*dharma*) born of meditation to the sense-organs? Does the *dharma* born of meditation increase the capacity of the sense-organs when they function with regard to their objects (e.g. atoms)? Or does it merely assist the sense-organs when they operate on their own objects? The first alternative is untenable, because the sense-organs by themselves can never operate on atoms, etc. If they operate on atoms, etc., they do not stand in need of the aid of the *dharma* born of *yoga*; and if they operate on atoms, etc., only when they are aided by the *dharma*, then there is a circular reasoning. The *dharma* born of *yoga* increases the capacity of the sense-organs, when they operate on their objects, e.g. atoms, etc.; and the sense-organs operate on atoms, etc., when they are aided by the *dharma* born of *yoga*. The second alternative also is impossible. If the *dharma* born of *yoga* cannot increase the capacity of the sense-organs, but merely assists them in operating on supersensible objects like atoms, etc., the aid

⁴⁸ PNT., ch. ii, 4, 5, 18-23; PMS., ii, 11; HIP., ii, pp. 189-90.

of *dharma* rendered to the sense-organs in their apprehension of supersensible objects is needless.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the internal organ (*manas*) with the aid of the *dharma* born of *yoga* can simultaneously produce a knowledge of all the objects of the world, past, future, remote, and subtle. But Prabhācandra contends that the *manas* which is regarded as atomic by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika can never enter into direct relation with all the objects of the world simultaneously, and therefore, cannot produce a knowledge of them at the same time; that otherwise there would be a simultaneous perception of all the qualities of a cake, e.g. its taste, colour, odour, etc., at the time of eating it, which is not admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In fact, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the possibility of simultaneous cognitions owing to the atomic nature of the mind. So it cannot produce a knowledge of all the objects of the world at the same time, even when it is aided by the *dharma* born of *yoga*. The atomic mind cannot enter into relation with many objects at the same time by contradicting its very nature. It is more reasonable to maintain that it is the self which apprehends all the objects of the world independently of the mind by virtue of the specific powers born of meditation. It is useless to suppose that the self knows an infinite number of objects through the atomic mind at the same time. If it be urged that the mind of a Yogin enters into relation with all objects of the world not simultaneously but successively, then there is no difference between the perception of a Yogin and that of an ordinary person. Hence Prabhācandra concludes that the atomic mind can never enter into direct relation with all the objects of the world at the same time. But it may be urged that the mind of a Yogin enters into relation with all the objects of the world, through its union with God who is ubiquitous and consequently related to everything in the world. Prabhācandra contends that the mind of the Yogin can enter into relation with the present objects only through its union with God, but never with past and future objects, since they are non-existent at the time when the mind enters into union with Him. Hence the Jaina concludes that omniscience can never be produced either by the external organs or by the so-called internal organ of mind, though they are aided by the peculiar powers born of meditation.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ PKM., p. 5.

According to the Jaina, there is no eternal and omniscient God, but the finite self can attain omniscience when all the *karma*-matter is totally destroyed, which is an impediment to right knowledge. And this omniscience is not derived through the channel of the external sense-organs or the internal organ of mind. And further, the Jaina holds that constant meditation cannot produce omniscience, until and unless the *karma*-matter, which is an impediment to right knowledge, is wholly destroyed. Herein lies the difference between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Jaina view. Just as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika proves the existence of yogic intuition by inference, so the Jaina also proves the existence of omniscience by the ontological argument. Just as heat is subject to varying grades and consequently reaches the highest limit, so right knowledge which is subject to varying grades owing to the various degrees of the *karma*-matter impeding it, reaches the highest limit of omniscience when the hindrance of the four kinds of *karma*-matter is completely destroyed. Omniscience is not derived from authority or scripture, because it can never give us a direct and distinct presentative knowledge which characterizes omniscience. Nor can it be derived from inference for the same reason. Nor can it be derived from the peripheral organs or the central organ of mind, as we have found already. Hence it is neither verbal, nor inferential, nor sensuous. It is a transcendental perception of the whole world, produced by the complete decay and destruction of the *karma*-matter. It is a distinct perception of all supersensible objects of the world on the complete destruction of Karma or infra-sensible particles of matter which encrust the self.⁵⁰

The Mīmāṃsaka, however, does not advocate this view of omniscience. He asks: What is the meaning of omniscience? Does it mean the knowledge of all objects of the world? Or does it mean the knowledge of certain principal objects? In the first alternative, does it mean the knowledge of all objects of the world in succession or at the same time? If the former, then there can be no omniscience. The objects of the world, past, present, and future can never be exhausted, and so their knowledge also can never be complete. And since there can be no knowledge of all objects of the world, there can be no omniscience. If the latter, then also there can be no omniscience. All objects of the world

⁵⁰ PKM., p. 65.

cannot be known simultaneously, because contradictory things like heat and cold cannot be apprehended at the same time by a single cognition. Moreover, if all objects were known at one moment by the omniscient self, then in the next moment it would become unconscious having nothing to know. Further, the omniscient self would be tainted by the desires and aversions of others in knowing them, and would thus cease to be omniscient, since these are impediments to right knowledge. Thus, omniscience cannot mean the knowledge of all objects of the world either at the same time or in succession. Nor, in the second place, can it be held that omniscience means the knowledge of certain principal objects or archetypal forms, because only when all the objects of the world are known can there be a discrimination of principal objects from subordinate objects. Moreover, there cannot be a knowledge of the past and the future, which are really non-existent. If the past and the future are known by the omniscient self, though they are non-existent, then its knowledge is illusory. And if the past and the future are known as real and existent, then they are converted into the present; and if the past and the future are known by the omniscient self as present, then its knowledge is illusory. Thus the Jaina doctrine of omniscience is untenable.

Prabhācandra severely criticizes all these objections of the Mīmāṃsaka. First, it has been asked whether omniscience is made up of a single cognition, or many cognitions. Prabhācandra replies that it is a single intuition of the whole world. It does not depend upon the external sense-organs or the mind; so it need not be diversified by many cognitions. Our perception is produced by the external organs or the internal organ; so it cannot apprehend past, distant, future, and subtle objects. But the perception of the omniscient self is not produced by the external sense-organs or the mind; hence it can apprehend all supersensible objects. The pure intuition of the omniscient self is not produced successively; it knows all objects of the universe simultaneously by a single stroke of intuition since it transcends the limits of time and space which are the necessary conditions of all sense-perception owing to the complete destruction of *karma*. Secondly, it has been urged that contradictory things like heat and cold cannot be apprehended by a single cognition. Prabhācandra asks whether they cannot be perceived by a single cognition, because they cannot be present at the same

time, or because they cannot be apprehended by a single cognition, though they are simultaneously present. The first view is untenable because contradictory things like heat and cold can exist at the same time; for instance, when incense is burnt in a pot, the upper part of it is hot and the lower part is cold. The second view also cannot be maintained; because when there is a flash of lightning in the midst of darkness, we have a simultaneous perception of contradictory things like darkness and light. Thirdly, the Mīmāṃsaka has urged that if the omniscient self knows all objects of the world at one moment, in the next moment it will become unconscious having nothing to know. Prabhācandra replies that the objection would hold good, if both the omniscient cognition and the whole world were destroyed in the next moment; but that both of these are never-ending; and that the omniscient self knows all objects of the world by a single unending intuition. Fourthly, the Mīmāṃsaka has urged that if the omniscient self knows the desires and aversions of the non-liberated souls, then it becomes tainted with these desires and aversions which hinder omniscience. Prabhācandra replies that desires and aversions are produced by modifications (*pariṇāma*); which do not affect the omniscient self, so that it cannot be tainted by desires and aversions of others by merely knowing them; that desires and aversions are of sensuous origin; but that the knowledge of the omniscient self is non-sensuous, which cannot therefore be tainted by the imperfections of ordinary men. Fifthly, the Mīmāṃsaka has urged that the omniscient self cannot perceive the past and the future, since they are non-existent; and that if it knows them as existent, then the knowledge of the omniscient self is illusory. Prabhācandra replies that the past and the future are perceived by the omniscient self not as present, but as past and future respectively; and that the knowledge of the omniscient self is not therefore illusory.

But how can the past be perceived? The past is not present; it is non-existent. Prabhācandra asks: Are past objects non-existent in relation to the past time? Or, are they non-existent in relation to the time when they are perceived by the omniscient self? The first alternative is untenable. The past objects are as much existent in relation to their own time, as the present objects which exist at their own time. The past objects as much exist in the past, as the present objects exist at present. The second

alternative is true. The Jaina admits that the past objects are non-existent in relation to the present time when they are perceived by the omniscient self. It knows the past as existing in the past; and it knows the future as existing in the future. In other words, the omniscient self knows the past as produced in the past; and it knows the future as to be produced in the future. Hence the knowledge of the omniscient self is not illusory.

But how can the past and the future be perceived by the omniscient self as past and future respectively, though they are not existent at the time of perception? The Jaina replies that the omniscient self is absolutely free from the bondage of physical existence; that its knowledge is not produced by the external sense-organs or the mind; and that therefore there is nothing to obstruct its knowledge of the past and the future. The Mīmāṃsaka himself admits that recognition, which is a kind of perception according to him, can apprehend the past as well as the present, and that a flash of intuition in ordinary life (*prātibhājñāna*) can apprehend the future as future. Similarly, the Jaina argues, it is not impossible for the omniscient self who is entirely free from the fetters of *karma* and mundane existence to have a super-sensuous vision of the whole world, past, present, and future. It directly and immediately knows all objects of the world, past, present, and future, subtle and remote, by a single unending intuition without the medium of the external sense-organs or the so-called internal organ of the mind.⁵¹

The Jaina believes in the supernormal telepathic perception of the mental processes of other persons owing to the destruction of a particular kind of *karma*-matter obscuring the knowledge. It is called *manahparyayajñāna*. It is direct or immediate knowledge (*sākṣātkārijñāna*), or perception.⁵² Patañjali also recognizes the supernormal perception of other persons' mental processes consequent on the concentration of the mind on their external behaviour. This telepathic perception directly apprehends others' psychoses, but not their objects.⁵³

⁵¹ PKM., pp. 67-73.

⁵² PNT. RK., ii, 18-23; HIP., ii, pp. 189-90; SS., viii, 6, pp. 224-5.

⁵³ YS., iii, 19-20; YBh., iii, 19-20.

CHAPTER XVIII

DIVINE PERCEPTION

(*Īśvara-Pratyakṣa*)

1. *Patañjali's Proof of Divine Omniscience*

We have discussed the different orders of human perception, normal, abnormal, and super-normal. Now we shall briefly refer to the nature of Divine Perception as conceived by the Indian philosophers, apart from its value and validity. Just as the possibility of yogic intuition has been proved by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and the possibility of the omniscience of the individual self or Jīva has been proved by the Jaina by an appeal to something like the ontological argument, so the omniscience of God is proved by Patañjali by the ontological argument such as we find in Anselm in the West. Gradation in degrees of worth gradually leads to and implies as the terminus of the series *ens realissimum* or the greatest reality which is omniscient, omnipotent, and all-perfect. Patañjali describes God as the Supreme Person untouched by all taint of imperfection, above the law of Karma, and above the processes of fulfilling and fulfilment.¹

We infer the existence of omniscient God from our knowledge of the supersensuous, whether in the past or future or present, whether separately or collectively, whether small or great. Our supersensuous knowledge is the germ of omniscience; so from this we infer the existence of omniscient God. When this supersensuous knowledge, which is the germ of omniscience, gradually increases and reaches the acme of perfection in a person, he is called omniscient. It is possible for the germ of omniscience to reach its highest limit of perfection, for it admits of degrees of excellence, as in the case of an ascending scale of magnitude. Whatever admits of degrees of excellence is capable of reaching the highest limit of excellence. We actually find that knowledge admits of degrees of excellence; it gradually increases in

¹ *Kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparīmarṣataḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ*. YS., i, 24.

proportion to the degree to which matter-stuff, (*tamas*), which covers pure essence (*sattva*), of the mind is removed; therefore it must reach the highest excellence of omniscience. But here we are not concerned with the proofs of the existence of God. We are concerned only with the nature of Divine Knowledge.²

2. *The Naiyāyika View of the Nature of Divine Knowledge*

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has discussed the nature of divine knowledge. First, God is free from all taint of imperfection, and so He is omniscient. But we are corrupted by the impurities of cravings, aversions, etc., and so we cannot perceive all objects of the world, and have fragmentary knowledge. Secondly, divine knowledge, which is all-embracing, is eternal; it is without a beginning and without an end. If there were a break in divine consciousness even for a moment, there would be a collapse of the whole universe, since it is created and sustained by the divine will which is inseparable from divine knowledge. Even at the time of the dissolution of the universe divine knowledge is not suspended, since there is no cause of its destruction at that time. And at the time of the creation of the universe, divine knowledge is not created, since there is no cause of its creation at that time. Hence divine knowledge is eternal. Herein lies the difference between the human omniscience and the divine omniscience; the former is produced, while the latter is eternal; the former is acquired, while the latter is natural and essential. Thirdly, divine knowledge is not diversified by many cognitions; it grasps all objects of the universe, past, present, and future, subtle and remote, by a single all-embracing intuition. Were it not so, God would have many cognitions either successively or simultaneously. But He cannot have them in succession, for, in that case, He would have discrete, discontinuous cognitions, and consequently, He would be unconscious at intervals, and thus would bring about a collapse of the universe at intervals, which would make all human activities impossible. God cannot have many cognitions simultaneously, for, in that case, there would be no cause of the difference of divine cognitions.³ Fourthly, divine knowledge is perceptual in character as it satisfies the essential conditions of perception. Viśvanātha defines perception as a cognition which is not derived

² *Tatra niratīṣaṃ sarvajñabījāṃ.* YS., i, 25. YBh., and YV., i, 25. HIP., ii, pp. 123-5.

³ NM., pp. 200-1.

through the instrumentality of any other cognition.⁴ Inference is derived through the medium of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Analogy is derived through the medium of the knowledge of similarity. Verbal knowledge is derived through the medium of the knowledge of the import of a term or a proposition. Thus perception alone is direct, immediate, and presentative knowledge. And divine knowledge is perceptual in character as it consists in direct and immediate apprehension of the whole universe. Divine perception is not produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects, as God has no sense-organs at all. In fact, divine perception is not produced at all; it is beginningless and endless; it is eternal. Divine perception, therefore, is not of the nature of sensuous perception, but of the nature of 'creative intuition'. God evolves the materials of His consciousness by the divine will, and perceives them all by a single all-embracing intuition, even as the sun illumines all objects of the universe, though it is not produced by them. Thus the knowledge of God is not determined by its objects; but the objects are determined by the knowledge of God.⁵ Fifthly, because divine perception is eternal, God has no subconscious impression (*samskāra*). He is never subconscious or unconscious. And because He has no subconscious impression, He has no memory. And because He has no memory, He has no inferential knowledge which depends on memory. He has no need of inference as it is a mark of limitation or finitude. God does not know things in a fragmentary and piecemeal fashion; He knows all objects of the universe, past, present, and future in one intuitive glance; He is above the limitations of time and space; so He has no need of inferential or discursive knowledge. For the same reason He has no analogical or verbal knowledge.⁶

First, human knowledge is finite and limited, while divine knowledge is infinite and unlimited. Human knowledge is produced by many causes, while divine knowledge is eternal. Human knowledge is tainted by errors and illusions, while divine knowledge is free from errors and imperfections. Human knowledge is conditioned while divine knowledge is unconditioned. Human knowledge admits of degrees of excellence, while divine

⁴ *Jñānākarāṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam*. SM., p. 237. NKS., iv, p. 26; HIP., i, pp. 471-2.

⁵ SM., pp. 237-40.

⁶ NV., and NVTT., iv, 1, 21. HIP., i, pp. 665-70.

knowledge is unequalled and unexcelled. Secondly, human knowledge is derived from perception, inference, analogy, and authority, while divine knowledge is neither inferential, nor analogical, nor verbal, but only perceptual in character. In human knowledge there is memory produced by subconscious impressions, while in divine knowledge there is no subconscious impression at all, and, therefore, no memory. There are breaks in human knowledge, while divine knowledge is unbroken and continuous. Man is sometimes subconscious or unconscious; but God is never subconscious or unconscious. Thirdly, human perception is sensuous, while divine perception is non-sensuous. Human perception is determined by its objects, while divine perception is not determined by its objects, but it determines its own objects. Human perception is limited by space and time, while divine perception is above the limitations of space and time. Human perception is confined to 'here and now', while divine perception grasps the past, the present, the future, and the remote in an Eternal Now. Man has sometimes a flash of intuition of the future, and can attain omniscience by constant meditation, practice of austerities, and so on, but divine omniscience is natural and eternal. This higher intuition of man is acquired through the internal organ or mind. But divine intuition depends neither upon the external organs nor upon the internal organ.

This interesting question has been raised by Udayana in connection with the validity of divine knowledge. God is omniscient. There is nothing in the universe which is unknown to God; so there is nothing in human experience which escapes divine knowledge. And since there are illusory cognitions in human experience, these, too, must be objects of divine knowledge. And if God knows human illusions, He must know also the objects of these illusions, since there cannot be a cognition of another cognition without apprehending the object of that cognition. Just as there cannot be a cognition without apprehending an object, so there cannot be a cognition of another cognition without apprehending the object of the latter cognition. So, if human illusions are objects of divine knowledge, the objects of these illusions, too, must necessarily be objects of divine knowledge. In other words, God being omniscient, must perceive certain objects as different things, and thus, He must be subject to illusions like human beings.

It cannot be said that God does not know the errors and illusions of human experience, for God is omniscient. But God cannot be subject to illusions as a penalty for His omniscience. His knowledge of human illusions is not itself illusory. When we perceive silver in a nacre, our perception is illusory; but when God perceives our illusory perception of silver, He does not perceive silver in a nacre, but He perceives silver as the real object of the cognition of silver, and so His cognition is not illusory. When we perceive that we have a perception of silver, though we do not know that it is illusory, this second perception, viz., the perception of the perception of silver, is not illusory. A cognition of silver in a nacre is illusory; but when it is appropriated by the self, the cognition of this illusory cognition is not illusory. Likewise, God never perceives silver in a nacre; He perceives everything as it really is; but when we perceive silver in a nacre God perceives that we have an illusory perception of silver in a nacre. Hence, God can never be subject to the illusions and imperfections of human experience. Divine knowledge is absolutely free from limitations and imperfections, illusions and hallucinations. It is the supreme norm and ultimate criterion of the validity of human knowledge.⁷

⁷ *Īvarajñānaṁ na pramā, viparyayatvāt. Na. Vibhramasyāpramāṇye'pi tadviṣayaśya tattvam ullikhato'bhṛāntatvāt. NKS, iv, p. 28. NKSP, iv, pp. 28-9; HIP, i, pp. 669-70.*

CHAPTER XIX'

JIVA-SAKṢI-PRATYAKṢA AND ĪSVARA-SAKṢI-PRATYAKṢA

1. *The Sāṃkara-Vedāntist : The Jīva and the Jīva-Sākṣin*

The author of *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* not only distinguishes between the Jīva (finite self) and Īśvara (God), but also between the Jīva-Sākṣin and the Īśvara-Sākṣin, and consequently he distinguishes between the perception of the Jīva-Sākṣin and the perception of the Īśvara-Sākṣin. This view is peculiar to the Sāṃkara-Vedānta.

According to the Sāṃkarite, there is one, undifferentiated, eternal universal consciousness (*caitanya*). And this universal consciousness is particularized by certain determinants. There are two classes of determinants, namely, qualifying adjuncts or qualifications (*viśeṣaṇa*) and limiting adjuncts or conditions (*upādhi*). A qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) is intimately connected with and inseparable from the qualified object, and as such distinguishes it from other objects. For instance, the particular colour of a jar qualifies it in such a way that it cannot be separated from the jar, and as such it distinguishes the jar from all other objects. A limiting adjunct or condition (*upādhi*), on the other hand, does not qualify an object in such a way that it cannot be separated from it, but simply limits the object to a particular time and space. For instance, the ear-drum is the limiting adjunct or condition of ether (*ākāśa*), because it is not inseparable from *ākāśa*, but simply limits it to a particular time and space, and can be separated from it.¹ Thus there are two kinds of determinants which particularize the one eternal consciousness.

According to the Sāṃkarite, the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is the principle of individuation; it particularizes the eternal consciousness in two different ways. When the universal consciousness is determined by *antaḥkaraṇa* as a qualifying adjunct or qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*), it is called the Jīva or the individual

¹ Viśeṣaṇam ca kāryānvayi vyāvartakam. Upādhiṣca kāryānvayi vyāvartako vartamānaśca. VP., p. 103.

self, and when it is determined by *antaḥkaraṇa* as merely a limiting adjunct or condition (*upādhi*), it is called the Jīva-Sākṣin or the Witness Self. *Antaḥkaraṇa* is not separable from the individual self (*Jīva*) because it enters as a constituent element into the individual self; but it is separable from the Witness Self (*Jīva-Sākṣin*), because it limits it merely as an adventitious condition. In both the individual self (*Jīva*) and the Witness Self (*Jīva-Sākṣin*) the presence of *antaḥkaraṇa* is necessary as a determining condition. But in the case of the individual self it is a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the universal consciousness (*caitanya*), while in the case of the Witness Self it is merely a limiting adjunct or condition (*upādhi*) of the universal consciousness. Thus *antaḥkaraṇa* is a constituent factor of the individual self, but it is merely an adventitious condition of the Witness Self.²

It is the Jīva or the individual self that is the knower (*jñātr*) doer (*kartṛ*), and enjoyer (*bhoktr*), but that in the individual self through which there is the manifestation of consciousness is the Jīva-Sākṣin or the Witness Self. *Antaḥkaraṇa* or the internal organ is material and unconscious, and hence it cannot manifest consciousness in the individual self. It is the Jīva-Sākṣin or the Witness Self which manifests consciousness and all objects of individual experience. It is not one; but it differs in each individual self, for otherwise there would be no compartmental division of individual experiences.³

But what is the use of the distinction between the Jīva and the Jīva-Sākṣin? The empirical ego is the object of consciousness. But who is the cognizer of the empirical ego? There must be a Sākṣin (Seer or Witness) of the empirical ego, otherwise there would be no unity of apperception in our knowledge of external objects and that of the empirical ego. But the Jīva-Sākṣin is not known as an object of knowledge; it is the presupposition of all knowledge, the knowledge of objects and the knowledge of the empirical ego or the subject. It is the Transcendental Ego as distinguished from the Empirical Ego. Thus the Jīva is the Empirical Ego, and the Jīva-Sākṣin is the Transcendental Ego.

The Jīva which is manifested either as a knower (*jñātr*) or a doer (*kartṛ*), or an enjoyer (*bhoktr*), is a psycho-physical organism;

² Jīvo nāmāntaḥkaraṇāvacinacaitanyam tatṣākṣi tu antaḥkaraṇopahitacaitanyam. VP., p. 102.

³ Ayam jīvasākṣiḥ pratyātmanā nānā. VP., p. 104.

it is intimately connected with the material *antaḥkaraṇa* which enters into it as a constituent factor. But the Jīva-Sākṣin is the universal consciousness only limited by *antaḥkaraṇa* to a particular individual and thus individualized by it; it is not qualified by *antaḥkaraṇa* as a constituent factor, and hence it is not a psycho-physical organism. But it is not altogether free from connection with organism (e.g. the internal organ); it is limited and individualized by the internal organ. The Jīva-Sākṣin may be regarded as the super-organic self, but limited by *antaḥkaraṇa* to a particular individual, while Jīva is the psycho-physical organism of which *antaḥkaraṇa* is a constituent factor. The Jīva is the Empirical Ego which is the centre of all feelings of 'me' and 'mine' intimately connected with the organism, while the Jīva-Sākṣin is the Transcendental Ego which lights up all the experience of the individual self, the experience of the known objects and the knowing subject.⁴

2. *Īśvara and Īśvara-Sākṣin*

According to the Śaṅkara-Vedāntist, just as the universal consciousness is particularized by *antaḥkaraṇa* in two different ways, so it is determined by Māyā or cosmic nescience in two different ways. When it is determined by Māyā as a qualifying adjunct (*viśeṣaṇa*) it is called Īśvara or God; and when it is determined by Māyā as a limiting condition (*upādhi*), it is called Īśvara-Sākṣin or the Divine Witness. In other words, when Māyā enters as a constituent factor into relation with the universal consciousness, it is called Īśvara; and when Māyā enters into relation with the universal consciousness merely as an adventitious condition, it is called Īśvara-Sākṣin.

Īśvara-Sākṣin is the connoisseur before whom the cosmic panorama unfolds itself. Though there is a difference between the character of Īśvara and the character of Īśvara-Sākṣin, according as the determinant Māyā enters into relation with the universal consciousness either as a constituent factor (*viśeṣaṇa*) or as an adventitious or limiting condition (*upādhi*), yet there is no difference whatsoever in the substrata of these two characters, namely, Īśvara and Īśvara-Sākṣin. Just as one and the same person, viz. Devadatta, may be a cook as well as a reader, so one

⁴ Śikhāmaṇi on VP., pp. 102-5.

and the same universal consciousness may be *Īśvara* and *Īśvara-Sākṣin*. Just as there is a difference between the two functions of *Devadatta*, viz. cooking and reading, but there is no difference in their substrata, viz. the cook and the reader, they being one and the same person, viz. *Devadatta*, so there is a difference between the two characters of the universal consciousness, viz. those of *Īśvara* (*Īśvaratva*) and *Īśvara-Sākṣin* (*Īśvara-Sākṣitva*), but there is no difference in their substrata, viz. *Īśvara* and *Īśvara-Sākṣin*, they being one and the same universal consciousness.

Though there is a plurality of *Jīva-Sākṣins* owing to the plurality of the limiting conditions, viz. *antahkaraṇas* or internal organs, there is only one *Īśvara-Sākṣin* owing to the oneness of its limiting condition, viz. *Māyā* or cosmic nescience; and this *Īśvara-Sākṣin* is eternal because its limiting condition, *Māyā*, is eternal. Thus according to the *Śaṅkarite*, there is not only a difference between human perception (*Jīva-pratyakṣa*) and divine perception (*Īśvara-pratyakṣa*), but there is also a difference between the preception of the *Jīva-Sākṣin* or the Witness Self and that of *Īśvara-Sākṣin* or the Divine Witness.⁵ The author or *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* does not specify the distinctive characters of these different kinds of perception, viz. *Jīva-pratyakṣa*, *Jīva-Sākṣi-pratyakṣa* *Īśvara-pratyakṣa*, and *Īśvara-Sākṣi-pratyakṣa*.

⁵ *Īśvarasākṣī tu māyopahita-caitanyaḥ, taccakam tadupādhibhūta-māyāya ekatvāt.* VP., p. 105.

CHAPTER XX

MEMORY AND IMAGINATION

1. *The Nature of Recollection: Its Kinds*

Gautama maintains that the self which is a permanent substance endowed with knowledge can recall an object of its past experience.¹ Vātsyāyana states that it is the self that recalls, and that a stream of cognitions can never recall.² These statements are directed against the Buddhist account of memory. *The Questions of King Milinda* expounds the Buddhist view. "The King said, 'By what, Nāgasena, does one recollect what is past and done long ago?' 'By memory'. 'But is it not by the mind, not by the memory, that we recollect?' 'Do you recollect any business, O king, that you have done and forgotten?' 'Yes.' What then? Were you then without a mind?'' 'No. But my memory failed me'. 'Then why do you say that it is by the mind, not by the memory, that we recollect?' 'Very good, Nāgasena'.³ The Buddhist regards the self as a stream of momentary ideas, feelings and volitions. It is not a permanent principle. The permanent self cannot recall a past object or action. But a later idea recalls a past object perceived by a past idea. Memory does not presuppose the existence of a permanent self. This is the Buddhist view.

But Vātsyāyana gives the Nyāya definition of recollection which contradicts the Buddhist view. He defines recollection as recalling and recognizing an object perceived in the past by the same self. One and the same self perceived it in the past, remembers it at present, and recognizes it as an object of its past experience. Recollection appears in the form 'I have known it before'.⁴ The definition implies the following characteristics of recollection. (1) Recollection presupposes a past apprehension of an object by the self. (2) It presupposes an impression (*samskāra*) produced by the past apprehension in the same self. (3) It pre-

¹ *Smaranantvātmāno jñāsvābhāvāt*. NS., iii, 2, 43.

² *Ātmana eva smaranam, na buddhi-santatimātrasya*. NBh., iii, 2, 43.

³ Vol. I, pp. 120-1. (S.B.E., Oxford, 1890).

⁴ NBh., iii, 2, 42.

supposes the awakening (*udbodha*) of the impression by excitants (*udbodhaka*), e.g., the perception of a similar object and the like. (4) It implies recognition of the recalled object as perceived in the past by the same self. A complete recollection involves an element of recognition. (5) Recollection implies temporal localization in the past. The object recalled and recognized is referred to a particular time in the past. (6) Recollection presupposes the identity of the self. The self that recalls an object is the same as perceived it in the past. If there were no identity of the self, there would be no recollection. Udayana asserts that the past perception, its impression, and its recollection must subsist in the same self; that otherwise one's impression would produce another's recollection.⁵ Hence, recollection implies the identity of the self which is endowed with the essential nature of knowing the past, the present, and the future.⁶ It implies retention (*dhāraṇā*) and recall (*smṛti*). It presupposes original apprehension, retention of its impression (*samskāra*), and recall and recognition of the object apprehended in the past by the same self. This is the Nyāya view of recollection.

Mānikyanandi, a Jaina philosopher, defines recollection as a cognition in the form of 'that' which is produced by the revival of an impression.⁷ For example, Devadatta was perceived in the past, and *that* Devadatta is remembered at present. Vidyānanda Svāmī asserts that recollection is a cognition that assumes the form of 'that'; and that it cognizes an object which was perceived in the past.⁸ Prabhācandra defines recollection as a cognition in the form of 'that' due to the revival of an impression generated by the perception of an object on a previous occasion,—the revival being due to the perception or thought of a cue.⁹ It is a representative cognition as distinguished from a presentative cognition. If the past perception of Devadatta, Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka observes, did not cognize itself, then the present recollection would be a novel knowledge, and consequently cease to be recollection. But it is an already acquired knowledge devoid of novelty, and therefore a reproduction of a past perception which cognized itself.¹⁰ This is the Jaina view of recollection.

⁵ Kir., p. 149; KVB., pp. 154, 160.

⁶ Trikalavyāpini jñānasaktireva jñasvābhāvyam. NVTT., p. 403.

⁷ Saṁskārodobodhanibandhanā tadityākārā smṛtiḥ. PMS., iii, 3.

⁸ Tadityākārānubhūtarthaviṣaya smṛtiḥ. PRP., p. 69.

⁹ PKM., p. 96.

¹⁰ TRV., i, 5, 5, p. 36.

The Sāṃkhya defines recollection as the cognition of a past object,¹¹ or a cognition produced by an impression.¹² It is the representative cognition of an object perceived in the past due to the resuscitation of an impression (*saṃskāra*).¹³

The Yoga gives a similar account of recollection. Patañjali defines it as mental mode which cognizes an object which was apprehended in the past.¹⁴ It does not cognize anything in excess of the object of a past apprehension. Vyāsa raises an interesting question whether the mind remembers a cognition or whether it remembers an object, and replies that recollection cognizes both a cognition and an object, since a cognition is coloured by its object. Consciousness is common to all cognitions, which are distinguished from one another by their objects which colour them.¹⁵ A cognition coloured by an object which is cognized by it, produces an impression of a similar nature. When it is revived by a proper excitant, it produces a recollection of the past cognition and its object. Both apprehension and recollection cognize a cognition and an object. But the manifestation of a cognition is predominant in apprehension, while the manifestation of an object is predominant in recollection. Apprehension cognizes an object which was not known already so that the manifestation of a cognition is predominant in it; whereas recollection cognizes an object that was known already so that the manifestation of an object is predominant in it.¹⁶ All recollections are produced by the apprehension of valid knowledge, illusion, imagination, sleep and recollection.¹⁷ These mental modes were apprehended in the past, and are remembered on a future occasion. Apprehension is an immediate knowledge of an object, which prompts a fruitful action leading to its attainment, whereas recollection is a reproduction of that apprehension.¹⁸

Pārthasārathi Miśra, a Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, defines recollection as a cognition that cognizes an object apprehended before,—that

¹¹ Smṛtir atītajñānam. SSV., ii, 33.

¹² Smṛtiḥ saṃskārajanyaṁ jñānam. SPB., ii, 33.

¹³ SSV., iv, 21.

¹⁴ Anubhūta viśayaśāstraprakāśaḥ smṛtiḥ. YS., i, 1, 11.

¹⁵ Grāhyoparaktāḥ pratyayo grāhyagrahanobhayākāra-nirbhāṣaḥ grāhyagrahanobhyātmikāḥ smṛtiḥ janayati. YBh., i, 1, 11.

¹⁶ Tatra grahaṇākārapūrvā buddhiḥ, grāhyākārapūrvā smṛtiḥ. YBh., i, 1, 11.

¹⁷ Sarvāḥ smṛtayaḥ pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtīnāṁ anubhavāt prabhavanti. YBh., i, 1, 11.

¹⁸ TV., i, 1, 11.

never cognizes an unapprehended object.¹⁹ Śālikānātha Miśra, a Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka, defines it as a representative cognition which is produced by the impression of a past cognition only.²⁰ They do not differ from the Naiyāyika in their views of recollection. They regard perception, impression and recollection as qualities of the self.

Vācaspati Miśra defines recollection as a cognition which is produced by an impression only. It is different from apprehension consisting of perception, inference, testimony, comparison, presumption and non-apprehension.²¹ Sāṃkhya regards dreams as recollections.²² In a sleeping person's mind only impressions persist, which produce dreams. They are false because they are tainted by sleep.²³ Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī gives the same definition of recollection as Vācaspati Miśra does.²⁴ Prakāśānanda observes, the past cognition which produced an impression, which is the cause of recollection, cognized an object only, but not itself ; so that recollection produced by the impression of the cognition of a mere object cognizes an object only, but not the past cognition.²⁵ He rejects the view of Vyāsa who maintains that recollection cognizes both a past cognition and its object. Mādhavācārya Vidyāranya regards recollection as a reproduction of an object exactly as it was apprehended in the past, which depends upon the mere revival of the impression of the past apprehension. It cannot transcend the limits of the past apprehension. It cannot be created, destroyed or altered at will.²⁶

Veṅkaṭanātha, a Rāmānujist, gives the same definition of recollection as Prabhākara, Vācaspati Miśra and others give. He observes that a recollection cognises that particular object, the apprehension of which produces it. The perception of an object produces a recollection, which cognizes that object which was known by the perception in the past. The perception of a jar produces the recollection of it. It can never produce the

¹⁹ NR., iv, 30, p. 142.

²⁰ Smṛtiḥ punaḥ pūrvavijñāna-saṃskāramātrajaṃ jñānam. PP., p. 42. TR., p. 20.

²¹ Saṃskāramātrajaṃ hi vijñānaṃ smṛtiḥ. Bhāmatī, S. B., ii, 2, 29. TK., p. 6 ; TSD., p. 35 ; TSC., p. 29.

²² Smṛtiḥ eṣā yat svapnadarśanam. S.B., ii, 2, 29.

²³ Bhāmatī, S.B., ii, 2, 29.

²⁴ Arthamātraviṣaya-jñānajaṃ smṛtiḥ arthamātrameva viṣayīkaroti. PPV., p. 24.

²⁵ Kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum aśakyā yathānubhūtaṃ vastu avilanghayaṭi tatsaṃskārod bodhamātrādhiṇā smṛtiḥ. VPS., p. 253.

recollection of a cloth.²⁷ *Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja*, a Vallabhite, defines recollection as a cognition produced by an impression only, and not by the external sense-organs, and not during sleep; or as a cognition produced by an impression as impression; or as a cognition which is different from an apprehension.²⁸

Some regard recollection as non-sensuous perception, since it is vivid like the experience of pleasure and pain. *Vidyānanda Swāmī* refutes this view. Recollection is not vivid (*viśada*) like perception. Sometimes by repeated representation it acquires vividness, but still it is invalid like a dream-cognition. A representation can never be perception.²⁹ The later cognitions of a serial perception (*dhārāvāhikabuddhi*) are not recollections, since they are perceptions, being produced by the stimulation of the sense-organs by external objects.³⁰

The Jains regard recollection as mediate knowledge (*parokṣa jñāna*), like inference and testimony, because an object which was perceived in the past and is remembered at present can never be vivid, like an object which is perceived at present. Every recollection cognizes its object as 'that.'³¹ A memory-image is a faint copy of the original percept.

But recollection is not inference, since it is produced without the knowledge of a mark (*liṅga*). If the recollection of invariable concomitance be inference, then the uniform relation is the probans, and so its relation to the recollection must be admitted. The recollection of this being an inference, it will depend upon the recollection of another invariable concomitance, and so on to infinity. Hence recollection is different from inference.³²

Recollection is different from recognition. (1) The former cognizes a past object, whereas the latter cognizes an object qualified by the past time and the present time.³³ (2) The former is produced by impressions as its specific cause, whereas the latter is produced by the sense-object-intercourse as its specific cause, which is aided by impressions.³⁴

²⁷ *Smṛter anubhūtavaktiniyataviśayatvam*. SAS or TMK., p. 579. PKM., p. 131; YMD., p. 4.

²⁸ PR., p. 21.

²⁹ PRP., p. 69. Cp. David Hume.

³⁰ PP., p. 42.

³¹ *Pratyakṣaṁ viśadaṁ jñānam. Pūrvānubhūte'te'rthe valādyā sambhavāt smṛtiḥ parokṣameva*. PRP., p. 69.

³² TSV., i, 22-3, p. 189.

³³ NM., 459-60.

³⁴ *Bhāvanā'sādhāraṇakāraṇaṁ jñānaṁ smṛtiḥ*. SP., p. 59. *Pratyabhijñā indriya-sannikarṣasādhāraṇa-kāraṇikā*. MB., p. 59.

Some maintain that recognition is not produced by impressions but by recollection.³⁵ Prabhācandra also maintains that recognition is produced by perception and recollection.³⁶ But recognition cannot be produced by perception and recollection, since there is no distinct recollection of the object of past perception in it. A memory-image is not disengaged from a percept, but there is a fusion of a nascent memory-image with a percept in it. Recognition is an effect of peripheral stimulation aided by an impression, and not of distinct recollection. It is a kind of perception qualified by an impression of past experience.³⁷

Recollection cognizes its past object, even as perception cognizes its present object. If recollection cannot cognize its past object because of its indistinctness, then inference also should not cognize its object for the same reason. But inference cognizes past, future and remote objects, and prompts actions which lead to their attainment. So recollection also cognizes its past object.³⁸

Memory consists in retention and recollection. Recall depends upon retention. If there is no retention of an impression of a previous perception, there can be no recollection. The Jaina regards retention (*dhāraṇā*) as the last element in the process of perception. An impression is retained in the self.³⁹ Retention is non-oblivion of an object that was known in the past.⁴⁰ An impression is produced by an apprehension or a recollection.⁴¹ It is different from merit and demerit. The former is a residuum of a cognition, while the latter are potencies of moral and immoral actions.⁴²

In the Alāṅkāra literature the nature of recollection is described. It is a representative cognition that cognizes an object perceived in the past.⁴³ It is a representation of the causes of pleasure and pain. It is the remembrance of emotions due to pleasure and pain.⁴⁴ It is the reproduction of objects forgotten

³⁵ Keci tu pratyabhijñāyām na samskāro janakaḥ kintu smṛtiḥ itī manyante. KR., p. 133. TK., p. 6.

³⁶ Pratyabhijñānasya darśana-smaraṇe kāraṇam. PKM., p. 97.

³⁷ KR., pp. 133-4. Advaitacintāmaṇi, pp. 21-2.

³⁸ TSV., I, 28-9.

³⁹ PKM., p. 96.

⁴⁰ Nirjñātārthā' viśmṛtiḥ dhāraṇā. TRV., I, 5, -5. p. 43.

⁴¹ Nyāyasāra, Benares, Sarhvat 1962, p. 103.

⁴² Karma-vāsanā dharmādharmau, jñāna-vāsanā bhāvanā. KVB., p. 114.

⁴³ Smṛtiḥ pūrvānubhūtiārtha-pratītiḥ. Rasārṇavasudhākara, p. 126. Daśarūpa, p. 149; Sāhityadarpaṇa, pp. 134-5.

⁴⁴ Sukha-duḥkha-kṛtānām bhāvanām anusmaraṇam. Nāṭyaśāstra (G.O.S.), p. 364. Kāvyaanulāsana, p. 87.

for a long time, which gave pleasure or pain in the past at a particular time, in a particular place, appropriate to the occasion.⁴⁵

The act of recalling is expressed by shaking the head, raising or lowering eye-brows, turning the head upward, looking at the sky, gazing, inhibiting the movements of the body and the like.⁴⁶

There are two kinds of memory, viz., passive memory and active memory. Mādhavācārya Vidyāraṇya describes the former as spontaneous recall which depends entirely upon the energizing of the impressions of the past cognitions of objects, and not upon a person's will.⁴⁷ It often appears in spite of his desire not to remember it. It does not appear even when he intently desires to remember it. An undesired object is recalled owing to the revival of an impression on the perception of a similar object or under influence of an unseen agency (*adṛṣṭa*). But sometimes there is active memory when a recollection depends upon the volition of a person; a series of thoughts produces concentration of mind which revives an impression.⁴⁸

Vyāsa describes two kinds of recollection: recollection of an imagined object, and recollection of unimagined object.⁴⁹ Dream is the recollection of an imagined object. Waking-recall is the recollection of an unimagined object. Vyāsa gives these examples. Dream involves imagination, whereas recollection involves memory. This is Vācaspati's interpretation. But Vijñānabhikṣu gives a different interpretation. He mentions two kinds of recollection: (1) recollection of forecast objects (e.g., dreams), and (2) recollection of unforecast-objects (e.g., waking recollection). Some dreams foreshadow future events, though they are recollections. Waking recollections do not forecast future events. They merely faithfully reproduce past objects or events perceived before. Vācaspati's interpretation seems to be right because it is natural. But it may be contended, that dreams are not recollections because they are not produced by impressions only, and because they do not represent objects perceived in the past. Vijñānabhikṣu

⁴⁵ Bhāva-prakāśana (G.O.S.), p. 19.

⁴⁶ Nāṭyadarpaṇa, (G.O.S.), p. 180; Rasagaṅgādhara, p. 123; Bhāva-prakāśana, pp. 19, 844; Kāvya-nusāsaṇa, p. 87; Nāṭyaśāstra, (G.O.S.), p. 364; Sāhityadarpaṇa, p. 134; Daśarūpa, (B.I.), p. 149; Rasārṇava-sudhākara, p. 126.

⁴⁷ Smṛtijñānaṁ saṁskārod-bodhādhīnaṁ na puruṣa-prayatnādhīnaṁ. VPS., p. 251.

⁴⁸ VPS., p. 251.

⁴⁹ Sā ca dvayī bhāvita-smartavyā ca abhāvita-smartavyā ca. YBh., i, 1, 11.

rejects this contention, and replies that sometimes they are recollections of objects perceived in the past,—being produced by impressions only.⁵⁰

Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī divides recollection into (1) valid recollection and (2) invalid recollection, and subdivides the former into (1) recollection of the self and (2) recollection of the not-self. Keśavamīśra, Jagadīśa, Mahādeva Paṇḍita and others also recognize valid recollection and invalid recollection. If the past apprehension is valid, the recollection is valid; and if it is invalid, the recall is invalid. Keśavamīśra regards dreams as invalid recollections.⁵¹

2. *Memory and Identity of the Self*

The Cārvāka denies the existence of the self, and cannot account for memory. All other schools of Indian philosophy except Buddhism maintain, that memory presupposes the existence and identity of the self. Gautama, Vātsyāyana, and Vācaspati Miśra's views have already been given. It is the permanent self that perceived an object in the past, retained its impression, remembers it at present, and will remember it in future. It is the self that remembers because it is endued with the character of being a knower. A mere series of cognitions cannot remember an object of past experience, because it is devoid of substantiality (*nirātma*). Memory presupposes the identity of the self as related to past, present and future cognitions.⁵²

The Buddhist idealist regards the self as a series of discrete and momentary psychoses.^{52a} Vātsyāyana urges that this conception of this self makes recollection impossible. If the self were a mere series of fleeting cognitions, then one momentary past cognition would perceive an object and another momentary future cognition would remember it—there being no connection whatever between them—which is absurd! What was perceived by one cognition cannot be remembered by another unconnected with it. Further, recollection involves recognition. Both presuppose the identity of the permanent self which knows the past, the present, and the future.⁵³

⁵⁰ YV., i, 1, 11; TV., i, 1, 11.

⁵¹ ACK., pp. 258-9; TA., p. 11; TBh., p. 30; Nyāyasāra, p. 116; Bhāskarodayā, p. 168.

⁵² NBh., NVT., iii, 2, 43.

^{52a} Cp. David Hume, J. S. Mill and W. James.

⁵³ NBh., iii, 2, 42.

The Advaita Vedāntist also urges that the Buddhist idealist, who advocates the doctrine of momentary ideas, cannot account for recollection, since the original apprehension, its impression, and its recollection, which are momentary, do not abide in a common permanent substrate; and that if they abide in different substrates which are momentary, then the same person cannot remember an object apprehended by him in the past. The Buddhist idealist argues that these discrete momentary cognitions can produce recollection because they belong to the same psychological series (*viññānasantāna*). The Advaita Vedāntist rejects this argument as invalid, since the so-called series is unreal. When one member of a series is produced, its preceding member is destroyed, and its succeeding member has not yet come into existence. Even if a series is real, there can be no recollection, inasmuch as impressions were destroyed long ago. An entity which is destroyed cannot produce an effect. If impressions are assumed to continue, then they cease to be momentary and contradict the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. Hence, the Yogācāra cannot account for recollection. The Sūnyavādin also cannot account for personal identity involved in memory. If all are non-existent in their real nature, then all empirical life is destroyed.

The Advaita Vedāntist criticizes the Naiyāyika view. The Naiyāyika who regards the self as omnipresent can account for personal identity in memory, because apprehension, impression and recollection abide in the same self. But there being no relation of a self and its cognition to an object, recollection cannot have the form of it. The Naiyāyika regards cognitions as formless. If a cognition does not cognize the form of its object, it cannot have its form. If the cognition has no form of its object, then its impression cannot have the form of the cognition, and consequently the recollection produced by the impression cannot have the form of the object perceived in the past. Moreover, if a cognition is absolutely destroyed, a recollection cannot be like a previous cognition, since an impression which is not a particular condition of a cognition, but assumes another independent quality, is not a residuum (*vāsanā*) of the previous cognition, and so cannot produce a similar recollection.

The Advaita Vedānta regards the empirical self limited by the adjunct of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) in which pure

consciousness is reflected, as the apprehender, the substrate of the impression, and the recollector, so that the original apprehension, its impression, and its recollection abide in the same substrate. The empirical self is directly related to an object through a mental mode in which pure consciousness is reflected, and which assumes the form of the object. The mental mode produces a residuum (*vāsanā*) in the nescience (*avidyā*) which is the cause of the internal organ; it is called an impression (*samskāra*). When the impression is revived by an excitant, a similar recollection is produced. Hence, a recollection is similar to the original apprehension which is its ultimate cause, and the apprehension, the impression, and the recollection have the form of the object which was apprehended in the past.⁵⁴

3. *The Nature, Causes and Effects of Impressions*

The Buddhist idealists regard impressions (*samskāra*) as residua (*vāsanā*) of momentary cognitions modifying the succeeding cognitions, which do not abide in a permanent self. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards an impression as a quality of the self produced by a cognition and subsisting in it. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the Vedāntists regard it as a modification of the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*), which is retained in it.

Vātsyāyana asserts that an impression is a quality of the self produced by the cognition of an object, which is a cause of recollection.⁵⁵ Praśastapāda says, "An impression is a quality of the self produced by objects seen, heard or otherwise apprehended on a previous occasion, which is a cause of recollection and recognition."⁵⁶ Śaṅkara Miśra describes an impression as the effect of a cognition and the cause of a cognition.⁵⁷ It is produced by perception or presentative cognition. It produces recollection and recognition or representative cognitions.⁵⁸ Jagadīśa opines that an impression is produced by a determinate cognition.⁵⁹ Śrīdhara observes, that even wrong cognitions leave impressions in the self, since we have recollections of even those objects which we

⁵⁴ ATP., pp. 109-10.

⁵⁵ NBh., iii, 2, 44.

⁵⁶ Bhāvanā ātmaguno dṛṣṭa-śrutānubhūteṣvartheṣu smṛti-prayabhijñāna-hetuḥ. PBh., p. 267. KR., p. 132.

⁵⁷ Jñāna-janitena samskāreṇa jñāna-jananāt. KR., p. 131.

⁵⁸ KR., p. 132.

⁵⁹ Bhāvanākhyāḥ samskāro viśiṣṭa-jñāna-janyaḥ. TA., p. 12.

perceived wrongly in the past.⁶⁰ Illusions are definite and determinate cognitions. Viśvanātha also opines that impressions are produced by definite and determinate cognitions, and not by doubtful cognitions. They are imperceptible and abide in the self.⁶¹ The Navya Nyāya maintains that recollections also produce impressions.⁶² Thus both presentative and representative cognitions produce impressions (*saṃskāra*) in the self.

Impressions are imperceptible. We infer their existence as the causes of recollection and recognition. We cannot account for them without impressions. Past cognitions cannot produce recollections without the operation (*vyāpāra*) of impressions since nothing can be a cause of an effect, if it does not exist itself or its operation. If recollection is the effect of a past cognition, then it must be due to its operation (*vyāpāra*), because it does not exist when recollection is produced.⁶³ A cause or its operation must exist at the moment immediately before the production of its effect. An impression is the operation of a perception, which produces recollection.⁶⁴ The destruction of a perception, it may be argued, is the operation which produces recollection. This argument is invalid, because an absence and its counter-entity together cannot produce an effect. Further, if an impression be not admitted, then what was perceived on a previous occasion will always be remembered, because the operation in the form of the destruction of a perception always exists. Therefore the destruction of a perception is not its causal operation (*vyāpāra*) which may produce recollection.⁶⁵

Varadarāja observes, that an impression, which is the effect of a perceptual cognition and the cause of a representative cognition, is not a cognition.⁶⁶ It is dissimilar to a cognition. Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja describes an impression as the subtle condition of an apprehension.⁶⁷

Veṅkaṭanātha regards an impression as a peculiar adventitious property produced by a past perception. Any impression cannot produce the recollection of any object. That particular

⁶⁰ NK., p. 268.

⁶¹ BhP., 160; SM., pp. 495-6.

⁶² Smṛter api saṃskāra-janakatvaṃ navānair uktam. TSD., p. 91.

⁶³ SM., pp. 496-7. TK., p. 6.

⁶⁴ Saṃskāraḥ pūrvānubhava-vyāpāraḥ. KR., p. 133.

⁶⁵ SMD., pp. 496-7.

⁶⁶ Saṃskāraḥ anubhava-jñāna-janyaḥ smṛti-jñāna-hetuḥ syaṃ na jñānājñāyaḥ. TR., p. 147. NBh., iii, 2, 45.

⁶⁷ PR., p. 21. Cp. NM., pp. 376-7.

impression produces the recollection of an object, which was produced by the perception of it. The past perception is not the adventitious property which produces recollection, because it is destroyed when recollection is produced. The perception of a similar object or the like is not a present impression which produces recollection, for, in that case, an imperceptible object would be remembered. Further, it cannot produce recollection without the aid of an impression of a past perception. Hence, the hypothesis of an impression is not unwarranted.⁶⁸

Veṅkaṭanātha, unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, thinks that an impression abides in the intellect (*buddhi*), and not in the self, and regards it as a modification of *buddhi* produced by frequent previous perceptions. He does not regard it as a modification of the self which is unmodifiable. An attributive cognition (*dharma-bhūta-jñāna*) is subject to modifications. So an impression produced by a previous perception subsists in *buddhi* which is a substance.⁶⁹ This is the view of Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda.

Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī also regards the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) as the receptacle of an impression.⁷⁰ The Nyāya regards the self as its substrate. What is called *ahamkāra* by the Advaita Vedānta is called *Ātman* by the Nyāya.⁷¹ Or, the empirical self limited by the adjunct of the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) in which pure consciousness is reflected, is the receptacle of an impression.⁷²

The Sāṃkhya also regards the mind (*manas*) as the receptacle of impressions, since persons whose sense-organs are destroyed still remember objects perceived in the past. It does not regard the self as the substrate of impressions, because it is unmodifiable and devoid of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.⁷³

The Advaita Vedānta severely criticizes the Buddhist view of impressions (*vāsanā*). Impressions are produced, according to Sāṃkhya, by perceptions. The variety of impressions is due to the variety of perceptions. The variety of recollections is due to the variety of impressions. They abide in the permanent empirical self. They cannot abide in the *Ālayavijñāna*, because it is a series of momentary self-cognitions.⁷⁴ Both are momentary and produced at the same moment, and consequently cannot be

⁶⁸ TMK., p. 689; SAS., p. 689.

⁷⁰ Saṃskāraḥ antaḥkaraṇa-niṣṭhaḥ.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 259.

⁷² SPS., SSV., ii, 42-4.

⁶⁹ TMK., p. 690; SAS., p. 690.

⁷⁰ Tattvānusandhāna on ACK., p. 259.

⁷² ATP., p. 110.

⁷⁴ S.B., ii, 2, 30-1.

related to each other as the substrate and the content, like the two horns of a cow springing up simultaneously.⁷⁵ A cause is the invariable antecedent of its effect. If the *Ālayavijñāna* is prior to the impression, then it cannot be its substrate because it is non-existent when the latter comes into existence.⁷⁶ If the Buddhist regards the *Ālayavijñāna* as permanent, he contradicts the doctrine of momentariness.⁷⁷

Kumārila and Pārthasārathi Miśra also severely criticize the Buddhist doctrine of impression (*vāsanā*). A preceding cognition that is entirely destroyed cannot modify the succeeding cognition. Even if they are produced simultaneously, they cannot modify each other because they are not related to each other. An impression is due to the operation of conjunction, inherence and the like, which are not possible if the preceding cognition is entirely destroyed before the succeeding cognition is generated. A composite substance (e.g. a *campaka* flower) can perfume another composite substance (e.g. oil), because it can transfer its fine parts into the latter. But a prior momentary cognition cannot transfer its parts to the succeeding momentary cognition and modify it, because both are partless. Further, all residua (*vāsanā*) abide in momentary cognitions. When they are destroyed, the residua are destroyed, and cannot produce recollections in a definite order. If they are supposed to persist as potencies (*śakti*) after the destruction of the cognitions in which they resided, then they undermine the doctrine of momentariness. If a series of residua were supposed to exist like a series of cognitions, then a residuum would produce a residuum only, and a cognition would produce a cognition only, because a like cause produces a like effect only. But a like cause, it may be argued, produces an unlike effect in co-operation with a dissimilar auxiliary condition. Similarly, a cognition produces a residuum, and a residuum produces a cognition. This argument is baseless, since there are no dissimilar auxiliary conditions as there is nothing else than cognitions. The Mīmāṃsakas obviate these difficulties in that they regard the permanent self as the receptacle of impressions.⁷⁸

Impressions produce recollections. They are auxiliary causes of recognition, because they render an aid to the sense-object-

⁷⁵ Bhāmati on S.B., ii, 2, 29.

⁷⁷ S.B., ii, 2, 31.

⁷⁶ Kalpataru on Ibid, ii, 2, 29.

⁷⁸ ŚV., NR., V, 192-200.

intercourse which is its principal cause. They are auxiliary causes of determinate perception which involves recollection of similar and dissimilar objects. They are auxiliary causes of acquired perception which is complicated by the recollection of an object perceived on a previous occasion. They are auxiliary causes of illusions in which an object (e.g. a shell) is misperceived as another (e.g. silver) perceived at another time, in another place, and remembered at present, but appearing as an object perceived (Nyāya); or in which there is non-discrimination between the perceived element and the remembered element owing to obscuratation of memory (*smṛti-pramoṣā*, Prabhākara). Inference depends upon the recollection of invariable concomitance of a probans with a probandum, which is produced by an impression. Comparison and testimony also involve recollection which depends upon an impression. Generally a single impression produced by a single perception produces a single recollection. But sometimes it produces the recollection of a collection of objects in co-operation with other impressions.⁷⁹ 'Bring a jar'. In this example, the impressions of the constituent letters in co-operation with one another produce the recollection of a word; and the impressions of the constituent words jointly produce the recollection of a sentence.⁸⁰ An impression is intensified by repeated recollection of a similar nature. It produces a recollection which produces a stronger impression, which, in its turn, produces another recollection which produces a still stronger impression, and so on. The same impression is not intensified by repeated recollection. Impressions are non-eternal. They are produced and destroyed. They are destroyed by similar recollections, diseases and the lapse of a long time.⁸¹

4. The Conditions of Retention (Causes of Impressions)

Retentive knowledge is the cause of not forgetting the objects which were learnt or perceived in the past. It is a condition of recollection.⁸² It depends upon the following conditions:

(1) The healthy and vigorous condition of the body is the physiological condition of retention. It is indicated by a passage

⁷⁹ Saṃskāraḥ kvacit pratyekānubhava-janito'pi samūhālambanāṁ smṛtim utpādayati. KR., p. 134.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 134.

⁸¹ PRP., p. 68; SS., i, 15.

⁸² Śāstrārthasaṃgraha, p. 379.

in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad: "When the food is pure, the mind is pure; when the mind is pure, memory becomes firm."⁸³ Memory depends upon the health of the mind (*sattva*), which, in its turn, depends upon the health of the body. The healthy condition of the psycho-physical organism is a precondition of memory.

Praśastapāda mentions three causes of impressions: (1) intense cognitions, (2) repeated cognitions, and (3) interesting cognitions.⁸⁴

(2) The contact of the self with the mind (*manas*) depending upon the intense perception of a wonderful object produces a deep and excessive impression in the self.⁸⁵ The attentive intense perception of wonderful objects produces deep impressions. For instance, when an inhabitant of the Deccan, who has never seen a camel before, sees it for the first time, his intense perception of the wonderful animal produces a deep impression in his self, which enables him to recall it ever afterwards. Śrīdhara suggests that *paṭupratyaya* not only means an intense cognition, but also a very distinct cognition (*sphuṭatara-pratyaya*). For instance, when we walk on grass barefooted, sometimes we have intense tactual perception of the grass; but it cannot produce a deep impression in the self, because it is not very distinct. Such indistinct perceptions cannot produce deep impressions. Distinct perceptions alone can generate such deep impressions as may produce recollections in future.⁸⁶

(3) Repetition or frequency is another condition of retention inasmuch as it produces a deep impression. In acquiring learning frequent reading is an important condition of retention. Sometimes a single perception, though distinct and intense, cannot produce a deep impression. But when it is repeated several times, it produces a lasting impression. When a chapter of the Veda is read for the first time, it does not produce any distinct impression. But when it is read over and over again, its distinct perception is repeated, produces a deep impression, and fixes the matter in memory.⁸⁷ In learning an art repeated practice is of

⁸³ *Āhāraśuddhau sattvaśuddhiḥ, sattvaśuddhau dhruvā smṛtiḥ*, vii, 26, 2.

⁸⁴ *Paṭvabhyāsādara-pratyayajāḥ*. PBh., p. 267. KR., p. 132.

⁸⁵ *Paṭupratyayāpekṣād ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād āścarye' rthe paṭuḥ saṁskārātisāyo jāyate*. Ibid, p. 267.

⁸⁶ *Paṭupratyayaḥ sphuṭatara-paratyayaḥ*. NK., p. 257.

⁸⁷ NK., p. 257.

invaluable service. In acquiring skill in physical exercise, swimming, dancing and the like repeated practice is of great help. When study, art, physical exercise and the like are repeatedly practised, deep impressions are produced by the mind-soul-contact and the perceptions aided by the preceding impressions.⁸⁸ A single cognition does not produce a lasting impression, because there is no distinct recollection after the first cognition. The last cognition also cannot be regarded as the cause of the deep impression. If it were so, there would be no need of repeated practice. Therefore, Śrīdhara concludes, the preceding impressions facilitate the succeeding cognitions, which, in their turn, strengthen the preceding impressions. When the practice is continued for a very long time with regard to the same object, the impression becomes very deep, and brings about a distinct recollection of it. This impression is produced by the last cognition, which depends upon the last but one impression. This is how impressions are strengthened by repeated practice.

(4) Interest is another condition of retention. The perception of an object which evokes great interest and compels attention produces a deep impression in the self. When a person puts forth special efforts and fixes his eyes on an interesting object with an attentive mind, which he has never seen before, his perception of it is as vivid as that of a flash of lightning. A deep impression (*samśkāraṭīṣaya*) is produced by the mind-soul-contact under the influence of the vivid perception. For instance, a deep impression is produced by the vivid perception of lotuses made of gold and silver in the Deva lake at midnight on the full-moon day in the month of Caitra, when the moon is in the asterism of Citrā. Though the lotuses appear for a single moment, they produce so vivid perceptions that they leave lasting impressions, and can be recalled ever afterwards.⁸⁹ Nobody can vouch for the truth of the statement. But the fact remains, that a rare object evokes great interest, attracts attention, and calls forth a special effort of the self to perceive it; and that it produces a lasting impression in it. Sometimes when we perceive a very strange or marvellous object only once in our life, we have such a vivid perception of it that we remember it ever afterwards.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ NK., p. 257.

⁸⁹ NK., p. 257.

⁹⁰ NK., p. 271.

5. *The Conditions of Recall*

The Buddhist account is found in *Milindapañha* which mentions sixteen conditions of recall in an unscientific and unsystematic manner. (1) An extraordinary effort reminds an adept (e.g. Ānanda) of his previous births. A superhuman effort of the mind is necessary for the revival of the deep-lying impressions of previous births. (2) Outward aid reminds a person of his past experiences. A person, forgetful by nature, is continually reminded by others of things which he cannot recall by unaided efforts. (3) Massive experience which moves a whole personality is a condition of recall. A deep impression left by the vivid perception of an interesting event can easily be recalled. Kings remember their coronation day, and persons remember their days of conversion on account of their deep impressions. This condition of memory corresponds to *ādarapratyaya* mentioned by Prāśastapāda. An intense experience which afforded pleasure or joy to a person on a previous occasion reminds him of it. (4) An intense experience which afforded pain or sorrow to a person on a previous occasion reminds him of it. Thus the influence of feelings and emotions on memory was recognized. (5) Similarity of appearance is a condition of recall. The sight of a person resembling the father, the mother, the brother, or the sister reminds us of the latter. The sight of a camel, an ox, or an ass reminds us of some other member of the species like it. These are examples of the law of similarity which is adumbrated here. (6) Difference of appearance is a condition of recall. When we perceive an object, we perceive all its qualities. Hence we remember that a particular colour, a particular smell, a particular taste, and a particular touch belong to a particular object. The law of contiguity is adumbrated here. (7) The knowledge of speech is a condition of memory. A person who is by nature forgetful is reminded by others of an object, and then he remembers it. This condition is akin to the second condition, viz., outward aid. (8) A sign reminds us of an object signified by it. We recognise a draught bullock by a brand mark or some other sign. (9) An effort to recall on the prompting of others is a condition of memory. A person by nature forgetful is urged again and again by others to try his utmost to remember his past experience, and succeeds in doing so. (10) Calculation is a condition

of recall. A person knows by the training he has received in writing that such and such a letter follows another letter. This is a mechanical condition of memory. (11) Arithmetic is a condition of memory. Accountants do big sums by their knowledge of figures. This is a mechanical condition of memory. (12) Learning by heart is a condition of memory. Those who recite the scriptures again and again can recall them easily. This also is a mechanical condition of memory. Calculation, arithmetic and learning by heart correspond to *abhyāsapratyaya* mentioned by Praśastapāda. They remind us of past experiences on account of the mere frequency of the same experience. They are causes of rote memory or cramming. (13) Meditation is a condition of active memory. A monk remembers his days of temporal life by meditation. This condition is mentioned by Gautama. (14) Reference to a book is a condition of memory. Kings are reminded of regulations by referring to the book of laws. This condition is akin to an external aid to memory. (15) Pledge is a condition of memory. A pledged ornament reminds a person of the circumstances under which it was pledged. (16) Past experience is a condition of memory. Recollection is a reproduction of past experience. A person remembers what he has actually seen, heard, tasted, smelt, or touched. Memory cannot transcend the bounds of experience. In *Milindapañha* there is simply an empirical enumeration of the conditions of memory, but no attempt at a classification and explanation of them.¹¹

The conditions of recall are discussed in the Vaiśeṣika literature. Kaṇāda mentions a particular conjunction of the self with the mind (*manas*) and an impression as the conditions of recollection.¹² A particular mind-soul-contact, Śaṅkara Miśra observes, called attention (*prañidhāna*) is the non-material cause (*asamavāyī-kāraṇa*), the self is the material cause (*samavāyī-kāraṇa*), and an impression is the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) of recollection. Attention is the concentration of mind. Past perceptions are the causes of impressions, and consequently the ultimate causes of recollections. There is not always remembrance of an object, because it depends upon the revival of impressions by suggestive forces.¹³ Jaya Nārāyaṇa mentions the mind-soul-contact, a desire

¹¹ *The Questions of King Milinda*, Vol. I, pp. 122-3. BhP., pp. 193-4. H.I.L., pp. 112-3

¹² *Ātmamanasoh saṁyoga-viśeṣāt saṁskārāc ca smṛtiḥ*. V.S., ix, 2, 6. VSU., ix, 2, 6. KVB., p. 154.

to recall (*susmūrṣā*), a similar impression, and excitants or cues as the conditions of recollection. He regards a determinate cognition which is not neutral in character as the principal cause (*karaṇa*), an impression as the casual operation (*vyāpāra*), excitants or cues as the auxiliary cause (*sahakāri-kāraṇa*), the mind-soul-contact as the non-material cause, and a desire to recall, attention and the like as the efficient cause of recollection.⁹⁴ There must be a definite, distinct and determinate cognition of an object which is either pleasant or painful. An indefinite, indistinct and indeterminate cognition cannot produce an impression. Further, a cognition with a pleasant or unpleasant feeling-tone can produce an impression. It can be revived by the cognition of suggestive signs. Its revival depends upon the intention to remember the particular object perceived in the past, the mind-soul-contact, and attention. These are the conditions of active memory.

Prāśastapāda mentions the following conditions of recall. The recollection of objects seen, heard, or otherwise perceived in the past is produced by a particular mind-soul-contact aided by the cognition of suggestive signs (*liṅgadarśana*), the desire (*icchā*) to recall, the thinking of associated ideas (*anusmaraṇa*), and impressions produced by intense, repeated, and interesting or vivid cognitions.⁹⁵ A particular mind-soul-contact, Śrīdhara observes, cannot bring about recollection unless it is aided by the perception of a suggestive sign which revives the impression. Hence the impression and the perception of a cue are the efficient causes of recollection.⁹⁶

Gautama mentions attention, context, repetition, signs, distinctive features, similarity, ownership, relation of the supporter and the supported, relationship, immediate sequence, separation, identity of function, excess, attainment, antagonism, concealment, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, fear, need, action, attachment, merit, and demerit as the conditions of recollection.⁹⁷ (1) Attention (*prāṇidhāna*) is the fixation of the mind on the object by a person who intends to remember it.⁹⁸ It consists in preventing the mind from wandering away to other objects.⁹⁹ Intently thinking of the suggestive signs which have the power of reviving the impression

⁹⁴ VSV., ix, 2, 6.

⁹⁵ PBh., p. 256.

⁹⁶ Liṅgadarśanavat saṃskāro'pi smṛter nimittakāraṇam. NK., p. 257.

⁹⁷ NS., iii, 2, 44.

⁹⁸ Susmūrṣayā manaso dhāraṇam prāṇidhānam. NBh., iii, 2, 44.

⁹⁹ Prāṇidhānam manaso viṣayāntara-sañcāra-vāraṇam. NSV., iii, 2, 44.

of the object sought to be remembered is a cause of recollection.¹⁰⁰ Constant thought of the signs (*liṅga*) which suggest the thing to be remembered directly leads to its recollection. Fixation of the mind on the signs which indicate these suggestive signs also indirectly leads to recollection.¹⁰¹ The associative tendencies are controlled and brought to a focus by concentration of mind so that their cumulative strength may easily rouse the dormant impression and produce its recollection. Attention is a subjective condition of recall. It throws the mind into an attitude which is favourable to recollection. (2) Context (*nibandha*) is a condition of recall. When many topics are discussed in the same work and repeatedly read together, an association is established among their ideas; so that they remind us of one another in the same order or in a different order. A person thinks of the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), and then remembers the object of valid knowledge (*prameya*), because he learnt them repeatedly in the same work on the Nyāya in the past. Here recollection of the contents of past experience follows the same order in which they were learnt in the past. When a person thinks of the grounds of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*), and then remembers the means of valid knowledge, his recollection follows a different order.¹⁰² Here contiguous association under the influence of the context is responsible for recollection. Vātsyāyana gives another meaning of *nibandha*. It consists in establishing associations between well-known things and new things to be remembered—the familiar and the unfamiliar—with the help of the art of concentration of mind.¹⁰³ It contains a significant suggestion. The things to be remembered must be associated with those already known and incorporated in the system of knowledge. Well-assimilated matter can be easily remembered. Undigested material of knowledge cannot be easily recalled. Hence, apperception is a subjective condition of memory. (3) Repetition (*abhyāsa*) is a condition of recollection. Vātsyāyana means by it an intense impression (*samskāra*) produced by the repetition of cognitions with regard to the same object. Vācaspati includes keen interest and vivid cognition (*ādara-pratyaya*) in repetition, since they also produce an impression through which they

¹⁰⁰ Susmūrṣita-liṅga-cintanam artha-smṛti-kāraṇam. NBh., iii, 2, 44.

¹⁰¹ NVTT., p. 404.

¹⁰² NVTT., p. 404. NSV., iii, 2, 44.

¹⁰³ Dhāraṇā-śāstra-kṛto vā prajñāteṣu vastuṣu smartavyānām upanikṣepo nibandhaḥ. NBh., iil, 2, 44.

bring about recollection. Repetition of the same experience produces many impressions of the same kind, which intensify and strengthen the last impression and fix it in memory. Though such an intense impression is not an excitant (*udbodhaka*) of recollection, yet it facilitates quick recall. Others maintain, that an intense impression produced by the repetition of the same experience is an excitant of recall.¹⁰⁴ (4) Suggestive signs (*liṅga*) remind us of the object with which they were associated in our past experience. They are of four kinds: conjunct (*saṃyogi*), inherent (*saṃavāyi*), coinherent in the same substrate (*ekārtha-saṃavāyi*), and contradictory (*virodhi*). (i) An object reminds us of something with which it was invariably found to be in contact in our past experience. Smoke was invariably perceived in the past in conjunction with fire. So smoke reminds us of fire. (ii) An object reminds us of something in which it was always perceived to inhere in our past experience. Horns were always perceived to inhere in a cow. So they remind us of a cow. (iii) An object reminds us of another, both of which were always perceived to coinhere in the same substrate. Hands were always perceived in the past along with feet to coinhere in the same body. So hands remind us of feet. Colour and touch were always perceived in the past to coinhere in one and the same substance. So the colour of the object reminds us of its touch. These examples illustrate the law of contiguity. (iv) Two objects, which were always perceived to be antagonistic to each other, remind us of each other. The non-existent remind us of the existent because they are opposed to each other. This is an example of the law of contrast. (5) Distinguishing features (*lakṣaṇa*) remind us of the objects which are distinguished by them. The sight of a flag with a distinctive mark reminds one of the nation to which it belongs. The sight of the distinctive features of an animal leads to the recollection of the species to which it belongs. The distinctive marks on the body of a person remind one of the race to which he belongs. (6) Similarity (*sādrśya*).—An object reminds us of another on account of its similarity with it. The picture of Devadatta reminds us of him. This is an example of the law of similarity. (7) Ownership (*parigraha*).—When two entities are related to each other as the owner and the owned, either of them reminds us of the other. A property reminds one of its owner,

¹⁰⁴ NBh., NVTT., NSV., iii, 2, 44.

and the owner reminds one of his property. (8) The supporter (*āśraya*) reminds one of the supported. A master reminds one of the servant supported by him. A king reminds us of his attendants. (9) The supported (*āśrita*) remind one of their supporters. A servant reminds one of his master who supports him. The attendants remind one of their king. If two objects are related to each other as the supporter and the supported, they remind us of each other. (10) If two objects are related to each other, one reminds us of the other. A pupil reminds one of his teacher. A priest reminds one of the person for whom he performs a sacrifice. Vācaspati Miśra observes, that some sort of relationship is involved in all the conditions of recall mentioned here. The special mention of relationship as a condition of recall means all relations other than those specially mentioned here.¹⁰⁵ (11) Immediate sequence (*ānantarya*) is a condition of recall. In performing a complex act the performance of one item reminds us of the item that follows it. The preceding item reminds us of the succeeding item. The sprinkling of water on rice reminds us of pounding it in a wooden mortar. Vācaspati gives an example of a series of acts which are habitually performed every day. They form a connected chain of acts; the preceding act reminds us of the succeeding act. We awake early in the morning, then get up from bed, then wash our faces, then satisfy the calls of nature, then clean our teeth. We perform these acts almost automatically owing to habit. Here the preceding act reminds us of the succeeding act, and then the act is performed. (12) Separation (*vijoga*).—When two lovers are separated from each other, one is reminded of the other. Separation implies sorrow which reminds one of the object of sorrow. (13) The identity of effect or function (*ekakārya*).—When C¹, C² and C³ co-operate and produce the same effect E, the perception of C¹ reminds one of C² or C³. Those who are engaged in the same profession or do the same kind of work remind us of one another. The fellow-students who are engaged in the same task remind us of one another. (14) Antagonism (*virodha*).—Of two rivals antagonistic to each other, the sight of the one reminds us of the other. A serpent and a mongoose remind one of each other, because they are naturally hostile to each other. (15) Excess (*atiśaya*) reminds one of what brings it about. The sacred thread ceremony

¹⁰⁵ NVTL, p. 404.

reminds a Brahmin boy of the priest who performed it. He attains a certain superiority in the shape of education, modesty, purity of conduct and the like after he is invested with sacred thread. Hence the superiority reminds him of his preceptor who is its indirect cause. (16) Attainment (*prāpti*).—One who received gifts from a charitable person often remembers him. A beggar often remembers the person from whom he received gifts or will receive them. (17) Concealment (*vyavadhāna*).—A sheath reminds one of a sword which is concealed in it. (18) Pleasure and pain (*sukha-duḥkha*).—Pleasure reminds a person of the object that gave him pleasure in the past. Similarly, pain reminds him of the object that caused his pain in the past. Pleasure and pain not only remind us of their causes, but also of each other. Pleasure reminds us of pain, and pain reminds us of pleasure. Present joy reminds us of past sorrow; present sorrow reminds us of past joy.¹⁰⁶ The law of contrast governs these recollections. (19) Desire and aversion (*icchā-dveṣa*).—Desire reminds a person of the object or person that he likes. Aversion reminds him of the object or person that he dislikes. Desire and aversion remind one of the objects that excite them. Vācaspati Miśra means by desire and aversion affection and hatred respectively. Affection for brothers reminds a person of his brothers. Hatred for a hostile wife reminds him of his wife. Conative tendencies determine recall. (20) Fear (*bhaya*).—Fear reminds one of its cause (e.g. death). (21) Affection (*rāga*).—Love often reminds a lover of his beloved woman. Affection reminds a father of his son. Thus emotions determine recall. (22) Need (*arthitva*).—It reminds a needy person of what he needs in the shape of food or clothing, or of a charitable person who will remove it. (23) Action (*kriyā*).—It reminds one of the agent who performs it. A chariot reminds one of the carpenter who made it. The movement of the branches of a tree reminds one of the wind that causes it. (24) Merit (*dharma*) acquired by the habitual performance of duties enjoyed by the Vedas leads to the recollection of past lives. It is the cause of extraordinary power of retention and recollection in this life. (25) Demerit (*adharma*) acquired by the habitual commission of sins reminds one of the cause of pain and misery experienced in the past. Merit and demerit remind one of the causes of pleasure and pain experienced on previous occasions in

¹⁰⁶ Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, Ch. 16, 15.

this life and previous births. A new-born baby sucks the breast of his mother because he remembers that it gave him pleasure in the previous birth.¹⁰⁷

The list of conditions of recall mentioned by Gautama is not an exhaustive enumeration of all possible conditions. It is purely suggestive.¹⁰⁸ Sometimes in abnormal conditions of the mind the impressions of past experiences in the inmost recesses of the mind are revived, which were almost beyond the reach of recollection under normal conditions. "It is well-known," Vācaspati asserts, "that insanity and the like also are conditions of recollection."¹⁰⁹

The causes of the revival of impressions are conditions of recall. Three excitants (*udbodhaka*) are mentioned in the Sāṃkhya, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and the Vedānta literature. The perception of a similar object, an unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*), and reflection are the revivers of impressions which are the seeds of recollections.¹¹⁰ (1) Sometimes the excitant is the perception of an object similar to what was perceived in the past. The sight of Devadatta excites the recollection of Yajñadatta who resembles him. Devadatta reminds one of Yajñadatta because of his similarity with him. This is an example of the law of similarity. (2) Sometimes the excitant is an unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*). An impression of the past life is revived by an unseen agency (*adṛṣṭa*).¹¹¹ An object perceived in the past, e.g. the holy place Śrīraṅgam, suddenly flashes into memory owing to an unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*). Here the dormant impression of the place is roused by *adṛṣṭa* and thrust into the focus of consciousness. This is an example of spontaneous memory. (3) Sometimes reflection (*cintā*) resuscitates an impression and brings about recollection of an object. For instance, one can voluntarily call up the divine image of Veṅkaṭeśa by thinking of all the associated ideas of its beauty, holiness, auspiciousness and the like. This is an example of active memory. By reflection we can bring to a focus all the forces of suggestion, the cumulative effect of which brings about

¹⁰⁷ NBh., NSV., iii, 2, 44; NVTT., pp. 404-5.

¹⁰⁸ Nidarsañcedam smṛtihetūnām, na parisāṅkhyānam iti. NBh., iii, 2, 44.

¹⁰⁹ Unmādādayo'pi smṛtihetavo lokaprasiddhāḥ. NVTT., p. 405.

¹¹⁰ Sadṛśādṛṣṭacintādyāḥ smṛtibhāṣyā bodhakāḥ. TBh., p. 28; SSV., iv, 21; VPS., p. 251; SAS., on TMK., p. 688; YMD., p. 4; KR., p. 133.

¹¹¹ Adṛṣṭāḥ janmāntare saṃskārodbodhakāḥ. KR., p. 133.

recollection which is due to convergent association. (4) Śrīnivāsa mentions contiguity (*sāhacarya*) also as a condition of recollection. Devadatta and Yajñadatta were always perceived together in the past. So the sight of the one reminds a person of the other. This is an example of the law of contiguity.¹¹² Veṅkaṭanātha also recognizes the law of similarity and the law of contiguity as the laws of association.¹¹³ Vātsyāyana recognizes the law of contrast and the law of causation also as the laws of association.

The causes of recollection do not operate at the same time. Therefore there cannot be simultaneous recollection of all our past experiences. Just as the mind-soul-contact and impressions are the causes of recollection, so are attention, perception of suggestive signs and the rest, which do not appear simultaneously. There is no simultaneous recollection of all past experiences, because these auxiliary conditions do not appear simultaneously.¹¹⁴ The succession of the causes of recollection accounts for the succession of recollections.

In the Alāṅkāra literature the following conditions of recollection are mentioned: the perception of similar objects, impression, attention, reflection (*cintā*), meditation (*dhyāna*), vividness of previous perception, repetition of similar experience, and health of the organism (*svāsthya*).¹¹⁵

Individual impressions are revived in isolation from one another. Many connected impressions are revived together in a single file. When they are revived singly, they produce recollection of single objects. When they are revived together, they produce recollection of many objects at the same time (*samūhālambanā smṛti*). Though a particular impression is produced by a particular perception, it is revived along with many other connected impressions and brings about recollection of all their objects together. Discrete impressions do not always produce discrete recollections, but a cumulative recollection of all the objects perceived together in the past. For instance, we hear the following words in succession: "Bring the horse". Here the perception of every letter produces an impression. The impressions of the letters are revived together and produce recollection of the words

¹¹² YMD., p. 4.

¹¹³ TMK., p. 576.

¹¹⁴ NS., NBh., NSV., iii, 2, 34; NVT., pp. 398, 429.

¹¹⁵ Nāṭyadarpaṇa, p. 180, (G.O.S.); Rasagāṅgādhara, p. 123; Bhāva-prakāśana, p. 844, (G.O.S.); Rasārṇavasudhākara, p. 126.

constituted by them. The impressions of the words are revived together and produce recollection of a sentence. Thus the isolated impressions of individual letters and words produce a collective recollection of the whole sentence. The meaning of a sentence is comprehended in this way.¹¹⁶

6. *The Effects of Recollection*

Praśastapāda mentions the following effects of recollection: (1) Recollection is the cause of recalling what remains behind of a previous cognition (*śeṣānurvyaśāya*). Śrīdhara interprets the term in this manner. Recollection consists in the revival of the impressions of previous cognitions by the perception of suggestive signs (*liṅgadarśana*). They revive the particular impressions because they were always perceived in the past together with the objects, the impressions of which are left in the self. The first cognition of a suggestive sign is the cause of recalling the object suggested by it because of recollection of the invariable concomitance between the suggestive sign and the suggested object.¹¹⁷ Śrīdhara thinks that recollection involves inference and recollection of its ground, viz. invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*). But this view is wrong. Recollection does not involve conscious or unconscious inference of the object suggested by the indicative sign or cue due to recollection of the invariable concomitance between them. In recollection there is suggestion, but neither inference nor knowledge of its ground. (2) Recollection of an object is the cause of remembrance of other objects associated with it (*anusmaraṇa*). Recollection of the first word of a sentence is the cause of remembrance of the second word because of its association with the first word. This is an example of contiguous association. One idea suggests another idea associated with it. This is called *anusmaraṇa*. It literally means after-recollection in which the recollection of one idea leads to the recollection of another idea associated with it. Suggestion and association are involved in memory. (3) Recollection is the cause of desire. The recollection of an object which afforded pleasure in the past is the cause of desire for it. This implies that pleasure can produce an impression

¹¹⁶ KR., p. 134.

¹¹⁷ PBh., p. 256. Prathamopajāta-liṅgajñānāpekṣayā tadantarbhāvyanumeyajñānam tasya hetur vyāptismaraṇam. NK., p. 257.

which can be revived by the recollection of the object which afforded pleasure in the past. (4) Recollection is the cause of aversion. The recollection of an object which caused pain on a previous occasion is the cause of aversion to it. This implies that pain can produce an impression which can be revived by the recollection of the object which produced pain in the past. Pleasure and pain can produce impressions which are revived not only by the perception of the objects which caused them in the past, but also by the recollection of them.¹¹⁸

Śrīdhara suggests here that feelings are not directly remembered, but that they are remembered through the medium of cognitions. First there is the recollection of objects; then the feelings caused by them in the past are remembered. Thus feelings are remembered through the intermediate agency of cognitions. Cognitions are directly remembered. But feelings cannot be directly remembered. They depend upon cognitions for their recollection.

7. Suggestion and Association

Milindapañha clearly gives the ideas of suggestion and association. "The King (Milinda) said: 'Does memory, Nāgasena, always arise subjectively, or is it stirred up by suggestion from outside?' 'Both the one and the other'. 'But does not that amount to all memory being subjective in origin, and never artificial?' 'If, O King, there were no artificial memory, then artisans would have no need of practice, or art, or schooling, and teachers would be useless. But the contrary is the case'. 'Very good, Nāgasena'.¹¹⁹

Memory depends upon subjective as well as objective conditions. The force of association of ideas is a subjective condition. One idea is suggested by another idea with which it was associated in the past experience. Or, it is revived by the perception of a suggestive sign or cue, which is an external stimulus. A teacher gives a suggestion to a pupil, which revives the idea of an object perceived by him in the past. The same action repeatedly performed by an artist is ingrained in his organism as a habit, which

¹¹⁸ *Śaṅkhuvyavasthāyēcchānusamarapa-dveṣahetuḥ*. PBh., p. 256. *Sukha-sādhana-tva-smṛtir icchāhetuḥ, Duṣkha-sādhaka-amarapaṇaḥ dveṣahetuḥ*. NK., p. 257.

¹¹⁹ *The Questions of King Milinda, Part I, pp. 120-1.*

facilitates the recollection of it in future. Repetition is an objective condition of recollection.

Milandapañha speaks of habit and association both as conditions of recollection. "Now give me an illustration of thought arising where sight is because of habit.' 'What do you think, great King, if one cart went ahead which way would a second cart go?' 'The same as the first.' 'But would the first tell the second to go where it went, or the second tell the first that it would go where it had gone?' 'No, Sir. There would be no communication between the two. The second would follow the first out of habit.' 'Just so, great King, with sight and thought.' 'Now give me an illustration of how thought arises, where sight has arisen, through association.' 'In the art of calculating by using the joints of fingers as signs or marks, in the art of arithmetic, pure and simple, and in the art of writing, O King, the beginner is clumsy. But after a certain time with attention and practice he becomes expert. Just so is it that, where sight has arisen, thought too by association springs up.'"¹²⁰

8. Loss of Memory

Forgetfulness is due to the destruction of the impressions of past experiences. Śrīnivāsa mentions the lapse of a long time, disease, and the effacement of impressions as the causes of forgetfulness.¹²¹ (1) Impressions are effaced by the lapse of a long time after the original perceptions. They gradually fade away, if they are not strengthened by repeated similar perceptions. (2) Sickness also weakens impressions which are gradually obliterated and lead to forgetfulness. The healthy condition of the body is a condition of memory. Sickness is a condition of forgetfulness. (3) The obscuration or destruction of impressions is a cause of the loss of memory.

Śrīdhara and Śaṅkara Miśra mention the following causes of the effacement of impressions. (4) Impressions are effaced by contrary cognitions.¹²² When Caitra is mistaken for Maitra, the illusory cognition of Maitra produces an impression of Maitra

¹²⁰ Pp. 189-92.

¹²¹ *Kāladairghyād vyādhyādinā vā saṃskārapramoṣāt smṛtyabhāvaḥ.* YMD., p. 4.

¹²² *Saṃskāraḥ kvacid virodhi-jñāna-nivartyaḥ.* KR., p. 132. *Pratīpakṣa-jñānena saṃskāro vināśyate.* NK., p. 268.

which is counteracted by the repeated contrary cognition that this is not Maitra but Caitra. Thus the impression of a wrong cognition is counteracted by the corresponding right cognition.

(5) Impressions are obliterated by intoxication.¹²³ The impressions of past experiences of intoxicated persons are found to be obliterated. There is lapse of memory under the influence of intoxication. Mental equilibrium is completely lost in an intoxicated condition. A certain amount of mental equipoise is a condition of memory. (6) Impressions are effaced by intense pain.¹²⁴ The impressions of the past life are effaced by the intense pain of death. Intense pain causes lapse of memory in this life. (7) Impressions are effaced by intense pleasure also. A person enjoying excessive pleasure forgets other things.¹²⁵ There is lapse of memory even under the influence of excessive pleasure. Thus forgetfulness is determined by feelings. (8) Impressions are effaced by anger. In a state of rage (*roṣa*) a person loses his mental equipoise, and consequently cannot remember things. Thus forgetfulness is influenced by strong emotions.¹²⁶ Mahādeva Paṇḍita mentions five causes of the destruction of impressions, viz. recollections of a similar nature, contrary cognitions, intoxication, intense pain, and a long interval of time.¹²⁷ (9) When the mind of a person is pre-occupied with something else, he cannot recall an object. Pre-occupation of the mind with something resists the revival of impressions of other things. When the mind is under the influence of the excitement of gambling and the like, he forgets what he has learnt. When the excitement is continuous, the impressions of other things gradually fade away and disappear.¹²⁸

(10) The *Bhagavad Gītā* traces the lapse of memory to delusion, and the impairment of intellect to the loss of memory.¹²⁹ Delusion is non-discrimination between right and wrong due to anger. It induces the lapse of memory which destroys the power of discriminating between right and wrong. The power of recollection can again be regained by destroying delusion due to ignorance.¹³⁰ Lapse of memory obstructs the production of

¹²³Kvacit madanivartyaḥ. KR., p. 132. Madenāpi saṃskārasya vināśaḥ. NK., p. 268.

¹²⁴Kvacit tīvraduḥkhanivartyaḥ. KR., p. 132. NK., p. 268.

¹²⁵Bhogāśaktaśya pūrvavṛtta-smṛtyabhāvāt. NK., p. 268.

¹²⁶NK., p. 268; KR., p. 132.

¹²⁷Nyāyasāra, p. 103.

¹²⁸Dyūṭādi-vyasanāpānnasya pūrvādhīta-vismaraṇāt. NK., p. 268.

¹²⁹Saṃmohāt smṛti-vibhramāḥ. Smṛti-bhramāśāś buddhināśaḥ. ii, 63.

¹³⁰Naṣṭo mohāḥ smṛtir labdhā. BG., XVIII, 73.

proper mental modes owing to the increase of contrary thoughts, or produces improper mental modes.¹³¹

(11) Caraka describes epilepsy (*apasmāra*) as a disease in which there is unconsciousness accompanied by abnormal actions, which is caused by the lapse of memory, and loss of intelligence and purity (*sattva*). He ascribes it to the provocation of the bodily humours owing to the excess of energy (*rajas*) and inertia (*tamas*). The bodily humours, being excited by lust, anger, fear, avarice, joy, grief, apprehension and anxiety, attack the heart and the seats of the sense-organs, and thus bring about lapse of memory and consciousness. Thus the provocation of the bodily humours, the loss of mental equipoise, and the preponderance of energy and delusion are the causes of loss of memory. Habitual commission of immoral actions, performance of bodily actions in an unnatural manner, and violation of the principles of dietetics cause epilepsy.¹³²

A past apprehension is the cause of recollection through its impression which is its causal operation. Some are of the opinion that it is the cause of recollection not as an apprehension, but as a cognition (*jñāna*), because otherwise there would be no recollection after recollection, in that the first impression of the past apprehension is destroyed by a similar recollection. But the first recollection, they argue, produces an impression, which produces another recollection. Viśvanātha criticizes this view thus: Where many objects were perceived together in the past, and subsequently some of them were remembered in succession, and not all of them, the recollection of the whole lot has not yet destroyed its impression, which is destroyed by a length of time, disease, or its last recollection, which is its ultimate effect. This view does not make successive recollections impossible. Nor does it make a stronger impression impossible on account of repeated recollections, because the strength of an impression means the quick appearance of an excitant (*udbodhaka*). The same impression continues to exist in the self, until the last recollection is produced. It is better to assume the existence of one impression of a past apprehension which is destroyed by the last recollection than to assume the existence of a series of similar impressions and similar

¹³¹ Madhusūdana's commentary on BG., ii, 73.

¹³² Caraka Saṁhitā, XI, 8, 4.

recollections which destroy them. The parsimony of a hypotheses demands it.¹³³

9. *The Nature of Imagination : Memory and Imagination : Reverie*

Vācaspati Miśra makes a distinction between recollection and imagination. The former cognizes an object perceived in the past in the same order ; it cognizes either the entire object or less than it ; but it does not cognize more than what was perceived ; it never transcends the limits of past experience.¹³⁴ The latter transcends the limits of past experience. It introduces a new order into the contents of past experience. It rearranges them into a new pattern. Memory supplies the material of imagination.

Vyāsa divides recollection into two kinds: recollection of an imagined object (*bhāṇvita-smartavyā*) and recollection of an unimagined object (*abhāṇvita-smartavyā*). Dream is recollection of imagined objects. Waking recall is recollection of unimagined or real objects. In dream there is the imagination of unreal objects. In waking recollection there is the reproduction of real objects perceived in the past.¹³⁵ Thus Vyāsa distinguishes between memory and imagination.

Mādhavācārya Vidyāraṇya defines recollection as the reproduction of the contents of past experience in the same order in which they were perceived in the past. A person read the Vedas repeatedly in the past, retains their impressions in his mind, and recalls them in the same order in which he learnt them. This mental process is called recollection. A person is not free (*svatantra*) in recall. In spite of his best efforts to concentrate his mind on a particular forgotten sentence, he fails to recall it. The sentence which has to be recalled cannot be remembered otherwise. If another sentence is called up, it will not be the proper sentence of the Vedas. Nor can the sentences of them learned frequently be forgotten by an effort of the will. Sometimes after a period of mourning when the study of the Vedas is prohibited, some sentences of them are recalled automatically without an effort

¹³³ SM., pp. 395-6. TSN., p. 92 ; Bhāskarodayā, pp. 179-81.

¹³⁴ Smṛtir na pūrvānubhava-maryādām atikrāmati, tadviṣayā tadūnaviṣayā vā, na tu tadadhikaviṣayā. TV., i, 1, 11.

¹³⁵ TBh., i, 1, 11.

of the will. Hence, spontaneous recollection depends upon the mere revival of a particular impression, which must conform to the order in which the object was perceived in the past. It cannot alter the order of the past experience. It cannot be made or unmade by the will of a person.¹³⁶ But imagination is unrestrained; it cognizes real or unreal attributes of perceived or unperceived objects. It is found in revery, phantasy, or day-dream.¹³⁷ A person is free in imagination, and not tied to the order of the past experience. It does not depend upon any other conditions than the mind and free volition.¹³⁸ Building castles in the air (*manorājya*) cannot be restrained by the command of a king or by the scriptures.¹³⁹ Free imagination is not subject to any conditions. In it the contents of past experiences are rearranged in any order which is pleasing to the agent. There is no hindrance to the imagination of unreal objects, which depends upon his free will.¹⁴⁰ Day-dreams, reveries, or phantasies are false and do not conform to the environment.¹⁴¹ They are creations of the normal mind, whereas hallucinations are creations of the diseased or abnormal mind.

10. The Nature of *Vikalpa*

Patañjali defines *vikalpa* as a mental mode which cognizes a cognition conforming to a word and devoid of an object.¹⁴² When we speak of a sky flower, we have a cognition conforming to the word, though there is no real object corresponding to it. A word produces a cognition, even though its object is non-existent. In a valid cognition there are three factors: (1) an object; (2) a word; and (3) a cognition. But in *vikalpa* there are two factors: (1) a word; and (2) a cognition. It is not valid knowledge,¹⁴³ because its object is non-existent, and because it ascribes difference to non-

¹³⁶ Kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum asakyā yathānubhūtaṁ vastva-vilaṅghayanti tatsaṁskārodbodhamātrādhinā smṛtiḥ. VPS., p. 253.

¹³⁷ Dhyānaṁ tvaṇubhūte' nanubhūte vā vastuni vidyamānānām avidyamānānām vā dharmāṇām niraṅkuśaṁ kalpanaṁ yal loka manorājyaṁ iti prasiddham. VPS., p. 253.

¹³⁸ Svecchā-monobhūyāṁ vinā sādhanantarānapekṣaṇāt. VPS., p. 253.

¹³⁹ Na hi manorājyaṁ rājādinaḥ śāstreṇa vā nivārayitum śakyate. VPS., p. 253.

¹⁴⁰ Avastu-viśaye dhyāne puruṣasya svacchanda-pravṛttau kaḥ prati-bandhaḥ. VPS., p. 255.

¹⁴¹ Manorājya-vikalpānām kāmam astvapramāṇatā. NM., p. 97.

¹⁴² Śabda-jñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ. YS., I, I, 9.

¹⁴³ Sa na pratītiśārohi. YBh., I, I, 9.

difference and non-difference to difference. Difference and non-difference are not real. Vikalpa is a mere semblance of them.¹⁴⁴

Vikalpa resembles an illusion in that in both there is the knowledge of an object as it is not. But there is a difference between them. When an illusion is contradicted by a sublating cognition, it ceases to produce an action. Ordinary persons have such sublating cognitions. But they have no sublating cognitions which contradict vikalpa. Only learned persons have such sublating cognitions. Hence, vikalpa does not cease to produce actions, though it is produced by a mere word.¹⁴⁵

The imagination of 'the head of Rāhu' attributes difference to non-different things. 'Rāhu', an imaginary demon, is nothing but a 'head'. There is no difference between them. The imagination of a 'distracted mind' attributes non-difference to different entities. 'Distraction' is a state of the 'mind'. They are different from each other. But they are stated to be non-different from each other. We speak of 'the consciousness of a self'. Here we attribute difference to non-different entities, because 'consciousness' is the essential nature of a 'self', which is nothing but consciousness.¹⁴⁶ We speak of 'a self as devoid of the attributes of objects' and of an 'inactive self' though the Yoga identifies negation or absence (*abhāva*) with its locus. So these are examples of *vikalpa*.¹⁴⁷ The cognitions of 'sky flower', 'horn of a hair' and the like also are vikalpas, since these objects are non-existent, and yet there are cognitions of them.¹⁴⁸

Vikalpa is the cognition of a non-existent object which is spoken of by a word. It serves a useful purpose. Many do not recognize it as distinct from an illusion (*viparyaya*). Bhojarāja regards it as definite knowledge, which does not depend on the real nature of its object.¹⁴⁹ But it is different from an illusion which is contradicted by a sublating cognition. The illusion 'this is silver' is contradicted by the sublating cognition 'this is not silver'. But the *vikalpa* 'consciousness of a self' does not vanish, because it is not generally sublated. Hence an illusion should be

¹⁴⁴ TV., i, 1, 9; YV., i, 1, 9.

¹⁴⁵ Na viparyayopārohi, vastuśūnyatve'pi śabda-jñāna-māhātmya-nibandhano vyavahāro drśyate. YBh., i, 1, 9. TV.,; Chāyā, i, 1, 9.

¹⁴⁶ RM., i, 1, 9.

¹⁴⁷ YV., i, 1, 9.

¹⁴⁸ Vastuśūnyas tathātvam anapekṣamāno'-dhyavasāyo vikalpaḥ. RM., i, 1, 9.

defined as the knowledge of an object as different from what it is, which does not conform to words and cognitions. The Vaiśeṣikas regard *vikalpa* as a particular kind of attributed cognition (*āhārya-jñāna*), and include it in invalid cognition (*mithyā jñāna*). But the Yoga regards it as a distinct cognition, which is either indeterminate or determinate.¹⁵⁰ The Sāṃkhya regards *vikalpa* (e.g. a man's horn) as invalid because it cognizes a non-existent object which is incapable of producing a valid cognition and an effective action.¹⁵¹

11. *Presumption (arthāpatti): Tarka: Āropa: Hallucination*

Presumption is the assumption of a fact which reconciles an apparent inconsistency between two facts. A person is not found to eat in the day, and yet he is fat. Fasting and fatness of the body cannot be reconciled with each other, unless his eating at night is assumed. This is the framing of a hypothesis which involves intellectual imagination.¹⁵² If one hypothesis is adequate to explain the apparent inconsistency, it is irrational to make more assumptions.¹⁵³ This is the parsimony of hypotheses (*kalpanā-lāghava*). But the law of parsimony does not hold good, if the existence of many entities is established by valid knowledge.¹⁵⁴ The existence of many sense-organs is proved by valid knowledge. So the existence of one sense-organ cannot be assumed for the sake of the parsimony of hypotheses. Presumption illustrates intellectual imagination which is conducive to intellectual advancement.

Tarka is hypothetical reasoning. It is the attribution of a generic quality on the attribution of a specific quality.¹⁵⁵ It is false knowledge because it involves attribution of what is not known to exist. Smoke is pervaded by fire which is its pervader. Wherever there is smoke there is fire. But wherever there is fire, there is not smoke. If a lake is supposed to have smoke, then it may be supposed to have fire. This kind of supposition is called *tarka*, which involves imagination. Fire is known to be non-existent

¹⁵⁰ YV., Chāyā; Sūtrārthabodhinī. i, 1, 9.

¹⁵¹ SSV., v, 52.

¹⁵² Upapādyā-jñānena upapādaka-kalpanam arthāpattiḥ. VP., p. 307.

¹⁵³ Ekātvenaivopapattau bahutva-kalpanā gurvī. SSV., ii, 24.

¹⁵⁴ Na kalpanā-virodhaḥ pramāṇa-dṛṣṭasya. SPS., ii, 25.

¹⁵⁵ Vyāpyāropeṇa vyāpakāropas tarkaḥ. TS., p. 89.

in a lake full of water. So smoke also cannot exist in it. Thus *tarka* removes doubt, and involves intellectual imagination.

Tarka consists in attribution (*āropa*) which is a kind of *āhāryajñāna*. 'If there were a jar on the ground, it would be perceived as qualified by the jar'. 'If a lake be smoky, let it be fiery'. Such kinds of knowledge are examples of attribution (*āropa*). *Āhāryajñāna* is the false knowledge of an object existing in a place where it is known to be non-existent. Fire is known to be non-existent in a lake, and yet it may be attributed to it. This is an example of *āhāryajñāna*. Attribution involves intellectual imagination.

Hallucinations (*mānasa vibhrama*) which are solely of mental origin and due to some defects of the mind (*manodoṣa*) involve imagination. In them the impressions of past perceptions are revived by constant brooding (*cintā*) or by strong passions of lust, grief, etc., and rearranged into a pattern which gives satisfaction to the agent. They involve strong phantastic imagination which does not conform to the environment. Yet hallucinatory images are so vivid and aggressive that they appear to be real objects of perception present to the sense-organs. Hallucinations produced by the repetition of impressions through the central sensory (*manas*) appear to be very distinct. Persons overpowered by lust, grief, disease, insanity and the like perceive non-existent objects as present before them.¹⁵⁶ A young man infatuated with intense lust for a woman and separated from her sees his beloved woman here, though she is far away.¹⁵⁷ Hallucinatory images do not appear to be absolutely non-existent like the image of a hare's horn. They obtrude themselves upon consciousness as something real and positive, though they are false.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ NM., p. 105.

¹⁵⁷ *Mānasa manmathonmāda-mahimnā mānini-matiḥ*. NM., p. 545. NK., p. 179.

¹⁵⁸ NM., pp. 89, 185 and 545; NK., p. 178; see *Ante*, Ch. XIV. *Nira-dhiṣṭhāne vibhrame manodoṣamātrānubandhini nārthasya sambhavaḥ*. NK., p. 179.

CHAPTER XXI

THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE

1. *The Nature of Concepts: The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika View*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika recognizes the existence of a genus (*jāti*) or a community (*sāmānya*) in the proper individuals. The genus of cow (*gotva*) exists in individual cows. A community is known by assimilative knowledge, while individuals are known by discriminative knowledge.¹ The distinctive characters of many individuals are cognized by discriminative knowledge (*vyāvṛtta-buddhi*), while their common characters are cognized by assimilative knowledge (*anuvṛtta-buddhi*). According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, community as well as individuality is perceived; both assimilative knowledge and discriminative knowledge are perceptual knowledge. But, in fact, its assimilative knowledge corresponds to a concept in western psychology, while its discriminative knowledge corresponds to a percept. Commonness is wider in extent than distinctiveness. Distinctiveness is narrower in extent than commonness.²

The summum genus (*parā jāti*) is Beinghood (*sattā*). It is the highest genus which is of the widest extent. The genus of substance (*dravyatva*), the genus of quality (*guṇatva*) and the genus of motion (*karmatva*) are subordinate genera (*aparā jāti*). But the genus of substance is higher than the genus of a jar; the genus of quality is higher than the genus of colour; the genus of motion is higher than the genus of upward motion. So the former are higher than the latter, which are the lowest genera (*aparā jāti*).³

Corresponding to them there is a hierarchy of concepts. The lowest concepts are formed by assimilating the individuals. Higher concepts are formed by assimilating the lower concepts. The highest concept is formed by assimilating the higher concepts. Assimilation depends upon abstraction.⁴

¹ *Anuvṛtta-buddhiḥ sāmānyasya, vyāvṛtta-buddhir viśeṣasya.* VSU., i, 2, 3.

² *Anuvṛttatvam adhika-deśa-vṛttitvam, vyāvṛttatvam alpa-deśa-vṛttitvam.* VSV., i, 2, 3. SM., p. 75.

³ PBh., pp. 311-2; SM., pp. 75-8.

⁴ VSV., i, 2, 3; PBh., pp. 311-2.

A community exists in all its proper individuals ; it is identical with itself ; it is the cause of the assimilative knowledge of its being common to one, two, many individuals ; it is the cause of the common notion or concept of what is identical with itself in many individuals.⁵ The highest genus is the cause of the highest concept or the most general idea.⁶ A subordinate genus is the cause of assimilative and discriminative knowledge.⁷

Different individuals have distinctive characters, and are distinguished from one another by them. They could not be assimilated to one another and recognized as members of a class, if they had no community in them. Common character produces the common notion or concept.⁸ If there were no common character among the individuals of a class, there would be no knowledge of their generic identity.⁹ Ideas are of two kinds, particular and general. Particular ideas are formed by discriminative knowledge, while general ideas are formed by assimilative knowledge. General ideas are called concepts. They are formed by the perception of many individuals belonging to the same class, comparison of them with one another, elimination of their distinctive characters, and abstraction of their common characters. They depend upon the past knowledge of the individuals, and the impressions due to their repeated perceptions.¹⁰ They are formed by assimilation of many homogeneous individuals. Concepts are expressed in words.

Gautama says, "A genus is the cause of a common notion or concept".¹¹ Vātsyāyana asserts that the same genus, which exists in many individuals and holds them together under the same class, is the cause of an inclusive idea or concept (*anuvṛtti-pratyaya*).¹² Uddyotakara also gives the same proof of the reality of a genus. It is the cause of the production of a concept of many individuals.¹³ We have an assimilative knowledge (*annuvṛtti-*

⁵ Sāmānyam anuvṛtti-pratyaya-kāraṇam. PBh., p. 311. NP., p. 22.

⁶ Sattāsāmānyam param anuvṛtti-pratyaya-kāraṇam. Ibid., p. 311.

⁷ Ibid., p. 312.

⁸ Nānādharmīnyeka-prakāra-pramā-prakāribhūto yo dharmah so sāmānyam. Sūkti, p. 52.

⁹ Na hi bhinnāsu vyaktiṣvekākāra matir anugata-dharmam apuraskṛtya. Setu, p. 53. Vyomavati, p. 55.

¹⁰ Abhyāsa-pratyaya-janitāt samakārāt atīta-jñāna-prabandha-pratyavek-ṣaṇād yad anugatam asti tat sāmānyam. PBh., p. 311.

¹¹ Samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ. NS., ii, 2, 71.

¹² NBh., ii, 2, 71.

¹³ Samāna-pratyayotpatti-kāraṇam jātiḥ. NV., ii, 2, 70.

pratyaya) where there are many like individuals; it is produced by a genus which is different from them. The genus of cow is different from the individual cows, because it is the object of a different cognition or a concept (*sāmānya-pratyaya*), and because the assimilative cognition is produced by the common cause (e.g. *gotva*) in the individual cows.¹⁴ There are two kinds of ideas, particular and general. Particular ideas are produced by individuals. General ideas or concepts are produced by individuals. General ideas or concepts are produced by generalities or genera. Common notions or concepts cannot be denied, which are produced by genera.¹⁵ They can never be produced by individuals; nor are they imaginary as the Buddhists maintain.

2. *The Buddhist View of the Nature of Concepts*

Paṇḍitāśoka criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of a community being one, eternal, and present in all its individuals. No wise person should believe in such a community as exists in different momentary specific individuals perceived as the cause of a general idea or concept and a general name which represents them all, because there is no evidence to prove it or to disprove it. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realist argues that the existence of a community is proved by the inference: 'An assimilative cognition of something common to many different individuals is produced by an entity common to them all. There is the assimilative cognition of something common to many different individuals which are produced and devoid of any relation to one another. Therefore it is produced by a community'. The Buddhist urges that this inference cannot prove the reality of a community, since many different cooks produce the one common notion of 'cook' though there is no one common entity among them. Even if a community exists in the specific individuals, it cannot be manifested by them, because it is eternal and devoid of an additament (*atīśaya*) and consequently independent of auxiliary conditions which cannot render any aid to it. If it has an additament, it is always ubiquitous and therefore incapable of action. Even if it be the cause of action, the actions of the specific individuals e.g., cooks, being different from one another, cannot produce the same

¹⁴ NV, ii, 2, 70.

¹⁵ NV, ii, 2, 67.

common notion 'cook'. Even if different actions can produce a common notion of them, then the different individuals also can produce a common notion of them, though a community does not exist in them. Hence a real community is not the cause of a common notion of it.

The common notion of 'cook' cannot be said to be produced by the genus of the actions of 'cooking', because one genus cannot be the cause of another common notion or concept, since then any genus would produce any concept. The genus of cooking, it may be argued, being related to cooks through inherent inherence, produces the common notion of 'cook'. This argument is invalid. The actions of cooking are temporary and destroyed. When they are destroyed, the genus of cooking cannot exist in them and cooks who are their agents. No relation exists between the genus of cooking and cooks; so the former cannot produce the common notion of 'cook'. Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika inference for the existence of a community is not valid; it involves the fallacy of irregular middle (*anaikāntika*). The specific individuals, the Buddhist concludes, produce an illusory common notion or concept by the negation of contradictory individuals (*apoha*).¹⁶

The Buddhists do not deny the possibility of a common notion (*parāmarśa-pratyaya*) which represents many individuals. But they deny the reality of a community in the individuals, which is the cause of the common notion. Paṇḍitāśoka says: "Community is not perceived in the five fingers which are perceived by the sense-organs. Only the individual fingers in their distinct shapes are perceived, but their community is never perceived. The concept of the so-called one community is produced by the illusion of similarity among different individuals."¹⁷ Generality (*jāti*) is a mere conceptual construction (*kalpanā*). It is a mere mental construct, which appears to be similar, produced by specific individuals. An identical genus does not exist because it is never perceived.¹⁸ But how can only certain individuals produce the common notion of a certain generality, and not all? It is the Law of Nature that certain individuals only produce a certain

¹⁶ *Sāmānyaduṣaṇadikprasāritā*, SBNT., pp. 94-6.

¹⁷ *Sāmānyam pratibhāṣate na ca vikalpākāra-buddhau tathā. Sādrśya-bhrama-kāraṇau punar imāvekopalabdhi-dhvanī*. Ibid, p. 102.

¹⁸ *Apratīter abhinnāpi jātir nāsti iti buddhir eva tulyākāra-pratibhāṣā sad asaditi śabdaś ca dr̥ṣyate*. NPVP., p. 69.

notion of generality, even as certain drugs cure a certain disease, and not all diseases.

3. *The Buddhist View of Kalpanā (Vikalpa) and Abhilāpa*

Dharmakīrti defines *kalpanā* as the experience of a cognition of something which is capable of being associated with a significant word.¹⁹ Dharmottara defines *abhilāpa* as a word which denotes an object, or as a significant word. The form of the signified object is united with the form of the significant word in the same cognition, which apprehends them both. This union is association of an object with a name. An object is capable of being associated with a name, if in its cognition there is the cognition of its being so signified by the name. Some cognition is manifested to consciousness as associated with a word. In the cognition (*kalpanā*) of the object 'jar' in a person who is acquainted with the meaning of the word 'jar' it is manifested to consciousness as associated with the word 'jar'. Some cognition, though unassociated with a word, is manifested to consciousness as capable of being associated with it, like the cognition of an infant who is not acquainted with the meaning of a word. The cognition of an infant born to-day is not associated with a word, but capable of being associated with it.²⁰

When there is no association of a cognition with a word, how can its capability of being associated with it be determined? It is determined by its irregular experience, which is due to the absence of a uniform rule of experience. A knowable object producing a cognition produces its experience regularly. A colour producing a visual perception produces it regularly. A cognition of *vikalpa* is not produced by an object. So a *vikalpa* does not produce its cognition regularly owing to the absence of a cause of uniform experience.²¹

Dharmakīrti maintains, that determinate perception apprehends a specific individual (*svalakṣaṇa*), while inference cognizes a common character (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), which is attributed to the specific individuals.²² Perception is devoid of

¹⁹ *Abhilāpa-saṃsarga-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ kalpanā*. NB., p. 13.

²⁰ NBT., pp. 13-4. LV., on *SDSm.*, p. 2.

²¹ *Vikalpa-vijñānam arthān notpadyate. Tataḥ pratibhāsa-niyama-hetor abhāvād aniyata-pratibhāsam*. NBT., p. 14.

²² NB., pp. 21 and 24. NBT., p. 24; NPV., p. 34.

conceptual constructs (*kalpanā*). Substance, quality, action, genus and name are *kalpanās*. 'This is a man with a staff'. 'This is white'. 'This man cooks'. 'This is a cow'. 'This is Dīṭṭha'. These perceptual judgments involve the conceptual constructs of substance, quality, action, genus, and name. They are determinate perceptions. Indeterminate perceptions apprehend the momentary specific individuals only, which are real and devoid of the illusory notions mentioned above.²³ The specific individuals are real, but the conceptual constructs are unreal. They are attributed to the individuals by the intellect (*buddhi*). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika criticism of the Buddhist doctrine has been given already.²⁴

4. *Qualified Cognition (Viśiṣṭa-buddhi): Judgment*

When a substance, a quality, and an action are known as qualified by the genus of substance, the genus of quality, and the genus of action respectively, they produce qualified cognitions (*viśiṣṭa-buddhi*). A qualified cognition involves the knowledge of a qualified being (*viśeṣya*) and a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*). 'This is a substance'. 'This is a quality'. 'This is an action'. These sentences are expressions of judgments which are qualified cognitions. They involve a subject-predicate relation. 'This is possessed of a staff'. Here there is a cognition of 'this' qualified by a cognition of a 'staff' which is a substance. 'This is white'. Here there is a cognition of 'this' qualified by the cognition of 'white' which is a quality. 'This is moving'. Here there is a cognition of 'this' qualified by the cognition of 'motion' which is an action. There is no knowledge of a qualified being, which is not related to a qualification, and the qualification of which has not been cognized.²⁵

'A conch-shell is white'. The quality of whiteness, the knowledge of whiteness as a qualification of a conch-shell, and the inherence of whiteness in a conch-shell are the causes of the qualified cognition.²⁶ The knowledge of a substance, i.e., a conch-

²³ NPV., p. 35.

²⁴ See *Ante*, Ch., X.

²⁵ Nāgrhīta-viśeṣaṇā viśiṣṭa-pratītiḥ na vā viśeṣaṇa-sambandham antareṇa bhavati. VSU., viii, 1, 7.

²⁶ VSU., viii, 1, 8. SM., p. 85; TSN., p. 19; KR., p. 91.

shell, in which whiteness inheres, and the knowledge of whiteness as its quality are the causes of the knowledge 'The conch-shell is white'. The knowledge of 'white' depends upon the knowledge of 'whiteness' as its cause; but it does not cognize 'whiteness'.²⁷ The knowledge of a substance as qualified by an attribute depends upon the knowledge of the attribute.

But the knowledge of 'this is a pitcher' occurring after the knowledge 'this is a post' is not its effect, because a 'post' is not a qualification of a 'pitcher'.²⁸ But where one substance is qualified by another, the knowledge of the substance which is a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) is the cause of the knowledge of the substance which is a qualified being (*viśeṣya*).²⁹ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards substance, quality, action, and genus as real existents, whereas the Buddhist regards them as mere conceptual constructs (*kalpanā*, *vikalpa*) attributed by the intellect to the specific individuals which are real.

Qualified cognitions involve judgments which are syntheses of two or more ideas into complex psychoses. They involve a subject-predicate relation, in which a substance is qualified by another substance, or a quality, or an action, but in which a quality is not qualified by a quality, or an action is not qualified by an action.³⁰ A qualified cognition is a knowledge that apprehends a subject, a predicate, and the relation subsisting between them. It is a relational knowledge as distinguished from a non-relational knowledge.

Some maintain that a qualified being (*viśeṣya*) and a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) are cognized by one and the same cognition.³¹ How can they account for the visual perception of fragrant sandal?³² Śrīdhara urges, that the visual organ cannot perceive fragrance; that the olfactory organ cannot perceive a substance, e.g. sandal; and that they together cannot perceive the relation between them in that the knowledge of relation presupposes that of the relata. The visual perception of fragrant sandal, it may be argued, is produced jointly by the visual organ and the olfactory organ, and apprehends both sandal and fragrance. This argument, Śrīdhara urges, is not sound, since the cognition is devoid of parts. If it were made of parts, one part of it might be

²⁷ VSB., viii, 1, 10.

²⁸ VSU., viii, 1, 10.

²⁹ VSB., viii, 1, 10.

³⁰ VS., VSU., viii, 1, 10.

³¹ Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyayor ekajñānāmbanatvam. NK., p. 116.

³² See *Ante*, ch., V.

produced by the visual organ, and the other part might be produced by the olfactory organ. But, in fact, the cognition is one and undivided, and cannot be produced by the two sense-organs. Further, if one cognition produced by the two sense-organs apprehended both sandal and fragrance, then odour would be apprehended by the visual organ, and a substance would be apprehended by the olfactory organ which, according to the Vaiśeṣika, apprehends smell only. Hence fragrance is perceived by the olfactory organ first, and then the visual organ aided by the olfactory perception of fragrance produces the visual perception of sandal only.³³ If a substance only were apprehended, it may be argued, by the cognition of a qualified being (*viśeṣyajñāna*), then even in the absence of a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*), there would be a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭajñāna*). But this is not possible. It may be argued, that the cognition of a qualified being (*viśeṣyajñāna*) is not produced in the absence of a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*), because it is the cause of the qualified cognition. Still the qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) does not differ from the cognition of substance, because a cognition cannot have a specific character unless its object has a specific character. The cognition of a qualified being does not apprehend a substance only, but it apprehends a qualified substance,—qualifiedness being something over and above the mere nature of a substance. The cognition of a person bearing a staff is not that of a person only, or that of his conjunction with a staff only, but that of a person being qualified by a staff.³⁴ The qualification, e.g. a staff distinguishes the person from other persons.

A qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) is different from a distinguishing feature (*upalakṣaṇa*). Both distinguish an object from other objects. But the former produces the knowledge of its being subordinate to the object that it qualifies, whereas the latter does not produce the knowledge of its being subordinate to the object that it distinguishes. In the cognition of a person bearing a staff the person is the principal factor to whom the staff is subordinate. But in the cognition of a saint wearing matted hair it is not subordinate to him.³⁵ Qualified cognitions involve judgments which are expressed in sentences.

³³ NK., p. 117.

³⁴ Na viśeṣyajñānasya dravyasvarūpamātram ālambanaṁ brūmaḥ kiṁ tu viśiṣṭajñānaṁ ca svarūpātirekiṇī eva. NK., p. 117.

³⁵ NK., p. 117.

5. Reasoning or Inference

Inference is the mental process of thinking by which the self passes to a new judgment from certain given judgments. It is inductive-deductive, and arrives at a new truth. It is preceded by perception, Vātsyāyana says, the perception of a probans or sign (*liṅga*) and that of a uniform relation between it and a probandum (*sādhya*). It is produced by the perception of a sign (e.g. smoke) and the recollection of invariable concomitance between the sign and the probandum (e.g. fire). An unperceived object is inferred by this process.³⁶ Inference differs from perception in that the former apprehends present, past, remote and future objects whereas the latter apprehends present objects only.³⁷

The Nyāya recognizes two kinds of inference: (1) inference for oneself and (2) inference for others. The former is a psychological process while the latter is a logical process. The former involves the following mental processes: A person himself perceives an invariable concomitance between smoke and fire by repeated observation (*bhūyodarśana*), for instance, in a kitchen and other places, approaches a hill, doubts whether there is a fire on it, perceives a smoke on it, recollects the invariable concomitance that wherever there is smoke there is fire, knows that the hill has a smoke that is pervaded by a fire, and then knows that the hill has a fire. This knowledge is inferential.³⁸ This is an example of an inference for oneself. It is inductive-deductive. It involves the process of generalization from particular instances observed and application of the general principle to a fresh particular instance. The invariable concomitance is the result of repeated observation of the copresence of a probans and a probandum and the absence of the knowledge of contrary instances. Wherever a smoke is perceived a fire is perceived, and wherever a fire is found to be absent a smoke also is found to be absent. But how can a uniform relation between smoke and fire be known in the absence of the knowledge of all cases of smoke and all cases of fire? Gaṅgeśa, the founder of Navya Nyāya, recognizes an extraordinary intercourse (*alaukika sannikarṣa*) called the intercourse characterized by generality (*sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*) which enables a person to perceive all cases of smoke through the

³⁶ Smṛtyā liṅgadarśanena ca apratyakṣo' rtho' numīyate. NBh., i, 1, 5.

³⁷ Ibid., i, 1, 5.

³⁸ TS., p. 50.

genus of smoke, and all cases of fire through the genus of fire.³⁹

The knowledge of invariable concomitance between a probans and a probandum, according to Navya Nyāya, is the principal cause (*karāṇa*) of inferential knowledge; and the knowledge of the probans being pervaded by the probandum and existing in the subject of inference (*pakṣa*) is the causal operation (*vyāpāra*) which immediately produces inferential knowledge. It depends upon the perception of a probans in the subject of inference (e.g. 'the hill has smoke'), the recollection of a uniform relation between them (*vyāpti-smaraṇa*) (e.g. 'wherever there is smoke there is fire'), and the knowledge of the existence of the probans pervaded by the probandum in the subject of inference (e.g. 'the hill has smoke pervaded by fire'). The perception of smoke in a kitchen is the first consideration of sign or reason (*liṅga-parāmarśa*). The perception of smoke on a hill is the second consideration of reason. The perception of smoke pervaded by fire on a hill is the third consideration of sign or reason.⁴⁰ It depends upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire.

But Dharmarājadhvarīndra, an Advaita Vedāntin, defines inferential knowledge as the knowledge which is produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance as the knowledge of invariable concomitance.⁴¹ The knowledge of invariable concomitance is the principal cause (*karāṇa*) of inferential knowledge; the impression (*saṁskāra*) of this knowledge is the causal operation (*vyāpāra*) which immediately produces it. The third consideration of sign or reason (*tṛtīya-liṅga-parāmarśa*) is not the principal cause of inferential knowledge as the Navya Nyāya maintains. It is not even its cause, far less its principal cause.

The self's mental perception (*anuvyavasāya*) of the knowledge of invariable concomitance is not the cause of inferential knowledge, since the knowledge of invariable concomitance is the cause of its *anuvyavasāya* as its object. The recollection of invariable concomitance is not the cause of inferential knowledge, since it cognizes an object similar to that of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Verbal knowledge of invariable concomitance is not the cause of inferential knowledge, since it produces the

³⁹ TS., p. 50; TSD., pp. 50-1; SM., pp. 86-8; see *ante*, ch. iv. HIP., i, pp. 724-7.

⁴⁰ TK., p. 10.

⁴¹ *Anumitis tu vyāptijñānatvena vyāptijñānanyā VP.*, p. 186.

knowledge of an object denoted by the word *vyāptijñāna*. But the knowledge of invariable concomitance as the knowledge of invariable concomitance is the principal cause of inferential knowledge. It is immediately produced by the impression (*samskāra*) of the knowledge of invariable concomitance as such. But it is not recollection for that reason because a recollection is produced by its prior non-existence or an impression only. A recollection is produced by the destruction of an impression. But the inferential knowledge 'the hill is fiery' is produced by the revival of the impression of the knowledge 'smoke is pervaded by fire'.

But why should the impression of the knowledge of invariable concomitance be a cause of inferential knowledge, since the recollection of invariable concomitance is its cause? Dharmarājadhvarīndra replies, that even when there is the recollection of invariable concomitance the impression of its knowledge also is its cause because a recollection does not always destroy an impression in that there is a series of recollections. When the impression is not revived, there can be no inferential knowledge. The revival of the impression of the knowledge of invariable concomitance is an auxiliary cause of inferential knowledge. First there is the perception 'the hill is smoky', then there is the revival of the impression of the perception of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire; then there is the inferential knowledge 'the hill is fiery'. There is neither the recollection of invariable concomitance nor the qualified knowledge 'the hill has smoke pervaded by fire', since there is no evidence for its existence and it violates the parsimony of hypotheses. Thus the Advaita Vedānta rejects the Navya Nyāya doctrine that the recollection of invariable concomitance and the qualified knowledge of the existence of a probans pervaded by a probandum in the subject of inference are the causes of inferential knowledge. In the knowledge 'the hill is fiery' the knowledge of the hill is perceptual, but the knowledge of fieriness is inferential.⁴²

According to Prabhākara, the perception 'the hill is smoky' and the recollection of invariable concomitance 'smoke is pervaded by fire' are the causes of the inferential knowledge 'the hill is fiery'. The knowledge of the existence of smoke pervaded by fire in the hill, which is said to be the principal cause of inferential knowledge by the Navya Nyāya, is not necessary for the

⁴² VP., pp. 186-98; Śikhāmaṇi, pp. 186-98.

inferential knowledge. The two cognitions are adequate to produce it, and the hypothesis of the third consideration of sign or reason or qualified consideration (*viśiṣṭaparāmarśa*) violates the law of parsimony. Gaṅgeśa criticizes Prabhākara's view.⁴³

The Advaita Vedānta defines invariable concomitance as the copresence of a probans and a probandum in all their loci. It is known by the observation of their copresence and the non-observation of contrary instances. The observation of copresence may be single or numerous. The number does not count much. The observation of copresence is the main condition, but the non-observation of contrary instances is essential.⁴⁴ Prabhākara regards repeated observation (*bhūyodarśana*) as the means of knowing invariable concomitance. Gaṅgeśa criticizes this view. He regards the observation of concomitance and the absence of knowledge of non-concomitance aided by hypothetical reasoning as the means of knowing invariable concomitance.⁴⁵

6. *The Nature and Import of a Word: The Means of Learning its Meaning*

Keśavamīśra defines a word as a collection of letters. By a collection here is meant that all letters are cognized by a single cognition.⁴⁶ Pārthasārathi Mīśra also regards a word as nothing but letters.⁴⁷ Prabhācandra defines a word as a collection of letters, which are dependent on one another, but independent of the letters of another word.⁴⁸ But the Yoga and the Śābdika define it as a single, indivisible, partless, and eternal word-form (*padasphoṭa*) which is cognized by a thought-form, and manifested by successive and momentary letter-sounds.⁴⁹

A word, according to some Buddhists, denotes the negation of contradictory individuals (*apoha*). It denotes, according to Ratnakīrti, a positive individual qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals. According to the Jaina, it denotes a multiform (*anekānta*) object with its positive and negative nature, and general and particular characteristics. According to some, it

⁴³ TCA., p. 493. HIP., i, pp. 731-2.

⁴⁴ VP., pp. 198-201.

⁴⁵ TCA., pp. 210-1; HIP., i, pp. 711-3.

⁴⁶ TBh., p. 14.

⁴⁷ Varṇā eva śābdāḥ. ŚD., p. 368.

⁴⁸ PKM., p. 133.

⁴⁹ YBh., iii, 17; TV.; YV., iii, 17; VPD., i, 73.

denotes a configuration (*ākṛtī*). According to Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, it denotes a genus. According to the Nyāya, it denotes an individual with a configuration and a genus subsisting in it. According to the Śābdika, a word-form manifests its object. According to the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā, the Vedānta and the Jaina, the last letter aided by the impressions (*saṁskāra*) of the perceptions of the preceding letters produces the knowledge of the object denoted by a word. These views will be considered in detail here.

A word has the power of denoting an object. This power is due to the convention (*saṁketa*) of God that a particular word denotes a particular kind of object.⁵⁰ A convention (*samaya*) is a volition of God. A child learns the meanings of words from the actions of the elders. He hears an elder commanding person (*uttama vṛddha*) say 'Bring a cow' to another elder person (*madhyama vṛddha*). Then he sees the latter bring a cow. Then he hears the former say, 'Remove the cow'. Then he sees the latter remove the cow. He learns that the latter's cognition which produces his action is produced by a cow. He learns that the word 'cow' means a cow in which the genus of cow subsists from the presence and the absence of a cow which is the object of bringing and removing. So the meanings of words are learnt from the speech and actions of the elders who are acquainted with them. They are also learnt from grammar, comparison, context, a dictionary, and testimony of reliable persons.^{50a}

7. The Buddhist doctrine of *Apoha*

The Buddhist maintains that a word denotes the negation of contradictories (*apoha*); that the word 'cow' denotes the negation of 'non-cow'. He regards *apoha* as neither internal nor external, but as different from a cognition and an object.⁵¹ But if it is neither an internal cognition nor an external object, it may be argued, then it does not exist at all, and cannot therefore be denoted by a word. The Buddhist replies, that the relation of a

⁵⁰ *Asmāt padād ayam artho boddhavya iṣṭvarasaṁketaḥ śaktiḥ*. TS., p. 69.

^{50a} NM., p. 325; TSD., pp. 71-2.

⁵¹ *Nāyam āntaro na bāhyo' pohaḥ kim tu jñānārthābhyām anya eva*. NM., p. 306.

word and its object is unreal because *apoha* is neither an internal cognition nor an external object, but a mere attributed form which colours a determinate cognition.⁵² But how can an attributed form colour a determinate cognition, though there is no external object? The Buddhist replies that the attributed form as perceived (*dṛśya*) does not colour a determinate cognition. A specific individual is apprehended by indeterminate perception; but it cannot be apprehended by determinate cognitions (*vikalpa*). They apprehend the shadows of the specific individuals. They apprehend mere differentiation (*vyāvṛtti*) or negation as the negated objects are not perceived. It may be argued, that negation and negated objects are non-different from each other; that negated objects being specific individuals, determinate cognitions apprehending negations (*vyāvṛtti*) apprehend the specific individuals which are negated; and that therefore indeterminate perceptions and determinate cognitions equally apprehend specific individuals. But this argument is invalid, since determinate cognitions do not apprehend specific individuals which are differentiated or negated, and negation is not real but a mere attributed form. If negation were real, then determinate cognitions apprehending real specific individuals would be faulty. But the negation is not real; so there is no difficulty. The Buddhist concludes, that the determinate cognitions of 'cow' succeeding the indeterminate perceptions of individual cows apprehend the forms differentiated from those of heterogeneous individuals; or that they apprehend the negation of contradictories.⁵³ Words produce verbal cognitions (*vikalpa*) which cognize negations of contradictories (*apoha*). *Apoha* is an attributed form, which is not external as it is attributed, nor internal as it is not in the nature of consciousness.⁵⁴ So it is not real, and because it is unreal it is merely attributed. When it is wrongly regarded as real and in the nature of a negation (*abhāva*), many difficulties arise needlessly. The definite nature of the object of a verbal cognition in such a form as 'this is indeed a cow, and not a horse' is not possible without the negation of other objects. Hence a word denotes the negation of contradictories, and a verbal cognition cognizes the

⁵² Āropitaṁ kiṁ cid ākāramātraṁ vikalpoparañjakam. NM., p. 306.

⁵³ Atatkāryaparāvṛttiviśayatvam eva vikalpānām avatiṣṭhate ityevam yuktyā teṣāṁ apohaviśayatvam ucyate. NM., p. 307.

⁵⁴ Soyam āropitākāro na bahir āropitatvād eva nāntaḥ abodha-rūpat āt. NM., p. 307.

differentiation of an object from other objects. It does not apprehend an external object, but an attributed form. It is an internal form which is not external, but is manifested to consciousness as external. There is no other similarity between an external object and an attributed internal form than an appearance of differentiation (*vyāvṛtticchāyā*). Verbal cognitions apprehend differentiation or negation.⁵⁵ The Yogācāras regard *apoha* as an internal form of cognition, which is a reflection (*pratibimba*) of a determinate or verbal cognition (*vikalpa*), and, though internal, appears to be like an external object, and to differ owing to the difference of various impressions (*vāsanā*), and thus serves the practical purposes of our life. It is called *apoha* because it is related to the reflection of differentiation.⁵⁶ The Mādhyamikas regard *apoha* as an attributed form which is neither external nor internal because of its relation to an appearance of differentiation.⁵⁷ According to both, specific individuals are not cognized by determinate or verbal cognitions (*vikalpa*). The false identification of the object of indeterminate perception (*dṛśya*) and that of determinate cognition (*vikalpa*) induces a person to act. Hence a word denotes *apoha* which is a reflection or semblance of *vikalpa*. An illusion of generality is produced by the specific individuals perceived being not differentiated from one another.⁵⁸ Jayanta Bhaṭṭa gives this account of the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* as denoted by a word.

Ratnakīrti (1000 A.D.), the Buddhist author of *Apohasiddhi*, maintains that a word denotes a positive individual qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals. What is the meaning of *apoha*? Etymologically it means either the exclusion of this individual (e.g. cow) from another contradictory individual (e.g. non-cow), or the exclusion of another contradictory individual from this individual, or the exclusion of another contradictory individual in this individual. Does *apoha* refer to an external object differentiated from heterogeneous objects, or to the internal form of a cognition, or to mere differentiation from other objects? The first two alternatives are false because a word denotes something positive. The third alternative also is false, since it is

⁵⁵ Vyāvṛttiviśayā eva vikalpāḥ phalato bhavanti. NM., pp. 307-8.

⁵⁶ Vyāvṛtticchāyāyogāt tad apoha iti vyavahriyate. NM., p. 308.

⁵⁷ Soyam nāntaro na bāhyo' nya eva kaś cid āropita ākāro vyāvṛtticchāyā-yogād apohasābdārtha ucyate. NM., p. 308.

⁵⁸ NM., pp. 306-9.

contradicted by experience. The verbal knowledge of a fire existing on a hill derived from testimony does not refer merely to the non-existence of a non-fire, but to the positive existence of a fire. What is contradicted by perception cannot be proved by any other *pramāṇa*.

It may be argued, that though there is no common notion (*vikalpa*) in the form of the experience of negation (*nivṛtti*) or differentiation, yet the cognition of differentiating objects itself is the cognition of differentiation. But an experience of a qualified object (*viśiṣṭapratīti*) is not the experience of a qualification (*viśeṣanāpratīti*) involved in it. Just as the Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣika regards a common notion (*vikalpabuddhi*) as the cognition of a community (*sāmānyabuddhi*) because of the distinct cognition of a common form of many individuals, so the cognition of differentiation or negation (*nivṛttibuddhi*) involved in the cognition of differentiating objects may be said to generate the empirical use of the experience of negation (*apohapratīti-vyavahāra*). If there is a regular cognition of a positive community because of a distinct cognition of a common form of many individuals, then there may be a regular experience of negation because of the absence of the cognition of the form of negation (*abhāva*). Hence, if there be a cognition of the form of negation in spite of the absence of the experience in the form 'I experience negation' then none can deny the existence of the experience of negation. Otherwise, if there were no experience of negation, there would not be the empirical use of such experience, and the cognition of the form of cow would give rise to the cognition of a horse.

It is said that the cognition of differentiation or negation is involved in the cognition of differentiating objects as a qualification. If a common notion of 'cow' (*vikalpa*) takes the form that it is differentiated from 'non-cows', then the cognition of differentiation may enter into it as its qualification. But the common notion is the experience of 'cow', which is positive in content. If the act of differentiation be present in the common notion as a qualification, but be not manifested to consciousness, then the regularity in the common notions representing positive contents cannot be accounted for. Ratnakīrti maintains, that the word *apoha* does not mean either a positive object only, or mere

differentiation from other objects, but a positive object qualified by differentiation from other objects.⁵⁹

According to Vidhivādins, the word 'cow' denotes a positive individual cow; and then its differentiation from 'non-cows' is determined. According to Pratiṣedhavadins, the word 'cow' denotes the negation of 'non-cows'. Ratnakīrti rejects both these views because the verbal experience of the word 'cow' is devoid of sequence; because no one knows its positive import (e.g. cow) first, and then knows its differentiation from 'non-cows' by presumption; because no one knows the negation of 'non-cows' first, and then a positive individual 'cow' differentiated from them; and because the knowledge of 'a cow' is itself the knowledge of its being differentiated from 'non-cows'.⁶⁰ When on hearing the word 'cow' a 'cow' is known, it is known as qualified by the negation of 'non-cows'. Both a 'cow' and the negation of 'non-cows' are known at the same time when the word 'cow' is heard. If the verbal knowledge of a 'cow' does not cognize the negation of 'non-cows', it cannot induce a person to avoid other individuals. He may fasten a horse when he is asked to tie a cow. Hence a word denotes a positive object qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals.⁶¹ This is the view of Ratnakīrti.

Dharmottara (900 A.D.) maintains, that an object with an attributed externality is positively or negatively denoted by a word.⁶² His view is stated by Vācaspati thus: The form which is imagined by the intellect (*buddhi*) to differentiate a specific individual from others is not external to the mind. Yet if it were not external, then a determinate cognition of a person desirous of an external object would not induce him to act on it. Hence, an unreal external object is an object of a determinate cognition; its externality consists in the non-apprehension of the difference of external objects, but not in the apprehension of the non-difference of external objects.⁶³ If an external object were apprehended by a determinate cognition, its non-difference could not be apprehended by it. Hence determinate cognitions following

⁵⁹ Nāsmābhir apohaśabdena vidhir eva kevalo' bhipretah. Nāpyanya-vyāvṛtti-mātraṁ, kintvanyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śābdānām arthaḥ. Apoha-siddhi, SBNT., p. 3.

⁶⁰ Goḥ pratipattir iti anyāpōdhapratipattir ucyate. Ibid. p. 3.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 1-4.

⁶² Āropitasya bāhyatvasya vidhinīṣedhau. Ibid, pp. 16-7

⁶³ Alīkabāhyam cañṁ viśayaḥ bāhya-bhedāgrahaś ca asya bāhyatvaṁ na punar bāhyābhedagrahaḥ. NVTT., ii, 2, 63; p. 339.

upon indeterminate perceptions do not apprehend the difference of external specific individuals—their externality being attributed to them by the imagination; and the unreal and attributed common forms of specific individuals induce a person to act on external objects as if they were real, and make him attain them. Determinate cognitions (*vikalpa*) cannot apprehend the mutual differences of their objects. Nor can other determinate cognitions apprehend them. So a person imagines non-difference among the objects of determinate cognitions, which produces non-difference among determinate cognitions. This non-difference produces non-difference among the indeterminate perceptions, which are the causes of the determinate cognitions. This non-difference is due to the non-difference among the specific individuals which are the causes of the indeterminate perceptions. So it is said: "Non-different cognitions are the causes of a common notion; so non-different specific individuals are the causes of a common notion." Hence an unreal external object is apprehended by a determinate or verbal cognition and denoted by a word.⁶⁴ It is in the nature of the negation of other heterogeneous individuals.

Ratnakīrti refutes the view of Dharmottara. If an object definitely known by a determinate cognition is not manifested to consciousness, why is it said to be definitely known by it? It may be replied, that an object is cognized by a determinate cognition without being manifested to consciousness in the same sense in which an object is acted upon without being manifested to consciousness. But how can a voluntary action be restricted to a particular object, and avoid other objects, though it is not manifested to consciousness? Though the world is not known, yet a determinate cognition of water, being produced by a particular collocation of causal conditions, has a definite form, is endued with a definite power, and prompts a voluntary action on water only, even as a smoke produces the mediate or inferential knowledge of a fire. Different objects are invested with different natures, which are cognized by different *pramāṇas*. There is no intermixture of powers of the different *pramāṇas* with regard to the same objects. Hence, the object, which is cognized by a determinate cognition, and imprints its form on it,

⁶⁴ Tat siddham alikarṣa bhāyaṣa viśayo vikalpānāṁ śabdānāṁ ceti. NVTT., p. 340.

is the cause of action on it. Voluntary action on an object is not due to the attribution of externality to it owing to similarity so that the attribution of an external form to the form of a cognition may produce a voluntary action on it. It is wrong to argue that a cognition, being produced owing to the maturation of an impression (*vāsanā*), functions as an external object, though it does not apprehend it. Hence, the positive import of a word is an object which is differentiated from other heterogeneous individuals, and qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals. A word denotes a positive individual qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals. It has a positive import and a negative import.⁶⁵ Every significant word denotes an object which is definitely known by a determinate cognition, and differentiated from contradictory individuals.⁶⁶ An external specific individual, which is cognized by a determinate cognition, is denoted by a word. It is the principal object of its denotation. The negation of the contradictory individuals is the subordinate object of its denotation.⁶⁷

The followers of Kumārila maintain, that an individual object cannot be a community (*sāmānya*) since it consists of parts; that a genus (e.g. treeness) is denoted by a word (e.g. tree), whose existence or non-existence in particular individuals is not yet ascertained; and that the genus is related to existence or non-existence in individuals known from other words 'exists' (*asti*) or 'does not exist' (*nāsti*). Ratnakīrti criticizes this view. When an eternal genus is denoted by a word and known by a verbal cognition, it cannot be said to be related to existence or non-existence in individuals not yet ascertained. Perception and verbal cognition manifest their objects in different ways; they are different means of valid knowledge and endued with different powers. So perception does not depend upon the word (*asti*) in order to manifest the existence of its object; but verbal cognition depends upon the word (*asti*) to convey the knowledge of the existence of an object. If perception and verbal cognition

⁶⁵ 'Tad evam anyābhāvaviśiṣṭo vijātivyāvṛtto' rtho vidhih. Sa evāpoha-śabdavācyaḥ śabdānām arthaḥ pravṛtti-nivṛtti-visayaś ceti sthitam. Apoha-siddhi, SBNT., pp. 17-8.

⁶⁶ 'Yad vācakaḥ tat sarvaṁ adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛtta-vastumātragocaram. Ibid, p. 18.

⁶⁷ 'Śabdais tñvan mukhyam ākhyāyate' rtha
Statrāpohaś tadgūṇatvena gamyaḥ.

apprehend the same nature of an object, then they cease to be different cognitions. Indeterminate perception and determinate cognition are different from each other, and consequently apprehend different objects. The former apprehends a specific individual, whereas the latter apprehends substance, qualities, actions, generality and name which are conceptual constructs. If a verbal cognition apprehends a specific individual apprehended by indeterminate perception, then it is like indeterminate perception. But, in fact, it is not like indeterminate perception, and therefore cannot apprehend a specific individual. The word 'tree', it may be argued, conveys the knowledge of the genus of tree, and that the word 'asti' is necessary to convey the knowledge of its 'being'. Ratnakīrti urges, that this argument is wrong for the following reasons. A specific individual is apprehended by indeterminate perception as devoid of parts; so its genus cannot be known by the verbal cognition of a word, and its positive nature and negative nature cannot be known by another *pramāṇa*. Perception also may be said to depend upon another *pramāṇa* to strengthen it. Ratnakīrti replies, that the perception of an object which was never perceived before requires the support of another *pramāṇa* because it is uncertain knowledge. But determinate cognition (*vikalpa*) itself is certain knowledge, and apprehends its object definitely, and therefore does not require the support of any other *pramāṇa*. Sometimes it depends upon verbal cognition and inference. But they cannot cognize the nature of its object. It may be argued, that genus and other qualities are different from one another and from the specific individual in which they subsist; that when a tree is known through its one attribute of genus, it is not known as endued with another attribute; and that therefore its other attributes, blueness, motion, tallness, etc. are known by the verbal cognitions of the corresponding words. Ratnakīrti urges, that an entire specific individual is apprehended by indeterminate perception; that the difference between the substrate and its attributes in the perceived object is not apprehended by indeterminate perception; and that the difference between them is imaginary. He further urges that the so-called inherence of attributes in their substrate is riddled with contradictions. So we must seek proximity between them, which renders an aid to them. Proximity (*pratyāsatti*) is close contact. Just as when a substrate is perceived with all its

attributes, being in close contact with the 'sense-organs, so when a substrate is known by a verbal cognition and an inference because of the invariable concomitance between a word and its object or a probans and a probandum being known, all its attributes are known because proximity is present here also as in perception. Hence a word does not denote a genus, but it denotes a specific individual as a positive entity qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals.⁸⁸

Vācaspati Miśra argues, that when a being qualified by an accidental attribute is known, its being qualified by another attribute is not known. Ratnakīrti urges, that the intrinsic nature of an object is different from its accidental attributes (*upādhi*). Neither a substance nor the accidental qualities constitute the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). If an accidental attribute be non-different from a substance, it cannot be invested with another accidental attribute. If there is a difference between a substance (*dharmīn*) and its attribute (*dharma*), then only the knowledge of a favouring factor (*upakāra*) will involve the knowledge of a favoured factor (*upakārya*). It is not proper to assume an invariable concomitance by nature between a substance and its attributes like the causal relation between a smoke and a fire. Moreover, a substance and its attributes also are not proved to exist. If they are so proved, they will constitute the intrinsic nature. Hence Vācaspati Miśra's view is wrong.⁸⁹

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa criticizes the Buddhist view that the difference between a substance and an attribute is due to close proximity between them so that when a favouring factor is known, a favoured factor also is known. He points out that, on the Buddhist view, the knowledge of the sun, a favouring factor, would involve the knowledge of all objects illumined by it, the favoured factor, which is not a fact. Ratnakīrti urges, that Nyāyabhūṣaṇa's objection is based on a misconception of the Buddhist view; that when a substance is known, according to the Buddhist, its attributes, existing in the same place, which are aided by it are known; that therefore when the sun is known, other objects in different places, though favoured by it, may not be known. Therefore, when the nature of an object is perceived through one attribute only, Ratnakīrti concludes, it is perceived in its entirety; consequently its positive nature and negative nature need not be

⁸⁸ Ibid, pp. 9-10.

⁸⁹ Ibid, pp. 10-1.

known by another word. But it is known by a verbal cognition of another word. Hence a specific individual is not apprehended by determinate cognition, inference, or verbal cognition;⁷⁰ it is apprehended by indeterminate perception only.

Ratnakīrti further contends that generality (*sāmānya*) also is not apprehended by a verbal cognition. The word 'cow' denotes an animal with a dewlap, horns, a tail and the like which are perceived together because its differences from other cows are not yet known. But these peculiar limbs do not constitute the generality of cow. The genus of cow is devoid of any form. The aggregate of a dewlap, horns, a tail and the like, though different in different individuals, is made one by the specific individuals in which they exist. So it is called a generality, though it is not really so. An external object with these limbs only is never perceived. So the idea of such common limbs is illusory. Hence, let this idea be a mode of the intellect (*buddhi*) under the influence of an impression (*vāsanā*) of it, or, let this illusory idea manifest such a common form; or, let the specific individuals produce a common notion because of the differences among homogeneous individuals being not known; or, let the common notion be due to the obscuration of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*). But in fact, the common notion or concept is absolutely objectless; there is no generality corresponding to it in specific individuals.⁷¹ It is wrong to argue, that if there were no generality in specific individuals, a concept would be produced without a cause, because the collocation of causal conditions, which produces non-different cognitions of some individuals, aided by the past perceptions and recollections of the previous similar individuals, produces an objectless concept. Therefore a genus is not apprehended by a verbal cognition. Nor is it apprehended by perception or inference. Because a genus is imperceptible its uniform concomitance with a sign (*liṅga*) cannot be perceived. So the existence of a genus cannot be inferred like that of the sense-organs. A common notion or concept, as an effect, does not prove the existence of a genus as its cause. It is produced by many specific individuals which produce non-different perceptions. According to the Buddhist, the individuals which are different from the so-called genus in their nature and independent of it are the causes

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 11.

⁷¹ Sarvathā nirviśayaḥ khalvayam sāmānyapratyayaḥ. Ibid, p. 12.

of a common notion or concept, even as according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika a genus which is one, independent of, and different from, another genus, is the cause of a concept.⁷²

Trilocana, the teacher of Vācaspati Miśra, maintains, that generality, which is the inherence of a genus in its substrates or individuals, is the cause of a concept and a common name. Ratnakīrti urges, that the individuals can produce a concept and a common name, and that the assumption of a generality or genus is unnecessary. He urges further, that inherence is not possible because it is known as 'a genus subsisting in an individual' which involves the knowledge of two entities that are never found in our experience. Hence Ratnakīrti concludes that a genus is a mere conceptual construct without any foundation in a object. The Mīmāṃsaka and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argue, that a common notion must be produced by and accord with a common object, i.e. a genus which is common to different individuals; and that otherwise different individuals, which produce different cognitions, cannot produce a common notion. Ratnakīrti challenges the validity of this argument on the ground that a common notion and a general name are produced by the nature of the specific individuals differentiated from the heterogeneous individuals without the existence of any common object in the shape of a generality or a genus.⁷³ Hence the individuals in whose close contact with a sense-organ a genus is said to be known to pervade them are the cause of the verbal cognition of a name. A generality is not perceived even in dream. So if it is presumed to exist, it is better to presume a close contact with a sense-organ to be the cause of a general concept without the additional assumption of generality. The existence of generality may be said to be proved by the following inference. A determinate cognition of a qualified object (*viśeṣya*) is preceded by the cognition of a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*). 'This is a cow'. It is the cognition of a qualified object (*viśiṣṭabuddhi*). So it must be preceded by the cognition of the genus of cow which is the qualification of 'this' individual. Thus the reality of a genus is proved as a qualification of an individual perceived. Ratnakīrti urges, that the difference between a qualified object and its qualification is imaginary; and that

⁷² Ibid, pp. 11-3.

⁷³ Anuvṛttam antareṇāpi abhidhāna-pratyānuvṛtter atadrūpaparāvṛttasvarūpaviśeṣāt avāśyam svikārasya sādhitatvāt. Ibid, p. 14.

the use of the sentence 'this is a cow' is due to the apprehension of an individual cow differentiated from non-cows, which is not the cognition of a generality. Hence the inference for the existence of a genus is not valid.⁷⁴

Vācaspati Miśra maintains, that the individuals in which a genus subsists, are objects of verbal cognitions and denoted by words;⁷⁵ that the forms of an individual and a genus are differentiated from those of other heterogeneous individuals and their genera; and that therefore when a person hears the words 'tie a cow', he does not tie a horse. Rantakīrti, a younger contemporary of Vācaspati, criticizes his view. If the form of an individual is differentiated from those of other heterogeneous individuals, then a word may denote a positive individual with its negation of other heterogeneous individuals, and a common notion may cognize them, and the assumption of a genus subsisting in the individual is needless. If the form of an individual be said to be differentiated from other heterogeneous individuals on the strength of its genus or the series of its causes, then let it be so. But in both cases there is the knowledge of its differentiation from other heterogeneous individuals in the knowledge of an object. The doctrine that a word denotes a positive object 'cow' differentiated from 'non-cows' does not involve mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). But Vācaspati's doctrine that a word denotes an individual possessed of a genus involves mutual dependence. If an individual cow is not known, the genus of cow cannot be known. If the genus of cow is not known, then its being denoted by the word 'cow' cannot be known. But the doctrine that a word denotes an individual which is perceived, on which a common form is imposed by a common notion (*vikalpa-buddhi*) which is a conceptual construct, does not involve mutual dependence. There is no common form in an individual in the shape of a genus; but it is an imaginary form superimposed by a concept on it.⁷⁶ It is in the nature of the negation of contradictory individuals. There is no contradiction between an individual differentiated from contradictory individuals and the differentiation from them, because they are not exclusive of each other, and because they coexist in

⁷⁴ Ibid, pp. 13-6.

⁷⁵ Jātimatyo vyaktayo vikalpānāṁ śabdānāṁ gocaraḥ. NVT., ii, 2, 63, p. 341.

⁷⁶ Yaḥ sarva-vyakti-sādhāraṇa iva bahir adhyasto vikalpa-buddhyākāraḥ. SBNT., p. 5.

the same locus. Nor do they cease to be related as a qualified object (*viśeṣya*) and its qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*). A positive individual 'cow' is a qualified object, and the negation of 'non-cows' is a qualification. The former as qualified by the latter is denoted by the word 'cow'. There is contradiction between a jar and its absence, but not between the ground and the absence of a jar. Similarly, there is no contradiction between an individual cow and the negation of non-cows. They can coexist in the same locus. Thus a word denotes a positive individual qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals.⁷⁶ When a positive object is denoted by a word, it is known as qualified by the negation of contradictories.⁷⁷ Vācaspati argues, that a verbal cognition apprehends an individual in which a genus subsists. Ratnakīrti urges, that it cannot apprehend an external individual which is apprehended by indeterminate perception only. If an external individual were denoted by a word, then its cognition could not be in the form of an assertion or a negation. If it is always positive, then it is useless to speak of its existence and it is incapable of non-existence. If, on the other hand, it is always negative, then it is useless to speak of its non-existence and it is incapable of existence. But we speak of 'existence' and 'non-existence' in this connection. Hence a verbal cognition cannot apprehend a form common to the existence and non-existence of external objects; or, it cannot apprehend the generality of an external object. A genus which is said to be denoted by a word cannot be common to the existence and non-existence of external objects. The existence of a genus is said to consist in its being related to a present proper individual. Its non-existence is said to consist in its being related to past and future proper individuals. So its being common to existing and non-existing individuals is an irregular middle because the non-existing individuals are doubtful or accidental. Vācaspati lays stress on the genus which is denoted by a word, and so admits that an individual is not denoted by a word. But everywhere a word denotes the existence of its object through an individual. It conveys the knowledge of an individual as existing. It is absurd to argue that the existence of a genus consists in its being related to a present proper individual. If a genus cannot be denoted by a word, an individual with a genus

⁷⁶ Tasmād apohadharmaṇo vidhirūpasya śabdād avagatiḥ. Ibid, p. 6.

⁷⁷ Apohaśabdenānyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhir ucyate. Ibid, p. 6.

subsisting in it also cannot be denoted by it. Hence Vācaspati's view is wrong.⁷⁸

8. *The Nyāya Criticism of the Buddhist doctrine of Apoha*

Uddyotakara states the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* thus: A word denotes the negation of contradictory individuals, which may be called a genus. The word 'genus' does not denote the reality of a genus.⁷⁹ Or, a word denotes the negation of the object denoted by other words.⁸⁰ Uddyotakara refutes this view. (1) If the positive import of a word is known, then only it can be denied of another object. Negation presupposes affirmation. The word 'cow' is said to denote a 'non-cow'. But until a 'cow' is known there is the absence of the knowledge of a 'cow' and a 'non-cow'. (2) In the so-called negation of the contradictory (*anyāpoha*) e.g. 'this is not a non-cow', does the word 'cow' mean a positive entity or a negative entity? If it means a positive entity, does it mean a 'cow' or a 'non-cow'? If it means a 'cow', there is no dispute. If it means a 'non-cow', then it shows a curious skill in manipulating the meanings of words! The word 'cow' does not mean a negative entity (*abhāva*), because absence cannot be the object of a command and the directed person's knowledge of its meaning. No one knows an absence on hearing a command. No one directs another person about an absence. (3) The doctrine of *apoha* does not apply to all words. The word 'all' cannot denote the negation of 'non-all', because 'non-all' does not exist, which may be denied by the word 'all'. (4) Further, does the negation 'this is not a non-cow' denote a 'cow' or a 'non-cow'? If the former, then a 'cow' cannot be absent from a 'non-cow'. If the latter, then the negation of 'non-cow' cannot produce the knowledge of 'cow'. (5) If a 'non-cow' is denied of a 'cow' in such a form as 'A non-cow is not a cow', then who asserts that 'a cow is a non-cow', which is denied of another? Or, how can a 'non-cow' be denied of a 'cow' without knowing that 'a cow is a cow'? The denial of a 'non-cow' of a 'cow' presupposes the affirmation of a 'cow' of a 'cow'. (6) Furthermore, is the negation of a 'non-cow' in a 'cow' distinct or non-distinct

⁷⁸ Ibid, pp. 4.

⁷⁹ NV., ii, 2, 67.

⁸⁰ Anyaśabdārthāpohaḥ śabdārthaḥ. NV., ii, 2, 67.

from it? If it is distinct from it, has it a substrate or not? If it subsists in a 'cow', then the word 'cow' is its quality, and there is no co-existence of 'cow' and 'negation of non-cow' in the same locus. If the negation of a 'non-cow' has no substrate, then it is meaningless. If it is non-distinct from a 'cow', then it is nothing but a 'cow'. Is the negation of a 'non-cow' one or many in regard to every cow? If it is one which is related to many cows, then it is nothing but the genus of cow. If it is many, then it is infinite in number like the individuals in which it exists, and cannot convey any general meaning. (7) Is the negation of contradictory individuals (*apoha*) capable of being denoted by a word (*vācya*) or incapable of being denoted by it? In the first alternative, a word denotes the negation of contradictory individuals, which denotes another negation, and so on to infinity, and thus leads to infinite regress. If exclusion (*apoha*) denotes the negation of non-exclusion (*anapoha*), then also it leads to infinite regress. In the second alternative, the negation of a 'non-cow' is not denoted by a word, and yet negates the imports of other words, and thus involves self-contradiction. (8) Moreover, the Buddhists who advocate the doctrine of *apoha* cannot account for the coexistence of a substance and its quality. The words 'blue lotus' mean, according to them, the negation of 'non-blue' and the negation of 'non-lotus' which do not coexist in the same locus. 'Non-blue' means 'white'; 'non-lotus' means a red *javā* flower; they do not coexist. But, according to the Naiyāyika, the words 'blue lotus' denote a positive substance in which the quality of 'blue' and the genus of 'lotus' subsist, but not the negation of 'non-blue' and the negation of 'non-lotus'. The assumption of the negation of contradictory individuals hinders the operation of the means of valid knowledge. Hence the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* is not right.⁸¹

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* in the following manner. (1) Jayanta asks whether the Buddhist advocates the doctrine of *apoha* because an external generality or genus does not exist or because there is no experience of it. The Buddhist admits that there is an experience of *apoha* which takes the place of what is called a genus. But a genus, Jayanta urges, is not non-existent because it is perceived, like a specific individual, by an uncontradicted and undoubted perception due to the

⁸¹ NV., ii, 2, 67. NVTT., p. 344.

intercourse of the sense-organs with it.⁸² (2) The perception of generality, like that of specific individuality, is unexceptionable. Therefore a generality is undeniable like a specific individuality. There is no need of assuming its existence because it is perceived. If it were inferred from its effect, then there might be a need for its assumption. (3) Jayanta asks whether the power of producing a common notion (*anuvṛttijñāna*) is distinct or indistinct from the individuals, subsistent in them or independent of them, eternal or non-eternal, perceptible or inferable. He replies that it is distinct from them, independent of them, eternal and perceptible. It is a genus subsisting in the individuals, which produces a common notion or concept. (4) It is wrong to argue that certain individuals (e.g. cows) produce a certain common notion of a 'cow', even as the genus of 'cow' is said to exist in certain individuals (e.g. cows), because a peculiarity in a cognition cannot be produced without a peculiarity in an object.⁸³ If a peculiarity in an object is proved, the reality of a genus is undeniable. (5) It is wrong to argue that one common notion is produced by the accidental quality of producing one and the same effect, since the production of the same effect by the specific individuals is not proved.⁸⁴ The Buddhists argue that the determinate cognitions of the specific individuals are non-different from one another because they produce one common thought.⁸⁵ This argument is wrong because oneness of common thought cannot be produced by many indeterminate perceptions of individuals collectively, which produce many determinate cognitions that are apprehended as different from one another; and because they do not produce any other effect by virtue of which they may acquire oneness; further because the so-called oneness of the determinate cognitions is not apprehended by indeterminate perception which apprehends a specific individual only; and because it is not apprehended by another determinate cognition (*vikalpa*) in that all determinate cognitions are incapable of apprehending difference and non-difference inasmuch as they apprehend their own forms or unreal attributed forms. (6) There is the identity of the determinate cognitions, it may be argued, on account of the non-apprehension of the difference of the forms

⁸² NM., p. 309.

⁸³ Viśayātīśayavyatirekeṇa pratyayātīśayānupapatteḥ. NM., p. 314.

⁸⁴ NM., pp. 313-4.

⁸⁵ Ekapratyavamarśasya hetutvād dhīr abhedinī. NM., p. 314.

apprehended by them, even as a determinate cognition following upon an indeterminate perception of an individual cow apprehends the form of 'cow' like another determinate cognition following upon another indeterminate perception of another individual cow, and the object of the determinate cognitions is said to be one because of its non-difference. Even if the determinate cognitions apprehend the forms, the difference of the objects is not manifested to consciousness. So a determinate cognition mixes up the different indeterminate perceptions, because it cannot apprehend the difference of the specific individuals which are apprehended by indeterminate perceptions. Jayanta refutes this argument. Determinate cognitions are momentary and therefore different from one another. The form which is apprehended by the determinate cognitions, the difference of which is not apprehended, is either distinct or non-distinct from them. If it is distinct from them, it is nothing but a generality. It cannot be said to be a distinctive character due to its unreality, since there is no evidence for its unreality. If the form is non-distinct from them, then determinate cognitions exist in their real nature, and cannot have identity. If they have identity, they cannot mix up different indeterminate perceptions of specific individuals. The determinate cognition of the same form cannot be produced without the admission of a generality. It cannot be produced by the identity of effects or the identity of determinate cognitions. Hence it is wrong to maintain that cognitions are non-different from one another because they produce the same common notion. All arguments advanced to prove that verbal cognitions and words have for their objects negations of contradictories (*apoha*) are false." (7) According to the Nyāya an object continues to exist for some time and is endued with different qualities so that endued with some qualities it is apprehended by indeterminate perception, and endued with other qualities it is apprehended by determinate perception. It has different powers which it manifests with the aid of different auxiliary conditions. So the objects of indeterminate perception and determinate cognitions are not identical. Even if an object is apprehended entirely by an indeterminate perception, it may be apprehended anew by a determinate perception. If an unreal external object in the nature of the negation of contradictory individuals (*anyāpoha*) be said to be

" NM., pp. 314-5.

denoted by a word and apprehended by a verbal cognition, Kumārila's objections against it are unassailable. If in order to remove these objections a mere attributed form with the reflections of determinate cognitions tinged with the appearance of a negation be assumed, it is incapable of inducing a person to act on the object denoted by a word. A *vikalpa* is in the nature of a cognition and transparent by nature. It cannot be tainted unless it comes into contact with something else, either as an internal impression (*vāsanā*) or as an external object. That it is neither an internal impression nor an external object, but something which tinges a mere cognition is an illusory concept made by fraudulent persons. Objects colour their cognitions; but impressions produced by the cognitions of objects cannot colour them. Cognitions may be coloured by certain objects which may exist in some other place, but they can never be coloured by attributed forms which are absolutely non-existent. Further, absolutely non-existent forms cannot be attributed. The Buddhist argues, that determinate cognitions following upon indeterminate perceptions operating on their objects are unable to apprehend the individual objects differentiated from other objects, but apprehend mere differentiation (*vyāvṛttimātra*); that determinate cognitions apprehend differentiation or negation only because their objects are differentiated from other objects homogeneous with the perceived individuals (*dṛśya*) and from heterogeneous objects (*vikalpa*). If the objects of determinate cognitions are related to both perceived individuals and *vikalpas*, then they simply apprehend what has already been apprehended, and become useless. Determinate cognitions are indeed useless as means of valid knowledge; or they apprehend other objects. But that they partly apprehend differentiation and partly do not cannot be believed. The negation of homogeneous individuals and the negation of heterogeneous entities are not different in their nature, so that a determinate cognition may apprehend the one and not the other. If a determinate cognition apprehended an object differentiated from other individuals which are homogeneous with the perceived individual, and from other heterogeneous entities (*vikalpa*), then it would apprehend a specific individual like an indeterminate perception, and there would be no inference and verbal cognition owing to the absence of any knowledge of the relations due to the reality of generalities (*sāmānya*). (8) If the negation or

differentiation be external, then Kumārila's objections stand. If it be internal, then it cannot be related to and colour a determinate cognition (*vikalpa*). That it is neither external nor internal is a fiction of the imagination. If it is a non-entity, then it cannot be related to and colour a determinate cognition, since an absolutely non-existent entity, like the horns of a hair, is not an object of speech and action. If it is an entity, it must be either external or internal. Hence the hypothesis of an attributed form, which is neither external nor internal, is irrational and unwarranted. (9) The cognition produced by the word 'cow' when it is heard apprehends the mere generality of cow unrelated to the words 'existence' and 'non-existence'. But it may be related to existence or non-existence denoted by the corresponding words in order to satisfy the desire to know more about the object. If the real nature of an object is not definitely known, then its distinction from other objects is investigated. 'A jar is really a jar, and not a cloth.' But from this it does not follow that a verbal cognition apprehends the negation of the contradictories (*apoha*). (10) The Buddhist maintains, that a person acts on an external object because he identifies the object of an indeterminate perception (*dṛśya*) with that of a determinate cognition (*vikalpa*). Jayanta urges, that if the identification is the absence of the knowledge of distinct cognitions, then, being akin to swoon and the like, it cannot give rise to action; that if it is an object of action, then it is perceived (*dṛśya*), and the assumption of the negation of contradictories (*apoha*) is unnecessary; that if it is an unreal imaginary object of a determinate cognition which is manifested to consciousness in its own form, then no conscious person can act upon it; that if it is apprehended as a perceptible object (*dṛśya*), then it gives rise to a contrary cognition, which is not non-distinction of cognition (*aviveka*); and that this contrary cognition is not false, because it is not contradicted like the illusory cognition of water in the rays of the sun in a desert. Jayanta further urges that an object cannot be said to be attained as an ultimate consequence of the indeterminate perception of a momentary specific individual, even as a gem is said to be attained as an ultimate consequence of the indeterminate perception of its ray. He concludes, that a determinate perception which apprehends a qualified external object is valid; and that when an individual (*vyakti*) endowed with a configuration (*ākṛti*)

and possessed of a genus (*jāti*) is apprehended by a verbal cognition when a word is heard, a person acts upon it. Hence the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* is not tenable.⁸⁷

9. *The Mīmāṃsaka Criticism of the Buddhist doctrine of Apoha*

Kumārila offers the following criticism of the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha*. (1) If exclusion (*apoha*) is absence (*abhāva*), then it is not known independently, like a jar, and subsists in another substrate. What is its substrate? The specific individual is not its substrate, because it is not an object of determinate cognition. Nor is the aggregate of all specific individuals the substrate of the negation of non-cows, because it is not possible. The specific individuals are infinite in number in different times and places, and can never be observed in thousands of years. Therefore the aggregate also does not subsist in them. Hence something unique existing entirely in all specific individuals is the substrate of the negation of non-cows. That is nothing but the genus of cow; if its reality is admitted, then the assumption of the negation of non-cows is needless. (2) The doctrine of *apoha* leads to infinite regress. The word 'cow' denotes the negation of 'non-cows' e.g., horses, etc., which also are not known as positive entities, but only by the negation of non-horses, and so on to infinity. Thus an *apoha* cannot be apprehended by a determinate cognition. Indeterminate perception cannot induce an agent to act upon an object. Thus the doctrine of *apoha* leads to an extinction of practical life. (3) It would make all words synonymous, since they are in the nature of negations of contradictories without any difference. The argument that negations of contradictories are different from one another is wrong, since they are not different from one another. If they are different from one another, then they are real like specific individuals. But the Buddhists do not consider them to be real. (4) The Buddhist may retort, that 'generalities' of the Naiyāyika, being denoted by words and not differing from one another, are synonymous with one another; and that therefore the doctrines of *apoha* and *sāmānya* are vitiated by the same defect. Kumārila replies, that generalities are positive in their nature, devoid of

⁸⁷ NM., pp. 315-7.

the natures of other generalities, and consequently different from one another; but that negations of contradictories, being merely in the nature of absence (*abhāva*), do not differ from one another. (5) If negations of contradictories be said to differ from one another because their substrates are different from one another, then the negations differ with every specific individual. If there are as many negations as there are specific individuals, then they cannot serve the purpose of generality. (6) Negations of contradictories, it may be argued, cease to be identical with one another, because their difference depends upon the difference of the objects negated. This argument is wrong, because the difference of *apohas* due to the difference of negated objects does not destroy their identity inasmuch as such difference of *apohas* is not real, but attributed. The difference of *apohas* cannot be due to the difference of negated objects (*apohya*). (7) The argument that the negation of 'cow' is the basis of the classification of 'non-cows' is wrong, because the 'cow' is already known as a positive being by denying which 'non-cows' are known. The denial of 'non-cow' presupposes the affirmation of 'cow'. If a 'cow' is known already, the assumption of 'non-cow' and the negation of 'non-cow' are needless. (8) If a specific individual cow is known already to exist, it does not require a word to denote it. If the genus of cow is known already to exist, then the assumption of the negation of contradictories is unnecessary. (9) The difference of *apohas* cannot be due to the difference of the negated objects, because their nature cannot be known. Are 'non-cows', e.g. horses negated in their general nature or special nature? They are not negated in their special nature, because they are not denoted by words. Nor are they negated in their general nature, because in that case they would be in the nature of absence, being the negations of contradictories. But there can be no negation of a negation. If a negation be negated, it leads to a positive affirmation, and a word denotes a positive entity. (10) Is the negation (*apoha*) of the negated (*apohya*), e.g. non-cows or horses different or non-different from them? If it is different from them, then it is a positive entity. If it is non-different from them, then it is the same as the negated, and thus a 'cow' is the same as a 'non-cow'. (11) The doctrine of *apoha* cannot account for the coexistence of a qualified object (*viśeṣya*) and a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*), for instance, a 'lotus' and 'blue', because two negations cannot

function in regard to the same object. (12) A negation of contradictories has no denotative power. The words 'non-existent', 'unknown' etc., do not denote the negations of contradictories because they cannot be ascertained. Nothing 'non-existent' or 'unknown' is known, which may be differentiated from others. If it is known, then it is existent and known. The existent cannot be negated by the word 'existent'; and the known cannot be negated by the word 'known'. An unknown entity is absolutely incapable of being negated. It cannot be said to be imagined, because its existence is known as soon as it is imagined. (13) What is denoted by the word *apoha* (negation)? It denotes the negation of non-negation (*anapoha*). What is the nature of non-negation? Why is it not *apoha*? If it is not *apoha*, what is its nature? These questions cannot be answered. The *apohas* of negative words, prefixes, verbs and the like are not thinkable. What is the *apoha* of 'is cooking' is not known. (14) General words, it may be argued, are denoted by the negation of contradictories (*apoha*), which are considered by some as denoting genera or individuals in which genera subsist. If general words denote external objects, they may denote genera as well. If they are without any basis in external objects, or consist in mere cognitions, the word 'genus' also may be objectless or a mere cognition, and the assumption of *apoha* is needless.⁸⁸

10. *The Jaina View of the Import of a Word*

Prabhācandra defines a word as an independent aggregate of letters which are dependent on one another. It does not depend upon the letters of another word.⁸⁹ Mānikyanandin observes that a word produces the knowledge of an object owing to the natural relation of signifying and being signified between them and convention.⁹⁰ An object of valid knowledge is individual and general; it is characterized by common characters and distinctive characters because it is apprehended by assimilative knowledge and discriminative knowledge, and because it prompts fruitful actions in the shape of the attainment of good and the rejection of evil.⁹¹ Similar modifications constitute generality.

⁸⁸ NM., pp. 303-6. ŚV., *Apohavāda*.

⁸⁹ PKM., p. 133.

⁹⁰ PMS., iii, 95; PMLV., iii, 95.

⁹¹ PMS., iii, 1-2.

The Jaina does not believe in a genus which is considered by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to be one, eternal, and inherent in many individuals⁹² Vidyānanda Svāmī holds that a word denotes an aspect of a multiform (*anekānta*) object. 'A jar exists'. 'A jar does not exist'. Here particular aspects of an object are denoted by words occurring in positive and negative sentences. If words denoted objects endowed with one definite nature (*ekānta*), they would falsify their real nature, since they are multiform in their nature. Words denote both positive and negative characters of their objects. If they denoted their positive characters only, they would falsify their nature because they have positive characters at particular times, in particular places, and under particular circumstances. A word denotes its object, and negates other objects. The word 'jar' denotes a jar, and negates a cloth and other objects. So it denotes a multiform object. If it denoted its object in its general character and devoid of its distinctive characters, then its object would be unreal inasmuch as there is no generality without distinctive characters. If a word denoted a generality (*sāmānya*) directly, and indirectly denoted an individual, then also its object would be unreal since one word cannot denote another object which is denoted by another word. A word denotes both general and distinctive characters of an object. The positive character of an object is not inconsistent with its negative character, both of which are denoted by a word. The acceptable nature of one object is not inconsistent with the avoidable character of another object.⁹³ Hence a word denotes a multiform object with its general and distinctive characters and positive and negative characters. This doctrine is consistent with *Syādvāda* advocated by the Jaina thinkers.

Kundakunda Svāmī regards a sound as an aggregate of atoms or as an effect produced by it. It is an aggregate of innumerable atoms. It is produced by the modification of large aggregates which are struck by one another. It is perceived by the auditory organ which is a physical sense-organ (*dravyendriya*).⁹⁴ The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika regard sound as a quality of *ākāśa*. But the Jaina criticizes this view. If sound were a quality of *ākāśa*, it would not be perceived through the auditory organ because, *ākāśa* being incorporeal, its quality is incorporeal and

⁹² PMS., iv. 1-2, 4.

⁹³ PK., 79; TDTV., 79.

⁹⁴ AM., 109-13; AMV., 109-13.

incapable of being perceived through a sense-organ.⁹⁵ Sounds are of two kinds, human and non-human. Human sounds are uttered by persons. Non-human sounds are made by natural objects (e.g. clouds). Or, sounds are of two kinds, language and non-language. Linguistic sounds either consist of letters or do not. Sanskrit, Prākṛta, Ārya, and Mleccha languages consist of letters. Sounds uttered by animals endowed with two sense-organs and supernormal sounds of an omniscient person are devoid of letters.⁹⁶

11. *Ākṛtivāda*

The Ākṛtivādins maintain that a word denotes a form, configuration (*ākṛti*), or arrangement of parts (*avayava-sanniveśa*). The meaning of a word is ascertained by its use and cognition. The elders use the word 'cow' to denote a particular kind of object on which they act. The hearers also know that the word denotes that particular kind of object. It is applied to an individual with a dewlap and the like, but not to one with manes. So it denotes an individual with a peculiar arrangement of parts. Further, the word 'cow' denotes a perceived object; perception apprehends a configuration; the peculiar arrangement of parts in an individual cow, which is different from that of a horse, is perceived through a sense-organ. A word denotes a configuration, since it denotes a perceptible object. Furthermore, a configuration only can be related to the act of command through an individual which is possessed of it. A genus subsisting in all its proper individuals which manifest it cannot be brought or removed. But a configuration which is common to all individuals coming under the same genus can be brought or removed. Hence a word denotes a configuration.⁹⁷

Vātsyāyana urges, that an individual, which is the substrate of a genus, is denoted by a word. It has a configuration. But a genus does not subsist in it. So a configuration is not denoted by a word. 'Bring a cow'. 'Give a cow'. In these sentences the word 'cow' does not denote an earthen cow, since the genus of cow does not subsist in it. Hence a word does not denote a configuration.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ TRV., V, 6, 24; p. 231.

⁹⁶ TRV., V, 24, 6; p. 231.

⁹⁷ NBh., NV., ii, 2, 64; NM., p. 318; SBNT., pp. 11-2; H̥P., i, p. 572.

⁹⁸ NBh., ii, 2, 65-6.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the view of the Ākṛtivādins. Configurations differ in different individuals. There are innumerable individuals, and consequently their configurations are innumerable. So the uniform relation of words to configurations cannot be known. The word 'cow' does not denote the configuration of white cows, since in its absence it denotes the configuration of black cows, which is perceived. There is no configuration common to all individual cows in the world, because it can never be known in that they are infinite in number. Further, there can be no action on a configuration to carry out a command; nor is it capable of action. Only an individual can act and be acted upon. If a person is commanded to bring a cow, he does not bring a painted cow or an earthen cow, though it has the peculiar configuration. Hence the doctrine that a word denotes a configuration is wrong."

12. *Vyaktivāda: Criticism of Jātivāda*

The Vyaktivādin advances the following arguments to prove that a word denotes an individual. 'A cow exists or sits'. An individual cow only can exist or sit. The genus of cow is incorporeal and motionless. But individual cows are corporeal and moving. A 'collection of cows' is a collection of individual cows, because the genus of cow is one. 'He is giving a cow to a Vaidya'. An individual cow only can be given or received, since the genus of cow is incorporeal and motionless and incapable of being given or received. 'Kaunḍinya's cow' is an individual cow belonging to Kaunḍinya. An individual cow only can be owned, but the genus of cow cannot. 'Ten cows' mean ten individual cows which can be enumerated. Number does not apply to the genus of cow. 'A cow is increasing or decreasing in bulk'. An individual cow only is capable of increase or decrease. The genus of cow is incapable of it, since it is incorporeal. 'A cow is white'. An individual cow only can be white. The genus of cow is devoid of qualities. Qualities can subsist in a substance only. 'The pleasure of a cow' means the pleasure of an individual cow. The genus of cow cannot have pleasure. 'A cow gives birth to a calf'. An individual cow only can produce a calf. The genus of cow is eternal, and consequently incapable of producing or being

produced.¹⁰⁰ An individual only can be the substrate of a genus, and be an object of action, while a configuration cannot be the abode of a genus, and is incapable of being acted on. So a configuration cannot be denoted by a word. An individual only is an object of use and command. It can be an object of action, e.g. acquisition, destruction, etc. But a genus cannot be acquired or destroyed. Even others admit that a word denotes a perceptible object, and that perception does not apprehend a mere genus, but an individual in which a genus subsists.

If a word denotes a genus, it may be asked, why a person does not bring an earthen cow when he is directed to bring a cow since the genus of cow is present everywhere. It may be replied that, though the genus of cow is present everywhere, it is manifested by the individual cows only. An individual cow with a dewlap and the like manifests the genus of cow; but an earthen cow does not manifest it. But the peculiar arrangement of parts exists in an earthen cow, and yet it is not denoted by the word 'cow'. It does not denote a configuration because, in that case, there can be no coexistence of white colour and the like in the same locus when it is denoted by another word. Qualities do not exist in a configuration. But white colour and the genus of cow coexist in an individual cow. Hence an individual is denoted by a word, and it produces a particular idea.¹⁰¹

13. *Jātivāda: Criticism of Vyaktivāda*

The Mīmāṃsaka and the Advaita Vedāntist maintain that a word denotes a genus (*jāti*). Kumārila argues : If an individual distinct from a genus were denoted by a word, no uniform relation could be established between them, since individuals are infinite in number. But if a word denotes a genus, it may denote an individual through its genus which qualifies it. Thus a relation can be established between a word and its object. A generality is common to many individuals, and produces a common notion or concept.¹⁰² It is denoted by a word. Prabhākara also maintains that a word denotes a genus. The genus of cow only is denoted by the word 'cow'. An individual cow being denoted by it contains a greater number of elements. So it is

¹⁰⁰ NS., NBh., ii, 2, 62.

¹⁰¹ NM., pp. 319-20. v

¹⁰² ŚV., NR., Ākṛtivāda, 1, 3-4.

not denoted by the word 'cow'.¹⁰³ Maṇḍana Miśra regards a genus as the primary meaning of a word, and an individual in which a genus subsists as its secondary meaning.¹⁰⁴

According to the Advaita Vedāntists, a word denotes a genus, and not an individual. It cannot denote an individual, since individuals are innumerable. But whenever it denotes a genus, it denotes an individual as well, since a genus is apprehended by that cognition which apprehends an individual. Or, a word has a natural power of denoting an individual, but it is not cognized by us. But its power of denoting a genus is cognized by us. A word is known to denote a genus and produces the knowledge of it. To maintain that a word is also known to denote an individual violates the law of parsimony, because no sooner than a genus is known to be denoted by a word an individual also is known. So the knowledge of an individual being denoted by a word is unnecessary. That is expressible by a word (*vācya*), which is the object of its denotative power which is cognized. Hence a genus is expressible by a word, but an individual is not. Though the word 'cow' denotes the genus of cow, it implies an individual.¹⁰⁵

Vātsyāyana gives the following arguments of the Jātivādin. An individual does not exist without a genus subsisting in it. An individual without being qualified by a genus is not denoted by a word. But it is denoted by it as qualified by a genus. A genus is capable of movement, increase, decrease, enumeration, collection, production and the like through the individuals in which it subsists. An earthen cow is not denoted by the word 'cow' because the genus of cow does not subsist in it, though an individual and a configuration exist.¹⁰⁶

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa gives the following arguments of the Mīmāṃsaka against the doctrine that a word denotes an individual: The Mīmāṃsaka asks whether a word denotes a mere individual or whether it denotes a qualified individual, and replies that it does not denote a mere individual, because the word 'cow' is not applied by speakers to any individual (e.g., a horse) and because the hearers do not know any individual when they hear the word. The word 'cow' may be said to denote an individual

¹⁰³ SSP., p. 91; HIP., Vol. I, pp. 573-4.

¹⁰⁴ SSP., p. 87; HIP., Vol. I, p. 573.

¹⁰⁵ S.B., I, 3, 28; VP., ch. IV.

¹⁰⁶ NBh., II, 2, 62, 66.

cow qualified by the genus of cow. Then the genus of cow is denoted by the word, and not an individual; because if a word denotes an individual, another individual cannot be denoted by it; and because if it denotes another Individual also, then it denotes an entity common to all individuals, and not one individual only. If an individual were denoted by a word, individual cows would be perceived as 'this is a cow', 'this is a cow', etc., and not as 'this is also a cow'. The uniform perception of cows as cows may be said to be due to the existence of a genus in them. Is it known or unknown? It is not unknown because then it would not serve any purpose. If it is known, it is known either through a word or through some other means of valid knowledge. It cannot be known by any other *pramāṇa*, since it is absent. If it were known through a word, then the word might denote it in the beginning. The word 'cow' may be said to denote a genus (*gotva*) as a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) and an individual cow as a qualified substance (*viśeṣya*). But it cannot denote innumerable individual cows as qualified substances and their genus as a qualification. There is no other means of knowing individual cows so that a word may denote them as qualified by a genus. The experiences of an individual and a genus are not denied for every one has both these experiences. But a word cannot denote an individual and a genus both. If it did, it would imply one by denoting the other. Then the word 'cow' either denotes the genus and implies an individual; or, it denotes an individual and implies a genus. If the genus is a qualification, then it is known before an individual is known, and can be denoted by a word. If it is known through a word, an individual also can be known through it. Then a word does not denote both a genus and an individual directly.¹⁰⁷

We know the genus of cow, it may be argued, as a qualification, and an individual cow as a qualified substance when we hear the word cow, even as we know a person bearing a staff when we hear the word 'daṇḍin'. This is not an appropriate example. The word 'daṇḍin' denotes both a staff (*viśeṣaṇa*) and a person with a staff (*viśeṣya*). It does not denote a staff which is a qualification; the word 'daṇḍa' does not denote a person, that is a qualified substance. But the word 'cow' denotes the genus of cow, a qualification, and an individual cow, a qualified substance.

¹⁰⁷ NM., p. 320.

When it denotes an individual cow (*viśeṣya*), it depends upon another *pramāṇa* to produce the knowledge of the genus of cow (*viśeṣaṇa*). When it denotes a genus, it implies an individual to produce the knowledge of it. There is nothing wrong in it. When a word being uttered, an individual is known,—whether it is known through a word or a genus,—it is not perceived, but known by reasoning. A word denoting a genus and an individual is not experienced. A genus is known through the perception of an individual; an individual is known through the perception of a genus, which is known through a word also. An individual only is not an object of action. A genus also can be an object of action. 'Make a sacrifice with an animal'. An incorporeal genus can be an object of action, even as incorporeal qualities and actions are the means of actions. A genus can be an object of action by suggesting an individual. Though it is incorporeal, it acts through an individual, even as the self, though incorporeal, acts through its body and sense-organs. Hence the Mīmāṃsaka concludes that a word denotes a genus.¹⁰⁸

14. *Jāti-vyakti-ākṛtīvāda: Criticism of Jātīvāda*

Gautama says, "An individual, a configuration, and a genus are denoted by a word."¹⁰⁹ Sometimes a genus is its principal import, and an individual is its subordinate import. 'The cow ought not to be touched with feet'. Here the cow means the genus of cow or all cows. Sometimes an individual is the principal meaning, and a genus is a subordinate meaning. 'Bind a cow'. Here a cow means an individual cow. Sometimes a configuration is the principal meaning, and an individual is a subordinate meaning, and a genus is not denoted at all. 'Make an earthen cow'. Here a configuration is the chief import of the word 'cow', and an individual is its subordinate meaning. It does not denote the genus of cow, which is non-existent in an earthen cow. Sometimes a word denotes an individual only, because it has no genus in that it is one. The word 'Dittha' denotes a particular individual because it is a proper name (*samjñā*) and devoid of a genus.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ NM., pp. 321-2. ŚV., Ākṛtīvāda.

¹⁰⁹ Vyākṛtyākṛtijātayas tu padārthah. NS., ii, 2, 68.

¹¹⁰ NM., pp. 325-6.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita Vedānta view that a word denotes a genus. A word occurring in a sentence has a case, a gender, and a number. But a genus cannot have any of them. It is wrong to argue that a genus can have these through an individual which is implied by a word, for a word, which is uttered only once, cannot denote a genus at first, then imply an individual, and then denote a case, a gender, and a number through an individual inasmuch as the sequence of such experiences is not cognized. A self, though incorporeal, may become an agent as related to a cognition and a volition. But a genus, though incorporeal, has no direct relation to an action, and consequently cannot have a case that is always related to an action. We perceive an individual qualified by a genus and related to a number. So an individual qualified by a genus is denoted by a word. The genus is a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) of an individual which is a qualified substance (*viśeṣya*). A word does not denote a mere genus, but an individual qualified by it. Nor does it denote a mere individual unqualified by a genus, if it is not one. Both a genus and an individual are perceived through a sense-organ. It cannot be said that a genus is perceived while an individual is inferred, because it is contradicted by experience. If it were so, then qualities only being perceived, a substance would be inferred. But, in fact, a substance and qualities both are perceived. Similarly, a word denotes both a genus and an individual, and not a mere genus. 'The cow is white'. The sentence means that the genus of cow and white colour coexist in the individual cow. If a word denotes an individual in which a genus subsists, then only a genus and a quality can coexist in the same substrate. Hence a word does not denote a mere genus.¹¹¹

15. The Yoga doctrine of *Sphoṭa*

Vyāsa (400 A.D.) expounds the doctrine of word-forms (*padasphoṭa*) and sentence-forms (*vākyasphoṭa*) in the *Yogabhāṣya*. There are three kinds of sounds: (1) articulate letter-sounds (*varṇa*) uttered by the vocal organs; (2) audible sounds (*dhvany*), which are modifications of air perceived by the auditory organ;

¹¹¹ NM., pp. 323-5. HIP., Vol. I, pp. 573-4, 804.

and (3) a word-image or a thought-form, which is a mental mode, and apprehends all the component letters at a time. This is called a word or word-form which signifies an object. The first two kinds of sounds do not signify it.¹¹² The articulate sounds and the audible sounds are produced successively, and do not coexist together. Nor are they aided by one another. So they do not constitute a word, and signify an object. All letters can signify all objects.¹¹³ The same letter combined with other letters in a particular order is modified into a significant word-form (*śabdaspṛṣṭa*), and signifies a definite object. It is a single thought-form which apprehends all the component letters in a single grasp,—which are determined by a convention (*saṃketa*), and from which the temporal order of the audible sounds has been withdrawn,—and signifies an object. It is one, the object of a single cognition, uttered by a single effort, devoid of parts, letters and temporal order, notional, and presented to the mind by the last letter aided by the impressions of the preceding letters.¹¹⁴ A word is devoid of parts. But the articulate letter-sounds (*varṇa*) appear to the intellects (*buddhi*) of persons invested with the impressions (*vāsanā*) of the words used by the people from beginningless time as its parts. A word (*śabda*), a cognition (*jñāna*), and an object (*artha*) are erroneously identified with one another. A convention is the mutual superimposition of a word and its object upon each other, which is in the nature of recollection.¹¹⁵

Vācaspati Miśra rightly asserts that a word-form is not a word-image or a thought-form, but that it is manifested or cognized by the intellect or a thought-form and manifested by audible sounds. Vijñānabhikṣu also is of the same opinion. He regards a word-form as cognized by the intellect only, and manifested by a single effort and successive letters.¹¹⁶ Nāgeśa states that it

¹¹² Tatra vāg varṇaṣvevārthavati, śrotram ca dhvani-pariṇāmanamātra-viśayaḥ, padam punar nādanusamhāra-buddhi-nirgrāhyam. YBh., iii, 17.

¹¹³ Varṇaḥ punar ekaikaḥ padātmā sarvābhidhānaśaktipracitaḥ. Ibid, iii, 17.

¹¹⁴ Tad ekaḥ padam ekabuddhiviśaya ekaprayatnākṣiptam abhāgam akramam avarṇaḥ bauddham antyavarṇapratyaya-vyāpāropasthāpitam. Ibid, iii, 17.

¹¹⁵ Saṃketas tu padapadārthayor itaretarādhyāsarūpaḥ smṛtyātmakaḥ. Ibid, iii, 17. HIP., ii. pp. 131-3.

¹¹⁶ Bauddham anusamhāra-buddhi-viditam. Buddhyā nirbhāṣyate prakāśyate, iti buddhi-nirbhāṣaḥ. TV., iii, 17. Padākhyo buddhimātra-grāhyaḥ sphoṭaḥ. YV., iii, 17.

is called a *sphoṭa* because it manifests an object.¹¹⁷ Thus a word-form is not a mere verbal image or a thought-form, but an objective sound-essence which is cognized by it. Vyāsa appears to regard it as subjective and notional (*bauddha*).

16. *The Sābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa (Padasphoṭa)*

Bhartṛhari (600 A.D.—650 A.D.), the great grammarian-philosopher, recognizes the reality of a letter-form (*varṇasphoṭa*), a word-form (*padasphoṭa*), and a sentence-form (*vākyasphoṭa*). One letter-form is manifested by many parts of a letter-sound (*varṇa*). One word-form is manifested by many letters. One sentence-form is manifested by many words. But parts of a letter-sound do not exist in a letter-form which is one, indivisible and partless; letters do not exist in a word-form which is one, indivisible and partless; words do not exist in a sentence-form which is one, indivisible and partless.¹¹⁸

The constituent letters of a word do not produce the knowledge of the object denoted by it, because each letter cannot produce it. Nor can the aggregate of them produce it, since there can be no aggregate of the successively produced momentary letters which are immediately destroyed. There can be no collection of the simultaneously produced letters, because the same person cannot produce different efforts in the different vocal organs to produce them simultaneously. Nor can the last letter aided by the preceding letters produce the knowledge of the object, since the preceding letters cannot render any aid to it as they are destroyed as soon as they are produced. Just as the preceding letters cannot render an aid to the last letter, so their perceptions and impressions (*samśkāra*) of these perceptions also cannot render an aid to it as they also are destroyed as soon as they are produced. Further, the impressions of the perceptions of the preceding letters can produce the recollections of these letters only, but cannot produce the knowledge of another object (e.g. a cow). Nor can the recollections produced by the impressions of the preceding letters render an aid to the last letter,

¹¹⁷ Chāyā on YS., iii, 17.

¹¹⁸ Pade na varṇa vidyante varṇasvavayavā na ca. VPD., i, 73; BPR., i, 73; HIP., i, pp. 870-1.

since they cannot be produced simultaneously and they cannot co-exist together if they are produced successively as they also are produced and destroyed. Nor can all the impressions of the preceding letters produce one recollection only with the aid of the last letter, for then the impressions of conflicting perceptions of many objects will produce one recollection only, which is not found in our experience. Nor can the last letter (e.g. *w*) independently of the other letters (e.g. *c* and *o*) produce the knowledge of the object (e.g. *cow*), since the other letters will then be useless. Hence the constituent letters can neither collectively nor distributively produce the knowledge of an object denoted by a word. The last letter combined with the impressions produced by the perceptions of the preceding letters cannot produce such knowledge, for a letter can produce the knowledge of an object if its relation to the object is already perceived. But the impressions are imperceptible, and consequently the last letter combined with them also is imperceptible. The last letter combined with the recollections of the preceding letters due to their impressions also cannot produce such knowledge, since the recollections also are successive.¹¹⁹ The assumption of the imperceptible impressions of all letters except the last one violates the parsimony of hypotheses. A word-form (*padasphoṭa*) which is manifested by the successively uttered letters produces the knowledge of the object denoted by the word. Though it is imperceptible, it is presumed to exist in order to account for such knowledge. To argue that letters only are perceived and that a word-form distinct from them is not perceived is wrong, because oneness of a word is perceived, which does not accord with letters, since they are different from one another and oneness and multiplicity which are contradictory to each other cannot coexist in the same object. Oneness of a word cannot be due to its producing the knowledge of one object because it involves mutual dependence. Oneness of a word is due to oneness of the object denoted by it; and oneness of the object denoted by a word is due to oneness of the word. Hence a word is not in the nature of letters, but a word-form (*padasphoṭa*).¹²⁰ It must be assumed to exist in order to account for the knowledge of an object denoted by a word. It is manifested to auditory perception as

¹¹⁹ YSP., Bombay, 1915, p. 95; S.B., I, 3, 28.

¹²⁰ YSP., p. 95; PKM., p. 131.

one, partless, and devoid of sequence, because there is the experience of one meaning after hearing the word. This perception cannot have letters for its object, since many letters which are different from one another cannot produce one perception. Nor has it a generality (e.g. the genus of letters) for its object, because it cannot produce the knowledge of one definite object. Nor is it illusory as it is not contradicted. Nor is it non-existent inasmuch as it is an uncontradicted perception. The word-form (*padasphoṭa*) must be admitted to be eternal. If it were non-eternal, then it would be destroyed after being perceived at the time when a convention (*samketa*) is made, and the word 'cow' being heard at some other time and in some other place would not produce the knowledge of the object (e.g. a cow), because a word-form which has not been made a convention cannot produce the knowledge of an object. If it could do so, then a person coming from an island where there are no cows would have the knowledge of a cow on hearing the word 'cow' and making a convention would be unnecessary. But both these contingencies are unthinkable. Hence a word-form is eternal.¹²¹

17. *The Jaina Criticism of the Sābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa*

Prabhācandra criticizes the Sābdika doctrine of a word-form (*padasphoṭa*). The Jaina maintains, that the last letter qualified by the destruction of the preceding letters perceived through the auditory organ produces the knowledge of the object denoted by a word, and that, therefore, the utterance of the preceding letters is not needless. A negation can be an auxiliary cause of an effect. For instance, the negation of the conjunction of a stem and a fruit is a cause of the fall of the fruit. A motion qualified by the negation of a prior conjunction is an auxiliary cause of a subsequent conjunction. The conjunction of a fire with the atoms of earth qualified by the destruction of their previous black colour produces red colour in them. Or, the last letter aided by the impressions (*samskāra*) of the perceptions of the preceding letters, and qualified by the negation of the perceptions of the preceding letters, produces the knowledge of the object denoted by a word. An impression of the perception of a preceding letter (e.g. *c* or *o*), it may be objected, cannot produce

¹²¹ *BKM.*, p. 131. *HIP.*, 1, Ch. XII.

the knowledge of another object (e.g. cow). This objection, Prabhācandra urges, is without any foundation, since the last letter modified by the impression of the perception of the preceding letter is found to produce the knowledge of the object denoted by a word. The impression of the perception of the preceding letter renders an aid to the last letter with the help of other conditions. The first letter (e.g. c) produces a cognition, which produces an impression. Then the cognition of the second letter (e.g. o) is produced. It is qualified by the impression of the preceding cognition, and produces an impression, which is qualified. Then the cognition of the last letter (e.g. w) is produced. It is qualified by the impression of the cognition of the second letter. The last letter aided by the last impression produces the knowledge of the object denoted by the word 'cow'. Or, the experiences of the preceding letters and their impressions are not destroyed, but continue to exist and modify the last letter. Or, the last letter depending on the recollection produced by the impression of the cognition of the preceding letter produces the knowledge of the object denoted by a word. The Śābdika argues, that when a word-form (*padasphoṭa*) is present, the knowledge of the import of a word is present; that when the former is absent, the latter is absent; and that, therefore, a word-form is the cause of the knowledge of the import of a word. But Prabhācandra contends, that the assumption of an imperceptible cause is justified when a perceptible cause cannot account for the production of an effect; and that the last letter qualified by the impression of the preceding letter can adequately account for the knowledge of the import of a word. He contends further, that all the component letters of a word, collectively or distributively, are unable to manifest a word-form, because they are produced and destroyed successively, and consequently do not coexist together, and because the first letter manifesting the word-form completely, the second and the subsequent letters become unnecessary. To argue that the utterance of the second and the subsequent letters is not unnecessary because the last letter manifests the word-form while it is refined by the preceding letters is wrong, since the nature of refinement as distinguished from manifestation is not known. Hence the Śābdika doctrine of a word-form (*padasphoṭa*) is not tenable.¹²²

18. *The Mīmāṃsaka Criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa (Padasphoṭa)*

Kumārila criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa elaborately. Pārthasārathi Miśra sums up his arguments in the following manner. A word which is nothing but letters or letter-sounds is perceived through the auditory organ. Nothing over and above them is manifested by auditory perception. The so-called word-form (*padasphoṭa*) is capable of being perceived, and yet it is not perceived. Hence it does not exist. The Śābdika who assumes the existence of a word-form has to further assume the impressions of letters. All letters manifest a word-form. But they are successive and consequently can co-exist through the impressions of the preceding letters. So the Śābdika must assume the existence of impressions (*saṃskāra*). If a word-form is manifested by each letter of a word—the preceding letters indistinctly manifesting it and the succeeding letters manifesting it more and more distinctly, then the second and the other subsequent letters are not needless. But, in that case, the succeeding letters capable of manifesting a word-form distinctly would manifest it, and the preceding letters would be useless. If the letters manifest a word-form partly, then it is not indivisible and partless. It may be argued, that a word-form is not distinctly manifested all at once, but that it is first indistinctly manifested, and more and more distinctly manifested as the letters are heard again and again. This argument is wrong for, in that case, a word-form would be manifested by the repeated preceding letters or by the repeated succeeding letters, and all letters would not be necessary. Further, if each letter manifested a word-form, then the preceding letters would distinctly manifest it, and the succeeding letters would indistinctly manifest it, or the letters uttered in a reverse order would manifest it. In order to avoid these difficulties the Śābdika must admit that a word-form is manifested by the last letter aided by the impressions of the preceding letters. So he must admit the reality of impressions (*saṃskāra*) in addition to that of an imperceptible word-form. Thus he violates the parsimony of hypotheses. According to the Mīmāṃsaka, the impressions of the letters produce collectively one recollection which cognizes all letters and produces the knowledge of the import of a word.

But this is not possible for the Śābdika, who holds that there are four kinds of words (*vāk*): (1) *parā*, (2) *paśyanti*, (3) *madhyamā*, and (4) *vaikhari*. The first is Śabdabrahma called *Bindu* abiding in *mūlādhāra* at the bottom of the spinal cord; it is in the nature of refined air in this plexus. The second abides in a plexus in the spinal cord near the navel; it is manifested by air and known by the mind (*manas*). The third abides in a plexus in the cord near the heart; it is a word-form (*śabdasphoṭa*), which is subtle and inaudible through the auditory organ, manifested by air, and cognizable by the intellect (*buddhi*) in the course of mental recitation of a *mantra* or a divine name. The fourth abides in a plexus in the cord near the throat, rises upward through air, strikes the head, returns, and is heard by the auditory organ. It is an audible word.¹²³ Articulate sounds (*nāda*), either being known, or remembered, or existing, manifest a word-form. They are not perceived through the auditory organ, and cannot, therefore, manifest a word-form. Their recollection also cannot manifest it because they are not perceived. They cannot be said to refine the auditory organ by their mere existence and thus manifest a word-form, for they are successive and cannot exist simultaneously. So they can exist simultaneously through their impressions only, and the assumption of impressions of letters is indispensable. It may be argued, that the impressions which are the causes of recollections are unable to manifest a word-form, but that the refinements of the auditory organ manifest it like the letters, and that the assumption of other impressions is not necessary. This argument is wrong because the refinements are momentary, and cannot therefore manifest it collectively. If each refinement manifests it, then the first refinement manifesting it, the later refinements are needless. Or, the conjunction of the auditory organ with a letter itself is its refinement. But it is momentary because letter-sounds are mobile. So other abiding impressions must be assumed to exist. Hence a word is not an entity over and above its component letters; a word-form is non-existent. According to the Mīmāṃsaka the letters being remembered signify the object denoted by a word. The order of succession among them also is its auxiliary condition. Otherwise the letters being uttered in a reverse order would produce the knowledge of the meaning

¹²³ G.D.P., p. 374; N.M., pp. 373-4.

of a word. Hence the remembered letters invested with the order attributed to them by the letter-sounds which manifest them signify the object denoted by a word.¹²⁴

19. *The Vaiśeṣika Criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa (Padasphoṭa)*

Śrīdhara criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa. When a word is uttered, its letter-sounds are heard in succession. Nothing over and above them is perceived. If a word-form is perceived after the letters are perceived, then the perception of letters is illusory, and that the word-form is valid. But the former is never contradicted by the latter, as the illusory perception of silver is contradicted by the valid perception of a nacre. A word-form is neither perceived nor known by any other *pramāṇa*. It cannot be said to be assumed to account for the knowledge of the meaning of a word. If a word-form being unperceived could produce such knowledge, it would always do so. It being perceived also cannot produce it for it is not perceived. The letters perceived and aided by their impressions can produce the knowledge of the meaning of a word. Though the letters are momentary, yet their impressions being produced successively produce such knowledge jointly. Or, the last letter aided by the impression or recollection of the preceding letter produces such knowledge.¹²⁵ The Nyāya also maintains, that though impressions produce recollections, yet they can produce other effects. The Śābdika assumes the existence of a word-form and its power of producing the knowledge of the import of a word with the aid of the impressions of the component letters, and thus violates the parsimony of hypotheses. Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika hypothesis is better than the Śābdika hypothesis of Sphoṭa.¹²⁶

20. *The Naiyāyika Criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa*

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa. The successive letters of a word only are perceived, but a word-form is not perceived. Nor is it inferred from the experience of the meaning of a word for it is produced by the successive letters

¹²⁴ ŚD., and ŚDP., pp. 370-7. ŚV., Sphoṭavāda.

¹²⁵ Pūrvavarnasamākārasamaranayor anyatarasāpekṣo'nyo varṇaḥ pratyāyakaḥ. NK., p. 270.

¹²⁶ Ibid., pp. 269-71. HIP., i, pp. 891-3.

which are perceived. A single letter cannot produce such knowledge. But all letters can jointly produce it. It is wrong to argue that all letters cannot collectively produce such knowledge because they are successive, for successive causes are often found to produce an effect jointly. For instance, many successive morsels of food jointly produce one satisfaction. They are successive and yet conjointly produce such an effect. Similarly, successive letters collectively produce the experience of the meaning of a word. Though the preceding letters are past and the last letter is present, yet the former render an aid to the latter. Therefore all letters jointly produce the knowledge of the import of a word, even as many successive momentary acts jointly produce an effect. The aggregate of successive letters is as imaginary as the aggregate of successive acts. Or, the mental cumulative knowledge (*samkalanāijnāna*) of all letters, which is produced after the successive letters are perceived, produces the knowledge of the meaning of a word. When Devadatta has eaten a hundred mangoes, he has a cumulative mental representative knowledge (*mānasa anuvyavasāya*) of all these mangoes. Such a cumulative knowledge (*samuccayajñāna*) of a collection of objects exists, which is neither doubtful nor uncontradicted. The cumulative knowledge of the perceived last letter and the remembered preceding letters is variegated, and apprehends existing and non-existent letters. It is produced after the successive letters are perceived, and produces the knowledge of the import of a word. It may be argued, that the impressions of letters can produce the recollections of them, but that they cannot produce the comprehension of the meaning of a word. This argument is wrong because it is not a command of the king that impressions can produce recollections only. An impression is not an independent substance, but a power of the self produced in it by the apprehension of an object, which is inferred from recollection that is its effect. This power can produce another effect viz., the knowledge of the meaning of a word. The self has such knowledge after having the impressions of the perceptions of the component letters. So an impression is not the power of recollection only. But it is a quality of the self called *vāsanā* which can produce the knowledge of the meaning of a word like recollection. The letters and their perceptions are past; another word-form is not perceived; but there is the knowledge of the meaning of a word.

It is produced by the impressions of letters. But why should impressions be the causes of apprehension (*anubhava*)? There is no rule that they must always produce recollections. Just as impressions are inferred from recollections as their causes, so they are inferred from the apprehension of the meaning of a word as its cause. Or, the impressions of letters produce such apprehension through recollections; the perception of the last letter and the recollections of the preceding letters, or the perceived letter and the remembered letters, produce such apprehension.¹²⁷ But recollections of letters also, it may be argued, are produced successively as they follow the order of the original perceptions, and cannot, therefore, coexist together and collectively produce such apprehension. This argument is invalid, since the self affected by the successive impressions of the letters remembers at once all of them, and acquires the apprehension of the meaning of the word. The *Śābdika* also admits the impressions of letters in order to account for the manifestation of a word-form. But he makes a number of needless assumptions e.g., a unique word-form, its existence, its distinctness from the letters, and its partlessness. Further, a word-form is said to be indistinctly manifested by the first letter, and more distinctly manifested by the succeeding letters. But because it is partless and indivisible, it is entirely and distinctly manifested by the first letter, and the other letters are needless. If it is partially manifested by the different letters, then it is not partless. If a succession of letters be said to manifest a word-form, it may as well produce the knowledge of the import of a word, and a word-form is not necessary for it.¹²⁸ Furthermore, the validity of verbal knowledge depends upon the reliability of the speaker of the words. But a word-form is eternal and not created by a reliable person. So it is not valid. Hence the non-eternal letters of a word, which are uttered by a trustworthy person, produce the valid knowledge of the meaning of a word.¹²⁹

21. *The Advaita Vedānta Criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa*

The component letters of a word successively produced and heard can produce the knowledge of the meaning of a word.

¹²⁷ *Smṛyamāpānubhūyamān*

¹²⁸ *NM.*, pp. 374-8.

upako'thāpratyayaḥ NM., p. 377.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 366.

So the assumption of a word-form (*padasphoṭa*) is unnecessary. It cannot be said to be apprehended by the perception of the last word modified by the impressions of the preceding letters, since it apprehends all the letters, and not a word-form. The one cognition of 'cow', which is produced just after the perceptions of the successive letters, apprehends nothing but these. What is called the one unique perception of a word-form is a mere recollection of all letters. But how can many letters be cognized by one cognition? That is not impossible. The one cognition of a line of trees, a forest, an army, a hundred, or a thousand cognizes many objects. Similarly, a series of successive letters (e.g. *c*, *o*, and *w*) can be cognized by one cognition. But if all letters constituted a word and were cognized by one cognition, then the same letters in different orders (e.g. 'pot' and 'top') would produce the knowledge of the same object. But, in fact, they produce the cognitions of different objects. Śaṅkara replies, that the same letters in the same order convey the same meaning, but that they in a different order convey a different meaning because they become different when they are in a different order. The letters in a particular order are cognized by the cognition of a word, even as ants in a particular order are cognized by the cognition of a line. The assumption of a word-form is unnecessary because it contradicts our experience and postulates a needless imperceptible entity.¹²⁰

22. *The Nature and Import of a Sentence (Vākyārtha)*

(1) The Nyāya defines a sentence as a collection of words, which has a single meaning.¹²¹ The mutual relation of the objects denoted by the component words is signified by it.¹²² The knowledge of the words is the principal cause (*karana*); the presentation of the imports of the words is its causal operation (*vyāpāra*); and expectancy, compatibility, proximity and knowledge of the intention of the speaker are the auxiliary causes of the knowledge of the import of a sentence. Verbal knowledge is the result (*phala*) of these causes. The words 'a jar' do not make a sentence; they expect other words to make a complete sense. Devadatta, bring a jar'. This is a sentence. There must be close

¹²⁰ *Sphoṭavādināḥ tu dr̥ṣṭānir adṛṣṭakalpanā ca.* S.B., i, 3, 28.

¹²¹ *Vākyam padasamūhah.* TS., p. 68. TK., p. 15.

¹²² *Padopasthānānāṁ mithah saṁgo vākyārthah.* TK., p. 15.

proximity among the words. If they are uttered at long intervals, they do not make a sentence. 'Irrigate the field with fire'. There is no compatibility of 'irrigate' with 'fire'. So this is not a sentence. 'Irrigate the field with water'. This is a sentence as the words are compatible with one another. A person says at the time of eating, 'Bring *saindhava*'. The word means either salt or a horse. He means by it salt here. So expectancy, proximity, compatibility and the speaker's intention are the auxiliary causes of verbal knowledge.¹³³

Viśvanātha makes the following observations on verbal knowledge. The known words are not the principal cause (*karana*), but the knowledge of the component words is so. If a silent person mentally recites a verse, he knows the meaning of the sentence, though words are not present here. The recollection of the objects denoted by the words is the causal operation (*vyāpāra*) which immediately produces verbal knowledge. The perception of the objects denoted by the words is not the causal operation. If that were so, a person perceiving them and acquainted with the meanings of words would have verbal knowledge. The words produce the recollection of the objects by their denotative power (*vr̥tti*). *Vr̥tti* is either denotation (*śakti*) or implication (*lakṣaṇā*). Words and objects were associated with each other in a person's past experience. He hears the words now and remembers the objects according to the law of contiguity. *Śakti* is the relation between a word and its object, which depends upon a convention (*saṃketa*). It is a volition of God. The ancient Nyāya does not regard a recent convention as a volition of God. The Navya Nyāya regards a convention as a mere volition, and not as a volition of God,¹³⁴ and maintains that recent conventions also have denotative power.¹³⁵ The Nyāya gives the realistic interpretation of a sentence. (2) Some maintain that a sentence is not external and distinct from the component letters and words, but a mere subjective cognition in the form of a sentence (*anusamhāra-buddhi*), which cognizes a series of letters and words in a single grasp. This is the idealistic interpretation of a sentence.¹³⁶ (3) The Śābdika regards a sentence as one, indivisible,

¹³³ TA., p. 18; TK., p. 15.

¹³⁴ Navyās tu īśvareccā na śaktiḥ kiṃ tvicchaiva. SM., p. 361.

¹³⁵ SM., pp. 360-1.

¹³⁶ Anusamhrtir vākyam. PKM., p. 134. YBh., iii, 17. ŚV., Vākyādhi-karaṇa, 118; NR., 118.

partless sentence-form (*vākyasphoṭa*), which is devoid of words but manifested by them. He considers the import of a sentence also to be one and indivisible (*akhaṇḍārtha*).¹³⁷ This is the transcendental interpretation of a sentence, since a sentence-form is supersensible but comprehended by the intellect or reason (*buddhi*). (4) The Jaina defines a sentence as an independent aggregate of words dependent on one another, which does not depend upon the words of another sentence, and which is partly different and partly non-different from the component words.¹³⁸ He distinguishes between a subjective sentence (*bhāvavākya*) and an objective sentence (*dravyavākya*).

23. *The Śābdika doctrine of Sentence-form (Vākyasphoṭa) and its Criticism*

A sentence, according to the Śābdika, is one, indivisible, partless sentence-form (*vākyasphoṭa*). There are no words in a sentence, as there are no letters in a word, and there are no parts in a letter. As a sentence is partless, so its meaning also is partless. The import of a sentence is really undivided and devoid of distinctions. But it appears to have distinctions owing to the limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) of the meanings of the words.¹³⁹ A word-form is manifested by many kinds of articulate sounds, which are similar to those that manifest another sentence-form. The cognitions of the parts of a sentence are illusory due to the similarity of the manifesting sounds.¹⁴⁰ A word-form (*padasphoṭa*) is cognized by the knowledge of a word; a sentence-form is manifested by the knowledge of a sentence. A word-form manifests the meaning of a word; a sentence-form manifests the meaning of a sentence.¹⁴¹ An indivisible sentence manifests an indivisible meaning.

Kumārila criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of a sentence-form in the following manner. The Śābdika, who regards a sentence

¹³⁷ Eko' navayavaḥ śabdo vākyaṃ. PKM., p. 134. VPD., Ch. II. YBh., iii, 17.

¹³⁸ Padānāṃ tadapekṣāṇāṃ nirapekṣaḥ samudāyo vākyaṃ. Padebhyah kathaṃcid bhinnam abhinnam ca vākyaṃ. PKM., pp. 133, 135.

¹³⁹ Avikalpe'pi vākyārthe vikalpā bhāvanāśrayāḥ.

Samudāyo'bhidheyaḥ syād avikalpasamuccayaḥ. VPD., ii; ŚDP., p. 610.

¹⁴⁰ SV., Vākyādhikaraṇa, 119, 123; NR., 119, 123.

¹⁴¹ Padabuddheḥ padasphoṭo vākyabuddheḥ ca vākyasphoṭo viśayaḥ. Padasphoṭāt padārtha-pratipattiḥ vākyasphoṭātca vākyārtha-pratipattiḥ. NM., p. 371. YBh., iii, 17.

or its meaning as external, indivisible and partless, maintains that the cognitions of its parts, words and their meanings, are illusory. Even if they are considered to be illusory, he cannot explain how they are thought to be real. If the parts of a sentence are not existent and separate, then there can be no similarity among them which may produce the illusion of parts. If there is similarity among them, then they are existent, and a sentence is not devoid of parts. If the parts were non-existent, then all sentences would be similar to one another, which is absurd! A sentence has no parts, but it appears to have similarity of parts, even as the cognition of a picture, which has no parts, appears to have similarity of parts (e.g. colours). This argument is wrong, since the object of the cognition has parts, though the cognition has no parts. The letters and words of a sentence are non-existent, and therefore cannot be similar to one another, and have any temporal order. If they are non-existent, then one non-serial, indivisible sentence-form cannot produce the cognition of many successive letters and words. The Śābdika doctrine of one indivisible sentence-form manifesting its meaning violates the parsimony of hypotheses, for an infinite number of sentence-forms invested with infinite imperceptible powers manifest infinite meanings. It is more rational to assume that a small number of words and their meanings produce an infinite number of sentences and their meanings.¹⁴² Pārthasārathi Miśra urges, that the parts of a sentence are known, and that the context determines the meaning of a sentence. There is a distinction of means and ends in Vedic and Tāntric injunctive sentences. They become useless, if sentences are partless and indivisible. An action depends upon the knowledge of the means and the end to be realized by them. Therefore the meaning of a sentence is not indivisible. It consists of a collection of many meanings of the component words. Or, it is qualified by their meanings. It is not uncaused; nor is it due to convention (*saṃketa*). It is produced and made known by the remembered meanings of the component words. It is also determined by the context. Hence an injunctive sentence is valid, and the doctrine of *Vākyasphoṭa* is untenable.¹⁴³ This is the Mīmāṃsaka criticism of the Śābdika doctrine.

Prabhācandra urges, that the doctrine of *Vākyasphoṭa* is a

¹⁴² *SV.*, *Vākyādhikaraṇa*, 120-4, 129-30, 132-5; *NR.*, 120-33.

¹⁴³ *SD.*, pp. 610-1.

mere fiction of the imagination, since it cannot be proved by any means of valid knowledge, and a sentence-form cannot produce the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence.¹⁴⁴ This is the Jaina criticism of the Śābdika doctrine.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the doctrine of *Vākyasphoṭa*. A sentence is not devoid of parts, since it contradicts our experience. In every sentence different words and their meanings are distinctly manifested to consciousness. The experience cannot be said to be illusory, as it is not contradicted by a sublative cognition. The illusion cannot be said to be due to similarity, since it presupposes the existence of some entities which are similar to one another. So the parts of some sentence must exist. A sentence may be said to be partless like the cognition of picture. This is a false analogy. The cognition of a picture is partless; but its object, the picture, has parts. Hence a sentence and its meaning are not partless. It is foolish to argue that a sentence and a word have no parts as letters have parts, and that if the former have parts, then the latter also have parts. Apprehension and non-apprehension determine the nature of an object; it is so as it is apprehended, and it is not so as it is not apprehended. If the argument mentioned above be valid, then the argument that atoms also have parts because jars have parts is valid. The parts of words and sentences are perceived, and so they are existent. But the parts of letters are not perceived, and so they are non-existent. A sentence is produced and destroyed when its component words are produced and destroyed. The meaning of a sentence is produced and destroyed when its component words are produced and destroyed. Similarly, the parts of a word also are real. Hence a sentence and its meaning have parts. The doctrine of a sentence-form is irrational.¹⁴⁵ This is the Nyāya criticism of the Śābdika doctrine.

24. *The Doctrine that a Sentence is a Cognition* (*Anusamhṛti*)

A sentence is a construction of the intellect. The first word, the last word, and the other words are dependent on one another. But the sentence composed by them is a creation of the intellect. It is a reflection (*anusamhṛti*) on the successive letters formed

¹⁴⁴ PKM., p. 134.

¹⁴⁵ NM., pp. 383-4.

into words. It cognizes the successive letters and words in a single grasp.¹⁴⁶ After they are uttered, a cognition is produced by the appearance of the relation of a substance, a genus, a quality, and an action to one another, which is the meaning of a sentence.

But there can be no cognition without an object ultimately. So there must be an external sentence corresponding to the cognition. This is Kumārila's criticism of the doctrine. The Jaina distinguishes between a subjective sentence (*bhāvavākya*) and an objective sentence (*dravyavākya*). The cognition of a sentence is a subjective sentence. It is a modification of the self invested with the impressions (*samskāra*) of the cognitions of the preceding letters and perceiving the last letter through the auditory organ. But it is not an objective sentence. A rational person cannot regard a cognition as an external sentence, since it contradicts our experience. An external sentence is real and cognized by the cognition. Hence a sentence cannot be regarded as a mere cognition.¹⁴⁷ This is Prabhāchandra's criticism.

25. *Prabhākara's doctrine of Anvitābhīdhāna and Criticism of Abhihitānvayavāda*

Prabhākara is an advocate of the doctrine of *Anvitābhīdhāna*. According to him, the words of a sentence denote their meanings as related to one another, from which the meaning of a sentence is known; they do not denote their separate meanings unrelated to one another. They cannot constitute a sentence, if they do not denote its unitary meaning. The meanings of words are not learnt from the usage of the elders. But the meanings of sentences are learnt from their speech and actions. The meanings of words are learnt from those of sentences which are spoken by certain elder persons (*prayojaka vṛddha*) acquainted with their meanings and the actions of bringing and removing certain objects performed by other elder persons (*prayojya vṛddha*) in execution of their commands.¹⁴⁸

Prabhākara criticizes the doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya* advocated by Kumārila and the Naiyāyika, who maintain that the words of a sentence denote their separate meanings. If words

¹⁴⁶ YBh., iii, 17; PKM., p. 134; ŚV., Vākyādhikaraṇa, NR., 118.

¹⁴⁷ PKM., p. 134.

¹⁴⁸ Vākyārthamāṭrkāṅgī, p. 2.

denote their separate meanings, they can do so only when their meanings are learnt from the behaviour of the elders (*vyavahāra*), which consists in their speech in the shape of a sentence, since a word only is not used in speech. A speaker speaks a sentence in order to communicate related meanings. A hearer also comprehends related meanings of a sentence. So related meanings are learnt from a spoken sentence. All component words collectively denote the meaning of a sentence.¹⁴⁹ This is the doctrine of *Anvitābhidhāna*. If the last word denotes the unitary meaning of a sentence unrelated to the meanings of the other words, then all words do not produce such knowledge. It is wrong to argue that if the first word denotes the integral meaning of a sentence, the subsequent words are needless, because one word without the other words cannot denote it. Each word persists in exercising causal operation until the knowledge of the unitary meaning of a sentence is produced so that no word is needless. Then let a sentence and its meaning be partless. This is not possible, since words singly denote their own meanings, but they collectively produce the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence.¹⁵⁰ which is a collection of words denoting one meaning. Prabhākara does not deny the meanings of words in producing the integral meaning of a sentence, which do not cease to function until the related meaning of it is produced. But he does not admit that words denote their separate meanings. The meanings of words apart from a sentence are not learnt, since there is no means of knowing them. The utterance of the second and subsequent words is not unnecessary, for their proximity is necessary for producing the integral meaning of a sentence. As all causes of action jointly produce an action, so all words collectively produce the meaning of a sentence. The unrelated meanings of words of a sentence cannot be learnt. No relation can be established among them, because there is no means of doing so. Expectancy, proximity and compatibility cannot be said to relate the meanings of words to one another. Words and their meanings are unconscious and cannot therefore have expectancy. It is absurd to say that a word expects another word or that a meaning expects another meaning. A person's expectancy

¹⁴⁹ *Samhātārtham abhidadhati padāni vākyam.* NM., p. 397.

¹⁵⁰ *Vākyārthapratipattiḥ saṃghātakāryam, svakāryam tu padārthapratipattiḥ.* NM., p. 397.

or desire after a sentence has been heard cannot establish a relation among the separate meanings of the constituent words. If it does so, then the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not due to words, and is non-verbal. Hence the words denote the meanings related to one another. Mutual relations among the meanings of words are known from the cognitions of the related meanings of words. There is no other means of knowing them. We learn the related meanings of words from the sentences spoken by the elders who are acquainted with their meanings. Hence the doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya* is not tenable.¹⁵¹

26. *The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā Criticism of Anvitābhīdhānavāda*

Kumārila criticizes Prabhākara's doctrine of *Anvitābhīdhāna*. Words do not denote related (*anvita*) meanings, because when a word is uttered, its own meaning only is apprehended. Hence the words of a sentence denote their separate meanings unrelated to one another. The meanings of words being known from the words, which are related to one another by proximity, expectancy and compatibility, produce the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. When the former are present, the latter is produced.¹⁵²

According to *Anvitābhīdhānavāda*, the unity of a sentence is due to the unity of its integral meaning denoted by the component words and the unity of purpose. Pārthasārathi Miśra urges that on this view 'should perform a sacrifice heaven result animal fire god' is a sentence, since all the words are connected with the performance of a particular sacrifice with a particular substance to a particular god with the object of achieving a particular end. He urges further, that a Vedic injunctive sentence is one because it embodies one purpose, but that its oneness is not perceived, but inferred from its context. Similarly, the unity of the sentence 'Bring a cow' is not perceived. The unity of a sentence is due to the unity of its meaning produced by the component words which denote their separate meanings, and do not cease to function. The words directly denote their separate meanings, and imply the related meaning of a sentence.¹⁵³ This

¹⁵¹ NM., pp. 396-9.

¹⁵² ŚV., Vākyādhikaraṇa, NR., 104, 110-1.

¹⁵³ Padābhīhitaiḥ padārthair lakṣaṇayā vākyārthaḥ pratipadyate. ŚD., p. 604

is the view of Pārthasārathi Miśra. It may be argued, that in the sentence 'Devadatta, bring a cow' 'Devadatta' and 'a cow' being known by perception and their expectancy, proximity and compatibility being present, there is no knowledge of the mutual relations among the meanings of the words, that therefore the meanings of words do not produce the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence; but that the words themselves denote the related meanings. Pārthasārathi contends that Prabhākara's doctrine also suffers from the same difficulty, since 'Devadatta' and 'a cow' being perceived, and expectancy, proximity and compatibility being present, the two words cannot denote the mutual relations among their meanings, because they are not actually present, but are remembered only. Hence Prabhākara's doctrine that words denote their related meaning is untenable.¹⁵⁴

27. *The Nyāya Criticism of Anvitābhīdhānavāda*

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the doctrine of *Anvitābhīdhāna* thus: Prabhākara maintains, that we learn the meanings of sentences uttered by elder persons acquainted with their meanings. Jayanta urges, that then we must learn the meaning of each sentence afresh; but that if we learn the meanings of words of a sentence, then the meaning of each new sentence need not be learnt afresh. Prabhākara does not maintain, like the Śābdika, that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is independent of the meanings of the component words. He admits that the meanings of the words collectively produce the meaning of a sentence. The meaning of a word is said to be related to the meanings of other words which are expected, proximate and compatible. A word does not always jointly produce a unitary meaning of a sentence, but it denotes its own meaning only. It does not renounce its meaning when it is combined with other expected, proximate and compatible words. Its limited meaning is known by the double method of agreement. Again, when one word is not used, the unitary meaning of a sentence is not produced. It is known from the intention of the speaker. Prabhākara advocates the doctrine of *Anvitābhīdhāna* because he does not consider the intention of the speaker. But his doctrine is wrong since words always possess

¹⁵⁴ ŚD., pp. 599-609. Na padānām anvite śaktiḥ pramāṇavati, nirastāś cāyam anvitābhīdhānavādaḥ. Ibid, p. 609.

the power of denoting their limited meanings. It is self-contradictory to maintain that a word denotes a related meaning (*samsrṣṭārtha*) without denoting its limited meaning, for the knowledge of a relation presupposes that of the relata. If it denotes its limited meaning as well as the related meaning, then it may as well denote all meanings. Hence a word does not denote all meanings, or a related meaning, but its separate limited meaning only; it can manifest an unrelated object, but not a related object. The doctrine of *Anvitābhīdhāna* is irrational.¹⁵⁵

28. *The Nyāya and Kumārila's doctrine of Abhihitānvaya*

The Nyāya advocates the doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya* according to which the words of a sentence denote their separate meanings, and convey the knowledge of their relations to one another when expectancy, proximity and compatibility of the words are considered. The meaning of a sentence is known after the meanings of its component words are known. It is not known if the meanings of the words are not known. The words mean a substance, a quality, an action, or a genus. The import of a sentence is comprehended when the relations among the objects denoted by the words are known. The meanings of words are known from the sentences uttered by some elder persons and acted upon by other elder persons acquainted with their meanings. Otherwise the meaning of each sentence would have to be learnt anew, and sentences being infinite in number, comprehension of their meanings would not be possible. Hence there would be extinction of the use of sentences. It is found that the meanings of the new verses of a poet are comprehended. The comprehension of them depends upon that of the meanings of the constituent words. But it would not be possible, if a sentence and its meaning were learnt from the speech and actions of the elders. Hence words do not denote their meanings related to one another. If they did so, the first word would denote the meaning of the sentence, and the subsequent words would be needless. But it contradicts our experience. If the proximity of the other words be said to be the cause of the first word's denoting the meaning of the sentence, then it is so by its mere existence or by denoting

¹⁵⁵ NM., pp. 400-1.

the meanings of other words. It cannot be so by its mere existence, since then proximity would not differ from non-proximity. Mere proximity whose relation to the words is not known cannot render any aid to the first word. If it is so by denoting the meanings of other words, then the separate meanings denoted by the component words are related to one another by virtue of their proximity, expectancy and compatibility. A word is related to those other words which it expects, which are proximate to it, and which are compatible with it. Hence the separate meanings denoted by the words are related to one another.¹⁵⁶ The words denote their separate limited meanings; and then they collectively produce the related meaning of a sentence. They do not denote the related meaning of a sentence.^{156a} They produce the knowledge of its integral meaning. The relations of the meanings of words are not denoted by them; but they are known from a sentence.¹⁵⁷ The Nyāya doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya* is better than Prabhākara's doctrine of *Anvitābhidhāna*, because it does not make the second and subsequent words unnecessary, and because it is not vitiated by the defects of the doctrine.¹⁵⁸

Kumārila also advocates the doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya*. The words denote their separate meanings from which the meaning of a sentence is known. They never denote the related meaning of a sentence. They do not lose their meanings in the meaning of a sentence, which is known from them due to the power of the intention of the speaker. The knowledge of the meanings of the words is verbal (*śābda*), since it is produced by words. But the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not directly produced by them. But it is not non-verbal (*aśābda*) for that reason. It is verbal inasmuch as the causal operation of the intention of the speaker conveyed by the words has not yet ceased to operate. Hence the words are indirectly the cause of the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence.¹⁵⁹ The component words, according to Pārthasārathi Miśra, denote their separate meanings, which collec-

¹⁵⁶ Abhihitānām eva padārthānam anvaya iti yuktam. NM., p. 396.

^{156a} Anvitam artham padāni saṁhatya saṁpādayanti no tvanvitam abhidadhati. Padānyanvitaṁ pratyāyayanti na tanvitam abhidadhati. NM., pp. 402-3.

¹⁵⁷ Na hi saṁsargo'bhidhīyate pratīyate ca vākyaṭ. NM., p. 403.

¹⁵⁸ NM., pp. 400-4.

¹⁵⁹ ŚV., Vākyaadhikaraṇa, 228-30; NR., 228-30.

tively produce the unitary meaning of a sentence ; they do not directly denote the related meaning of a sentence.¹⁶⁰

29. *Anvīyamānābhīdhānavāda and Abhidhīyamānānvayavāda*

According to the doctrine of *Anvīyamānābhīdhāna*, words denote their separate meanings which are related to one another. According to *Abhidhīyamānānvaya*, words relate the separate meanings which are denoted by them. Jayanta criticizes these views, and urges that both are wrong, since the two separate acts of denoting (*abhīdhāna*) and relating (*anvaya*) are not experienced. They are either successive or simultaneous. They do not exist simultaneously, as they are not experienced together. When words are used, the act of relating their objects is not perceived. If they are successive, then either the act of denotation is prior to the act of relating or the act of relation is prior to the act of denotation. In the first alternative, the doctrine is nothing but *Abhihitānvaya*. In the second alternative, the doctrine is nothing but *Anvītabhīdhāna*. They are not *Abhidhīyamānānvaya* and *Anvīyamānābhīdhāna* respectively. The act of denotation is one, which is known by experts. The act of relating the objects denoted by words is not possible without their denotation. There is nothing new in these two doctrines. They are vitiated by the defects of the doctrines of *Abhihitānvaya* and *Anvayābhīdhāna*.¹⁶¹

30. *The doctrine of Anvītabhīdhāna in a general way and Abhihitānvaya in a special way*

Some maintain that words denote the related meaning in a general way, and denote their meanings which are related to one another in a special way. The word 'cow' denotes its own meaning related to the meanings of other words in a general way, its special qualities and actions being unknown. So far the doctrine is *Anvītabhīdhāna*. The relation of a cow to its special qualities and actions is known from other words. So far the doctrine is *Abhihitānvaya*. *Anvītabhīdhāna* in a general way is vitiated by the defects of *Anvītabhīdhāna*. *Abhihitānvaya* in a special way

¹⁶⁰ Padārthā ekaika-viśiṣṭārtha-pratipādanāya samāhṛtā vākyārtham pratipādayanti. ŚD., p. 609.

¹⁶¹ NM., pp. 401-2.

is vitiated by the defects of *Abhihitānvaya*. Hence this is not a new doctrine.¹⁶²

31. *The Jaina doctrine of the Import of a Sentence and Criticism of Abhihitānvaya*

Prabhācandra criticizes Kumārila's doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya* which maintains that the words denote their separate meanings, and that a sentence means the relation among them. Prabhācandra asks whether the meanings denoted by the words are related to one another by another word or whether they are related to one another by a cognition. The first alternative is not possible, for another word which manifests the meanings of all the words and relates them to one another is absent. The second alternative does not prove Kumārila's thesis, since the knowledge of the words itself is a sentence (*bhāvaavākya*), which comprehends its meaning, but the words are not a sentence. It may be argued, that a sentence is not different from the constituent words, because it is produced indirectly by them, and because the meaning of a sentence is known from the meanings of the words, which are related to one another owing to their presence to the discriminative intellect (*apekṣābuddhi*). Then, Prabhācandra contends, words are not different from their roots, case-endings, etc., since they are stated when their parts are stated and their meanings are known from the parts, which are related to one another. Kumārila may argue, that a word only is used in common parlance and in the Vedas to convey the meaning of a sentence, but that its roots, etc., are not used; that they are separated from a word in order to show its derivation; and that a word which is partless like a letter, and the parts of which are distinguished from one another by the imagination is known to produce the knowledge of its meaning. Prabhācandra urges that this argument is wrong, because a sentence only is real on a similar ground; that words are separated from it in order to show its construction; and that a sentence only is used in common parlance and in the Vedas to produce the knowledge of objects, which prompts actions to accept or reject them. Hence Prabhācandra concludes, that a word which is experienced as partly different and partly non-different from its parts must be admitted to be so; that it is not

¹⁶² NM., p. 402.

entirely partless as it cannot be proved ; and that a sentence which is experienced as partly different and partly non-different from its component words must be admitted to be so ; that a sentence is a collection of mutually dependent words, and independent of other words in another sentence ; and that there are two kinds of sentences: (1) an objective sentence (*dravyavākya*) which is in the form of a statement ; and ' a subjective sentence (*bhāvanavākya*) which is the thought of it. Experience cannot be denied. So Kumārila's doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya* is not tenable.¹⁸³

¹ PKM., p. 135.

APPENDIX

1. *The Jaina views on the Manas* (chapter I).—Pūjyapāda regards the mind (*manas*) as not a sense-organ because it is partly a sense-organ and partly not.¹ The external sense-organs can apprehend their objects here and now. But the objects of the mind are not restricted to a particular time and place. The external sense-organs apprehend external objects. But the mind (*manas*) cannot apprehend external objects. It is called an internal organ, because it does not depend upon the external sense-organs in deliberation on merits and defects of objects and recollection of objects.² There are two kinds of *manas*: (1) objective mind (*dravyamanah*) and (2) subjective mind (*bhāvamanah*). The former depends upon the emergence of infrasensible atoms of *karma*, which are the modifications of atoms. The latter is the purity of the self, which depends upon subsidence or partial destruction of *karma*—matter concealing sensuous knowledge.³ The former is composed of atoms which are aids of the self, and incline it to the discrimination of merits and demerits of things, recollection of, and reflection upon, objects due to the subsidence or partial destruction of knowledge-concealing *karma*-matter. Certain atoms which are aids to the self are modified into the objective mind and constitute *dravyamanah*. The latter consists in *labdhi* and *upayoga*.⁴

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika regard the *manas* as non-material, atomic and devoid of colour and other modifications. Pūjyapāda criticizes this view thus. He asks whether the *manas* is unrelated to the self and the sense-organs or whether it is related to them. In the first alternative, it cannot be an aid to the self, nor can it assist the sense-organs. In the second alternative, being atomic, it is related to a part of the self, and cannot assist it in its other parts. It cannot be said to be connected with different parts of the self in quick succession like a quickly moving firebrand, under the influence of merits and demerits (*adṛṣṭa*), since it is devoid of the power of quick movement. *Adṛṣṭa* is a quality of the self which is incorporeal and unmoving ;

¹ Anindriyam manah. Iṣad indriyam anindriyam. SS., i, 14.

² SS., i, 14.

³ SS., ii, 11.

⁴ SS., v, 19.

it is devoid of movement, and, consequently, cannot generate movement in the *manas*. A particular substance called air is perceived to be active, endued with touch, and causing motion in an object with which it comes into contact. But the *manas* is inactive, devoid of touch, and does not cause motion in another object with which it comes into contact. It is corporeal, because it is struck by the roar of a thunder. It cannot be struck by a corporeal substance, if it is not corporeal. It is influenced by the drinking of wine. It is overpowered by phlegm. Hence it is corporeal.⁵ Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of *manas* is wrong.

Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka regards the *manas* as a sense-organ, because it does not depend upon another sense-organ in its function, viz. examination of merits and defects of objects, even as the eye does not depend upon another sense-organ in apprehending colour. The *manas* does not cease to be a sense-organ because it is imperceptible. It is imperceptible as it is a modification of a subtle substance. It is inferred from the absence of simultaneous production of many kinds of sensuous perception in spite of the presence of colour, sound, odour, taste and touch. It is inferred from the recollection of an object seen or heard once before.⁶ Hence it is a sense-organ. *Manas* is the internal organ. Its function is not restricted to a specific kind of objects like an external sense-organ. It is not a sense-organ like an external sense-organ. But it is not devoid of the characteristics of a sense-organ.⁷

The author of *Jainatarkavārtika* does not regard the *manas* as a sense-organ. He regards the self itself as *manas*, which may have simultaneous cognitions due to the subsidence or partial destruction of *karma*-matter which conceals knowledge.⁸ A *jina* has clairvoyant perception of objects at a distance (*avadhi*) owing to the subsidence or partial destruction of the *karma*-matter which conceals clairvoyant knowledge due to the conquest of love and hatred. He has telepathic perception of the mental processes of other persons owing to the destruction of the *karma*-matter which conceals telepathic knowledge (*manahparyaya-jñāna*). The inclination of the self towards knowledge or its self-luminosity is the invariable precondition of such kinds of knowledge, which do not require the aid of *manas*. A Yogin can have one synchronous

⁵ SS., v, 19.

⁶ TRV., i, 5, 19, 4-8.

⁷ TRV., i, 5, 14, 2.

⁸ Manahsahjñāsyā jīvasyā jñānāvṛti-śamākṣayau. JTV., p. 100.

knowledge of common and distinctive features of objects owing to his inclination to know them without its aid. A *kevalin* also can have an omniscient cognition of all objects simultaneously without a *manas*. Hence the *manas* is not the internal organ.⁹ The self itself is *manas*, and nothing else.

Amṛta Sūri recognizes five sense-organs, e.g. tactual, gustatory, olfactory, visual, and auditory. He maintains, that the auxiliary function of *manas* is assisting the five sense-organs in performing their functions, and that its primary function is the production of mediate knowledge (*śrutajñāna*), e.g. inferential knowledge and verbal knowledge.¹⁰

2. *Veṅkaṭanātha's view of Perception: Indeterminate and Determinate Perception* (chapter II).—Veṅkaṭanātha defines perception as immediate knowledge. It is not mediated by any other knowledge. It is free from recollection. It is direct knowledge. It is immediate apprehension. Directness of a cognition consists in its manifesting its object distinctly. Distinctness consists in manifesting an object with its specific individuality.¹¹ Perception is either eternal or non-eternal. Divine perception is eternal. Human perception is non-eternal. It is either yogic perception or non-yogic perception. Yogic perception is produced by a particular excellent merit acquired by the practice of meditation and austerities. It is either ecstatic perception (*yukta pratyakṣa*) or non-ecstatic perception (*viyukta pratyakṣa*). The former is produced by the internal organ only in the state of ecstatic union with God. The latter is produced by the internal organ and the external organs in the state of falling off from ecstatic union with God. Veṅkaṭanātha includes sagic intuition (*ārśajñāna*) in yogic perception because both are produced by excellent merit.¹² Divine perception, perception of the liberated souls, and perception of the souls united with God are independent of the sense-organs. Cognition by its essential nature manifests all objects, but it is obstructed by the veil of ignorance (*avidyā*), which is partially destroyed by the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, and completely destroyed by perfect

⁹ *Ātmaiva mano nānyat*. JTVV., p. 100.

¹⁰ TSar., ii, 48.

¹¹ *Sākṣātkāri pramā pratyakṣam. Sākṣād anubhavaḥ pratyakṣam. Aparokṣyam nāma viśādāvabhāsatvam. Vaiśadyam nāma asādhāraṇākāreṇa vastvavabhāsatvam*. NP., pp. 70, 71, 72.

¹² *Prakṣādarśajātāvīṣṣāt*. NP., 75. Ibid, pp. 74-5.

knowledge in liberated souls. So their cognitions manifest all objects by their essential nature. The cognitions of sages also manifest all objects because the veil of their ignorance is destroyed by excellent merit due to the practice of austerities. Their super-normal perceptions are non-sensuous. The Yogins have mental perception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*). Non-yogic perception (*ayogi pratyakṣa*) is produced by the intercourse of normal external sense-organs with external objects aided by ordinary merit, light and other auxiliary conditions. It is of five kinds, visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactual. Each sense-organ apprehends its own appropriate object.

Normal perception is indeterminate or determinate. Both of them apprehend qualified objects.¹³ Only indeterminate perception is devoid of recognition, while determinate perception involves recognition.¹⁴ Indeterminate perception does not apprehend an unqualified object, since a cognition apprehending such an object is never perceived or possible. Even perceptions of babies, dumb persons, birds and beasts apprehend qualified objects, though they are devoid of names. They recognize the objects perceived by them as favourable or unfavourable and either accept them or reject them. The cognition of a qualified object, it may be argued, presupposes the cognition of a qualification, because it is a determinate cognition, like the acquired visual perception of fragrant sandal. This argument is wrong. In indeterminate perception, a substance, an attribute, and the relation between them are perceived through a sense-organ.¹⁵ The cognition produced by the first intercourse of a sense-organ with an object apprehends a qualified object, because it is a cognition. All cognitions apprehend qualified objects. Determinate perception is the cognition which is produced by the sense-organs aided by the revival of subconscious impressions. Indeterminate perception is independent of subconscious impressions. Determinate perception is dependent on them. The perception of the first individual of a class is indeterminate. The perception of the second individual and so on of the same class is determinate.

¹³ Ubhayavidam apyetaḍ viśiṣṭa-viśayaḥ. NP., p. 77.

¹⁴ Sapratyavamarāsapratyakṣaḥ savikalpam. Tadrहितam pratyakṣam nirvikalpam. NP., p. 77.

¹⁵ Nirvikalpake dharmavad dharmivacca tatsambandhasyāpyaındriya-katvāviśeṣeṇa grahaṇasambhavāt. NP., p. 79.

Indeterminate perception does not apprehend mere Being (*samātra*) as Śaṅkara wrongly maintains.¹⁶

The Advaita Vedāntist disputes the Rāmānujist's view that indeterminate perception apprehends a qualified object, e.g. a jar as a jar. He asks whether the difference of a jar from other objects is apprehended by a momentary indeterminate perception successively or simultaneously. In the first alternative, the difference cannot be apprehended because the different objects which are the substrates of difference were not apprehended at first. In the second alternative, the same first cognition apprehends different objects (*dharmin*) first, and then their difference (*bheda*). Thus it operates successively on its object, and does not apprehend it simultaneously. It cannot be held that the first cognition apprehends different objects only (*dharmimātra*) and that the second cognition apprehends their difference (*dharmā*), because the first cognition is destroyed when the second cognition appears, which, consequently, apprehends both different objects and their difference; so that the difficulty of its apprehending both either successively or simultaneously is not obviated. If the first cognition apprehends different objects only (*dharmimātra*) without their difference (*dharmā*), then perception does not apprehend jars, cloths and the like, nor their existence, but it apprehends mere Being which is common to them and their substratum, which is pure consciousness or Brahman. Śrīnivāsa urges, that in that case there would not be the perception of a jar or a cloth as existing, but that of 'existing', 'existing' and the like. Hence perception apprehends both different objects and their difference.¹⁷ Veṅkaṭanātha maintains that an infant does not apprehend an object devoid of a substratum (*dharmin*) and an attribute (*dharmā*), even though there is no inherence (*samavāya*) between them; and that he perceives them as inseparably related to each other. Indeterminate perception, therefore, apprehends a qualified object. A Rāmānujist does not recognize inherence as a distinct category.¹⁸

3. *Non-perception* (chapter III).—Non-perception is due to the absence of the intercourse of a sense-organ with its object, or its great distance, or great proximity, or hiddenness, or minuteness,

¹⁶ NP., pp. 82-3.

¹⁷ Nyāyasāra on NP., pp. 82-5.

¹⁸ TMK., p. 597; SAS., p. 598.

or being overpowered, or preoccupation of mind. It is due to inattention (*mano'navasthāna*) or instability of mind. Inattention is due to an intense emotion. When the mind is overwhelmed with grief, it cannot attend to an object and perceive it, even if it is quite near a person. Inattention is a condition of non-perception.¹⁹

4. *The Buddhist view of sense-object-contact* (chapter VII).—What is called the sense-object-intercourse by the Naiyāyika is called contact by the Buddhist. It is in the nature of a clash between a sense-organ and its object, like the clash between two cymbals or the butting together of two rams. The eye should be regarded as one of the two, the form or object as the other, and the contact as the union of the two. Contact is the dynamic union of a sense-organ and its object. This is the view of Nāgasena.²⁰

5. *The Buddhist view of the distinguishing mark of perception* (chapter VII).—According to Nāgasena, recognition is the distinguishing mark of perception. “‘What, Nāgasena, is the distinguishing mark of perception?’ ‘Recognition, great king.’” “Recognition is the mark of perception.”²¹ A person recognizes an object which he perceives with his eye, or a sound which he hears with his ear, or an odour which he smells with his nose, or a taste which he experiences with his tongue, or a touchable thing which he touches with his body, or a quality that he recognizes by his mind. Thus recognition is the distinguishing mark of perception. Definite perception involves recognition.

Nāgasena maintains also that recognition is the mark of an idea (*saṃjñā*). “‘What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nāgasena, of idea (*saṃjñā*)?’ ‘Recognition, O King’. ‘And what does he recognize?’ ‘Blueness, yellowness, redness, whiteness and brownness’.”²² When the treasurer of a king enters the treasure, he recognizes the jewels by their colours. So when we perceive different objects, we recognize them by their qualities.

6. *The Buddhist view of preadaptation in the perceptual process* (chapter VII, 1).—Nāgasena maintains that investigation should precede the perceptual process. A traveller should test the stability of a bamboo bridge before he mounts on to it. Perceptual

¹⁹ SSV. 108.

²⁰ *The Questions of King Milianda*, I, pp. 92-3.

²¹ *Ibid*, I, pp. 95, 132.

²² *Ibid*, I, p. 94.

activity should be preceded by preadjustment of the sense-organs to the object to be perceived by a train of perceptual activity.²³ The perceptual process involves attention. Alertness or set is a condition of attention. Buddhaghōṣa makes readiness (*upatthāna*) the mark of mindfulness (*sati*). Nāgasena regards repetition as a condition of attention.²⁴

7. *The Jaina theory of Perception* (chapter VII, 2).—Vidyānanda Svāmī defines perception as a vivid cognition.²⁵ Inference and the like are not vivid cognitions. Perception is presentative knowledge. It is of three kinds: (1) sensuous; (2) non-sensuous; and (3) supersensuous. (1) Sensuous perception is produced by the external sense-organs. It is empirical perception (*sāmvya-vahārika pratyakṣa*). It has spatial vividness. Or, its object is vividly perceived in space. (2) Non-sensuous perception is internal or mental perception. It is not produced by the external sense-organs. It has partial vividness. (3) Supersensuous (*mukhya*) perception is of two kinds: (1) incomplete or partial (*vikala*); and (2) complete or total (*sakala*). Incomplete (*vikala*) perception is of two kinds: (1) perception of distant objects (*avadhijñāna*); and (2) telepathic perception of the mental processes of other persons (*manahparyayañāna*). Complete (*sakala*) perception is omniscience (*kevalajñāna*). It is transcendental perception (*mukhya pratyakṣa*). It is independent of the sense-organs and the mind (*manas*), transcends temporal distinctions, and vividly apprehends the forms of all objects completely. Transcendental perception is different from empirical perception, which is dependent on the sense-organs and the *manas*. The knowledge of formless objects is not perception.²⁶

Amṛtacandra Sūri defines perception as the cognition of the real form of an object, which depends upon the sense-organs or the mind (*manas*).²⁷ A valid cognition apprehends itself and its object definitely. It is of five kinds: (1) *matijñāna*; (2) *śrutajñāna*; (3) *avadhijñāna*; (4) *manahparyayañāna*; and (5) *kevalajñāna*.²⁸ Hemacandra divides knowledge into immediate and mediate: Perception is immediate knowledge. It is empirical and transcendental. Empirical perception is sensuous and non-sensuous. It consists of four stages: (1) *avagraha*; (2) *īhā*; (3) *avāya*; and (4)

²³ Ibid, I, pp. 172-3.

²⁴ Ibid, I, p. 58.

²⁵ Viśada-jñānātmakam pratyakṣam. PRP., p. 67.

²⁶ PRP., p. 68.

²⁷ TSar., i, 17.

²⁸ TSar., i, 18.

dhāraṇā. Transcendental perception is of three kinds: (1) *avadhi*; (2) *manahparyaya*; and (3) *kevala*. Mediate knowledge is of five kinds: (1) recollection; (2) recognition; (3) conjecture (*ūha*); (4) inference; and (5) scriptural testimony.²⁹

8. *The Jaina view of Matijñāna*.—Brahmadeva defines *matijñāna* as determinate perception such as 'this is white' which the self acquires with the help of the five sense-organs and the *manas* which is not a sense-organ. It follows upon an indeterminate perception of the being of an object owing to the subsidence or destruction of the appropriate *karma*-matter concealing knowledge. This indeterminate perception of an object through a sense-organ is wrongly called intercourse (*sannikarṣa*) by the Naiyāyika. *Matijñāna* is determinate perception. Amṛtacandra Sūri includes the internal perception of pleasure and the like, sense-perception, recollection, recognition, knowledge of inseparable relation between a probans and a probandum (*ūha*), inferential knowledge of the probandum, *buddhi*, *medhā* and the like in *matijñāna*. Vidyānandi Svāmī regards *buddhi* as the power of comprehending objects, *medhā* as the power of remembering words, *prajñā* as a kind of thought which is in the nature of conjecture (*ūha*) and the negation of contradictories (*apoha*), and *pratibhā* as recognition and knowledge of similarity, and includes them in *matijñāna*. He includes inclusion, presumption, non-apprehension, and comparison in *matijñāna*. He treats them as kinds of inference.³⁰

9. *The Jaina view of Śrutajñāna* (chapter VII).—*Śrutajñāna* is of two kinds: (1) inferential (*liṅgaja*) and verbal (*śabdaja*). (1) Inferential knowledge is the knowledge of one object (e.g. fire) from that of another object (e.g. smoke). (2) Verbal knowledge is the knowledge of an object (e.g. a jar) from hearing a word (e.g. a jar). This is the view of Brahmadeva. These two kinds of knowledge give us the determinate knowledge of the objects, which are not perceived. Verbal knowledge is of three kinds: (1) verbal knowledge preceded by perception; (2) verbal knowledge preceded by inference; and (3) verbal knowledge preceded by testimony. The first kind is produced by perception aided by the testimony of another person. The second kind is produced by a mark of inference aided by another's testimony. The third

²⁹ VRS., p. 206.

³⁰ DSV., 44, pp. 169-70; TSar., i, 19-20; TSV., i, 13, 1-7, p. 188.

kind is produced by another's testimony only. *Śrautajñāna* is the knowledge that is derived from the testimony of other persons. This is the view of *Śāntyācārya*.³¹

10. *Veṅkaṭanātha's criticism of Prabhākara's view that Movement is not an object of perception* (chapter VIII).—According to Prabhākara, movement is not perceived, but it is always inferred from the successive positions of an object; a motion (*karma*) is imperceptible, because it is a motion, like the motion of an atom. Veṅkaṭnātha refutes this view. He urges, that the inference is not valid, because there is no uniform concomitance between motion and imperceptibility. The motion of the sun is imperceptible because it is at a great distance. All objects, which are perceptible, are not perceived owing to the absence of auxiliary conditions. Further, if motion is imperceptible, then it does not exist. The conjunction of an object with another point of space, which is said to be the effect of motion, would be called motion. It might be regarded as the effect of the cause of what is said to be motion, and the assumption of motion would be needless. Furthermore, the conjunction of a bird with a post would be the effect of motions of both, even as the conjunctions of two wrestlers is the effect of their motions, because motion is nothing but the conjunction of an object with another position. But this contradicts our perception. Hence motion must be regarded as an object of perception, which is different from its effect, viz. conjunction of a moving object with another position.³²

11. *Nāgasena's view of time* (chapter IX).—"What does the word 'time' mean?' 'Past time, O King, and present, and future'. 'But what? Is there such a thing as time?' 'There is time which exists, and which not?' 'Which then exists, and which not?' 'There are constituent potentialities of being, O King, which are past in the sense of having passed away, and ceased to be. To them time is not. But there are conditions of heart which are now producing their effect, or still have in them the inherent possibility of producing effect, or which will otherwise lead to reindividualisation. To them time is. Where there are beings, who, when dead, will not be reborn, there time is not; and where there are beings who are altogether set free, who, having attained

³¹ DSV., 44, p. 170; JTVV., pp. 131-2.

³² TMK., p. 693; SAS., pp. 693-4. See ch. VIII.

Nirvāṇa in their present life, have come to the end of life, there time is not—because of their having been 'quite set free'.³³

"The King said: 'What is the root, Nāgasena, of past time, and what of present, and what of future time?' 'Ignorance. By reason of Ignorance came the predispositions (*sankhāra*), by reason of predispositions consciousness, by reason of consciousness name-and-form, by reason of name-and-form the six organs of sense, by reason of them contact, by reason of contact sensation, by reason of sensation thirst, by reason of thirst craving, by reason of craving becoming, by reason of becoming, birth, by reason of birth, old age, grief, lamentation, sorrow, pain and despair. Thus is it that the ultimate point in the past of all this time is not apparent'.³⁴

Thus the Buddhist realist, Nāgasena, regards time as relative to our empirical life due to ignorance. When ignorance is completely destroyed by enlightenment, there is no time. The past, the present, and the future are real to ignorant persons, who regard the impermanent as permanent and are whirled in the wheel of birth and death. But to the enlightened who have destroyed the predispositions due to ignorance, there is no distinction of the past, the present, and the future. They are relative to desires due to ignorance. The desire which is in the course of being fulfilled indicates the present time. The desire which has been fulfilled indicates the past time. The desire which craves for fulfilment indicates the future time. To the enlightened person who has uprooted desires there is no time. Thus time is relative to the empirical life of a person.

12. *The Yoga conception of time as a construction of the intellect (buddhinirmāṇa)* (chapter IX).—Vyāsa regards time as unreal and subjective, a construction of the intellect, which appears to ordinary persons with empirical consciousness as a real entity.³⁵ The present moment alone is real; the past moments and future moments are non-existent. So they cannot be combined with one another. The past moments and future moments are in the nature of modifications of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. So time is not an aggregate of the past, the present, and the future.

³³ *The Questions of King Milinda*, I, pp. 77-8.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, I, p. 79.

³⁵ *Sa khalvayam kālo vastuśūnyo buddhinirmāṇaḥ śabdajñānānupātī laukikānām vyutthitadarśanānām vastuśarūpa ivāvabhāste.* YBh., iii, 52.

It is an imaginary collection of moments, which is a construct of the intellect.^{34b} A moment (*kṣaṇa*) is the time that is required by an atom to move from one position of space to the next position. Continuity of the series of moments is called succession. There can be no real synthesis of moments, but there can be imaginary synthesis of them by the intellect. Day, night, etc. are imaginary combinations of moments. They are intellectual constructions (*buddhinirmāṇa*).³⁵ The Pātañjalas call the order (*karma*) of moments time, though it is unreal and subjective, because there is no real aggregate of moments.³⁶ The Sāṅkhya-Yoga does not consider time to be a real entity, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

The Pātañjala views the present, the past, and the future in relation to causal activity in the following manner. The present is engaged in its causal activity. The past is that whose causal activity or manifestation was perceived already. The future is that whose causal activity or manifestation will be perceived afterwards.³⁷ The past and the future exist at present in a subtle form. The past exists in a sublatent condition in a present substance, the manifestation of which was perceived in the past. The future exists in a latent condition in a present substance, the manifestation of which will be perceived in the future. But the present exists as a manifest modification of a substance which is perceived now.³⁸ The present modifications are manifest, while the past and future modifications remain unmanifest and hidden in their causes.³⁹

13. *Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja's view of the perception of time and space* (chapter VIII-IX).—Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja, a follower of Vallabha, maintains that space and time are not directly perceived, but that they are perceived as qualifications of perceived objects.⁴⁰ His view agrees with that of Pārthasārathi Miśra, a follower of Kumārila.⁴¹

^{34b} *Buddhikalpitah samāhārah*. YV., p. 252.

³⁵ *Tatpravāhavicchedas tu kramah, kṣaṇatatkramayor nāsti vastu-samāhāra iti buddhisamāhāro muhūrtāhorātrādayaḥ*. YBh., iii, 52.

³⁶ YBh., iii, 52.

³⁷ *Bhaviṣyadvyaktikam anāgatam, anubhūtavvyaktikam atītam, svavyā-pāropārūḍham vartamānam*. YBh., iv, 12.

³⁸ *Svenaiva vyaṅgyena svarūpenānāgatam asti, svena cānubhūtavvyaktikena svarūpenātītam iti, vartamānasyaivādhvanaḥ svarūpavyaktir iti*. YBh., iv, 12.

³⁹ YBh., iv, 13.

⁴⁰ *Dikkālau grāhyarthavivakṣaṇatayaiva grhyete, na sāḥkṣāt*. PR., p. 110.

⁴¹ See *ante*, pp. 140-2, 149.

14. *The Jaina view of a self-aware cognition* (chapter IX).—The Buddhists regard a self-aware cognition (*svasaṃvedana pratyakṣa*) as a distinct kind of perception. But the Jaina does not regard it as a distinct perception, since it is common to all cognitions.⁴² Sensuous perception perceives itself and another object. It is one perception, and does not consist of two cognitions, viz. a cognition of an object and a cognition of that cognition. Mental perception also is one and self-aware. Transcendental perception also is one and self-aware. Otherwise each kind of perception would consist of two cognitions, and would not apprehend itself and its object. Hence a self-aware perception has no other object than itself. It is not a distinct kind of perception.⁴³ Vidyānanda Svāmī propounds this view.

Amritacandra Sūri defines a valid cognition as the determinate cognition of itself and its object.⁴⁴ It is a determinate cognition of the real nature of its object, and it cognizes itself. According to the Naiyāyika, a cognition cognizes an object, but does not cognize itself; it requires another cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) to cognize it. But the Jaina maintains that a cognition cognizes itself and its object. If it does not cognize itself, it cannot cognize an object. The Advaita Vedānta maintains that a cognition cognizes an object, but that it is cognized by the witness self (*kevalasākṣivedya*). He further maintains, that the integral knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) cognizes pure universal consciousness or *Brahman*, but that it does not cognize any object. The Jaina does not believe in *Brahman*, but he believes in the omniscient cognition of an individual self, which cognizes itself and all objects in their real nature. Omniscience is attained by a person on the complete destruction of *karma*-matter which encrusts the soul.

15. *Rāmānuja's view that a cognition is self-luminous* (chapter XI).—Rāmānuja regards a cognition as self-manifest or self-cognized (*svaprakāśa*). A cognition, he argues, manifests itself by virtue of its being; it does not require another cognition to apprehend it. A jar is manifested by a cognition which is different from it. But a present cognition is never experienced as unmanifest. If it were unmanifest, it would require another cognition to apprehend it. The opponent may argue thus: When a

⁴² *Tasya sakala-jñāna-sādhāraṇa-svarūpatvāt. PRP., p. 68.*

⁴³ *Na tato'rthāntarāṇaṃ svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣam. PRP., p. 68.*

⁴⁴ *Samyag jñānaṃ svārthavyavasāyātmakam viduḥ. Tattvārthasāra, i, 18.*

cognition is produced, there is the manifestation of an object only in it, but there is no manifestation of the cognition, which is not an object of valid knowledge. The existence of a cognition is a condition of the manifestation of an object, like the intercourse of a sense-organ with it. Hence a cognition is inferred from an adventitious peculiarity called manifestness (*prakāśa*) in an object. If a cognition were perceived by another cognition, then it would be insentient like an object. But a cognition is admitted to be sentient. What is sentience? It is an entity in the presence of which there is no absence of manifestation. Rāmānuja urges, that this argument is wrong, because the non-absence of manifestation is possible in the case of pleasure and pain. Existent pleasure and pain are never unperceived or unknown. Hence a cognition is perceived by itself, and not perceived by another cognition. Manifestation is a property of a cognition, which does not depend upon another valid knowledge. It manifests an object by virtue of its relation to itself. It is the cause of the manifestation of an object without depending on other conditions. Hence a cognition is self-manifest;⁴⁵ it manifests itself by virtue of its existence.⁴⁶

16. *Veṅkaṭanātha's criticism of Kumārila's doctrine of Cognizedness (jñātatā) or Manifestness (prakāṣya)* (chapter XI).—Kumārila maintains, that a property called manifestness is produced in an object by its relation to a cognition. Veṅkaṭanātha criticizes it thus. Knowledge is always favourable to action. This favourableness is sometimes natural; sometimes it is an object of a cognition. It is natural in a self-manifest entity. It is an object of a cognition in an entity which is manifested by another. A cognized object is manifested by a cognition abiding in a self, even as a desired object or a hated object is qualified by desire or hate abiding in a self. Cognizedness is not produced in a cognized object, even as desiredness or hatedness is not produced in a desired or hated object. Further, past and future objects are cognized, but cognizedness cannot be produced in them. The argument that a cognitive act must produce cognizedness or manifestness in its object because an action must produce a result in its object is wrong, since desire or hate does not produce

⁴⁵ Anubhūtir ātmanah prakāśamānatve, 'prakāśate' iti vyavahāre ca svayam eva hetuḥ. RB., I, I, I.

⁴⁶ Svastattayaiva prakāśamānatvāt. Ibid, I, I, I.

desiredness or hatedness in its object. The cognition of acceptability or avoidability or neutrality of an object cognized is the only result of the cognition, which is experienced. Cognizedness or manifestness is not experienced in it. Hence there is no manifestness in an object of a cognition.⁴⁷

Kumārila argues, that a cognition is neither apprehended by itself nor by a mental perception, but that it is inferred from its result, viz. manifestation of its object.⁴⁸ Veṅkaṭanātha urges, that the inference is invalid because there is no difference between the probans, viz. manifestation of an object and the probandum, viz. cognition. Manifestation of an object may be said to be the probans and manifestation in the self may be said to be the probandum. Even if there were such a difference between them, the manifestation of an object would be produced by the same collocation of conditions as would produce the cognition; and there would be no action without the manifestation of an object. Therefore the cognition would be useless. It is neither the cause of action on an object nor the cause of its manifestation, since both depend upon other conditions. Hence a cognition is not inferred from the manifestation of its object.⁴⁹

17. *Veṅkaṭanātha's view of Self-luminosity of a Cognition* (chapter XI).—Veṅkaṭanātha, as a follower of Rāmānuja, maintains that a cognition is self-luminous or self-apprehended, which involves a knowing self and a known object; that it manifests itself and an object; that it is conducive to an action which does not depend upon another cognition apprehending it.⁵⁰ A cognition manifests itself because it is a cognition. It apprehends itself without depending upon another cognition apprehending it (*anuvyavasāya*) as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains. A cognition apprehends itself and other objects, even as the cognition of an omniscient self apprehends itself and other objects. If an omniscient cognition did not apprehend itself, it would not be omniscient or all-knowing. Some maintain, that the omniscient cognition is apprehended by itself (*svasamvedya*), but that it does not manifest itself (*svaprakāśa*). Veṅkaṭanātha urges, that self-luminosity of a cognition does not imply that it is a knowing

⁴⁷ TMK., p. 658; SAS., p. 658.

⁴⁸ *Buddher arthprakāśādnumitiḥ*. TMK., p. 394.

⁴⁹ TMK., p. 394; SAS., p. 394.

⁵⁰ *Svayamītaramatir buddhiḥ* TMK., p. 389. *Buddhiḥ svayamsiddhā svagocaraññāna-nirapekṣa-vyavahārānugūṇā*. SAS., 389.

subject or a known object; that a cognition does not manifest itself as a knower or a known object; but that its conduciveness to an action is independent of another cognition apprehending it, which cannot be denied. Some maintain, that omniscience of God consists of two cognitions,—one apprehending itself and the other apprehending the entire universe. Veṅkaṭanātha urges, that there is no proof for the existence of two cognitions of God; that the existence of one omniscient cognition of God is proved by other valid arguments; and that one omniscient cognition of God is enough to apprehend itself and all other objects, so that the assumption of two cognitions in God is needless. Some maintain, that God's cognition apprehends the entire universe, but does not apprehend itself, because a cognition does not manifest itself. Veṅkaṭanātha urges, that if God did not know his cognition, then he would not know it to be his cognition, and others' cognitions as not his cognitions, and he would not know some objects as objects of his knowledge, and other objects as not objects of his knowledge, and thus he would cease to be omniscient; and that in that case an unconscious cognition of a conscious self would act, and that an unconscious unseen principle (*adr̥ṣṭa*) of a conscious self would act, and that the Vedic testimony about the omniscience of God would be contradicted. Veṅkaṭanātha further urges, that the denial of self-luminosity of a cognition would make continuous cognition (*dhāravāhikabuddhi*) impossible, because a continuous cognition apprehends itself; and that if it did not apprehend itself, but were apprehended by another cognition, then there would be a breach in its continuity. The existence of a continuous cognition is proved by its valid recollection in the form 'I perceived an object for such a long time'. It may be argued, that it is self-contradictory to regard a cognition as self-luminous, because it cannot act upon itself, even as a fire cannot burn itself, or as an axe cannot cut itself, or as a finger cannot touch itself. Veṅkaṭanātha urges, that a cognition apprehends itself, even as a self apprehends itself, or as a perceived object is apprehended by a perception, and produces the perception that apprehends it. Hence a cognition is self-manifest.⁵¹

18. *Veṅkaṭanātha's criticism of the doctrine that denies the apprehendedness of a cognition* (chapter XI).—Some deny the apprehendedness (*vedyatva*) of a cognition in order to save its

⁵¹ SAS., pp. 390-1; TMK., p. 389.

self-manifestness (*svayamprakāśatva*). They maintain, that a self-manifest cognition is not known by itself, but that it is known by a recollection, or a testimony, or an inference, or a yogic perception. The recollection 'I perceived Devadatta' apprehends the previous cognition. Testimony or verbal cognition apprehends another cognition. Cognitions of others are inferred from their behaviour. A yogic perception apprehends another cognition. But Veṅkaṭanātha disputes this view. If a cognition is self-manifest because it is a cognition, then it is self-contradictory to maintain that it is not known by itself. 'Apprehension (*anubhūti*) is self-manifest because it is in the nature of apprehension'. Is the apprehension indicated by the subject of inference, the probandum, or the probans? Or, is it not indicated by them? In the first alternative, a cognition is known by itself. In the second alternative, the opponent's antithesis is not proved. If a cognition is said to be indicated by them, erroneously, but not in reality, then even this illusory apprehendedness presupposes its real apprehendedness. If the real apprehendedness of a cognition be not proved, its illusory apprehendedness cannot be established.⁵² If a cognition were apprehended, it may be argued, it would be insentient (*jaḍa*). Veṅkaṭanātha criticizes this objection thus. A cognition is either known by testimony, or it is not known by it. If it is known by testimony, then it is not insentient. If it is not known by testimony, then it contradicts its own statement. Further, is the so-called insentience (1) mere apprehendedness or (2) being proved by a cognition apprehending it or (3) the absence of self-manifestness or (4) the absence of connection with the state of being unknown? The first alternative is desirable. Veṅkaṭanātha admits that a cognition is apprehended, but that apprehendedness is not insentience. The second alternative is wrong. A cognition known definitely is proved independently of another cognition apprehending it; it apprehends itself. The third alternative also is false. The absence of self-manifestness is another name for insentience. The fourth alternative is a desirable contingency. A cognition is not apprehended by another cognition during its existence.⁵³ Therefore apprehendedness is not insentience. Further, if cognitions were not

⁵² TMK., p. 392; SAS., pp. 392-3.

⁵³ Na hi buddhir vidyamānāvasthāyām svabuddhyantaraviditā. SAS., p. 393.

apprehended, then a teacher could not educate a pupil, because their cognitions would not be apprehended by each other, and the opponent also would not be able to make his views known to others. Hence the view that a cognition is not apprehended is wrong.⁵⁴

Veñkaṭanātha refers to a view of an old school that there is no mental perception. The self and its cognitions, according to them, are self-luminous. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are not different from their cognitions which are produced by their causes. The cognitions of past apprehensions are recollections. The mind cannot operate independently of the external sense-organs in the perception of external objects, which are different from the self, pleasure and the like.⁵⁵

19. *Keśavamiśra's view of cognitions* (chapter XI).—Keśavamiśra divides cognitions into apprehension (*anubhava*) and recollection (*smṛti*). Apprehension is valid or invalid. Valid apprehension is perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Invalid apprehension is of three kinds viz. doubt, hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*) and error or illusion. Recollection is valid or invalid. All cognitions are formless. Forms are not produced by their objects in their cognitions. The existence of objects is not inferred from the forms of cognitions as the Sautrāntikas maintain, since their forms are not perceived, but objects are perceived as jars and the like. All cognitions manifest their objects, and do not cognize other objects. Particular cognitions apprehend particular objects, and are determined by them. Cognitions are known as cognizing objects, and not as unrelated to them.⁵⁶

20. *The Sāṃkhya and the Advaita Vedānta views on the Nature of Dreams* (chapter XV).—The Sāṃkhya advocates the representative theory of dreams. Vijñānabhikṣu regards dreams as recollections during sleep. They are the modifications of *buddhi*, which are produced by impressions (*saṃskāra*) only.⁵⁷ They are not produced by the external sense-organs or by the external stimuli. They are of central origin, and in the nature of false recollections.

Śaṃkara, the Advaita Vedāntist, regards dreams as false cognitions of unreal objects. The mind (*manas*) creates, by its

⁵⁴ SAS., p. 393.

⁵⁵ NP., p. 76.

⁵⁶ TBh., pp. 29-30.

⁵⁷ SPB., I, 148.

own power, the knower and the known.⁵⁸ Dreams do not conform to the proper time, place, and causes of real objects. A person dreams of objects hundreds of miles away, which it is not possible for him to travel. So there is no correspondence between the place of dreams and that of their objects. A person dreaming at night dreams of objects in the day. A dream occurring in a few seconds cognizes events occurring in several years. So there is no correspondence between the time of dreams and that of their objects. Perceptible objects are perceived through the external sense-organs, and produced by their causes. But objects (e.g. chariots) of dream-cognitions are not perceived through the external sense-organs, and cannot be produced by their causes (e.g. wood) in a moment. So there is no correspondence between the causes of dreams and those of their objects. Further, dreams are contradicted by waking perceptions, while real objects corresponding to dream-objects are not contradicted. Hence dream-cognitions are false.⁵⁹ Dreams are recollections due to the revival of the impressions of waking perceptions of objects, which therefore appear to be like them.⁶⁰ Dreams with their objects are produced by the impressions of waking perceptions when the external sense-organs cease to operate. The empirical self limited by the subtle body (*śūṭīkṣa*) experiences dream-cognitions.⁶¹ Śāṅkara is an advocate of the representative theory of dream.

Śāṅkara regards the subtle body (*līṅga deha*) as the vehicle of the experience of dreams. It contains the potencies of actions and the impressions of waking cognitions, and makes the empirical self enjoy the fruits of actions. It is the limiting adjunct of the empirical self, until it realizes its essential nature.⁶² Dreams are the manifestations of the subtle body. The self-luminous pure self is manifested as an agent with the help of the impressions (*vāsanā*) of waking perceptions of objects in dream with the subtle body as its organ. But the pure self is detached.⁶³ This is Śāṅkara's view. Rāmatīrtha Yati also maintains, that in the dream-state the subtle body invested with the impressions of

⁵⁸ VCM., 172.

⁵⁹ Māyāmātram svapna-darśanam. S.B., iii, 2, 3.

⁶⁰ Jāgarita-prabhava-vāsanā-nirmitatvāt tu tattulya-nirbhāsatvābhiprāyaṁ tat. S.B., iii, 2, 6.

⁶¹ Karaṇeśūpasamīhṛteṣu jāgarita-samakārajāḥ pratyayaḥ saviṣayaḥ svapna ityucyate. Pañcīkaraṇa, K.S.S., 1923, p. 2.

⁶² VCM., 99.

⁶³ VCM., 100-3.

waking cognitions is the limiting adjunct of the empirical self.⁶⁴ Sureśvara also maintains that the *taijasa* or empirical self limited by the subtle body is the knower of dreams. The subtle body is its organ of experience. Dream is a mental mode which is manifested to consciousness in the form of a knowing self and a known object.⁶⁵ Ānandagiri also defines dreams as cognitions of objects produced by the impressions of waking experiences when the external sense-organs cease to operate.⁶⁶ Mādhavācārya Vidyāraṇya regards dreams as illusions during light sleep. They are modes of the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) tainted by sleep, which are produced by impressions (*samskāra*) revived by merits and demerits (*adṛṣṭa*). They abide in pure consciousness limited by modes of the mind.⁶⁷

Padmapāda maintains that the mind (*manas*) tainted by sleep and aided by particular impressions revived by merits and demerits (*adṛṣṭa*) produces false cognitions of unreal objects, which are called dreams. The power of nescience (*avidyā*) abiding in the immediate consciousness limited by the dream-objects is transformed into dream-cognitions. But if it were so, it is objected, the objects of dream-cognitions would be manifested to consciousness as within the mind. This objection is not sound, since dream-objects are not extra-mental. But dream-objects are perceived as external to the mind like the objects of waking perceptions, and cannot, therefore, be within the mind. This objection is not valid, because space or externality is an unreal construction of imagination. Even in waking perceptions the perceptibility of an object does not differ from its valid, objective, immediate apprehension, because they are manifested in this form. Hence, even in waking experience an object is apprehended together with a subjective immediate apprehension. Otherwise an insentient object would not be manifested. The appearance of externality in dream-objects is projected by cosmic nescience (*māyā*) like that of the empirical objects. Pure consciousness (*caitanya*) is partless and non-spatial. It is the substratum of the whole universe of phenomenal objects which appear to be external to one another. In fact, subjectivity and objectivity are mere appearances, which are projected by cosmic nescience. Or, space and

⁶⁴ Svapne jāgrad-vāsanāmayam liṅga-śarīram upādhiḥ. VMR., p. 111.

⁶⁵ Grāhya-grāhaka-rūpeṇa sphuraṇam svapna ucyate. PKV., 38.

⁶⁶ Paścikaraṇavivaraṇa, pp. 53-4.

⁶⁷ Adhiṣṭhānam vṛttiyavacchinnam caitanyam eva. VPS., p. 39.

ākāśa, which are the substrates of appearances, are mere constructions of the mind.⁶⁸

Raṅgojī Bhaṭṭa (1700 A.D.) maintains that dream-objects are produced in the witness self (*sākṣin*) limited by the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). They are the modifications of the cosmic nescience (*mūlājñāna*). There is no evidence of any other entity being their material cause. The dream-objects have illusory existence (*prātibhāsikasattā*), and are sublated by waking perception. They have no empirical existence (*vyāvahārika sattā*), because they are produced by nescience (*ajñāna*) tainted by sleep. The nescience which is the cause of dream objects does not disappear until a contradictory waking perception appears. Raṅgojī Bhaṭṭa maintains that cognitions of dream-objects are cognized by the witness self which is self-manifest.⁶⁹ No other cognition of dream-cognitions can exist at the time. Dream-cognitions, according to Raṅgojī Bhaṭṭa, are not recollections, since they are sometimes not recollections of objects perceived in a particular place at a particular past time.⁷⁰ Dream-creations are not real. The empirical self (*jīva*) experiences pleasure and pain by creating dream-objects out of his own nescience. They are manifested by the witness self limited by the adjunct of the internal organ.⁷¹

Rāmātūrtha Yati maintains, that dreams are the modes of the mind tainted by sleep, similar to the impressions of waking cognitions, which are revived by merits and demerits. The empirical (*taijasa*) self limited by the subtle body experiences subtle objects created by the power of *avidyā* abiding in the pure consciousness limited by the mind. Dream-objects are subtle and composed of the impressions of waking cognitions. They are experienced slightly indistinctly.⁷² Rāmātūrtha Yati does not regard dreams as recollections, since they are manifested to consciousness as immediate presentations.⁷³ But they are not valid perceptions, since they are not produced by the right intercourse

⁶⁸ Digākāśau manomātragocarau vidyete. Pañcapādikā, p. 11. Ibid, pp. 10-1.

⁶⁹ Svāpna-padārtha-jñānam api svaprakāśa-sākṣyeva. Advaitacintāmaṇi, p. 22.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 22.

⁷¹ Ibid, pp. 23-4.

⁷² Nidrādidōṣadūṣitasyādrṣṭādi-samudbodhita-saṁskāra - viśeṣa - sacivasyā - ntaḥkaraṇasya yāḥ saṁskārānūrūpā vṛttayas tādṛg antaḥkaraṇa-saṁvṛṭta-caitanyasthāvidyāsakti-vijṛmbhita-viśyākārās tābhiḥ sūkṣma-viśyāḥ jāgrad-vāsanā-mayān īśad asphuṭān anubhavataḥ. VMR., p. 107.

⁷³ Na svapnaḥ smṛtiḥ aparokṣāvabhāsitatvāt. VMR., p. 107.

of the sense-organs with their objects. Nor are they deep sleep, since they are distinct cognitions of objects. Nor are they waking cognitions, because they do not conform to the time, place, and causes found in the waking condition. The objects of dreams are constructed by the impressions of waking cognitions; they are unreal.⁷⁴

Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī regards dreams as the cognitions of objects produced by the impressions of waking perceptions when the external sense-organs cease to operate and merits and demerits capable of producing the waking experience of pleasure and pain cannot produce any effects.⁷⁵ But dreams are not recollections, but perceptions. They are illusory perceptions during light sleep.⁷⁶ Thus Śaṅkara's followers do not advocate his representative theory of dreams.

Rāmānuja treats dreams as illusory perceptions produced by the sense-organs overcome by the defect of sleep, which are contradicted by waking perceptions.⁷⁷ God creates dream-objects by a mere fiat of will, which are perceived by a dreamer, and persist so long as they are perceived.⁷⁸ According to Mādhvas, dream-cognitions are false, but the creation of dream-objects is real and devoid of any material. Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja criticizes this view. If the creation of dream-objects is real, then dream-cognitions of them are true. If the creation of dream-objects were devoid of any material and yet real, then magical acts devoid of any material also would be real. A person dreams that his head has been cut off. If the dream-cognition were false, but the act of cutting were real, then the dreamer would die. Hence the Mādhva view is wrong.⁷⁹ Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja maintains that the creation of dream-objects is a mere appearance, and not real; that dream-objects are created by God out of the stuff of nescience (*māyā*) with the instrument of *māyā*; and that dreams are the cognitions of dream-objects, which are perceptual in character, since they are not sometimes recollections of waking perceptions (e.g. cutting off one's head).⁸⁰

⁷⁴ VMR., p. 107.

⁷⁵ Jāgrad-bhoga-prada-karmoparame sati indriyoparame jāgrad-anubhava-janya-samakārodbhūta-viśayaś tajjñānāvasthā svapnāvasthā. ACK., pp. 89-90.

⁷⁶ Svapnas tvanubhava eva na smṛtiḥ. ACK., p. 265.

⁷⁷ Svapna-jñānāni hi nidrādi-doṣa-duṣṭa-karaka-janyāni bādhitāni ca. R.B. ii, 2, 28.

⁷⁸ Svapnadre-anubhāvayatayā tatkāla-mātrāvasānān arjate. R.B. iii, 2, 3.

⁷⁹ PR., p. 25.

⁸⁰ PR., p. 24.

21. *Puruṣottamaḥ Mahārāja's view of the perception of the Ātman or Self* (chapter XII).—The pure self cannot be perceived without resorting to the means prescribed by the scriptures. Only the attributes of the self are perceived through the internal organ (*manas*). The pure self is not an object of normal perception because it is ubiquitous, like ether, (*ākāśa*). One's own self is not an object of normal perception because it is a knowing self. It is inferred by the method of agreement like another's self. It is not perceived because it is atomic or subtle. It is inferred like an atom. The ego-consciousness is illusory because the self is erroneously identified with egoism (*ahamkāra*).⁸¹ The pure self can be intuited after continuous practice of meditation.

22. *The Sāṃkhya view of the perception of the Self* (chapter XII, 5).—Listening to the scriptures about the nature of the self (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*) on the self with the help of rational proofs after knowing its nature from the testimony of the scriptures, and meditation (*dhyāna*) on the self are the means of intuiting the self.⁸² Indirect knowledge derived from testimony is strengthened by rational reflection. Then it is further strengthened by meditation (*nididhyāsana*). It is the concentration of the mind on the self. These three are the causes of the intuition (*darśana*) of the self. It is not sense-perception, but higher supra-rational intuition. The first two yield general knowledge. The third gives particular or detailed knowledge. The self is intuited when the sense-organs are controlled and withdrawn from their objects and the mind is controlled and not affected by joys and sorrows and absorbed in the self, and primal desires for sons, wealth and happiness are uprooted.⁸³ Hence the pure self is not an object of normal perception, but of ecstatic intuition.

23. *The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of the intuition of the pure self* (chapter XII).—The pure self, according to some later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, can be apprehended by supra-rational intuition, which is higher immediate apprehension. It is the effect of listening to the scriptures, reflection on their instruction, and meditation on the self. Jagadīśa regards reflection (*manana*) as

⁸¹ PR., p. 110.

⁸² śrotavyaḥ śrutivākyebhyo
Mantavyaś copapattibhiḥ.
Matvā ca satataṁ dhyeya
Etc darśanahetavaḥ. SSV., ii, 1.

⁸³ SSV., ii, 2.

inference of the self as different from the not-self.⁴⁴ Mādhava Sarasvatī regards it as reasoning which excludes contrary thoughts and opposite alternatives.⁴⁵ The pure self devoid of empirical contents—cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition can be intuited. This intuition is the effect of rational reflection and intense meditation. Śaṅkara Miśra also maintains, that the pure self can be intuited through the internal organ (*manas*) with the aid of merit brought about by meditation, when it is in conjunction with the self. Though we have flashes of perception also of the self, they are almost non-existent because they are concealed by false knowledge (*avidyā*).⁴⁶

24. *Vasubandhu's view of four kinds of Meditation* (chapter XVII, 7).—Vasubandhu mentions four kinds of meditation. The first meditation involves discrimination (*vicāra*), zest (*prīti*), and pleasure (*sukha*). The second meditation involves zest and pleasure. The third meditation involves pleasure only. The fourth meditation is devoid of discrimination, zest, and pleasure.⁴⁷ Vasubandhu mentions four kinds of pure meditation free from impurities. The first pure meditation involves reflection (*vitarka*), discrimination (*vicāra*), zest (*prīti*), pleasure (*sukha*), and trance (*śamādhi*). The second pure meditation involves zest, pleasure, trance, and tranquillity (*adhyātmāprasāda*). The third pure meditation involves neutral feeling (*upekṣā*), recollection (*smṛti*), wisdom (*saṃprajñāna*), pleasure, and trance. The fourth pure meditation involves refinement of neutral feeling, refinement of recollection, feeling of non-pleasure, feeling of non-pain, and trance.⁴⁸

Nāgasena maintains that passions and evil thoughts are destroyed by meditation. Ideas of lust, ideas of anger, ideas of cruelty, various bad thoughts, that spring from evil dispositions of pride, self-righteousness, wrong views, and doubt are dispelled by meditation.⁴⁹

25. *Omniscience of the Buddha on Reflection* (chapter XVII, 7).—According to Nāgasena, the Buddha was omniscient even when he did not know all things for he could know them on reflection. He did not know all things at all times. His

⁴⁴ TA., p. 1.

⁴⁵ MB., p. 32.

⁴⁶ VSU., ix, 1, 11.

⁴⁷ *Vicāraprītisukhavat pūrvapūrvāṅga-varjitam. Abhidharmakośa* (edited by Rahul Sankrityayan, Benares, Sarvāt, 1968), viii, 2.

⁴⁸ AK., AKV., viii, 7-8.

⁴⁹ *The Questions of King Mūlinda*, II, pp. 222-3.

omniscience was dependent on reflection. "Venerable Nāgasena, was the Buddha omniscient?" 'Yes, O King, he was. But the insight of knowledge was not always and continually with him: The omniscience of the Blessed One was dependent on reflection. But if he did reflect, he knew whatever he wanted to know.'"⁸⁸ "The knowledge of the Blessed One, O King, is dependent upon reflection, and it is on reflection that he knows whatever he wishes to know." "And although it is by reflection that they know whatever they want to know, yet even when they are not reflecting, the Blessed Buddhas are not, even then, anything other than omniscient.'"⁸⁹ The omniscience of the Buddha dependent on reflection is similar to the non-ecstatic intuition (*yuhjāna pratyakṣa*) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Only the Buddhist does not believe in God. It is similar to the transcendental perception of an omniscient person conceived by the Jaina who also does not believe in God.

26. *The Jaina view of Avadhijñāna* (chapter XVII, 8).—Amṛtacandra Sūri defines *avadhijñāna* as the immediate knowledge of corporeal objects independently of the sense-organs and the mind (*manas*). *Matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna* depend on them, and are therefore mediate knowledge (*parokṣajñāna*). But *avadhijñāna* is supersensuous, valid, immediate knowledge of corporeal objects.⁹⁰ It is the first stage of supernormal perception due to the subsidence or partial destruction of the *karma*-matter concealing *avadhijñāna* in ordinary persons. But *jīnas* or *tīrthaṅkaras* have *avadhijñāna* from their birth. Their clairvoyant perception is innate. *Avadhijñāna* can apprehend atoms.⁹¹

27. *The Jaina view of Manahparyayañāna* (Chapter XVII, 8).—Amṛtacandra Sūri defines *manahparyayañāna* as the supersensuous and very vivid immediate knowledge of the objects of other persons' mental processes independently of the sense-organs and the mind (*manas*). The mental processes are more subtle than atoms. So *manahparyayañāna* is higher than *avadhijñāna*. There are two kinds of *manahparyayañāna*: (1) *ṛjumati* and (2) *vipulamati*.⁹² The former perceives the present simple thoughts of others' minds. The latter perceives the past, future, complex and subtle thoughts of others' minds. The latter is purer than

⁸⁸ *The Questions of King Mūlinda*, I, p. 154.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, I, pp. 160-1.

⁹⁰ *Parīpekāśah viśāḥ jñānaḥ rūpīṇaḥ bhāṣito* vadhiḥ. TSar., I, 25.

⁹¹ TSar., I, 27.

⁹² TSar., I, 28.

the former because it perceives more subtle mental processes. It persists till the advent of omniscience, because the subsidence or destruction of the *karma*-matter concealing knowledge is so stable that it does not stop, but the former may disappear. There is a greater purity of character in *vipulamati* than in *ṛjumati*.²²

Manahparyayajñāna differs from *avadhijñāna*. (1) A person in the first four stages of *guṇasthāna* may have *avadhijñāna*. But a person in the sixth stage of *guṇasthāna* may have *manahparyayajñāna*. (2) The sphere of *avadhijñāna* extends to numberless islands. But the sphere of *manahparyayajñāna* consists of the region of human beings. (3) *Avadhijñāna* perceives subtle corporeal objects like atoms. But *manahparyayajñāna* perceives subtler incorporeal objects like others' mental processes. (4) The latter requires greater purity of the self than the former does.²⁴

28. *The Jaina view of Kevalajñāna* (chapter XVII, 8).—Amṛtacandra Sūri defines *kevalajñāna* as the particular determinate knowledge of all objects, which is produced by the innate purity of the self, which is due to the complete destruction of all *karma*-matter concealing knowledge, which is devoid of succession, and which is independent of the sense-organs and the mind (*manas*) and other conditions.²⁵ It is omniscience. Umāsvāmī traces it to the destruction of delusion and hindrances to the general and detailed knowledge of all objects. Vidyānandi Svāmī asserts that it apprehends all objects distinctly, certainly and simultaneously with their modifications in their real nature owing to the complete destruction of the veil of *karma*-matter encrusting the self.²⁶

29. *The Jaina view of the relation of five kinds of knowledge* (chapter XVII, 8).—An intelligent person can know all substances with some of their modes through *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna*. He can know corporeal substances with some of their modes through *avadhijñāna*. Infinitesimal parts of corporeal substances, which are perceived by *avadhijñāna*, can be perceived by *manahparyayajñāna*. All substances with their modes are perceived by *kevalajñāna*.²⁷

All these five kinds of knowledge cannot exist simultaneously in any person. In some persons the first two, three, or four kinds

²² TSar., i, 29.

²³ TSar., i, 30.

²⁴ Asahāyārṇ svarūpotthahā nirāvaragāṃ akramāṃ.

Ghātika-karma-kṛpayotpannaṃ kevalaṃ sarvabhāvaṃ, TSar., i, 30-1.

²⁵ TVS., i, 29, 1-2, p. 251.

²⁶ TSar., i, 31-3.

of knowledge can exist synchronously. *Kevalajñāna* is one, and cannot exist with other kinds of knowledge. So long as the *karma-matter* concealing knowledge persists, a person has knowledge of some objects sometimes through the first two, or three, or four kinds of knowledge owing to its subsidence or destruction for the time being. When the *karma-matter* concealing knowledge is completely destroyed, he has complete knowledge of all objects with their modes, which ceases to be fragmentary. So long as the knowledge-concealing *karma-matter* is not completely destroyed, and the *karma-matter* concealing *avadhijñāna* and *manah-paryayañāna* persists, *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna* may exist owing to the subsidence or destruction of the *karma-matter* concealing them. If there is the subsidence or destruction of the *karma-matter* concealing *avadhijñāna*, such knowledge may also emerge. At that time three kinds of knowledge exist simultaneously. If there is the subsidence or destruction of the *karma-matter* concealing *manah-paryayañāna*, such knowledge also may appear. At that time four kinds of knowledge exist simultaneously.¹⁰⁰

30. *Recollection and Recognition* (chapter XX).—Hemacandra defines recollection as a representative cognition of an object perceived in the past due to the revival of its subconscious impression, which assumes the form of 'that'.¹⁰¹ He defines recognition as a composite cognition produced by perception and recollection both.¹⁰² 'He is that Jinadatta'. 'A wild cow is like a cow'. 'This cow belongs to that variety'. Such cognitions are recognition. But Annambhaṭṭa holds that recognition is produced by the sense-object-intercourse aided by a subconscious impression, but that recollection is produced by a subconscious impression only.¹⁰³ He does not regard recognition as an effect of perception and recollection. This is the difference between the Jaina view and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view.

31. *Nāgasena's views on the marks of Reflection, Investigation, Reasoning, and Wisdom* (chapter XXI, 5).—"What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nāgasena, of reflection (*vitakka*)?' 'The effecting of an aim'. 'Give me an illustration'. 'It is like the

¹⁰⁰ TSar., i, 34.

¹⁰¹ *Saṃkṣepa-prabodha-sambhūtam anubhūtārtha-viśayaṃ tadityākāraṃ vedanāṃ smṛtiḥ*. VRS., p. 206.

¹⁰² *Anubhava-smṛti-bhūtaṃ saṃkalpanāmakaṃ jñānaṃ pratyabhiññānam*. VRS., p. 206.

¹⁰³ TSar., p. 35.

case of a carpenter, great king, who fixes in a joint a well-fashioned piece of good. Thus is it that the effecting of an aim is the mark of reflection'. 'Very good, Nāgasena'.¹⁰² In reflection the mind focusses its attention on an aim, and selects the proper means for the realization of it.

"What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nāgasena, of investigation (*vicāra*)?' 'Threshing out again and again'. 'Give me an illustration'. 'It is like the case of the copper vessel, which, when it is being beaten into shape, makes a sound again and again as it gradually gathers shape. The beating into shape is to be regarded as reflection, and the sounding again and again as investigation. Thus is it, great King, that threshing out again and again is the mark of investigation'. 'Very good, Nāgasena'.¹⁰³ Investigation is repeated deliberation on the different courses of action for the realization of an end. Reflection is the concentration of the mind on an end. These two mental processes go together.

"The King said: 'What is the characteristic mark of reasoning and what of wisdom?' 'Reasoning has always comprehension as its mark; but wisdom has cutting off.' 'The recluse by his thinking grasps his mind, and by his wisdom cuts off his failings. In this way is the comprehension the characteristic of reasoning, but cutting off of wisdom.'¹⁰⁴ Here Nāgasena speaks of practical reason by which the nature, causes and conditions of one's evil propensities are known, and of wisdom by which one eradicates them. Desires and passions are due to ignorance. When it is completely destroyed by wisdom, they are destroyed for ever. Enlightenment also is another mark of wisdom. "How is enlightenment its mark?' 'When wisdom springs up in the heart, O King, it dispels the darkness of ignorance, it causes the radiance of knowledge to arise, it makes the light of intelligence to shine forth, it makes the Noble Truths plain. Wisdom puts an end to evil dispositions.'¹⁰⁵ Thus wisdom destroys evil dispositions and brings about enlightenment. Discrimination is the mark of reason.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Ibid, I, p. 96.

¹⁰³ Ibid, I, p. 96.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, I, p. 132.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, I, p. 51.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, I, p. 62.

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